The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

ARTICLE

Haryana elections smash a myth
A setback to defectors and khap panchayat leaders
D.R. Chaudhry

Quite contrary to the popular perception of Haryana being progressive, it is, in fact, a sick state. Crudity, corruption, blatant violation of all accepted norms in running the state administration, political horse trading to capture or retain power, politicians accepting big amounts from industrialists in return for granting them concessions at the cost of the state exchequer, fraud in land deals, are all have been an everyday occurrence.

Haryana’s rulers take pride in high per capita income, GDP growth etc. but its social indicators are abysmally poor. To cite one example: child sex ratio in the 0-6 age group is an important indicator of gender relations in any society. According to the 2011 census, it is 830 in Haryana. It is the lowest not just in India but the whole of the world. Even sub-Saharan African countries, often smitten with epidemics, famines and civil wars, have a better record.

The all-pervasive corruption, which has sapped the moral fibre of Haryana society, can best be illustrated by the quick changes of political loyalties. This bane struck roots in Haryana right from its existence as a separate state in 1966. In 1967 one legislator Gaya Lal changed three parties in a fortnight. When the floor-crossing assumed alarming proportions in 1967, the then Chief Minister was willing to pay Rs 20,000 to a prospective defector to save his ministry from being toppled. However, before the money could be handed over, a radio broadcast announced that the assembly had been dissolved and President's rule imposed in the state.

A report from the then Governor to the President of India said: “In an assembly with an effective strength of 79, some thirty members have defected one way or the other, some members have defected not once but three or four times. Two members have defected four times, two others thrice and six members twice. To some members, changing parties is apparently of as little consequence as changing a coat.”

“These defections particularly the one after remaining a minister for five days,” lamented the report “have made a mockery of the Constitution and have brought democracy to ridicule. Members of the legislature are being seduced from one party to the other by the devious means and the entire political life of the state has been polluted.” And so the phrase “Aaya Rams and Gaya Rams” was added to the political lexicon of the country.

One Chief Minister of Haryana performed the incredible feat of converting the 40 Janata Party legislators into Indira Gandhi loyalists overnight after she came to power in i980. After the 1982 assembly poll he performed another feat. His party, though in minority, was the single largest and he was administered the oath as Chief Minister by the then Governor and was given one month to prove his majority. He had 36 legislators of his party and in the short stint of one month he reversed the sequence of the numerals and raised the strength to 63.

In 1996 the Haryana Vikas Party (HVP) came to power in alliance with the BJP. In 1999 some turncoats toppled this government and brought the Indian National Lok Dal (INLD) to power. Two successive governments had an absolute majority and thus did not need defectors to survive. The third successive government — the outgoing Congress government now — too survived with the help of defectors from the Janhit Congress Party (JNP).The process continues unabated till today.

Haryana politicians, leaving aside exceptional cases, pursue the politics of “soot-kasoot” (convenience). Bereft of any commitment to an ideology and the good of the people at large, they put self before everything else.

What was a trickle in 1967 became a tornado when the BJP launched its campaign for the Haryana assembly poll in 2014 after its spectacular victory at the Centre. There was a virtual stampede to enter the BJP portals by other party leaders, bureaucrats etc. In the first rally addressed by BJP president Amit Shah in Haryana more than 50 known individuals from politics and the bureaucracy joined his party. The process continued during the campaign.

The analysis of the data of turncoats shows that out of the 90 assembly seats 45 constituencies had candidates who had changed their parties or stood as independents. A majority of the turncoats were in the BJP — 12 from the Congress, seven from the INLD and one each from the HJC and the BSP. Two from the BJP and one each from the Congress and the BSP joined the INLD. Three from the Congress and two each from the HJC and the Haryana Janhit Congress joined the BSP. All of them were given the ticket by their new patrons. Of all the turncoats only four won on the BJP ticket and one as an Independent. The Congress was the major loser. It expelled as many as 46 leaders who were either contesting on behalf of other parties or helping other parties. The result clearly indicates that Haryana voters do not favour “Aaya Rams and Gaya Rams.” Even earlier trends show that there have never been much love lost between voters and defectors. However, the malady persists. Earlier defections took place after elections. This time the script was written much before the play was enacted.

There has been a popular perception that khap panchyats in Haryana enjoy a lot of influence and popularity in society. It has been largely a media creation. The myth has been exploded in the latest assembly elections. This time four important khap leaders were contestants.

Baljit Singh Malik is the head of the Gathwala khap of Malik gotra Jats — the largest khap of Haryana. He was a BJP candidate from the Baroda constituency dominated by Malik Jats in Sonepat district. He lost his deposit. Tek Ram Kandela, head of the Kandela khap, which is said to have influence in two dozen villages, contested as an independent candidate from the Jind constituency. He too lost his deposit. Shamsher Kharkara, chief of Athgaon khap, contested from the Meham constituency in Rohtak district on the BJP ticket. He lost to the Congress candidate. Santosh Dahiya, president of the women wing of the Sarvkhap Panchayat, contested from the Beri constituency on the INLD ticket. She finished a poor fourth.

The roots of political opportunism shown most unabashedly in defections are deep and are to be located in Haryana's history. This poses a challenge to Haryana's researchers and academics to explore the phenomenon deeply. Unless the roots of political opportunism are properly grasped and uprooted, there can be neither a healthy polity, nor a healthy society in Haryana

— The writer is a retired academic from Delhi University

MIDDLE

SSB — Experience of a lifetime
Aneet Kanwal Randhawa

An employment-seeking youth knocks all possible doors till he finally makes a cut. At times, the search for new vistas continues even beyond that. Yet all of you who have in this course had a chance to face a selection board for recruitment to defence forces would agree with me about how holistic the entire process is — a process, in which every aspect of your personality is uncovered with such finesse that any effort on your part to conceal it or portray it differently is made futile.

‘Late bloomer’ as I am often referred to by my friends, the only opportunity left for me to join the Army at my age was the Territorial Army entry which is a three-stage process. I was fortunate to reach the third stage, which was the selection board. I was allotted the selection centre east at Allahabad, where I arrived with all the gusto of a prospective Army officer, hopeful of making the cut.

I had no idea that my being a part of this four-day selection process would be such a value addition. Being a part of the Army fraternity for these days is an experience in itself. The largesse of the Army lies in the fact that every prospective officer is treated as good as an officer. You are offered a sumptuous meal and a comfortable lodging, something which is unthinkable in any other recruitment process.

A typical day with a selection board starts early. At 4.30 a.m. when you are in deep slumber, you are suddenly woken by the washer man’s call, asking for your laundry, in an astounding pitch to scare the hell out of you. You miss him and your evenings are ruined washing your laundry. You report for your breakfast at 5.30 a.m. in the dress code specified for the day. At 6 you report for the day's grilling sans your watch. When you are done with your day's tasks, to your utter surprise, it is barely 11 a.m. Quite a lesson in effective time management, I must say.

PPDT, SRT, WAT, PGT, IO etc. may be quite a familiar terminology for those who have faced a selection board at some point of their life. Yet, for the benefit of others I would like to state that these are various psychological testing techniques adopted by the selection boards. The dexterity with which the group task officers and psychologists check your perceptions, reactions to crisis situations, behaviour in groups and personality conflicts is amazing. The selection process reaches its summit with the interview, which is a virtual CT scan of your personality.

Yet the most memorable task which I executed was the individual obstacle task. And to add to the fun, it was held in the midst of torrential rain. 'Tiger leap' was the most interesting obstacle in which from a raised platform I had to take a leap akin to a tiger’s leap and cling on to a hanging rope and come down. Soon I found myself huffing and puffing and being unable to complete all the tasks in the specified time, yet having a sense of satisfaction over the fine display of perseverance.

In the final conference, when results are to be announced, you are counselled to be prepared for any eventuality. You are told that how great achievers like Amitabh Bachchan and A.P.J. Abdul Kalam came out unsuccessful from selection boards. Indeed, a great gesture.

You come out of the selection board as a transformed individual. You are able to appreciate the synergy of a group. You have a better sense of national integration. And finally, you have bonds to cherish for a lifetime. A must go for all, at least once, not for success or failure, but for the experience it offers.

OPED — Defence

Defence equipment need indigenisation
If the national aim to make India a design, manufacture and export hub is to be met, the Department of Defence Production needs to be made a separate entity under a cabinet minister with indigenisation and modernisation of the existing manufacturing units
Davinder Kumar and Gurmeet Kanwal

HAL Tejas light combat aircraft takes off for a sortie.

Soon after approving 49 percent FDI in the defence sector, Prime Minister, Narendra Modi exhorted the nation to create a viable “defence industrial base” in India with “indigenisation” as the mission. He launched a “make in India” drive and expressed his government’s intention to permit defence exports.

The long-pending Request for Proposal (RFP) for light helicopters was cancelled by the government and the Defence Minister directed that the helicopters be manufactured in India with appropriate technical collaboration. Now, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) has granted industrial licences to 19 private sector proposals and declared that 14 other pending proposals do not need clearance as the manufacture of a large number of defence items has been de-licensed.

All of these are bold steps which send a powerful message and indicate that the much needed “political will” for self-reliance in defence manufacture is no longer lacking. Its translation into action will involve the transformation of the policy framework andprocedures to help indigenous defence manufacturers to flourish.

Historically, despite the fact that India participated in both the World Wars and lost over a quarter million soldiers, the country was denied a viable defence industrial base by our erstwhile rulers. Sadly, we have not been able to improve the situation even 67 years after independence. Our 39 ordnance factories are still designed mainly to manufacture only low-end items like clothing, tents, accoutrements and small arms ammunition.

The situation with regard to our nine Defence PSUs is also not very encouraging considering the huge investments made by the nation. Fifty plus DRDO laboratories also do not inspire much confidence when it comes to the development of weapons technology, its engineering into production and system integration. This situation must change, but where have we gone wrong and what do we need to do?

Successive governments since 2001 appointed high-powered committees headed by eminent persons to make recommendations, with regard to organisational transformation, in-house development of technology and related reforms to involve the private sector in defence production on equal terms. Seven committees have submitted their reports since then. Unfortunately, even the common recommendations made by them have not been implemented. This is primarily due to the lack of political will, bureaucratic lethargy and inadequate public scrutiny.

National security has been treated as a holy cow on the plea of the need for secrecy and the “people” have not been involved in decision making. In a democracy, people’s participation is necessary to justify the budget and establish accountability. We need to build “national security awareness” among the people and create the requisite environment for meaningful interaction between decision makers, manufacturers and the people. Secrecy cannot be an excuse to hide lack of accountability, slippages in the production schedules and escalation of cost. People need to know where and how their money is being spent and be reassured that it would ensure both human security and national security.

Institutions like the Standing Committee for Defence in Parliament require transformation. India must study the Chinese concepts of “leap frogging” of technology across several generations and “civilianisation” to exploit dual use technology. We will have to modify these concepts to suit our conditions and set up a viable defence industrial base by the end of this decade. Those who exclusively promote imports should be guarded against.

The Department of Defence Production must be made a separate entity under a cabinet minister with indigenisation and modernisation of existing R&D and the manufacturing assets as its primary responsibilities. The three Services and the private sector must be integrated with this Department with appropriate representation. The DRDO, suitably reorganised, should also be part of this organisation. The Scientific Advisers to the three Chiefs must be made more accountable. The Army and the Air Force must have integral design and development organisations like the Navy’s Weapons Engineering Electronics Systems Establishment (WEESE).

It would be beneficial to establish a Defence Technology Mission (DTM) and a Project Implementation Agency (PIA). The DTM must develop and hunt for technology in consonance with the concepts of “leap frogging” and “civilianisation” of dual-use technologies and should be placed under the PMO. The PIA should report to the Defence Minister and ensure “on time” execution of all projects without cost overrun. A separate Class A service needs to be raised as a Defence Technology cadre for the MoD and our embassies and missions. It should have linkages with major academic and R&D institutions in the country and abroad.

India needs to follow a multilateral approach for technology development that has synergies with our “centres of excellence”. We need to work concurrently on local R&D, technology transfer to include “know why”, co-development and co-production, reverse engineering, exports and harnessing of dual-use technology. We need to encourage innovation and establish “technology incubators”, particularly in information and communication technology (ICT) and cyber domains.

While the PM has displayed the necessary political will for indigenisation and establishment of an advanced manufacturing base in the country, the challenge lies in its comprehensive implementation. That requires an enabling policy framework, focus, commitment, pride and a never say die spirit.

A National Security and Strategic Review should be regularly presented in Parliament prior to discussions on the defence budget, just like the Annual Economic Survey is released before the presentation of the Finance Bill.

The PM and the CCS should be briefed every quarter on the status of indigenisation, technology and infrastructure by the Defence and Home secretaries. These briefings should be attended by the three Chiefs and the CDS when appointed.

In the beginning of each financial year, the government must bring out a comprehensive White Paper on national security to include security environment scan, budget, technology, state of major projects, development of human resources, major acquisitions and technology absorption and progress on infrastructure projects.

We need to demonstrate the same resolve, unity, sacrifice and sense of purpose that we exhibited during our freedom struggle and launch a movement for the development of “swadeshi” technology to build the India of our dreams: self-reliant, strong, prosperous and peaceful.

Lt-Gen Davinder Kumar (Retd) is former Signal Officer-in-Chief. Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd) is former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

‘Major Saab’ suffers rank indifference
The Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW), in its true bureaucratic lack of empathy and common sense has created more confusion and heart-burn for senior ex-servicemen
Vijay Oberoi

Many veteran majors continue to be treated shoddily by our government, as manifested by the policies issued by a department of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), ironically named the Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (DESW)! This department has the dubious distinction of doing zilch for the veterans, since it was carved out from the MoD and placed under a secretary level bureaucrat.

Although this piece talks of only ‘majors’, it is equally applicable to the equivalent ranks in the navy (lieutenant commander) and the air force (squadron leader).

The rank of ‘major’ has always been a pivotal rank in the army. Earlier, an officer reached the substantive rank of ‘major’ after 13 years of tough service in various locations and climates. Now, after a change in policy, officers are promoted to the rank of major after only six years service and the erstwhile major’s rank has now been upgraded to that of lt-col.

As youngsters, we used to look forward to the rank of ‘major’, as one was then considered mature, senior and experienced to command a sub-unit, i.e. company/ squadron/ battery. These were the appointments that were the work-horse of the army in all facets of functioning; whether in operations, intelligence, training, logistics or administration. Majors also held important appointments as staff officers, instructors or other specified appointments. With the rank, one also earned the privilege of being called a ‘field officer’, which gave two immediate benefits. Firstly, one became entitled to a full salute at the Quarter Guard or by any other sentry on duty. Secondly, one earned the honour of wearing spurs on one’s half-wellington boots, while donning the formal summer or winter Mess dresses, in some regiments like mine.

The major change in the fortunes of ‘majors’ came when a policy decision was taken in the late 1980’s that henceforth the first selection grade rank would be lieutenant colonel (lt-col), instead of major. This resulted in captains becoming majors after completing six years service and majors becoming lt. cols after 13 years of service. Thereafter, selection ranks would commence. The positive effect of this new policy was that those who were not selected at the first selection stage would at least retire in the higher rank of lt -col, instead of a major and would get higher pension. While this was a welcome development, the MoD forgot to give this largesse to those majors who had already retired.

In a classic case of bureaucratese, while serving majors became lt- cols on reaching the stipulated 13 years of service and drew enhanced pay and allowances, the majors who had already retired after completing their stipulated years of service were denied the pension of lt-cols. When manpower policies are changed, as in this case, for meeting the aspirations of a particular group of personnel, as well as for better management of the cadre, it is incumbent on the government to ensure that all past cases get placed in the same category and draw the same emoluments as their counterparts who were upgraded to a higher rank.

In this case, all retired majors should have automatically been given the pension of lt-cols, even though the higher rank could not be conferred on them. Instead of doing so, the MoD adopted the bureaucratic way of simply ignoring the large number of veteran majors, depriving them of their legitimate emoluments. MoD forgot that there was no difference between those who went home as majors on superannuation and those who were in service on that date and were promoted as lt-cols; in terms of years of service, professional expertise, exposure to dangers of losing life or limb, and all hardships associated with serving in inhospitable/uncongenial areas and climates.

After the 5th Pay Commission recommendations were accepted, the MoD did make amends by issuing a letter dated 21 November, 1997, that stated that officers who became substantive majors on or after 01 January, 1996, would be granted the scale of lt-col, without increase in the rank. However, similarly placed substantive majors who had retired prior to the magic date of 01 January,1996, would not be eligible for this largesse! The predictable result was that one more category was created, whereby some veteran majors started receiving pay and consequently pension of lt-cols, while the older lot whose needs and requirements were obviously more, were left in the lurch. This was yet another case of creating categories within categories; which the bureaucrats seem to enjoy doing, possibly to confuse everyone.

The initial blame for the distress caused to all veteran majors must be borne by the service headquarters. At the time of the policy change, the service headquarters, on whom all ranks — serving or retired — look up to for ensuring that their welfare and concerns are fully met, failed in their duty and the veteran majors were left high and dry. However, the major part of the blame must go to the MoD and specifically to DESW, for it is their responsibility to ensure that no military person gets an unfair deal.

It will be a monumental shame if these forgotten warriors of yore go to their ‘happy hunting grounds’ carrying a grudge against the system.

The writer is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff