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Reprieve for stock markets Ranking matters |
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Obama's great dilemma
A hunt gone awry
49 years on, India-Pak disputes still intractable
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Reprieve for stock markets Stock markets the world over have felt relieved after the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the US like the Reserve Bank of India, announced its much-awaited decision on Wednesday to keep interest rates near zero for "a considerable time". The two-day meeting also decided to wind up its bond-buying programme next month. Speculation was the US central bank, better known as the"Fed", would announce interest rate increases from March next year. This had made stock markets edgy and even a normally out-performing BSE Sensex of India fell by 324 points on Tuesday ahead of the Fed meeting. After the Fed decision became public, the Sensex went up sharply on Thursday, gaining 480 points. It was in November 2008 that the Federal Reserve launched a massive bailout programme to rescue its economy and corporate sector, shattered by the sub-prime crisis leading to the implosion of Lehman Brothers, an investment bank. It began pumping in money into markets by buying treasury and mortgage bonds and has injected $4 trillion in six years. Interest rates were also kept at zero to make cheap capital available to the corporate sector. Now that the crisis is almost over and the economy has shown unmistakable signs of recovery and job creation has picked up, the Fed has decided to stop bond-buying, also called quantitative easing in financial jargon, from October, while keeping interest rates unchanged for the time being. When interest rates move up in the US, it has side-effects almost worldwide. Surplus capital deployed in various economies, including BRICS, starts moving back to the US, which is the preferred destination of global wealth managers. The fear in India, as elsewhere, is that foreign investors, who have put in huge chunks of money in India's stock markets and debt, may start pulling out of the country and this would cause turmoil in markets, depending on the quantum of interest rate hikes. While large fund managers plan in advance for such eventualities, small investors, who usually enter stock markets when these are already at a high, are left holding stocks bought at inflated
rates.
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Ranking matters THE quality of education in India has always been a matter of great concern. Be it the President of India or the former Prime Minister or other dignitaries, all have repeatedly reiterated what has by now become a truism of our education system. Without a doubt, quality has not kept pace with the quantitative expansion of the Indian education system. To monitor the quality and performance of Indian universities annually, Human Resource Development
(HRD) Minister Smriti Irani has now proposed the idea of a national ranking system. Indeed, bearing in mind the disheartening faring of the Indian universities in international rankings, what with none of them finding a place in the top 200 universities in the world, perhaps this could be the way forward. While we are free to dismiss international rankings as irrelevant to our system, there is no denying the inertia that plagues our higher education sector. It's precisely to check this that the recommendations of the
"Yash Pal Committee to advise on renovation and rejuvenation of higher education in India" were taken seriously. In order to ensure academic meritocracy, accreditation, an international practice that assures quality, was made mandatory for all higher educational institutions by the
UGC. But the poor progress made on this front makes one wonder whether the proposed ranking system would deliver,let alone provide the much-needed cutting edge to our educational institutions. Amidst the gloomy scenario, however, the silver lining is the news that India is emerging as the least expensive destination for education for foreign students. If only quality were to match the economic advantage that Indian universities offer, education could become a key catalyst in India's economic growth. While India might be en route its goal of universal access to elementary education, it can become a knowledge hub only if education imparted at all levels is truly world class. Sadly, as things exist, adverse learning outcomes only decelerate the wheels of economic growth. The Indian education system has to ensure quality to make the most of its demographic dividend.
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It is necessary for me to establish a winner image. Therefore, I have to beat somebody. — Richard M. Nixon
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Commissions in the army for University candidates THE War Office issued through the Press Bureau in mail week a list of 115 candidates who have been nominated by the several Universities in the United Kingdom for appointment to commissions in the Regular Army subject to their having been found physically fit. Some have been allotted commissions on the unattached list for the Indian army and some commissions in the Royal Artillery, while the remainder are to be appointed commissions in the Cavalry, Foot Guards, Infantry or Army Corps. The list includes the names of several members prominent in golf and hockey circles. How much would India rejoice if like opportunities of distinction be offered to our own University candidates here! Lord Minto was in favour of granting commissions to Indians in the Army, but the scheme appears to have been dropped owing to opposition from other quarters. German attitude towards Englishmen SO much has been said about the cruelty and disregard for civilised conduct of the Germans — especially in their treatment of the Belgians. They have burnt towns, destroyed churches, shot non-combatants, pillaged property and wrecked libraries. Considerable indignation has been roused in the world at these reports. But their conduct towards Englishmen is reported to be respectful. Indians have read with agreeable surprise that the conduct of the German officers on the battle cruiser Emden towards the British crew on the sunken vessels in the Bay of Bengal was above reproach. Having already heard of German atrocities the English crew on the vessels were in no little anxiety when they were arrested by Germans in the Bay. But every one of them now speaks of the kindness shown by the enemy.
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Obama's great dilemma There have been pledges of support from a variety of actors, but at the end of the day it is fair to ask whether such support is solid or consequential. Turkey did not sign the Cairo statement, and while Iran was not invited to the Paris meeting, there are wide cracks among those who attended. The truth is that while US and allied air strikes are effective in weakening IS, boots on the ground to help Iraqi forces are needed to destroy IS. President Obama has ruled out US boots while his senior military official feels it might come to that. The President has projected air strikes on IS in Syria, but such action opens up another can of worms. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad wants coordination and although Iran is helping demolish IS, it is on the other side of the fence in supporting the Syrian regime. While the Iraqi regime, now under a new prime minister, is delighted that the Americans are back in a military role, many of the Arab states are at best ambivalent over the latest turn of events. For instance, it has been common wisdom that Saudi and Kuwaiti individuals, in addition to those in Qatar, have been funding extremist Sunni organisations. Now the Saudis have got the message that IS represents a different scale of threat to them and they occupy a major role in the American scheme in funding the new anti-IS coalition. What the Americans and the West want is to see Arab troops helping Iraq on the ground in fighting IS. Financing the effort is easier for countries such as Saudi Arabia and promises to help in other ways, for instance by Jordan, are forthcoming. Turkey has agreed to police its long border, commonly used by jihadi fighters, better but has not agreed to let US forces use its major base to launch strikes on IS. How then can the United States resolve its conundrum? The picture is further complicated by the fact that at home President Obama is viewed as a reluctant warrior and is particularly blamed for letting events slip in Syria until the extremists were able to capture large parts of the country to build a base, which enabled them to capture roughly one-third of Iraq, including its second largest city of Mosul. President Obama was therefore forced to expand his stated objective as destroying IS to appease his domestic critics. If he keeps his promise, it means an open-ended war in total contradiction to his election promise of ending the two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly clear to the American and Western establishments that IS represents great threat to the region and ultimately the world. It is also agreed that unless the major regional powers are willing to fight the menace on the ground, an outside US or Western force cannot win the war for them. Here lies the rub. The Arab world and their neighbours are hopelessly divided. There are the monarchies on one side with their own differences. Qatar, apart from Turkey, is sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, which the Egyptian military overthrew and is now prosecuting. In fact, the former military chief is now the country's President. Ankara's own role is determined by its Sunni evangelism and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ambition of creating its own sphere of influence in the region and beyond. There is also the large shadow of the Sunni-Shia divide, with Iran as the regional heavyweight seeking to expand its influence. It supports the Shia regime of President Assad in a Sunni-majority country and funds and supports the Lebanese Hezbollah movement which has sprung to the aid of Damascus. On the other hand, Iran supports the majority Shias of Bahrain ruled by a Sunni king. Bahrain is the home of the
US Fifth Fleet. The question the world is now asking is whether the United States has again bitten more than it can chew. Everyone agrees that the American invasion of Iraq was a major blunder as was the assiduous arming of mujahideen through Pakistan to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But that represents the past and the future is beset with troubling problems. President Obama is now signalling that the anti-IS fight will last beyond the remaining years of his second term, a grim prospect with which a majority of Americans are coming to terms. Second, it will be Washington's task to make sense of the divergent interests of the major regional powers. The main Sunni Arab powers now agree that they need to act but still fight shy of engaging IS on the ground. Iran’s planning is, in a sense, easier to understand. It is focused on fighting IS to the extent that it was the first to send military supplies to the beleaguered Kurdish forces. It is equally interested in fighting IS in Syria, but in support of the Assad regime. While the US is still negotiating with Iranians on the nuclear issue, it cannot be a party to buttress the Syrian regime whose ouster was an early aim of President Obama. While the US military will continue to strike IS forces in Iraq and expand the operation to include Syria, the regional equations are still being juggled. It is ironic that a President who took power to end America's wars is giving the bugle call to fight another open-ended war.
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A hunt gone awry Born in a family where making a living was the last thing on anybody's mind, it was natural for Sardar Sahib to develop a flair for things regal. His kennel boasted of the finest dog breeds and his stable the thoroughbreds matching his regalia. He picked up hunting as soon as he entered the teens and over a period of time became a skilled marksman, to the utter misfortune of his prey. His living room was a fine display of his “shikaar” trophies and the kitchen would emanate an aroma of his daily feats. Life was going pretty fine for him till this particular hunting expedition made things take a turn for the worse. His trusted aide was done with all the necessary arrangements for the hunt. Soon they were off to their expedition, unmindful of what awaited their fate. Those were the times when animal sightings were not a rare occurrence. Normally, they would encounter their prey within few a few miles of their village. But today, after roaming around for a couple of hours, chances seemed dismal. His aide counselled him to go a few miles further towards the shrubbery, where it was certain to find their prey. Soon they stood facing the shrubbery, eagerly awaiting their prey. They didn’t have to wait long. As soon as Sardar Sahib noticed some movement in the shrubbery, he took a mark and fired. Skilled marksman as he was, one shot was enough to put an end to any further movement in the shrubbery. He signalled his aide to go and fetch his hunt without any further delay. The aide obeyed his command immediately. “Sardar Sahib, eh taan budha hai” (Sardar Sahib, it is old). He could hear his aide say in a subdued voice from the shrubbery. What he inferred from his aide’s remark was actually quite different from what his aide intended to convey. His aide wanted to convey that he had actually killed an old man, while he inferred it as having killed an old prey. “Koi gal nahin, chak leya, bhora vadh rinh laange” (No issues, just get it, we will overcook it), said the Sardar, oblivious of the act he
had committed. As the things unfolded, what ensued is anybody’s guess. Sardar Sahib had to bear the brunt of the act committed in oblivion by cooling his heels in prison for some years, bereft of the luxury of his favourite sport. But as they say old habits die hard. He took up his favourite sport again as soon as he was a free man.
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49 years on, India-Pak disputes still intractable
Even 49 years after India and Pakistan fought an indecisive war over it, the Western Front, bordering Kashmir, remains extremely volatile. Clearly, the two neighbours learnt few lessons from the bloody clash, because the contentious border issues that led to the 1965 war have grown only more sensitive. Pitched battles After Partition, though the two armies had clashed in 1947-48 over Kashmir, it was only in September 1965 that the two fought pitched battles. It was for the first time since World War II that a conventional war using armour and air force on such a scale was fought. The conflict sounded alarm bells across the world. Although by the end of it, there was a stalemate of sorts, the Indian Army managed to redeem its image that had taken a beating in the 1962 war with China. At the same time, since Pakistan was able to hold off a bigger neighbour, its military and political leadership got emboldened. This perhaps led to the 1971 war with India, resulting in its dismemberment and the creation of Bangladesh. The clouds of war had started forming in January-February 1965 when foot patrols on both sides started probing the Rann of Kutch area to set up border posts. In April, Pakistan launched an attack to evict the Indian guards from some of the posts. Both armies joined in and after a few weeks of fighting, a ceasefire was brokered by the then British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson on June 30, 1965.
Operation Gibraltar The troops of both sides withdrew but remained battle ready. Within one month, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, codename for armed insurrection by a few thousand of Pak Army’s airborne paratroopers and guerillas in Kashmir. They were to mix up with the Indian populace and incite locals to join them. Taken aback at first, the Indian Army soon recovered and in mid-August crossed the ceasefire line. While Pakistan managed to make headway in some areas, India captured, besides other places, the strategic Haji Pir Pass between Uri and Poonch. Having failed in its objective to create mayhem in the Kashmir Valley, Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam on September 1 and made a bid to capture Akhnoor and threaten Jammu with the intention of severing Indian supply lines and also the lines of communication. Pakistan had the advantage of not only surprise but also superior armaments procured from America as a member of the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO).
Indian offensive However, due to a last minute change of command of its lead infantry division, the Pak attack on Akhnoor was delayed which gave just about enough time to the Indian Army to recover and rush reinforcements. As the Indian Army held on against the offensive, it opened up another front across the International Border (IB) in Punjab on September 6. Pakistan had not catered for the crossing of the IB at this juncture for they felt that India would restrict the war to J&K. The Indian offensive in Punjab forced Pakistan to divert its force from Kashmir to save Lahore. Between September 6 and 10, the western plains of Punjab and Rajasthan witnessed some memorable ground offensives. Indian Army’s repeated attempts to cross the Ichhogil Canal in a bid to get to Lahore failed due to Pakistan counter-attacks and also because the breakthroughs which had been achieved by some infantry columns were not followed up.
Pak counter-attack Meanwhile, Pakistan counterattacked and took Khem Karan. But its armoured columns did not make headway as the infantry support could not fetch up and instead of making a dash for the Beas Bridge and bypass Amritsar, the armoured division withdrew into harbours at night. When they finally advanced, the Indians were ready and the famous Battle of Assal Uttar followed. The Pak offensive was stalled but not before causing panic in some military and political quarters. Also on the Western Front, the Indian 1 Corps offensive towards Sialkot achieved a measure of success. However, in subsequent battles, the offensive was held off at Chawinda by Pak’s newly raised second armoured division (6 Armd Div). Meanwhile in Rajasthan, Pakistan managed to advance deep inside Indian territory – up to Longewala in Jaisalmer and Munabao in Barmer sectors (Longewala was to became a battleground once again in 1971). The unique feature of the 1965 war was the intense use of air power by both India and Pakistan. Though the IAF had the numerical superiority, the two sides were more or less evenly balanced on the Western Frontier since India had to keep a sizeable force in the east for fear of Chinese intervention. Though numerically inferior, the PAF boasted of F-86 Sabres, F-104 Starfighters and B-57 Canberra aircraft. Against this the IAF had Hunter, Gnats, Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and one squadron of MiG-21. Though neither side managed to gain air superiority that was essential for a decisive victory, but there were some heroic tales of valour on both sides. While the PAF played a great role in the defence of Lahore, the Indian-built Gnat earned the sobriquet of “Sabre slayer”. On the bidding of the PAF, Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG), attempted some daring missions. Three SSG teams of about 40 commandoes each were para-dropped to neutralise the airfields of Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara. However, all three teams failed in their mission as the raids were poorly planned and coordinated. Besides, the exfiltration plan had not been thought through. After 17 days of intense attacks and counterattacks, both sides were running low on ammunition and a stalemate set in. By then, while India had 3,000 battlefield dead, Pakistan had 3,800. When ceasefire was called out, India had captured 1,800 km territory in Lahore and Sialkot sectors, while Pakistan had captured about 550 km in Sind-Rajasthan, besides the strategic area of Chhamb in Jammu Sector. On hindsight, tactical failures and lack of strategic foresight were evident during the six-month-long face-off between the two sides. Not only was the Indian response in the Rann of Kutch half-hearted, it lacked punitive action. What was worse, in spite of a clear warning, India was taken by surprise by Pak actions in Jammu and Kashmir, starting from August 1965. When India did react on ground, its response was reactive and poorly coordinated. Though the 1 Corps offensive in the Sialkot sector achieved operational surprise, the gains were frittered away by poor execution.
Lessons from the war Clearly, prior to 1965 our preparation for war against Pak had been neglected. Our armoured forces were obsolete, except for Centurions and AMX tanks. Our anti-tank capability and artillery were neglected. In the IAF, except for Gnats, there was nothing else which was a match for F-86 Sabres and F-104s. The Army-Air coordination was poor. What is worse, when the war finally broke out in September, half of the Indian Navy ships, including the aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, were undergoing refit and were unfit to give battle. As a result, even when the port of Dwarka was bombarded, the Indian Navy was not allowed to retaliate, despite protestations by the then Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral B.S. Soman. Thus we failed to inflict our full war-waging potential on the enemy. Since India went to war without a clear-cut strategic aim, it agreed to a ceasefire without decisive results. The war having been started by Pakistan provided a good opportunity to solve the Kashmir problem on our terms by continuing the war. At the end of it, our war-waging potential and ammunition reserves were terribly depleted, but Pakistan was worse off. Besides, Sino-Pak relations were yet to take a concrete shape then. Since India had after the 1962 debacle raised a couple of mountain divisions and the overall force ratio was in India's favour, the ceasefire need not have been rushed through. What was also paramount was that the national patriotic fervour too was strong. Unfortunately, the political leadership did not quite comprehend long-term strategic issues of war and peace. If a strategic aim had been formulated, we could have gone for decisive gains in J&K before agreeing to a ceasefire. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War readily comes to mind; Israelis, though surprised initially, regained the initiative and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army to dictate terms at the post-war negotiations. Least of all, we ought to have wrested control of Northern Areas. This was a mistake we were to repeat in 1999. We agreed to a ceasefire when Pak intruders had been merely pushed back in Kargil. What is surprising is that we also did not look at East Pakistan as Pakistan’s vulnerable underbelly. What was achieved in 1971 could have been got in 1965 itself. Post-war negotiations at Tashkent have also come under criticism. Haji Pir Pass captured by us, which was vital to our defences in the Uri-Poonch sector, was returned while Chhamb captured by Pakistan was got back. Since we were to lose Chhamb yet again in 1971, the return of Haji Pir at Tashkent continues to rankle. Pakistan in possession of Chhamb is definitely at an advantageous position as it makes Akhnoor vulnerable, which in turn has wider ramifications for the linkage of Jammu to the Kashmir Valley.
Weaknesses remain Even after 49 years we appear to be found wanting in certain crucial aspects. An effective organisation for higher direction of war and the required politico-military synergy are not in place. Despite repeated rejigs of our intelligence-gathering machinery, correct inputs and assessments have belied us and thus allowed us to be surprised like in Kargil in 1999. We are still grappling to understand Pakistan’s aims and strategy on Kashmir. Nor have we come to grips with the implications of the Sino-Pak nexus and the response thereof. With China using Pakistan to serve its strategic interests, we are today faced with the spectre of a two-front war. Despite such a challenge, modernisation of the armed forces has been neglected. The synergy between the three armed forces of the kind required is still missing – as was evident during the Kargil war. Even though Pakistan is continuing to use irregular warfare as a weapon in Kashmir, we have failed to cobble together an effective counter to its strategy before and during a full-fledged encounter. There have been numerous rounds of talks and efforts through back-channel diplomacy but the unresolved issues have only become more intractable with the passage of time. While the 1968 Tribunal verdict resolved the larger issue of the Rann of Kutch, the Sir Creek issue, which is over a 96-km strip of marshy land, still lingers. Though the Cease Fire Line was converted into the Line of Control (LoC) during the Simla Agreement in 1972, on ground it has made little difference. The continuing LoC dispute in Kashmir has led to tension further North in the glacial heights of Siachen since 1984.The lingering issues have led to large-scale organisational changes and augmentation in force levels and weaponry on both sides. If anything, since both are armed with nuclear weapons, the uncertainty only heightens.
Lack of readiness for war
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