The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

ARTICLE

Can Syria be Obama's Vietnam?
It's not a silly question at all
Inder Malhotra

ON the face of it the question I have raised does look silly. After all President Barack Obama, whose supporters call him a “gloomy realist”, has learnt the lessons of not only the Vietnam war but also of those in Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s longest war. In this it is ending its combat role while retaining a relatively small number of American troops there to train and advise the Afghan National Army. More remarkably, while announcing his plan to “degrade and finally destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”, Obama made it clear that this objective would be achieved by intensive air strikes on the ISIS (besides sending some special forces to Iraq) and there would be “no boots on the ground”.

Before proceeding further, let me admit that the headline I have used is taken verbatim from The New York Times of October 7. In the article under it eminent historians have argued that half a century ago President Lyndon Johnson had also authorised “only a strategic bombing campaign” against targets in North Vietnam, but this was swiftly followed by deployment of ground troops. The rest of the story, including LBJ's undoing, is well known. To the argument that Johnson was deeply committed to winning the war in Vietnam and had indeed made it a “personal war”, historians reply that this widely held belief is factually wrong. They have cited evidence to show that privately Johnson often told his confidants and aides that there “was no point fighting when there was no daylight in sight”. Another quote attributed to him is: “What can Vietnam mean to me?” Yet he had to go on escalating the war in Vietnam under "pressure" from his hard-line adviser who felt that the withdrawal from or defeat in Vietnam would have a “domino effect”. Some are suggesting that Obama may soon be in the same plight that LBJ was in then.

This assessment must not be swept away with a flippant wave of the hand. For only one month after its start, the failure of Obama's current strategy is becoming evident and he obviously cannot call it a day. One of the several points on which there is unanimity among military leaders, diplomats and analysts is that air strikes alone cannot defeat the IS. At best these might have delayed the Islamists' advance but the air strikes haven't prevented their conquests. Their grip on strategically vital Kurdish town of Kobane on Syria’s northern border with Turkey is undeniable. In a few places the air strikes have helped the Kurds regain some territory from the IS but the Islamists control large areas in Syria and Iraq. Security in the Sunni-dominated Iraqi province of Anbar is deteriorating fast. Even more stark is the success of IS fighters in overrunning several Iraqi army bases, and seizing Abu Ghraib, which is within shelling distance of Baghdad's international airport. Alarmed over this, the Americans, for the first time, sent Apache helicopters to strike at the IS targets on the road that runs west of Baghdad to the IS stronghold of Falluja. The Economist's comment on this is eloquent and revealing: “Calling up the Apaches — no boots on the ground, perhaps, but certainly boots in the air — is an admission that the high-flying jets have their limitation”. A further problem confronting Obama is that some of its “willing allies” bomb only Iraq whose government has invited them to do so, but are staying away from Syria. A cruel irony is that the American air strikes on Syria have driven the “moderate fighters against President Assad of Syria”, whom the Americans were hoping to train and arm, to the side of the jihadists!

Moreover, despite the change of government in Iraq at American behest, Baghdad is still unable to win over suspicious Sunnis. Despite America’s strong advice to the new government to be more inclusive, Shia militias of Iraq are still killing Sunnis. The US knows that the country best able to persuade the Shia-led government in Baghdad to win the confidence of the Sunni minority that ruled in the era of Saddam Hussein is Iran. But then Iran is the closest ally of Assad-led Syria. No wonder Saudi Arabia, the leader of the Sunnis and a bitter rival of Shia Iran, saying openly and loudly that the war in the Middle East will last long and also become a source of terrorism in both the West and the East. In this context one has to bemoan the tragic fact that, in the words of an eminent Kurd leader on the CNN, “the Iraqi army no longer exists; it has evaporated”.

Turkey, the biggest military power in the region and a staunch ally of the US, has become the most difficult problem for the Americans and the biggest contradiction in the Middle East situation. Nothing illustrates this more vividly than the horrendous plight of Kobane, the Kurd town on the Syrian border. Turkey has lined up its tanks and troops on its side of the frontier. But these are not being used to fight the IS. Instead the Turkish army is engaged only in firing tear gas to beat back the Turkish Kurds wanting to help their Syrian brethren who are being slaughtered by the IS. This is happening in spite of the fact that on October 2, the Turkish Parliament had authorised the Turkish forces to operate in Syria. But the country’s President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is playing a different and puzzling game. He already has nearly two million Syrian refugees on his soil. His greater worry is that if the Syrian Kurds prevail, his own Kurds that have been revolting for decades would also join them to form an independent Kurdistan. He is making it clear that the Turkish support to the US-led coalition will remain rhetorical until America enforces a buffer and a no-fly zone on the Syrian side. That is not going to be easy.

MIDDLE

How ceasefire violations stopped then
Brig Jagbir Singh Grewal (retd)

OUR Army personnel have always shown a remarkable humane approach, more so, whenever the civil population is involved, even if it is Pakistan’s population.

In earlier times in J&K, no barbed wire fencing barricaded the India-Pak Line of Control (LoC). Lack of fencing proved quite a boon for Pakistani villagers settled across the LoC to sneak into India's side, mainly for tree or grass cutting. The trend was to venture into the Indian side, but remain just close to the LoC for such misdemeanors, and flee back when detected. Such incursions were quite a nuisance, but tree cutting could be easily detected due to the 'tak, tak' noise of the axe. A considerate, humanitarian view was adopted because the civil population was involved. According to the Standing Procedure, we would fire a warning shot close to the miscreant, warning him to move back. In case the culprit did not desist, the second shot to kill or incapacitate him was to be fired after the lapse of a few minutes. However, such an occasion hardly arose. Though at times, a stubborn culprit would enjoy an interval of a couple of hours, and re-appear to pursue his hazardous but lucrative task.

One sultry noon, an old man ventured and sat just close to the LoC for grass cutting. He had taken a shrewd decision to hide in the tall grass and simultaneously wield his sickle. The thick, green, crunchy grass was irresistible fodder. His own side of the LoC had been denuded of such grass as soon as it had erupted, as the grazers were many. It was a risky mission, but he had done his calculations. When confronted, he could just take a side roll off the cliff and roll over into his side of the LoC.

Our patrol positioned in bunkers in close proximity of the LoC noticed this to and fro swaying of the tall grass. Suspecting it to be either some animal or at worst an infiltrator, our jawan shouted, “Kaun hai”? He was just about to fire his weapon when the old man hastily stood up. He waved his sickle and shrieked in a quivering voice that he was just cutting grass. He was told to drop his sickle and come over to the bunker. He came over and pleaded for mercy and for water in the same breath. A water bottle was instantly handed over to him. After the old man had taken a large sip of water, it dawned on the patrol party that the old man was not feigning but was actually shell shocked. He divulged that he was the Numberdar's father and much more. He was apprehensive that a frantic search must be on to trace him. Soon the Pakistani post commander emerged holding a white flag and stood partially screened by a huge rock. He repeatedly screamed at the top of his voice in chaste Punjabi, “Khuda de vaaste, saada budda wapis kar diyo, sadi naukri kharab ho gayi” (for God’s sake, return our old man, our job is spoiled). This melodrama continued for some time till our post commander responded that intrusions across the LoC should be stopped. The Pakistani post commander vowed, “Kasam se, koi bhi ab LoC paar nahin karega, aur lakri ya ghas katne nahin ayega” (henceforth no one will neither cross the LoC nor indulge in tree or grass cutting).

The old man was given a hearty meal and 'shakarparas' by our jawans from their own tiffin boxes and sent back. Sure enough, the Pakistani post commander kept his word, for during our tenure, no foolhardy daredevil ventured into our side of the LoC. The Pakistani post commander had indeed brokered peace and no ceasefire violation occurred thereafter.

OPED-NEIGHBOURS

Populism’s second coming in Pakistan
It is for the second time in Pakistan’s history that populist politics is being offered as the panacea for all ills. Populism fails because it assumes the possibility of change as a push-button operation, without the support of social forces that understand the dynamics of change.
I A Rehman

Populist rhetoric has been used to sustain the Islamabad dharnas long enough to justify an inquiry into its impact on the country’s politics.

This is the second time in Pakistan’s history that populist politics is being offered as the panacea for all ills, the first one being the populism of the PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) 47 years ago. A comparison between the two populist waves should be quite rewarding.

The PPP’s populism had quite a few extraordinary features. It had its roots in great turmoil at home and abroad. The people had taken to the streets not only to seek Ayub Khan’s ouster from power but to replace the system of controlled democracy imposed by the dictator with a representative government. They had risen in revolt against exploitation by the 22 privileged families.

Pak’s populist cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri addresses followers during the anti-government protests outside the Parliament in Islamabad. AFP

The movement had also received a boost from the Vietnamese people’s heroic resistance to a superpower that had broken all records of aerial bombardment. The anti-imperialist wave that was sweeping the globe had not bypassed Pakistan. No discussion on the people’s plight was possible without reference to the country’s dependence on the controllers of the world capital. The people had acquired ideas of freedom from Cold War shackles, the right to self-rule and social justice before they were picked up by political parties. One has to take a look at the political parties’ election manifestos of 1970 to realise the extent to which all parties, including conservative religious groups, were trying to woo the electorate from Left-of-Centre planks.

The founders of the PPP tried to harness public yearning for an egalitarian order by spelling out, in their foundation papers, the nature and scale of the change they wanted, or they thought the people wanted. It was in this milieu that matchless slogans, such as roti, kapra aur makan — food, clothing, and shelter — and jera wahway ohi khaway, (as you sow so shall you reap) gained currency.

This populist upsurge produced significant changes in social behaviour, especially among the underprivileged. The common man found his voice. The worker had learnt to talk to the employer during the anti-Ayub movement, now the tenant began to challenge the landlord.

Since the PPP’s populist demands were derived from the people’s experiences they helped the party secure an electoral victory beyond its expectations, thanks to its success in winning over activists from older parties who had been struggling for socio-economic change for many years. Even this robust populism fizzled out. How this came about is not the subject of this piece. It is, however, necessary to point out that populism fails because it assumes the possibility of change as a push-button operation, without the support of social forces that understand the dynamics of change and are also capable of throwing up qualified cadres. These change-makers must be strong enough to defeat the forces of the status quo. The present wave of populism is manifestly different from the earlier phenomenon. It comprises two different tracks. While Dr Tahirul Qadri has from the very beginning called for a change of the system of governance, Imran Khan’s objective at the start of his march was only the removal of the prime minister, followed by an independent probe into his allegations of rigging during the 2013 election. This process could lead to a fresh election but that was not an explicit part of the agenda. Both the challengers have been relying on populist rhetoric with a view to strengthening their claim to power. Piqued by the criticism that his assault on the Sharifs represented a split in the Punjab elite, Imran Khan began recognising other federating units. As hopes of a quick victory faded away, both Qadri and Imran Khan began discovering the plight of the underprivileged. When they talk of corruption and favouritism in administration or denial of education and employment to the youth or the failing economy of the agricultural community they touch on matters the people wish to see resolved without delay. This populism without limits amounts to preparing a huge wish list that neither of the two challengers has tried to present in the form of a credible programme of action — and one fails to notice among the dignitaries that assemble on the containers for the daily drill the human material needed to translate dreams of a social revolution into reality.

While the dharna wish list is quite impressive the omissions are not only significant they also betray the principles behind the agitation. There is sympathy for peasants but land reform cannot be mentioned; labour is offered friendship but little is said about its right to collective bargaining; police are warned against committing excesses but there is no indication of a new plan for reform; and militant religiosity and the imbalance in civil-military relations are matters still outside the agenda for national uplift. The weaknesses of the present flush of populism hardly need elaboration. Populist movements have a poor record of success and the cost of their failure can be heavy. Indira Gandhi’s populism, that earned Tariq Ali a citation in the Oxford dictionary, degenerated into arbitrary rule and an assault on the people’s basic freedoms. Similar will often be the result of populist campaigns for the simple reason that the expectations they arouse cannot be realised by pushing a button here or waving a staff there. This is not to deny the contribution populism can make to the movement of ideas. The Democratic Party of the United States needed a man of Franklin Roosevelt’s will and calibre to profit from the manifesto of the Populist Party of America many years after that organisation had expired. His New Deal proved, perhaps for all times, that there can be situations when the lords of rightist politics can find in an opening to the Left the only route to national revival. After all, the best of populism is often a pale reflection of Left ideals minus the scientific foundations. One wonders whether Pakistan’s present–day populists have the capacity to learn from the fate of their predecessors at home and abroad.

By arrangement with the Dawn

Flooding priorities
This year, all Met Departments gave their flood alert barely 48 hours ahead of the flood peak. It was grossly insufficient time in which to organise a response.
Khurram Husain

IN the last five monsoon seasons, Pakistan has seen five floods. That means each year since 2010 has brought a massive flood that has affected the lives of millions of people in each case. Each flood has been caused by unusual rains. And the rainfall-producing storm systems in at least three of these years — from 2010 till 2012 — have been studied very carefully by a group of meteorologists who argue in their latest paper that these storms are not normal monsoon systems.

Flood forecasting in an era of climate change is a crucial priority for Pakistan & India. AFP

For the last couple of months, I have immersed myself in a careful reading of papers from the cutting edge of meteorological research being carried out on Pakistan’s flood-producing storms and the anomalous weather patterns behind them. The first results from my readings appear in the latest edition of Herald, this newspaper’s sister publication, as two long format reports. In this column, let me give a quick synopsis.

Scientific studies of the Indian monsoon, on whose western edge we sit, began in the late 19th century by the British colonial government following a deadly drought that led to mass starvation across the subcontinent. The Indian Met Department (IMD) was created in the aftermath of that event, and its first two directors general — Messrs Blanford and Walker — were the first people to begin detailed scientific observations of the annual cycle of rains that sustained life in such critical ways across British India.

From the earliest observations, two different directions emerged. Blanford searched for a land-based link between the monsoon system and the weather patterns that produced the winter snowfalls in the Himalayas. Walker on the other hand, was the first to discern a link between a peculiar seesaw-like variation in atmospheric pressure between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This seesaw mechanism came to be connected later with the phenomenon known as El Nino.

As the volume of meteorological measurements being undertaken increased over the decades of the 20th century, the two lines of inquiry initiated by these two men began to bear fruit. For most of the 20th century, meteorologists focused on the El Nino link and growing volumes of research output added more flesh to the proposition that the great Southern Oscillation, as the pressure reversal brought about by El Nino was called, holds the secret to forecasting the monsoon rains in India.

But forecasting the monsoon rains with any meaningful exactitude remained elusive, although it became possible to say with some measure of probabilistic certitude how wet the forthcoming wet season might be. Yet despite the increasingly technological sophistication of the data and the statistical models being used for meteorological observations, the IMD was wrong more often than it was right in its forecasts.

This year, for instance, the IMD forecasted a dry monsoon season, with below average rains and even the possibility of drought. A newly launched private weather forecasting service in India came to the same conclusion, citing the appearance of El Nino in the Pacific in April, saying that a drought is likely across North India with monsoon being far below average. The CEO of the private service was even quoted, in July, saying if there are no rains in July then the monsoon will most likely fail. The drought was going to be particularly intense in the northwest, according to both of these services.

The Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) also acknowledged the appearance of El Nino this year in April, but hedged its forecast, saying “irregular rains” are likely this season. The rains were certainly irregular. When they came they were so heavy as to submerge the provincial capital of the very region that the IMD and the private forecaster were saying would be at the epicentre of a drought. In fact, a report by Deutsche Bank, widely cited in the Indian media, looked in detail at the IMD’s forecasts over the last 20 years and found that they have been correct in only four years. A coin toss is more likely to give you a more accurate result.The story has been largely the same every year since 2010. Why are the Met Departments having such a hard time detecting these storms with any meaningful lead time? This year, all Met Departments gave their flood alert barely 48 hours ahead of the flood peak, grossly insufficient time in which to organise a response. Part of the answer takes us back to the differences between the approaches taken by Blanford and Walker. New research is finding out that the El Nino connection might be overstated, that the Indian monsoon interacts with weather systems in the Eurasian landmass as well as more distant systems. It’s also telling us that the very structure of the monsoon system appears to be changing, producing rainfall patterns that are entirely anomalous.

While details are contained in the longer report, for now it’s enough to say the following. Flood forecasting in an era of climate change is a crucial priority for us now. Five floods in five years are enough of a hint that our climate is changing in crucial ways. We cannot reverse the process, nor did we create it. But we must adapt to it, and adaptation begins by upgrading our forecasting abilities so we can have some lead time in which to prepare our response. The technology to do this exists, and was offered to Pakistan last year by the World Bank, but the authorities were too busy in other matters to pay any attention. Instead each year’s floods have amplified calls within Pakistan for building more dams and barrages and other hydrological infrastructure to be used for management of floodwaters. But more infrastructure for flood management is pointless in the absence of longer and more reliable forecasts.

By arrangement with the Dawn