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Not just
God's act Caste bias
in Haryana police |
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Complexities
of Siachen dispute
All for
that additional parantha
Ensuring
continuity in the nuclear programme The
‘No-first-use’ policy and BJP’s dilemma
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Caste bias in Haryana police Amidst
applause for the death sentence awarded to the Shakti Mills rapists by a Mumbai court come reports of rape victims from smaller towns raising doubts about our justice delivery system, especially in cases involving Dalit women. On March 23, four Dalit girls were kidnapped by five youths and one of them was allegedly gang-raped. The girls, who belonged to Bhagana village of Hisar district in Haryana, were later found at Bathinda railway station, from where the police took them back to their village. One of the victims, an 18-year-old girl, in a complaint alleged that five youths — all residents of Bhagana village — kidnapped her and her three friends and gang-raped her after giving some intoxicants. Though, the police arrested five of the accused, the victims allege there were more men and their arrest has been delayed due to the clout of their dominant Jat community that has prohibited them from using the village well, temple and school, a punishment for reporting rape to the police. The victims along with other Dalit families are protesting against police inaction at Jantar Mantar, Delhi. The victims demand compensation of Rs 15 lakh, death sentence for the rapists and facilities to move to an urban area. The demands are reflective of their desperation and lack of trust in the administration, which, unfortunately is controlled by its own caste matrix. While urban high-profile cases of sexual crime get media attention, forcing the law-enforcing agencies to deliver justice in time, rape victims belonging to the backward classes and rural areas remain vulnerable. One should not forget that Bhanwri Devi, whose gang-rape triggered major changes in the law dealing with rape, continues to struggle for justice after 30 long years. She is a Dalit too. About 137 Dalit families have left Bhagana village to demand justice. It is time the local administration controlled law and order with an iron hand without showing any caste consideration.
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You cannot find peace by avoiding life. — Virginia Woolf
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Suppression of anarchy
TOWARDS the close of his Budget speech His Honour the Lieutenant Governor made a reference to the subject of anarchical crime. His Honour said the Government gave a full opportunity for the criticism to the public with a view to remove defects or anomalies in the administration. Such criticism was welcomed as it afforded the Government an opportunity to justify their policy or to perfect their machinery of administration. If Government did not move at the pace some people desired, it was not because Government was hostile but because Government must regulate the pace to suit the views of all classes. To impatient idealists he would quote the maxim of Burke that "innovation was not reformation." In the community there was a backward or conservative class as well which was opposed to a hasty change.
Honourary Magistrates’ Association, Punjab
AT the general meeting of the Honourary Magistrates' Association held on 11th instant, the Deputy Commissioner is reported to have made an eloquent and thoughtful speech which created a great impression on the audience. This was presumably before the proceedings of the meeting commenced. The reading of the annual report and the fixing of the admission fee and monthly subscription were among the business transacted. But the most important business was the decision that a deputation should wait upon the Lieutenant Governor as early as possible "with a view to represent their claim for a seat or seats on the Legislative Councils." The public would have been able to judge the claim of the Honourary Magistrates "for a seat or seats in the Legislative Councils" if the good Secretary had also explained the objects of the Association and the work it has been doing.
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Complexities of Siachen dispute
The
75-km long Siachen glacier sits astride two disputed boundaries — with Pakistan and China — and covers about 10,000 sq km uninhabited terrain. Along with other glaciers in this area, it is an important source of water to the Indus river which passes through Ladakh and Kargil, and then into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Siachen is claimed by India on the basis of accession of J&K to India in October 1947 and the India-Pakistan Karachi Agreement of 1949 which described the ceasefire line beyond Point NJ 9842 on the map to be 'thence north to the glaciers'. Thirty years ago, an alert Northern Army Commander, Lt Gen M.L. Chibber, deployed troops to pre-empt Pakistan's military occupation of Siachen and ensured against India ceding this territory by default. The Indian Army occupied the Soltoro Ridge, which runs northwards to secure the glacier and territory to its east. The military significance of this deployment is that (a) it dominates Pakistani positions west of the Soltoro Ridge and blocks infiltration possibilities into the Shyok valley of Ladakh (b) it prevents Pakistani military adventurism in Turtuk and areas to its south, and (c) its northern-most position at Indira Col overlooks the Shaqsgam valley of Gilgit-Baltistan, ceded illegally by Pakistan to China in 1963, and denies Pakistan an access to Karakoram Pass. Since 1984, the line dividing the military forces of India and Pakistan in the area north of NJ 9842 has come to be known as the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). Siachen has always been considered a military setback by Pakistan. That the Pakistan army is nowhere near the glacier is a fact never mentioned in public and serves as a psychological drain. When Pervez Musharraf commanded the Special Services Group in Gilgit-Baltistan, he made several futile attempts to capture Indian posts near Bilafond La and suffered casualties. One of the military objectives of the Pakistan army during the Kargil war was to recapture a part of Siachen and cut off our vital communication links to this area. It failed. In the 1950s, China constructed a strategic road connecting Tibet to Xinjiang through Aksai Chin. The dispute over Aksai Chin became one of the triggers for the Sino-Indian war of 1962. In 1963, Pakistan and China signed a border agreement wherein Pakistan unilaterally ceded the Shaqsgam valley to China. This agreement described the eastern termination of the Sino-Pakistan boundary at the Karakoram Pass, ignoring "thence north to the glaciers" statement of the 1948 Karachi Agreement. This alignment and its demarcation were formalised through a protocol in 1987. According to Senge H. Sering, a scholar from Gilgit-Baltistan, “China has a huge and long-term presence in Gilgit-Baltistan and is building extensive road, bridge and telecom networks to sustain it. The drivers compelling China to develop Karakoram Corridor are diverse and mainly pertain to its economic, strategic and political ambitions.” China’s control of Shaqsgam and other valleys of Gilgit-Baltistan enables it to connect them with the Karakoram highway and its military and industrial complexes of northwestern Tibet. Notably, China has been willing to negotiate and settle the POK-China boundary with Pakistan. But they have refused to discuss the LAC or Chinese boundary with J&K on our side. Instead, they have repeatedly given several signals that Ladakh is a ‘disputed’ area ranging from issuing ‘stapled visas’ to visitors from J&K and refusing a visa to the GOC-in-C, Northern Command, who was to make an official visit to China as a part of the ongoing military-level exchanges, to name a few. The view among some in India that Siachen is a 'low-hanging fruit' amongst India-Pakistan disputes but the Indian Army does not allow it to be resolved is unjustified. Given the strategic importance of Siachen, three major factors that influence efforts to resolve the Siachen issue with Pakistan are: Indo-Pak trust level, the Sino-Pak nexus, and technological developments affecting its geography. Decades ago, when India and Pakistan started discussions on de-militarisation of Siachen, Pakistan's demand was that India should withdraw its troops to the pre-1972 positions which were to the east of the line joining NJ 9842 and Karakoram Pass. Pakistan did not and has not till date agreed to authenticate and delineate the AGPL and existing troops' locations. This was not acceptable as it would have given considerable geographical advantage to the Pakistan army to access the Saltoro Ridge and the glacier and also recognise the line joining NJ 9842 to Karakoram Pass. The lack of trust between India and Pakistan is well known. Without formal authentication of the AGPL, how does one detect any future encroachment into this area? It must be stated here that no amount of existing technology can have fool-proof surveillance/capability to detect small-scale infiltration, sufficient to hold and defend a tactical feature in this terrain. In 1997 when this issue came up for discussion, I pointed out the strategic and military pros and cons to the then Prime Minister. Someone asked what the Army could do if Pakistan violated the agreement any time later. I said that it would not be possible to re-capture the Soltoro Ridge. We would have no alternative other than to capture Pakistani territory somewhere else. This issue was not discussed thereafter. In the initial stages, the occupation of Siachen, apart from a military effort of Herculean proportions, involved considerable financial drain. The sacrifices made by the Army and Air Force personnel on account of the harsh terrain and enemy actions can never be forgotten. However, over the years, with experience and ever-improving technology, it has been possible to overcome terrain and sustenance problems substantially. Technological advancements in future can be expected to further offset these difficulties. Should India forego its strategic advantage due to cost-benefit ratio analyses? Or, because not a blade of grass grows in the area? Certainly not. At the strategic level, one requires a long memory and a longer foresight and vision. We should look ahead and ask ourselves: (a) Can we trust Pakistan to the extent of foregoing authentication of the AGPL after what its army did across the formally delineated LoC in Kargil? (b) What long-term strategic advantages will accrue to the Sino-Pak nexus? How will it affect our political (Parliament's) stand on Aksai Chin under China's and Gilgit-Baltistan under Pakistan's occupation? We must keep these factors in mind when discussing this subject.
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All for that additional parantha Sita Ram, stout, five-foot-something, was one of the many bearers we had in the mess. He usually handled the most important dish, or dessert or fruit, on the menu. On Sundays when we got two paranthas each with curd, he would distribute additional paranthas on demand. On non-veg days, he was the one who decided who got leg pieces — and how many. On Saturdays, when English movies were played, he would even pack something for us to munch. The seniors, students of classes 11 and 12, and the prefects usually sat at the table closest to the concrete slab where steel dongas were replenished by the kitchen staff, who stood on the other side. That was an unwritten rule, a tradition, that as you got older you inched closer to this vantage point. That table of prefects and other seniors got the best stuff. But if others, like minions in lower classes, also wanted VIP treatment, Sita Ram had to be bribed. The ones in classes 6, 7 and 8 gave him money to buy a bottle of liquor; others, in classes 9 and 10, bought him a bottle themselves. Sita Ram was liberal with brands — also with obligations. In winter, when day scholars also had lunch in the hostel mess, and it would be a full house with even girls in the otherwise all-boys' domain, Sita Ram obliged us by treating our girlfriends as special guests. Boys chose to sit with their partners or at a position from where their eyes could easily communicate with each other even through the din. Sita Ram was briefed beforehand about the special ones. The bribe seemed well worth it because it got your girlfriend hot chappatis or an extra fruit. I left the hostel a good 20 years ago, and have forgotten the names of all other bearers. I have even forgotten who courted whom or if those affairs continued beyond school too. But Sita Ram has stayed firmly in my memory through these two decades. Last evening, an unknown alumnus put pictures of a cock house dinner on Facebook and there, in one of the photos, was Sita Ram, with his quintessential white turban with a protruding plume. Somehow I felt like going over to Patiala to offer him a bottle of Teacher's. I'm sure his standard, in these 20 years, must have reached this level.
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Ensuring continuity in the nuclear programme
India’s nuclear journey can be categorised into two broad parts, the ‘retrospect,’ covering the period from 1947 to 2008, and the other being the ‘prospect’ phase post-2008, which is still unfolding and whose achievements are yet to be fully harvested. Notwithstanding these phases, an element of continuity is reflected in three policy constituents – an Indian worldview, political will and a military-technical capability, which has to keep evolving. The first phase actually began even before Independence when Dr Homi Bhabha wrote to the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust in 1944, drawing attention to the enormous potential of nuclear technology and suggesting the setting up of the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research. After Independence, things moved rapidly – establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1948, commissioning of the research reactor, Apsara, in 1956, and by 1969, the Tarapur power plant was on line. It was an optimistic period marked by the sentiment behind ‘Atoms for Peace’ and the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency with the idea of promoting international cooperation for peaceful applications. India spelt out its three stage nuclear power programme with its closed fuel cycle, which remains an integral part of the Department of Atomic Energy’s mandate. This was also the phase when India took a number of disarmament initiatives to curb nuclear testing and the spread of nuclear weapons. However, during the 60s, particularly after the India-China war in 1962 and the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, there was a rethink. The nuclear issue had entered our security calculus for the first time and in the resolution at the All India Congress Committee Session at Durgapur in 1965, failure to obtain security guarantees from the US, USSR, UK and France, and the Indian rejection of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP) in 1969, lay the seeds of the ‘nuclear option.’ The 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion demonstrated Indian capability but also attracted international criticism and sanctions. For the next quarter century, India’s nuclear policy was marked by restraint even though safeguarding the ‘nuclear option’ remained an article of faith with successive governments. The Indian nuclear establishment was forced to rely on indigenisation, leading to inevitable delays. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was set up. Meanwhile, during the 1980’s, the international community turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s nuclear weaponisation and acquisition of missile capability, with its implications for our security environment. The end of the Cold War generated optimism about the prospects for nuclear disarmament but this was short-lived. The focus was on tackling proliferation threats, leading to further expansion of export control regimes to cover dual use goods and technologies. The indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in 1995 was another indicator that salience of nuclear weapons was not going to come down any time soon. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations yielded an outcome which fell short of our expectations in being neither comprehensive nor a ban. There were growing concerns that the ‘nuclear option’ which had been safeguarded since 1974 could well cease to be a ‘credible option’ and wither on the vine. The third phase began with the nuclear tests in mid-1998 when India declared itself a nuclear weapon state. Initially, the international reaction was strong. However, with sustained diplomatic efforts and changes in the international environment, particularly the realisation of the threat of global terrorism after 9/11, we were able to come out of the isolation phase. The circulation of the draft doctrine in 1999 was an unusually open step. Despite changes of government, this has stood the test of time except for a few small changes. Meanwhile, India was able to undertake a new set of security dialogues with its strategic partners and also engage China and Pakistan. Through these turning points, there has been a degree of continuity, an intertwining of the strands of moral politik and real politik, a conviction that the three-stage nuclear power programme was essential and a determination that India would not be subjected to nuclear threats or coercion. Coupled with the unique restraint between demonstration of capability in 1974 and declaration of India as a nuclear weapon state in 1998, was also the conviction that a nuclear-weapon-free world is a desirable objective because it enhances India’s security and global security. This stand has been consistently maintained since Independence and is reflected in the nuclear doctrine as well. Let me now turn to the prospects for nuclear India. Since the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 2008, also called the 123 Agreement, a number of bilateral agreements have been signed, some with regard to supply of reactor fuel and others for setting up nuclear power plants. India has also adopted its Nuclear Liability Act, though this is a subject on which nuclear technology suppliers still have some questions. Gradually, India has overcome the barriers that isolated it from nuclear trade and commerce in the civilian field, though membership of export control regimes, particularly the NSG, remains a work in progress. Greater transparency in the nuclear establishment has come about as preliminary steps have been taken to separate the military and civilian fuel cycles by voluntarily placing some of our power reactors under IAEA safeguards and strengthening regulatory and oversight mechanisms. All these are ongoing processes which need to be followed through by the new government. Bold decisions require a combination of both – external circumstances and domestic leadership – and it is these two together that constitute the turning point in our nuclear journey. However, the ‘prospects’ for a nuclear India, reflect the same underlying Indian worldview and political will that has characterised the turning points in the six decade long story even as we continue to build our military-technical capabilities in keeping with our doctrine. The writer is Special Envoy of the Prime Minister for
Disarmament & Non-Proliferation Issues. Excerpted from a lecture delivered at Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi
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The ‘No-first-use’ policy and BJP’s dilemma
Prime
minister Manmohan Singh’s recent exhortation that a global no-first-use convention relating to nuclear weapons should be established, is surreal. He argued that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons being to deter nuclear aggression, the nuclear weapon states should formally declare their adherence to this norm, permitting the establishment of a global no-first-use regime, reduction and finally, elimination of nuclear weapons. The bewildering question is why the Prime Minister chose to make this statement in the dying hours of the UPA government, especially when its return to power seems unlikely. Moreover, India’s present ‘No-first-use’ policy was derived by the BJP and the NDA government that had conducted the Shakti nuclear tests in May 1998, making India a de facto nuclear weapons state. The BJP’s manifesto for the 2014 general elections pledges to “Study in detail India's nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times.” How the nuclear doctrine would be modified has not been clarified, though there is speculation that India’s traditional ‘No-first-use’ posture would be reviewed. Election manifestoes are not taken seriously in India since they are plainly designed to garner votes. Not so the BJP. Its manifesto in 1998 had stated that if elected to power, it would “Re-evaluate the country's nuclear policy and exercise the option to induct nuclear weapons.” This had attracted little attention except for a few comments. Hence the huge surprise when the Vajpayee-led NDA government conducted the nuclear tests in 1998, ostensibly to counter the threat from China and Pakistan. Shortly thereafter then Prime Minister AB Vajpayee declared that India would pursue a ‘No-first-use’ policy in regard to employing nuclear weapons. This was reaffirmed in Parliament in December 1998. Ultimately, the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) undertook an extensive exercise to draft India’s nuclear doctrine. There was some ambiguity after its release in August 1999, when the National Security Adviser, Brajesh Mishra, declared that it was only a draft proposal by the NSAB and not yet approved by the government. The unseemly haste in releasing the doctrine followed by a disclaimer was widely believed to be designed to seek electoral advantage by emphasising the BJP’s commitment to national security. Ultimately, India’s nuclear doctrine was officially released in January 2003 by promulgating the decisions thereon by the Cabinet Committee on Security stating, inter alia, that India would adopt a policy no-first-use of nuclear weapons. These would only be used to retaliate against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces. But in the event of a major attack by biological or chemical weapons, India would retain the option of using nuclear weapons. Further, the doctrine pledges that India will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. These are important qualifications to India’s nuclear weapons policy, but they leave three important dilemmas. First, the problem of attack by non-state actors remains open, which has been the subject of anxious debate in the three global Nuclear Security Summits. Second, how does one define a ‘major attack’ by biological or chemical weapons? What is ‘major’ and what is ‘minor’ could be interminably debated. Third, serious difficulties arise in identifying the perpetrator of a chemical or biological weapons attack. They could be undertaken by a state actor or non-state actor and, conceivably, by a non-state actor assisted by a state actor. The present difficulties in identifying the source of chemical weapons attacks in Syria are instructive in this regard. The BJP’s current unease with pursuing its ‘No-first-use’ policy is believed to be resultant of internal discussions regarding Pakistan's determined efforts to increase its nuclear stockpile and deploy tactical nuclear weapons. Pakistan, of course, has no use for a no-first-use doctrine, arguing that the weaker conventionally armed power in a nuclear adversarial situation has to rely on nuclear weapons to assure its security. NATO had refused to accept a no-first-use policy during the Cold War, although this was declared by the Soviet Union on the premise that Warsaw Pact’s superior conventional forces could defeat NATO. This logic might also be behind Pakistan’s decision to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to counter India’s Cold Start strategy, despite the dangers inherent in this strategic posture. Paradoxically, India is pursuing the same nuclear policies as the United States and the former Soviet Union. It wants to deploy the strategic triad comprising land, air and sea borne nuclear weapons. While India is committed to a ‘credible minimum deterrent’ posture, there is little understanding about what exactly this means in terms of weapon systems and funds. Paradoxically, India’s armed forces have been kept out of the nuclear decision-making structure. The Atomic Energy Agency (AEC) is charged with maintaining the physical infrastructure and security of the nuclear arsenal but the armed forces are charged with maintaining the delivery systems and the actual utilisation of nuclear weapons. Further, it remains unclear what will be India’s response to a limited attack with tactical nuclear weapons. A detailed study India's nuclear doctrine is called for that has to address all these issues in their totality. An exercise to either promote India’s present exception-riddled ‘No-first-use’ policy, as sought by Manmohan Singh, or reject it completely in a knee-jerk reaction, as suggested by the BJP manifesto, will not serve the national interest.
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