The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

ARTICLE

Changing political scenario
Even presidential candidates are campaigning!
by S. Nihal Singh

As the Indian political system evolves, institutions and power structures are taking new shapes and attributes. The myth that the presidency is a non-political institution was exploded in 1969 when Indira Gandhi successfully employed it in her intra-party struggle with what came to be known as the Syndicate. Mr Pranab Mukherjee and his opponent, Mr Purno Sangma, are taking the Indira logic to its rational conclusion by embarking on countrywide campaign tours to win votes from the electoral college.

Likewise, there can be no doubt that in India's semi-federal structure, the states are assuming greater power, with the Centre having to yield more often than not. It can, of course, be argued that such was the sway of the Congress party in the first decades of Independence that the Constitution was distorted in practice by the extraordinary powers New Delhi wielded by virtue of Congress supremacy at the Centre and in the states. The picture began to change with the splintering of the parent Congress and the ability of Opposition parties to wrest control of more and more states.

A third stage of political development arrived with the decimation of the Congress (I), as the predominant faction came to be called, in the Hindi heartland states. The ruling Congress was being forced to rely on non-Hindi-speaking states to retain power. Retrospectively, it was a revolution because historically the Congress was reared in Uttar Pradesh, with the Nehru ancestral home in Allahabad serving as the party's nodal point. Divisions along caste lines, midwifed by Vishwa Pratap Singh along Mandal lines, became so obsessive that caste-identified parties gave the Congress no chance to work its magic. Obviously, the Congress had a larger constituency to think of.

In a sense, the Congress acknowledged reality by agreeing to play second fiddle to the Dravidian parties of the DMK or AIADMK variety in a state like Tamil Nadu. The party's most recent efforts to try to begin wresting back the traditional base in the assembly elections by launching the political career of the crown prince of the Nehru-Gandhi family proved a signal failure. The states have moved on from the days of Congress monopoly of power even as Opposition parties have adopted the Congress practice of relying on a political dynasty to win votes, Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav installing his son as chief minister. The opposition Bharatiya Janata Party, mired in never-ending quarrels in the only southern state of Karnataka it rules, has found a recipe of success in letting chief ministers get on with the job without too much central interference.

Although the next general election is some two years away, the changes that have come about in the Indian political scene, in some cases somewhat imperceptibly, are bound to affect the fortunes of the major parties and the place a diminished Congress will come to occupy. Apart from the Congress, the main opposition party, the BJP, is subject to regional and local pulls it has not confronted before. The BJP's health is further complicated by the fact that its mentor, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has asserted itself as the ultimate authority. What the RSS did not dare do in the days of Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the active political career of Mr L.K.Advani, it does now with carefree abandon not only in foisting a party president but also by having his term extended through a party constitutional amendment.

It seems that the RSS has come to the conclusion that much as it was miffed by the independent ways of the Gujarat Chief Minister, Mr Narendra Modi, there is no alternative to him as the party's prime ministerial candidate in 2014. If the RSS maintains this position, it and its political front, the BJP, are taking a great risk. Mr Modi is too divisive a figure to permit the National Democratic Alliance to stitch together a workable alliance, should the BJP win most seats in the Lok Sabha. It seems highly unlikely that the BJP can win a majority on its own.

With the BJP confronted by its own internal contradictions and the impossibility of promoting a narrow Hindutva plank on a national scale in a multi-religious and multi-ethnic nation, the future political picture remains foggy at best. One already hears faint cries of a third front, an apparition that always appears before a general election but never fructifies. The harsh reality is that there are too many popes in the regional parties and ego clashes are the order of the day. There is, besides, no ideological glue to bring them together, the only uniting factor being the lust for power.

There can be little doubt that the Congress president, Mrs Sonia Gandhi, is positioning her son Rahul for the prime ministerial stake in the next general election. But he has so far shown himself as a reluctant leader and his UP foray in the recent elections has been anything but encouraging. The Indian political culture of anointing a family member, particularly in the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, in the political hierarchy takes it for granted that he or she would acquire requisite leadership qualities by learning on the job.

Are we then to assume that the country will muddle through, as it has done before? Perhaps. But we must remember that the context and circumstances have changed and even as the semi-federal nature of the polity is being redefined, there is less tolerance for the inadequate performance of a crown prince or crown princess for that matter. Second, the flavour of the country's electorate is changing, with a more literate and aware population asking awkward questions about parties’ and politicians’ performance.

It would appear that the thinking of party strategists has not changed much in the new political scenario. Some, of course, rely on strong-arm tactics but that cannot influence overall results. Others inordinately bank on caste and local factors. Party pundits must take into account the aspirational character of the growing middle classes. Unlike companies selling products by changing their advertising campaigns, political strategists are behind the curve in attuning to a changing India.n

MIDDLE

Rohtang Pass and back
by Pramod K Chaudhari

Rohtang Pass or “Khuda ke pass?” “We escaped death just by one inch,” said Narendra, the van driver. Only one inch more and the van would have fallen off the treacherous road and we would have met our Maker.

We were going from Manali to Rohtang Pass just the other day. There were three families — the families of Satish Kharbanda, Sushil Mittal and that of yours truly. It was quite sunny, still we needed woollens to survive the cold of one of the highest peaks in the world. We hired these woollies on the way.

Rohtang Pass is closed for most parts of the year because of heavy snowfall. It remains open only for a few days. It was closed the day when we reached Manali, and opened only after two days. We thanked our stars.

The driver had told us a day before the journey that we should leave for the place at 4 in the morning if we wanted to come back by 4 in the evening, the time when my Volvo bus was to leave for Delhi from Manali. I had got the tickets booked for the return journey. The bus was to depart at 4 pm.

Quite torturous for me to get up so early in the morning! “However, what is the use of coming to Manali if we cannot see Rohtang Pass? I thought and prepared myself for the arduous trip. The other two families were sounded accordingly.

We left our hotel at 4.30 in the morning. Mr Kharbanda had been to Snow Point, a half way to Rohtang Pass. He advised us to carry woollens. “It is icy cold up there. You will fall ill if you don’t wear snow boots and coats,” he said. We believed him and hired them on the way.

Rohtang Pass is 51 km from Manali. It is a tough terrain. Two vehicles can hardly cross the way at the same time. Our van was moving very slowly. As the word spread that the Pass was open, everybody wanted to visit it. There was a sea of vehicles, including buses and military trucks.

There were jams at every corner and the path was scary, but as they say, “A goal should scare you a little, and excite you a lot.”

All of us, including five children, were quite excited. We wanted to see the scenic beauty of the place which has cast a spell over the world for generations.

The terrain as I have already said was tricky. As the driver negotiated many a death-defying turn, we went through the Via Dolorosa, as it were. It is at such a turn, the driver said, that one inch more and all of us would have been gathered to our fathers.

Slowly inching towards the goal, the driver made it after about four hours. We came, saw and were conquered by the heavenly snow-scape. There was snow all over. We rolled over it, threw snow balls at one another, clicked photos and played the fool. We stayed there for an hour or so and then left. Again a four-hour arduous journey to Manali, but this time we had seen something which we would cherish throughout our life.

OPED neighbours

Look-East Policy: Need for enlarged engagement
The commemorative India-ASEAN summit to mark 20 years of the completion of the Look-East Policy later in the year cannot be allowed to be just a milestone event. India will have to give direction and substance to the agenda and priorities for the next decade of partnership.
N. Ram

Arguably, a defining dimension of India’s post-Cold War external engagement has been the Look-East Policy conceptualized by former Prime Minister Narasimha Rao two decades ago. While the politico-economic imperative of the early 1990s may have shaped its initial content and course, in the last two decades it has acquired a self-sustaining critical mass to make it an indispensable factor in our politico-economic-strategic calculations.

Today, the Asia-Pacific region is India’s leading and fastest growing economic partner, vital for our economic security; it deeply impinges on some of our domestic concerns, specially in the Northeast and in the Andaman Sea. It is linked to our maritime and ecological security and enables a coordinated holistic response in dealing with natural disasters like the tsunami and even pandemics. Its space impacts on our conventional and non-conventional security environment, including threats of terrorism, piracy, transnational crime and spread of weapons of mass destruction in undesirable hands. Above all, the region stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific encompasses a space in which we could potentially play a significant role of partnership.

Asia-Pacific

If, indeed, the Asia-Pacific is likely to remain vital for our national interests, how could we build upon the significant achievements of the past two decades of partnership as we commemorate this important milestone this year? Quite clearly, our priorities will need to go beyond trade, investment and other economic areas to include our growing geo-strategic concerns in the context of rapidly changing equations in the Asia-Pacific in which India now is an important player and a necessary factor in the geo-strategic considerations of the region. For us to optimise the full inherent potential of this partnership, apart from other steps, we may need to focus on many areas of cooperation with the region, both at macro and bilateral levels, in the coming third decade of our Look-East Policy:

First, a major thrust ---- as repeatedly emphasised by the Prime Minister --- has to be on integrating our economic structures and systems with those of the Asia-Pacific and working towards a Pan-Asian economic community, selectively and step by step harmonising our approaches and policies, building upon the free trade agreements and the comprehensive economic cooperation arrangements we have entered into with a number of counties. While this thought has been articulated in the pronouncements of our leaders (the Prime Minister’s earlier reference to the “arc of advantage”), no serious steps seem to have been taken so far.

Second, priority will need to be accorded to creating and augmenting all encompassing regional connectivities and networking --- economic, infrastructural, social and institutional --- stretching from Myanmar to the Pacific coast. This too came across as a strong theme during our Prime Minister’s pronouncements in Myanmar. We will need to initiate regional consultations to identify and pursue specific projects connecting India to the entire region. So far, very little seems to have happened, although a few schemes have been on the drawing board for some time.

Closest neighbours

Third, Myanmar and Thailand, two of our closest neighbours with whom we share land and/or maritime boundaries, are pivotal to our Look-East Policy. Both are members of the nascent Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Techno- Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), a sub-regional grouping comprising two ASEAN and five South-Asian countries, potentially vital for the development and security of our Northeast. Both are our traditional partners enjoying ethnic, cultural and trans-border economic links with the northeast. Both are the key to our security, specially maritime and ecological security. Cooperation with both is necessary for our efforts to combat and contain terrorism, insurgency and trans-border crime, particularly in our Northeast. Both are potentially important economic partners vital for the development of our Northeast. Indeed, economic integration, interdependence, connectivity and cross-border traditional links are the best insurance for peace, progress and stability, particularly of our Northeast. BIMSTEC needs to be more optimally factored into our Look-East Policy. So far, in concrete terms, very limited progress seems to have been achieved.

Fourth, China’s lengthening shadows and growing presence in our neighbourhood is best countered in this strategically important space through meaningful regional cooperation. ASEAN, for example, has its own concerns about China’s intentions in the region as reflected by the South China Sea standoff. Myanmar too has begun to show unease over China’s tight embrace. Japan and South Korea have their own differing perceptions with China in the context of the geo-politics of northeast Asia. It would be useful to engage the countries of the region in a strategic dialogue to identify and evolve possible convergences. The democracies of the Asia-Pacific, specially, could cooperate in dealing with common challenges. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a regional security dialogue platform, could provide useful aegis for such exchange of views with India playing a more proactive role, notwithstanding China’s influential presence in the ARF. The idea cannot be to confront or counter China but to focus on the concerns of the countries of the region.

Fifth, maritime security is likely to emerge as a key concern in the coming decades. India’s pivotal role in the Indian Ocean stretching up to the Pacific could contribute to ensuring freedom of the seas, peace, security from piracy and sea-borne transnational crime and keeping this space conflict free. Our proactive engagement in this area is likely to yield positive results for our own security. Again the ARF could be used as an umbrella for such engagement with regional participants. We have already begun to see results.

Sixth, India enjoys excellent bilateral relations with almost all the countries of the Asia-Pacific, free of conflict or differences. We now have strategic dialogues with many leading Asia-Pacific countries like Japan, South Korea and some ASEAN countries. We are also members of many Asia-Pacific institutions. In the next and succeeding decades we will have to deepen and enlarge the content, scope and frequency of our strategic dialogue to include regional and global strategic issues in our discussions and evolve convergences, where possible. A shared “Asian” approach on issues of peace, security, development, democracy and on countering the challenges facing the region will have to be our larger objective in such strategic discussions. In this context, our effort could be to institutionalise strategic dialogue and cooperation arrangements, including on regional defence and security issues through the ARF and possibly the ASEAN Defence Ministers plus Meetings (ADMM+). India’s now acknowledged growing centrality in this process needs to be demonstrated and projected. India, along
with China, Japan, Australia and ASEAN, collectively, needs to shoulder the responsibilities of the new emerging Asia-Pacific security and politico-economic architecture in the coming Asian century.

India’s growing “soft power” and skills in HRD and S&T and ASEAN’s success in managing growth with equity and excellence in the service sectors, even in times of crisis, provide useful areas for enhancing cooperation involving people-to-people and grassroot links, an enduring and mutually beneficial basis for sustained cooperation. Specific task forces will need to be constituted to explore possibilities of cooperation in a time-bound manner. The direct involvement of the people is vital to sustained partnership. So far, critics would argue that India’s cooperation arrangements have been overly government-centric and government-driven. This has to change.

Finally, Asia-Pacific regional organisations like the East Asia Summit (EAS), the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia-Pacific (UNESCAP), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the ARF, the Track II Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and other dialogue arrangements and the many ASEAN-driven regional fora of which India is a member provide an opportunity to engage with China in the regional context. This could be cautiously explored and used as an incremental confidence-building measure with China. Both countries, through regional arrangements, could find themselves in a web of mutually reinforcing equations which may not only be beneficial to the region but also act as a benign factor in our own complex relations with China. The Asia-Pacific dimension of India- China relations, if handled with caution, could emerge as an important factor for peace and stability in the region, as for our bilateral relations. We, together
with the regional players, will cautiously need to explore mutually reinforcing elements with China.

Opportunity

The next decade could be a period of opportunity for India in the Asia-Pacific. For the first time in many decades, India is becoming integral to Asia-Pacific peace, progress, security and stability. It is increasingly being seen as one of the pillars of the emerging politico-security and economic architecture of this rapidly changing region on the threshold of a promising century. More importantly, the regional perspective of India is positive and India is seen as a desired partner in a shared Asia-Pacific space. We will need to build on this opportunity by creating mutually beneficial and reinforcing imperatives of interdependence, sharing and common destiny. The time for an imaginative phase II of our successful Look-East Policy may have arrived. The commemorative India-ASEAN summit to mark 20 years of the completion of the Look-East Policy later in the year cannot be allowed to be just a milestone event. India will have to give direction and substance to the agenda and priorities for the next decade of partnership. ASEAN, from all accounts, is eager and receptive to deepening and enlarging its engagement with a potentially powerful India. Its own Look-West Policy is clearly anchored on developing closer relations with India. Are we ready?

The thrust areas
l A major thrust has to be on integrating our economic structures and systems with those of the Asia-Pacific and working towards a Pan-Asian economic community.
l Priority will need to be accorded to creating and augmenting all- encompassing regional connectivity and networking stretching from Myanmar to the Pacific coast.
l Myanmar and Thailand are pivotal to our Look-East Policy. Both are members of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Techno- Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC).
l China’s lengthening shadows and growing presence in our neighbourhood is best countered in this strategically important space through meaningful regional cooperation.
l Maritime security is likely to emerge as a key concern in the coming decades. India’s pivotal role in the Indian Ocean stretching up to the Pacific could contribute to ensuring freedom of the seas, peace, security from piracy.
l India enjoys excellent bilateral relations with almost all the countries of the Asia-Pacific, free of conflict or differences. We now have strategic dialogues with many leading Asia-Pacific countries like Japan, South Korea and some ASEAN countries.
l Asia-Pacific regional organisations like the East Asia Summit, the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia-Pacific, the Asian Development Bank, the ARF, the Track II Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific and other dialogue arrangements and the many ASEAN-driven regional fora of which India is a member provide an opportunity to engage with China in the regional context.

The writer, a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, was closely associated with the early phase of the Look-East Policy.