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Nailing rapists
Locating suspects |
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Traumatised existence
The West concedes failure
Romeo and Juliet
Tribune Special China modernises while India lags behind
Review
What’s in a name?
A ride to remember
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Locating suspects Monitoring the mobile phone usage of suspects is an integral aspect of law-enforcement operations the world over. Ever since these small communication devices have become ubiquitous, they have provided millions of users with unprecedented freedom to communicate with each other.
By tracking particular mobile phone numbers, law-enforcement agencies too have been able to solve many crimes, or help to exonerate people if they are found to be innocent. While privacy concerns dominate the discourse on the interception of phone calls in many western nations, it is not such an issue in India. Perhaps it should be, because surely Indian citizens too have as much right to their privacy as those in any other part of the world. What they say or write to each other should be between the sender and the recipient. Criminals, however, should not be allowed to use technology for their nefarious designs and thus law-enforcement agencies have the right to intercept such communication, provided they do so with oversight. Tracking the movement of criminal suspects through their phones, on the other hand, is far less controversial and is, in fact, something that is used practically all over the world. The Department of Telecommunication requires mobile companies to provide “location-based service” (LBS) to law- enforcement agencies as well as those connected with national security. It is surprising that various telecommunication companies have, till now, not given LBS access to the government agencies concerned. At the root of the matter is the question of who will bear the cost of setting up such a service. The government should step in promptly to ensure that whatever problems exist should be sorted out promptly. On the other hand, various telecom companies would be well advised to look beyond the bottom-line and provide the needed access. With the rising crime graph, in an increasingly insecure world, law-enforcement and national security agencies need all the tools that can help them in discharging their duties. |
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Traumatised existence Here is a script perfected for disaster. A public school drop -out with high aspirations, Nishan Singh, is accused of being involved in 16 criminal cases and yet roaming free under alleged political protection. A 15-year-old girl, Shruti, abducted twice, is not well aware of her rights in a social set-up where male sexuality is perceived as an uncontrollable force to which women should succumb, or would be forced to succumb.
Then, there are her parents helplessly watching the sequence of events in their daughter’s life, who is once again abducted in broad daylight at gunpoint from their home in a state where the law and order situation is becoming a nightmare for the common man and woman. To top it all, here is a police force that almost always looks for a clue in a victimised woman’s “character” to blame it on her “modern” life-style and wriggles out of cases that involve notorious characters. Only in this particular case, the police went a step ahead in putting a stamp of its insensitivity by releasing pictures of the abducted minor girl and spreading word about the so-called letter of her elopement, which by its own admission later, showed the possibility of being a forged one. It is only the people of Faridkot and the neighbouring areas who gathered courage to disprove the police theory of elopement and demanded action. Twentyfive days later, though a dozen alleged accomplices have been arrested, neither Shruti nor the main accused, Nishan Singh, has been traced. Politicians of all hues found an opportunity in this case to grind their axe. Despite the resources and the time spent on the gender-sensitising programmes of the police, the male-dominated force refuses to understand that because of several socioeconomic factors, women victims are differently placed and need sensitive treatment. If only the police ensured after her first abduction that the accused was kept behind bars, the girl and her family would have been saved from a traumatic experience. |
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What you do today can improve all your tomorrows. — Ralph Marston |
The West concedes failure After all the hype about negotiations with the Taliban, finally the pretence is gone. The Obama Administration has conceded that it has failed in getting the Taliban to the negotiating table and it now expects that any progress on the political front is going to come only after 2014 when most of the western forces would be out of Afghanistan.
The whole logic behind Obama’s surge was that a final push with additional 30,000 American troops would be able to set the terms of engagement with the adversary in Afghanistan. But the surge is now over and there are few results to show for it. The surge was half-hearted to begin with. Obama had approved a 30,000-troop increase sought by the military in 2009 but at the same time he had made it clear that the surge forces would begin returning home by July 2011. Even the pace of that reduction was ambiguous, with Defence Department officials describing the initial reductions as minor and some of the President’s other advisers, including Vice-President Joe Biden, suggesting the pullout would be as rapid as the deployment of the surge troops. Tensions within the Obama Administration over the size and pace of the planned pullout of US troops from Afghanistan were always there, with the military seeking to limit a reduction in combat forces and the White House pressing for a withdrawal substantial enough to placate a war-weary electorate. At a time of economic turmoil in the US, the war’s cost has led to increasing public disenchantment with the war. Nearly two-thirds of Americans, according to various surveys, no longer find the war in Afghanistan worth fighting. After repeatedly arguing during 2008 elections that Afghanistan was the “good” war, the “necessary” war, Obama started searching for an exit strategy because he couldn’t “lose the whole Democratic Party”. As Woodward has argued in his book, Obama’s Wars, “He (Obama) was looking for choices that would limit US involvement and provide a way out.” Washington’s decision led the US adversaries to conclude that President Obama’s heart was not in the war. He had no will to fight. A perception gained ground in the region that the West was losing the war and negotiations only reinforced the notion that the West was losing and as such was willing to negotiate from a position of weakness. Now the world is being told that attempts to broker meaningful talks with the Taliban have been given up and Washington is merely laying the groundwork for peace talks after the departure of western forces in 2014. The US expects the Afghan government to take the lead in these negotiations. But it is a moot point as to what credibility the West has at the moment when NATO is openly talking of considering an earlier withdrawal because of the growing insider attacks that have increased the trust deficit between western and Afghan forces to an all-time high. The present governance structure in Afghanistan is unlikely to survive the departure of western forces and the 2014 elections are also not likely to produce a national government capable of addressing myriad challenges facing the troubled nation. This begs the question as to who will negotiate with the Taliban if at all the group shows an interest in talks. Pakistan, meanwhile, will continue with its old game and has so far not given any indication that it has an interest in a regional framework. The West has concluded that it has done what it was able to and today has neither the will nor the capability to sustain a long-term military presence in Afghanistan. Domestic economic issues are more significant at the moment and geopolitical developments of greater long-term importance need to be dealt with. The Obama surge was the last attempt to shape political equilibrium in Afghanistan by using the military instrument. It has turned out to be less effective partly because it was half-hearted and partly because the main problem turned out to be Pakistan which no one had any intention of tackling. The idea that the Taliban can be divided into good and bad categories might look appealing to outsiders desperate to make an exit, but to regional powers like India, Iran and Russia such an approach is anathema. Those elements of the Taliban who might be willing to strike a deal with the West just to see the western forces leave the region will haunt the security of regional states like India and Iran long after the western forces would have left, just as they had done in the past. The idea that the US could do business with the Taliban is not new. This was what led the Clinton administration to turn a blind eye to the Taliban’s rise to power in Kabul and its medieval practices, all in the name of good old-fashioned realism. Though former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf committed Pakistan to support efforts to stabilise Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime and agreed to strengthen the Karzai administration, Islamabad’s capacity and commitment to crack down on terrorists and militants was always questionable. It is chimerical to assume that the US can negotiate its way out of the present mess by luring the “moderate” Taliban. But as the deadline for the withdrawal of US forces draws near, it is incumbent upon the regional states to step up to the plate and start providing some solutions embedded in the region. India, which has much to lose with the new regional configuration post-2014, should be doing much more in galvanising regional support for a lasting solution to the Afghanistan problem. The first step in this direction should be assessing what Pakistan’s intentions are, and if Pakistan’s military elites are intent on a self-destruct posture then New Delhi should be working with other regional players much more proactively than it has done so far. Time is running out and India will have only itself to blame if the region ends up returning to the dark days of the 1990s. Then it will not be the West’s problem; it will be India’s. The writer teaches at King’s
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Romeo and Juliet
Human
soul is pre-eminently amorous and nothing if not amorous. Love and desire are dark, obsessive and central to our lives. Desire is like a dice rattling before a gambler. My boss rang me up. His friend wanted an “Entry Permit” to the airport to receive a special guest. I arranged it. He met me at the India International Centre, and thanked me. I found him to be a decent gentleman in his late sixties. He had an old world charm, and exuded comfortable prosperity. After a few days, he again requested for an “Entry Permit”. It was arranged. On that very day, I was at the airport to attend a meeting. He met me. He was with a middle-aged lady whom he introduced me as a very “special friend”. She had the proportions of a Roden’s sculptor, and dark eyes that seemed to swallow everything they saw. Her normal gestures were hotter than a frying pan. Later on, he told me that both of them had troubled marriages, and were in search of true love. There is a deep dark subway of despair that rumbles underneath the human beings. In life there is nothing “just right”. Monotony and monogamy of marriage starts affecting people. Abraham Lincoln remarked, “Marriage is neither Heaven nor Hell, it is purgatory.” A Hollywood actress said, “Marriage is a romance in which the hero dies in the first chapter.” Marlyn Monroe described a husband as “chiefly a good lover, when he is betraying his wife”. In fact, marriage is a tyranny over man’s natural instincts. A 12th century Sanskrit poet wrote, “Virgins indulge in love for curiosity, harlots for money, widows for remembering good old days, wives out of sense of duty, but the real pleasure of love is possible only in adultery.” The rituals of romance, the pursuit and evasion, the pain and expectation of rapture, the decibels of delight and deliciously corrupt excitement of a secret encounter. Age is like a creeping tiger crawling upon a sleeping prey. Sometimes when one is past the prime, re-greenings of the heart take place. Hollywood diva Mae West remarked, “It is better to be looked than to be overlooked.” In marriage after some time sparkle turns to frost. Marriage starts with a young man looking longingly at a young women, and with the passage of time, it turns to be a fat woman glaring at an old balding man. Shelly said marriage “starts with heat and ends in cold”. Passion has two ends: delightful and deranged. In marriage one becomes a prisoner of familiarity. Love is like measles – all the worse when it comes late in life. One day I received an invitation for lunch in Ashoka Hotel. They had got married. My office was in Hotel Samrat, and I walked next door to Ashoka. They were looking lovingly at each other like young lovers. A colleague remarked that we could also look forward for a romantic retirement. In metros I have found that the elderly romance is becoming quite common. In India, the upper middle class has come of age. I feel that every man is a Romeo at heart and every woman a Juliet, and age is
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Tribune Special OCtober 20, 1962 is not a date Indians would like to remember. During the 1962 border war with China, the Indian Army was far inferior and far inexperienced compared to the Chinese and also compared to what it is today. The Indian Army had then never really fought a full scale war, certainly not with a country of the size of China. The Navy, equipped mostly with hand-me-down British warships, was far too tiny. Similarly, the Indian Air Force (IAF) comprised world war vintage aircraft. Prior to Independence, the officer cadre of the Indian Army comprised junior officers with just one brigadier rank officer, later Field Marshal Kodanandra Madappa Cariappa, who in 1950 became the first Indian to become India's Commanderin-Chief of the Indian armed forces, a post that was later abolished. Army Chief. The Indian Army, raised entirely by the British colonialists, had fought under the command and leadership of British officers in various theatres overseas during the two world wars. In the first 15 post-Independence years immediately prior to the Sino-Indian war, the Indian Army had only fought tactical level infantry and light artillery battles with its own breakaway faction that now belonged to a freshly carved out Pakistan over a year-and-two-month period in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The two armies were similarly trained, equipped and led and spoke the same language. Nehru's retrospectively misplaced faith in the newly created United Nations and the fact that both the Indian and Pakistani armies were commanded by British generals, a situation further complicated with India's then Governor General being a Briton (Lord
Mountbatten), came in the way of the Indian Army fully testing its military prowess at that time.
Other Indian Army actions during this 15 year period were limited to mere force posturing in Junagadh (1947), a short 'police action' against the forces of the Nizam of Hyderabad (1948) and a limited joint services operation in Goa (1961) - all of which formed part of a post-Independence nation consolidation exercise. It is with this meagre experience that India faced Mao Tse-tung's far more experienced PLA (Peoples Liberation Army), that had in 1949 succeeded in defeating the West-backed Knomintang (KMT) government after a long struggle. Only a few years earlier, the PLA had briefly collaborated with the KMT forces to repel a Japanese invasion. Soon after wresting control of the country from the KMT, the PLA had fought the UN forces in Korea. Indeed, the PLA was not just an army - it was an ideologically committed and trained movement that was synonomous with the then newly created Communist China. The role of India's political leaders (notably Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Defence Minister Vengalil Krishnan Krsihna Menon), the conduct of the military leadership (notably Lt Gen Brij Mohan Kaul) and the dysfunctional state of India's higher defence management system is well known and been elaborately explained in preceding articles.
The issue that begs the question is whether India has learnt its lessons, and what is the state of the current military balance between the two countries in case of a future conventional and/or nuclear war between the two countries. The answer is only too evident. India is far from matching China's numerically superior conventional and nuclear armed forces (see graph above). More critically, India is quite some time away from matching China in certain strategic military capabilities, especially long-range missiles, space-based military systems, nuclear-powered submarines and other nuclear warfare technology. China is markedly ahead in both information warfare and an indigenous military-industrial complex that will be there to elaborately support its war efforts and armed forces during a war. The obvious conclusion would thus be that India would easily lose the next war. Such a conclusion, however, would be too simplistic and reductionist. As recent history tells us, wars are complex human activity and are becoming far more difficult to win. A militarily inferior Vietcong defeated a vastly superior US Army in Vietnam during the 1960s and the 1970s. A far superior Indian Army faced considerable resistance from the Pakistani Army during the 1971 India-Pakistan war in erstwhile East Pakistan even though the Pakistani forces had been virtually abandoned by the establishment in West Pakistan as is well explained by both Lt Gen Jack Fredrick Ralph Jacob in his book, Surrender At Dacca: Birth of a Nation and by Lt Gen Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi in his book, The Betrayal of East Pakistan. During the 1999 Kargil War, a numerically superior Indian Army assisted by the IAF wrested control of the Pakistani army occupied mountain peaks in Ladakh at considerable human and financial expense over an agonisingly long two month period and with strong diplomatic support from the US. In more recent times, the world's sole superpower (the US) has had to pull out from Iraq after facing heavy weather and is slated to do the same from Afghanistan. Change in
strategy In 1962, India fought the war with a relatively neglected Army that was pushed into fighting with little preparation and training. The IAF was not utilised out of fear of escalation and it remains a matter of intense debate as to how much the IAF would have been able to help the Indian Army in repulsing the Chinese attack. While successive IAF chiefs and other senior officers have stated that the air force could have altered the course of the war, Chinese analysts disagree and point to the limitations of precision bombing in mountainous terrain by world war vintage era aircraft which were then equipped only with free fall bombs and cannons instead of air-to-air missiles. These aircraft had none of the precision guided munitions that were used during the Kargil War during which, again, the IAF had limited success despite being equipped with advanced sensor technology such as both laser-guided and TV-guided bombs. Should China similarly attempt to run over Indian territory along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), they will find that Indian troops are deployed in far greater strength and are better equipped to repulse such an attack. There is also greater political and military resolve. For example, China's encroachment in Sumdorong Chu in Arunachal Pradesh in 1986 resulted in a swift and no nonsense Indian response that eventually (in 1999) led to status quo ante. India is now in the process of raising two additional Mountain Divisions and a first-ever Mountain Strike Corps. India currently has three Strike Corps, all of which are directed to fight a war with Pakistan. Considering that there has been a revolution in military technology since the 1962 war, Infantry soldiers trekking up a ridge line is not going to be China's strategy in a future war. This is where the military imbalance between the two countries comes into play. China has proven long-range missiles that can target any part of India. In contrast, India's longer-range Agni series missiles are still in their testing stage and as such India cannot target China's 'centre of gravity' in and around Beijing and Shanghai (see box on missile arsenal). Similarly, China’s long-range conventional and nuclear-tipped missiles fitted on nuclear-powered submarines can strike Indian targets from anywhere in the Indian Ocean. In contrast, India is still a few years from inducting its first indigenously developed nuclear-powered submarine. India has leased a Russian Akula class nuclear-powered submarine but that is only for training. India's conventional submarine fleet is modest when compared to China as are the number of warships. China has acquired its first aircraft carrier, an instrument of sea control. The Indian Navy too has an aircraft carrier, which, however, is much smaller and close to decommissioning. India's first indigenously developed aircraft carrier is another six years away while induction of the Russian-origin 44,500 tonne aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov is at least another year away. India's fighter aircraft fleet is similarly modest when compared to the Chinese fleet. The IAF's Sukhoi-30 MKI multi-role fighters has a deep penetration capability and can attack targets well inside Tibet if required. But like in the case of Indian missiles, these aircraft will be unable to reach China's military-industrial complex in the Beijing region. The only advantage the IAF has is that its aircraft can take off with a higher quantum of payload (bombs) from airbases located in the plains of Assam or central India compared to their Chinese counterparts since the latter are stationed in high altitude airbases which severely restricts taking off with heavy payload. The
chinese edge China's communication infrastructure is considered better than that of India, which lacks an extensive road network for faster movement of troops and equipment. In contrast, China has an excellent road network on the Tibetan plateau and even has a rail network connecting Beijing with Lhasa with five subsidiary railroads under construction. Of considerable importance is China's approach to Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA. China's focus is on information warfare which both includes and goes beyond cyber espionage and cyber warfare. This, according to Stephen Peter Rosen at Harvard University, will mean defeating India's early warning system, denying India the information to detect and react to Chinese movement and possibly attacking Indian satellites. In competing with the US, China has long since militarily surpassed India. Not to be under-estimated is Sun Tzu's philosophy of ‘winning without fighting’. There is enough evidence to suggest that China has since long been engaging in 'strategic encirclement'. Based on the dictum that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend', China's friendship with Pakistan includes cooperation in a wide range of military technologies that ranges from aircraft, tanks and missiles to nuclear technology. China's deep military engagement with Myanmar, arms supplies to Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and now Nepal are only too well known. India's armed forces are mostly concentrated vis-à-vis Pakistan. For example, four (the North, West, South Western and Southern Commands) out of a total six operational commands of the Indian Army are Pakistan centric. Practically only one operational command (Eastern Command in Kolkatta) and partially a second (Northern Command in Udhampur) are China-focused. Of the total thirteen corps, only two-and-a-half corps (numbers 3, 4 and part of 14) are deployed along the border with China. The same applies to India's airbases, most of which are located along the India-Pakistan border. Similarly, most of the Navy's assets are positioned with the Western naval Command in the Arabian Sea. Most military exercises conducted by the Indian armed forces have and continue to be Pakistan focused. Notwithstanding the lessons presumably learnt from the Kargil War of 1999 and the large scale mobilisation of 2001-02 (Operation Parakram) and the comprehensive recommendations made by the specially constituted Group of Ministers (GoM), Indian higher defence management is still in dire need of reform. In keeping with India's strategic culture, decision making continues to be slow, incremental and reactive. Fifty years later, the Indian decision making process remains as painfully slow as the elephant. Defence Minister Arackaparambil Kurien Antony’s recent assurance that a repeat of the 1962 defeat is now impossible is largely correct should China attempt the same tactics as used in 1962. For, the Indian armed forces are better equipped, the country more confident and the politicians well aware that any military defeat will not be acceptable to the Indian people who are today far more aware and conscious. The fact also is that both countries have matured and shown greater restraint in the last 50 years. Sino-Indian relations have made far greater headway compared to India-Pakistan relations. The world too has changed. And so, as of now a military conflict on a scale of the 1962 Sino-Indian War increasingly seems improbable. The Clausewitzian dictum of war being the ‘continuation of politics (policy) by other means’ is unlikely to apply in Sino-Indian relations in the near future. That has since long shifted to a combination of several non-military fronts such as diplomatic, economic, political and soft power. |
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China modernises while India lags behind
A casual glance at tables comparing Indian and Chinese military assets shows the numbers heavily stacked in favour of China, which has more of just about everything. Numbers matter, but then these are subservient to a host of other factors like doctrinal aspects, technological prowess, terrain and deployability, logistic support, training levels and leadership. To get a holistic picture of the might of the nations and the effectiveness of their military machines, one needs to assess the capabilities of the assets and their ability to perform under specific conflict situations in convectional and sub-convectional environment, including indulgence in cyber warfare and psychological operations. The current Chinese military doctrine, which began taking shape soon after the 1991 Gulf War is based upon "active defence" and "local wars under high-tech conditions". The Chinese believe the possibility of an all-out war being extremely low and its doctrinal approach for low intensity conflict and small local wars calls for the use of very high levels of military force, with stress on pre-emption and seizing the initiative. China's National Defence, a white paper issued by the communist regime in Beijing last year emphasises the Chinese military's rapid transformation into a lean, agile and integrated force, moving away from its earlier focus on quantity and manpower to technology, quality and efficiency capable of providing a long reach in a short time. The paper also stresses upon "informationisation" or the exploitation of the information spectrum as the key to empowerment, dominance and success, both in war and peace. This not only involves secure and effective intra-nation communication, but also the ability to penetrate, manipulate or cripple hostile networks. China is also engrossed in what it calls "military confidence building", involving military-diplomatic engagement and strategic consultations with other countries. Accentuated
modernisation In the backdrop of China's perception that international strategic competition and contradictions are intensifying, global challenges are becoming more prominent, and security threats are becoming increasingly integrated, complex and volatile, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has "accentuated modernisation from a higher platform", strengthening the building of a new type of combat capability with enhanced fire power, mobility, protection and support. In line with the strategic requirements of mobile operations and tri-dimensional offense and defence, the Chinese army has emphasised the development of new types of combat forces, optimised organisation and structure, strengthened military training in conditions of "informationisation", accelerated digitised upgrading and retrofitting of weaponry, deployed new weapon platforms, and significantly boosted capabilities in long-distance maneuvers and integrated assaults. Artillery and armoured components are developing precision operations capability with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment elements. Other arms and services are being upgraded into multi-functional support forces for use in war, peace and military operations other than war. A large component of the PLA is mechanised or motorised. The Chinese air force is working to ensure a combat force structure that focuses on air strikes, air and missile defence, and strategic projection, to improve leadership and command system and build up an informationised, networked base support system. It conducts training on confrontation between systems in complex electromagnetic environments and different tactical contexts. The navy endeavors to accelerate the modernisation of integrated combat forces, enhance capabilities in strategic deterrence and counter-attack, conducting operations in distant waters and in countering non-traditional threats. In September this year, its first aircraft carrier was commissioned into service, opening a new chapter in Chinese maritime operations and significantly expanding its capability of engaging sub-surface, surface and airborne targets. The Second Artillery Corps, PLA's strategic missile component, strives to improve its capabilities in rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations. Joint operation systems are the focal point of PLA's modernisation and it has improved joint support mechanisms, enhanced IT-based integrated support, and established a basic integrated support system linking strategic, operational and tactical levels. The PLA is also laying stress on the training of commanding officers for joint operations and under its strategic project for talented individuals, it is cultivating a contingent of commanding officers, staff officers, scientists, technical experts and non-commissioned officers as joint operation commanders, "informationisation" professionals and experts in operating and maintaining new types of equipment. Plans for wartime troop mobilisation have been improved and the reserve force has been strengthened. While planning the development of future weapons and equipment, it is using advanced and mature technologies to retrofit existing systems to upgrade their comprehensive performance. It is strengthening logistics systems and revamping capabilities in managing, maintaining and supporting equipment by applying modern management techniques, integrating systems and outsourcing services. China has a large industrial base to support indigenous production. The Indian
Transformation Fifty years after the two Asian giants went to war, the Indian armed forces have come a long way, having built up considerable force structures, absorbed newer technologies and refined operational art. Working towards a capability-based approach, the armed forces have, according to the Ministry of Defence, embarked on several transformational initiatives spanning concepts, organisational structures and absorption of new age technology, particularly in precision-guided munitions, advanced surveillance systems, space and network-centricity. Over the past few years, the three services have also been developing and validating network-centric operations aimed at seamless flow of data laterally and vertically to provide commanders access to real time information and decision-making abilities. A Strategic Forces Command has come up and is evolving to handle critical deterrent assets while joint commands for cyber war and special operations are being planned. The biggest drawback in Indian defence preparedness is the heavy dependence on foreign suppliers for major weapons systems and critical components. The military industry in India is at a nascent stage and private participation in research and development is negligible. A critical deficiency on the Indian side is border infrastructure which could seriously affect rapid troop deployment and movement of logistics. According to a former Army Commander, it is just about 30 per cent of what it ought to be. China on the other hand, has built up a vast road and rail network. At present India has no counter offensive capability and in the event of a conflict cannot carry the battle into China. Nor will any offensive by China be a cakewalk as in 1962. While not much is known about the Chinese forces, they too are bound to have their weaknesses and disadvantages and any border conflict could well end in a stalemate. Tomorrow: Experts on the
lessons learnt For earlier parts of the series on the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian war log on to
www.tribuneindia.com |
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Review Karan
Johar is not exactly known for meaningful cinema. Or, cinema with a punch. But as a rule his films are high on mush quotient and leave you both smiling and crying. While Student of the Year does bring more than an occasional smile, you can safely leave your hankies at home.
Sure like all his films, this one too is powered with high voltage glamour and glitz. You bet the lead protagonists are super-duper rich. Only this time he places them in an elite high school where all they do is chill and romance. Especially the rich brat Rohan (Varun Dhawan) who takes as much pride in driving the swankiest of all cars as in his beautiful beau Shaneya (Alia Bhatt). Yet, he can't keep his hands off other girls too. Enter cool dude Abhimanyu (Siddharth Malhotra), who for a change doesn't belong to the rich club. But since he can play the football as fast as he can speak, suddenly the rules of love, friendship and competition too begin to change. Till the first half, the adversaries turned bosom pals bit works well. With a big fat Indian wedding set in Thailand (haven't you heard of destination weddings?) there is much scope for jhatkas, matkas and song and dance. Songs do seem too many but are well picturised and ones like remixed Disco Deewane are worth grooving to. In the second half as the competition hots up for the student of the year trophy…(in case you had forgotten this is a school) you expect the gossamer shades to acquire a cutting edge. But remember this is no Jo Jeeta Wahi Sikander. Of course, to give KJo his due he does keep you interested in who is going to be the winner. In comparison, who will get Shania (Alia Bhatt looks delightfully fresh, young and pretty) doesn't evince all that interest. After all, in popular Indian cinema you know who walks away with the girl in the end. Let the underdog win, though Johar does manage to fuse the line as to which one he is. In the second part, Varun displays an intensity quite credible for a debutant actor. Siddharth too is promising. But whatever promise the plot holds takes a toss and one is left wondering where the film is going. Is Johar celebrating the spirit of competition or deriding it…. . the diatribe by one of the students Pseudo (Kayoze Irani) against the dean (Rishi Kapoor) seems quite unwarranted. Dean's sexual preferences (no prizes for guessing) too are far from funny. Yes, the movie is an ode to friendship that survives jealousy and other misgivings too. But the treatment is not likely to warm the cockles of your heart. Precisely for none of the characters are well delineated. Ram Kapoor carries his TV persona of rich business tycoon to silver screen yet minus the goodness. Pray which father would have a crestfallen face on seeing his son win? Or was it Johar's way of reminding us all is not well in the world of rich and famous. Anyway, what could have been a refreshing look into the world of youth falls way short of even being a trademark KJo entertainer. Still it's watchable if for nothing else the fresh faces. The spirit of bonhomie among students too is well captured. And yes despite the film lacking depth there are a few honest moments like the one where Shania accidentally utters Happy Birthday when she goes to look up Abhimnayu's ailing grandmother in the hospital. |
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What’s in a name? After
the ouster of the Shah of Iran and the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini Iran suffered some turbulent times, including the 444-day holding of American hostages. Alongside was a drama of six Americans holed up in the Canadian Embassy. Argo is a taut drama of how, posing as a film crew, they managed to escape thanks, to an American civilian Tony Mendez’s (Ben Affleck) heroic efforts. Actually Argo means nothing. Not the Argonauts of ancient Greek mythological fame or any other historical detail. In fact “Argo f..k you” is the favourite line coined by Hollywood expert Lester Siegel (Alan Arkin). Based on two novels The Master of Disguise by Antonio J. Mendez and The Great Escape by Joshua Bearman. Affleck also plays the lead role. Director Ben Affleck wastes no time in zeroing in on the notorious hostage issue. It then moves to these nervous six, too scared to try anything and having to be cajoled into escaping. Of all the ideas on hand they choose a film crew but in the process veteran actor Alan Arkin walks away with the honours and the best lines. His first three films had totally different roles —-Wait Until Dark where he plays a villain to Audrey Hepburn as a blind girl, The Heart is a Lonely Hunter as a deaf mute in a novel by Carson McCullers and The Russians Are Coming, a delightful spoof on the Soviets at the
height of the Hot War. He must be at least 80. Argo is all of 120 minutes but one never finds time drag. A good mix of human interest and the escape plan it is aided by a rich screenplay by Chris Terrio who has researched the period very well. Affleck is also very convincing in the lead role and underplaying it at the right moments. Then good cameos by Bryan Cranston and John Goodman further embellish the drama. And of course golden oldies will find Arkin as the icing on the cake. Just do not miss Argo, whatever it means! |
A ride to remember Joseph
Gordon-Levitt, who put in an excellent performance alongside Bruce Willis in Looper, seems like an exciting new star in the Hollywood firmament. As a daredevil messenger Wilee, Joseph Gordon-Levitt is just one of 1,500 cyclists who weave in an out of the Big Apple’s rush hour traffic delivering envelopes. But Wilee is unique, if somewhat foolhardy and prides himself in not having brakes on his bicycle. In the same group of bikers are Vanessa (Danie Ramirez), Marko (Sean Kennedy) and Polo (Kymberly Perfetto) who do the same thing but sensibly. But they have their own rivalries. Wilee soon gets into trouble carrying a letter from Nima (Jamie Chung) who is involved with the drug mafia in a bid to get her son into the United States. Gambling addicted NYPD officer Bobby Monday (Michael Channon), who initially has sparring rounds with Wilee, runs into him again when dealing with Nima’s letter. One of the catch-lines is “Ride Like Hell” and speed is the name of the game. The establishing shots are well handled by director David Koepp and though the script is at best average. The spills and crashes are graphically captured with the FX team working overtime. But in good time director Koepp dwells on the story which zeroes in on the Chinese mafia with some good cameos like Henry O as Mr Lung. There’s also a romantic element with Vanessa. Shuttling between speed on the roads and a sliver of a story it is action in king-size doses, but giving Mitchell Ambudsen ample scope to exhibit his slick camerawork. It’s 91 minutes of exciting entertainment, a tad predictable, but enjoyable. Apart from Joseph Gordon-Levitt in the lead role there’s not much talent on display but Michael Shannon’s hamming is quite annoying. Premium Risk is worth
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Movies on
TV
Saturday october 20 Tees Maar Khan MOVIES OK 6:05 PM Tees Maar Khan revolves around conman Tabrez Mirza Khan (TMK, Akshay Kumar) who has been a criminal since he was young. He is caught in France and deported back to India. Two police officers Chatterjee (Aman Verma) and Mukherjee (Murli Sharma) arrest him but he escapes. He is in love with the struggling actress Anya (Katrina Kaif). TMK takes a job from the Johri brothers to rob a train loaded with precious antiques. ZEE
CINEMA 7:20AM Ek Vardaan Nagina 10:50AM Viewers Choice 2:20PM Vaishanavi 5:45PM Aan: Men at Work 9:00PM Sholay STAR GOLD 8:25AM Golimaar 11:20AM Sivaji: The Boss 2:20PM Taqdeerwala 5:30PM Ghatak 9:00PM Wanted STAR MOVIES 8:27AM The Front Row with Anupama Chopra 8:57AM Pirates of The Caribbean: On Stranger Tides 11:36AM The Chronicles of Narnia: The Lion, the Witch & the Wardrobe 1:54PM Salt 4:07PM X-Men: First Class 6:42PM Fist of Fury 9:00PM Scream 4 11:22PM Rise of the Planet of the Apes INDIA TALKIES 6:00AM Suno Sasurjee 9:30AM Housefull 1:00PM I See You 4:30PM Sailaab 8:00PM Paatshala MOVIES OK 6:00AM Dum Maaro Dum 8:55AM Khullam Khulla Pyaar Karen 11:40AM Hello Brother 2:35PM Baadshah 6:05PM Tees Maar Khan 9:00PM Ayan Vidhwansak The Destroyer HBO 7:30AM My Boss's Daughter 9:25AM RV 11:40AM Yogi Bear 1:30PM Green Lantern 4:09PM Rush Hour 6:02PM Liar Liar 7:29PM Street Fighter: The Legend of Chun-Li 9:30PM 2 Fast 2 Furious SAHARA ONE 9.00 AM Jai Maa12.00 PM Vishwanath10.30 PM Aaj Ki Awaz Sunday
october 21 Cocktail COLORS 1:00PM Veronica (Deepika Padukone) and Meera (Diana Penty) start living together during the summer in London. Meera is shy while Veronica is a rich, spoilt brat who is fearless and free. Being poles apart brings the two close, forging a loyal and solid friendship. Life takes a new turn when Gautam Kapoor (Saif Ali Khan), a software engineer by profession, starts living with them in Veronica’s apartment. ZEE CINEMA 7:15AM Haatim Tai 1:50PM Judaai 9:00PM Agneepath STAR GOLD 6:00AM Farz 9:40AM Ramayana: The Epic 12:00PM Beta 3:40PM Ek Aur Qayamat 6:35PM Hero No. 1 9:00PM Ra.One STAR MOVIES 7:56AM Sister Act 10:05AM The Chronicles of Narnia: The Voyage of the Dawn Treader 12:22PM Scream 4 2:21PM Jingle All the Way 4:23PM Rise of the Planet of the Apes 6:41PM X-Men Origins: Wolverine 11:15PM Fright Night MOVIES OK 6:00AM Anjaana Anjaani 9:25AM Krishna 11:30AM Maine Pyaar Kyun Kiya 2:50PM Biwi No. 1 5:20PM Krodh 9:00PM Golmaal 3 HBO 7:20AM Street Fighter: The Legend of Chun-Li 9:30AM Liar Liar 11:25AM Ong Bak 2 1:30PM Transformers: Dark of the Moon 4:45PM 2 Fast 2 Furious 6:55PM Fast Five 9:30PM Transformers: Dark of the Moon SAHARA ONE 9.30 AM Gair 4.30 PM Waqt Ki Deewar7.30 PM Ghajini11.00 PM Bandit Queen COLORS 1:00PM Cocktail |
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