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Gadkari in firing line
Australia for N-pact |
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Secure the cyber frontier
Haryana rocked by rapes
Missing ‘mom & pop stores’
Tribune Special
Tawang: Saga of Chinese advance and Indian retreart
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Gadkari in firing line
By
making BJP president Nitin Gadkari as their latest target, India Against Corruption activists Arvind Kejriwal and Prashant Bhushan have tried to dispel the impression gaining in political circles that they were anti-Congress and pro-BJP. After breaking away from Anna Hazare’s team, the two have embarked on a political career and plan to float a political party next month.
First, they picked up a soft target like Robert Vadra, son-in-law of Congress president Sonia Gandhi. Then Law Minister Salman Khurshid came on their hit list. Instead of taking the accusations in his stride as his party chief has done, Salman Khurshid first over-reacted, and then, as media reports indicate, threatened Kejriwal and dared him to visit Farrukhabad, his Lok Sabha constituency After hitting the Congress where it hurt the most, the Kejriwal-Bhushan duo trained their guns on Gadkari, who was accused of securing 100 acres of land in Maharashtra with help from former Irrigation Minister Ajit Pawar of the Nationalist Congress Party. Some suspect the attack has been arranged by Gadkari’s detractors in his own party to thwart a second-term for the chief. Notably, senior BJP leaders came out in defence of their party president. They were rather relieved that the charges were not as damning as they had feared. Nevertheless, these do shake a bit the moral high ground the BJP leaders have occupied in their tirade against the UPA. Being on the threshold of entering politics, Arvind Kejriwal and his colleagues are pursuing a dirtier version of politics. They are more interested in making allegations, generously lapped up by the media, than presenting foolproof evidence in support of their charges before an appropriate authority to carry the battle against corruption to its logical end. The common man does not know whom to believe — the accuser or the accused? We must reform the existing institutions — Lokayukta, the judiciary and the police — so that they take suo motu notice of charges made by public figures to bring the guilty to justice.
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Australia for N-pact The most significant development during Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s visit to New Delhi is the decision the two countries have taken to start negotiations for a nuclear safeguards agreement to pave the way for the supply of Australian uranium to India. Last year her Labour Party had agreed to lift the ban imposed on uranium sale to India because of India not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
India’s record as a nuclear weapon power has been impeccable, which helped in getting the Nulcear Supplier Group’s (NSG’s) waiver during the negotiations for the operationalisation of the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal in 2008. Interestingly, Australia had supported India’s case at the NSG, though it declined to sell uranium to this country, citing the NPT factor. But the Australian leadership realised later on that Canberra’s stand on uranium sale to India was not guided by pragmatism. Australia, the world’s third largest uranium producer, needed fresh markets for its product because of a sharp decline in the yellow cake’s demand. The uranium demand fell considerably after last year’s Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. The Australian mining industry, greatly worried about the dampening developments, put tremendous pressure on the ruling Labour Party to take the advantage of India’s plan to meet nearly 40 per cent of its energy needs by generating nuclear power. All this led to the Labour Party deciding to scrap the ban on uranium sale to India last year. As a result, there was a 10 per cent rise in the uranium prices in the world market and Australia was a major gainer in the process. India’s efforts for getting Australian uranium supplies will, however, bear fruit after lengthy negotiations to clinch an agreement. Both sides will have to tread the path cautiously, keeping in view their own national interest and the reaction of the public. But an India-Australia nuclear agreement, once it is signed and operationalised, will bring immense advantages to both countries. India will find it easier to meet its growing energy demand by generating as much nuclear power as it can, and Australia’s earnings through uranium exports will go up considerably. |
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Secure the cyber frontier In the increasingly networked world of today, cyber security is a vital national need. It is indeed heartening that the government has taken steps to enrol the private sector as an ally in its battle to defend the nation from cyber attacks — both within and from outside.
The world over, governments and the private sector work together to patrol the increasingly chaotic cyber space, and it’s high time the Government of India did so too. The ‘Recommendations of Joint Working Group on Engagement With Private Sector On Cyber Security’ prepared by the government lays down the parameters on which both sectors can work together. The government is reacting to the misuse of cyberspace facilities that had triggered the mass movement of people from the Northeast who were working or studying in other parts of the country. The government is doing well in setting up various groups and committees that will enable it to move swiftly as and when the need arises. However, fire-fighting is only one aspect of the problem. What is needed is to train personnel and build expertise. The nation needs to develop expertise in dealing with cyber security. Private enterprise will help cut the red tape, and add the necessary verve as well as cutting-edge technology/training needed to combat cyber threats. It has been estimated that India needs over five lakh cyber security professionals, something that is simply not available right now. To fulfil this need, cyber security needs to be immediately introduced in the academic curricula of professional colleges. The government must also take effective steps in training the police and other law enforcement agencies in the various aspects of cyber security. Only then would they be equipped to deal with cyber-crime investigation and cyber forensics. A world of caution is in order here, as in any such endeavour: the government must ensure that the democratic rights of freedom of speech and privacy of the citizens are not violated. India is a leading provider of IT talent to the world; it needs to secure itself even as it continues to embrace cyberspace. |
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If you can't be in awe of Mother Nature, there's something wrong with you. —Alex Trebek |
Tawang: Saga of Chinese advance and Indian retreart Flaws in India's 'forward policy' of locating troops north of the disputed MacMahon line, were exposed in Kameng frontier division of Arunachal Pradesh. Within days of the attack, the well-prepared Chinese had overrun the Indian defences. Thousands of Indian Army soldiers and officers were killed, captured or wounded while some even shame-facedly took refuge in neighbouring Bhutan. Interspersed in this mayhem, some units showed flashes of military, bravado and tenacity. However, over all, the largely unhindered Chinese advance and India's retreat remains one of the saddest chapters in military history. The debacle in the Kameng sector aptly illustrates the confusion and lack of planning. It was in August 1962 when the Chinese crossed the MacMahon line to counter the Indian moves and occupied the Thag La ridge north of Tawang. The lone Indian post at Dhola, created as part of the Forward Policy, was attacked. It signalled the Chinese were not averse to crossing the MacMahon Line -- a thing which they had not done since the 1914 Simla conference with the British and Tibetans. The Indian leadership took a stand "Chinese must be evicted by force". The Eastern Army Command sent a message asking Indian troops "to engage Chinese patrols that came within the range of their weapons". Brig John Dalvi, Brigade Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade, asked for logistics to support his troops. Eastern Army Commander, Lt Gen LP Sen, shared his opinion that eviction of the Chinese was not possible with existing logistics. Brig Dalvi wanted logistics in place. The top echelons were keen to press ahead. The differences are aptly summed up by Maj Gen DK Palit in his well-documented book 'War in the Himalaya'. Palit, then the Director Military Operations, says "Senior commanders were ignorant of both the terrain and logistical difficulties." Bringing in supplies and ammunition was not easy. Only a jeep track existed only till Bomdilla located some 160 kms north of Tezpur in Assam, further north the journey was on foot and the mountains tracks were unsuitable for load carrying soldiers. Indian troops had made a strong beginning on October 10 when the Chinese attacked Tseng Jong just north of the river Namkha Chu. A single company, about 120 men, from 9 Punjab, retaliated. Some 77 Chinese died (as reported by the Peking press at that time). The Punjabi's won three Mahavir Chakra (MVC) and two Vir Chakra (VrC). The Company Commander, Maj MS Chaudhary, died of wounds, his sepoy Kanshi Ram overpowered a Chinese with bare hands and snatched his automatic rifle. Despite a good start, the Punjabis were asked to withdraw from Tseng Jong. The Chinese stepped in and started probing around Tsangle and 'Bridge 5'. indians under fire At the first light of October 20 Chinese opened up a full attack all along the Namka Chu. Within the first few minutes Indian telephone lines broke down, leaving the units to act on their own. The Chinese had used the gaps in the Indian defences and occupied positions at the rear of the Indians, sandwiching them. Resultantly, an entire company of 2 Rajput was wiped out while the 1/9 Gorkha Rifles (GR) had been overrun within the first few hours. The enemy guns now turned towards "Tsangle" and "Bridge 5", while the Indian radio frequencies had been jammed so the gunners did not even get a signal from their superiors to fire. The Rajputs suffered the worst. A total 282 of were killed. The 'History of the conflict with China' produced some thirty years after the war by the Historical Division of the Ministry of Defence, says "The unit fought a heroic battle, literally to the last round". All officers excepting Maj Gurdial Singh were killed. He led another charge, was taken prisoner of war (POW), and later awarded an MVC. The Gorkhas, like the Rajputs, were also attacked from the rear. By then the 7 Infantry Brigade lost links with its units. Brig John Dalvi was taken prisoner on the afternoon of October 21 -- and entire Brigade had disintegrated. Elsewhere, the Chinese had attacked the Assam Rifles-held post at Khinzemane. A five-hour battle ensued following which Col Rattan Singh and 24 others were taken prisoner. Some miles away Second Lieutenant GVP Rao of Artillery was fighting a losing battle, Chinese had attacked in huge numbers. Rao and his men fought on till the last bullet. He died and got an MVC. On the night of October 20, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, GOC, 4 Infantry Division, told his superiors that the Indian frontline had been wiped out. The next morning the Division's tactical headquarters was asked to withdraw from Zimithang and locate South, at Tawang. The Chinese broke up their force into two. One headed to Tawang and the other to get the Lumpo ridge vacated. Zimithang was taken over on the night of October 22-23 and Lumpo was under Chinese control by 9 am on October 23. Elsewhere the Chinese targeted Bum-La before they entered Tawang, here the 1 Sikh covered itself in glory. Subedar Joginder Singh held back the invaders. With no ammunition left, Joginder Singh was asked to withdraw. He and his men responded by advancing with only the bayonets fixed to their guns. The Subedar was wounded and taken POW. He died in enemy custody. "Subedar Joginder Singh and his men mowed down the first wave, and the enemy was temporarily halted by the heavy losses it suffered. Within a few minutes, a second wave came over and was dealt with similarly", read the citation for the Param Vir Chakra - the highest war-time gallantry honour -- awarded to him. Another company of 1 Sikh led by Capt Haripal Kaushak stood firm. They "proved to be an iron curtain for the enemy", says the 'History of the Conflict with China'. The Chinese had moved into Tawang unopposed on October 23. Lt Gen Sen, ordered withdrawal of troops to Bomdila located further south. Lt Gen BM Kaul was appointed the new IV Corps Commander on October 29 while Maj Gen AS Pathania replaced Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad as the GOC 4 Infantry Division. Yet again the Chinese sneaked in south of the Se La pass and cut lines of communication of the 4 Infantry Division. Indian field units reporting rapid road construction and Chinese movement were admonished for 'exaggerated' reports about enemy movements. On November 17 the second attack commenced at Nuranang. The 4 Garhwal Rifles held positions with tenacity and won two MVC -- Lt Col BM Bhattacharjea and Rifleman Jaswant Singh, besides seven VrC. The 62 briagde had been withdrawn to south of the Se La. By now the Indians were virtually being pushed down the Himalayas with the Chinese in hot pursuit. the lost advantage Strangely the Indian side wanted to be north of Bomdila. Strategically, the Indians could have just dug themselves in at Bomdila located at 10,000 feet and stopped the enemy. South of Bomdilla was a steep downward gradient that led to the Assam plains. The Chinese had no means to transport its guns across Se La and their supply lines were getting affected. By now the Chinese were not pursuing the retreating Indian Army, the indication was they were regrouping, a tactic they used in the 1952 Korean war. Indians had taken defensive positions at Se La (14,600 feet), Dirang and Bomdila. At Dirang the 7 cavalry was holding fort with its Stuart tanks which deterred the Chinese. The task was to stop the advance on the Bomdilla-Dirang road. The 7 cavalry provided covering fire to the troops to extricate themselves. On November 18 Bomdila had fallen without much of fightback. On November 23, the Chinese announced a ceasefire. The Rajputs, headed by Lt Col Bhramanand Avasthy, did not know of this and were retreating with 300 odd men when they came under attack. More than a hundred Chinese were killed and the entire lot of the Rajputs was wiped out at battle now known as the 'Last stand at Lha-Gyala Gompa'. Baring a lone shepherd not a single man survived to cite the valour of Lt Col Avasthi and his men, hence no battle honours. His daughter Neeharika Naidu, who was only nine years in 1962, says, "A shrine has come up at the place where people come and worship and pay homage to my father". Maj Gen DK Palit writes in his book, War in the High Himalay "The civilians set the pace, but the Army went along, beguiled by the conviction that the Chinese would not call our bluff." Such was the confusion that 2 Sikh Light Infantry was withdrawing when it met with the frontline defences of 1 Sikh who did not even known about the withdrawal. With communication lines snapped, 4 Sikh LI and a section of 7 Mahar MMG unit were left to fend for themselves. When attacked these two small units were butchered. Some of them managed to save themselves by escaping into Bhutan. It was decided to pull out of Bomdila. There was little the brigade commander could do. There were no mines and just a handful of troops to defend Bomdila, which the Chinese took over on November 18. Elsewhere the 62 Brigade commander Brig Hoshiar Singh was ambushed and killed on November 27. Such was the condition that on December 1 -- a good fortnight after the withdrawal -- some 2,291 ranks were still missing. Tomorrow:
Military balance For earlier parts of the series on the 50th anniversary of the Sino-Indian war log on to
www.tribuneindia.com |
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