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Diesel fuels price rise
Banning franchise is fine |
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Act of depravity
Warnings from rating agencies
Landing in trouble
Tribune Special The way ahead
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Diesel fuels price rise The jump in inflation, which has touched a 10-month high of 7.81 per cent, was entirely expected. When the government raised the diesel price by Rs 5 a litre last month, triggering political protests, it was aware that the cascading effect on prices would be harsh. Yet why did the government do it? This was partly to bridge the widening gap between the cost and selling price of diesel and partly to control the burgeoning fiscal deficit. The immediate fallout of soaring prices will be that the Reserve Bank of India may not lower interest rates at its meeting scheduled for October 30. The apex bank has made it clear that its primary concern is to control inflation. But lately it has been under government pressure to lower interest rates so that the demand for industrial products perks up, reversing the GDP growth slowdown. Now that the government has taken some hard decisions to boost growth and straighten up finances, it expects the RBI to lend a helping hand. Finance Minister P. Chidambaram has been throwing hints at the RBI to act to spur growth. In a recent interview in Tokyo he observed that high interest rates hurt everyone. The softening of crude prices and the appreciation of the rupee in recent weeks have come as a relief for the government, which imports oil to meet 80 per cent of the country’s energy requirements. The government’s hope is that prices would rise initially in line with the diesel price increase and then start declining. However, the inflation data for September shows that more than diesel, it was a hike in foodgrain prices that contributed to the latest spiral in prices. This is surprising as the country has enough food stocks. It only shows that the government has not been releasing enough grain stocks in the open market to calm prices. That too when the ruling Congress had two by-elections to contest and it is well known that price rise is a major issue for voters.
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Banning franchise is fine
The
franchise education industry was copied after the success of this model in America and some other developed countries. In the US, it produced an annual revenue of $40 billion. The increasing demand for higher education made educational franchise a highly profitable business, and it was thought to be doing a service for society. Amidst tough economy, it also offered a way of cutting costs to the universities. But the model adapted by Indian universities developed its own unique character — dilution of quality, in an already compromised quality of academics. In the rush to open more branches and to get more students, the screening of franchisee was limited to just getting the fee involved. Also, while the universities themselves do not get faculty with adequate skills, the quality of the staff hired by the franchisee was left to anyone’s imagination. A good model turned out to be a nightmare for students in the absence of proper regulations. Today, the shortage of skilled labour in India is estimated at a whopping 67 per cent. This was found in a global survey conducted by the Manpower Group, one of the world’s largest staffing service providers. Even if a foreign agency’s report is dumped as propaganda, a professor of sociology from JNU has come on record stating that not more than 25 per cent of engineering graduates can fulfil the requirements of the IT industry. We have numbers but not quality, we have degrees but not skills. This drawback in our education system also feeds a $6.4 billion parallel coaching industry. The skill shortages threaten to blunt what is seen as one of India’s biggest economic advantages — our demographic dividend aspiring for higher education. The banning of distance education study centres for both state and private universities by DEC (Distance Education Council) has protected students’ fate for the time being, but are they offered a better substitute? Since mainstream institutions are not producing quality in their limited number of seats and franchising of education has failed, where do millions of aspiring youth go for quality education?
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Act of depravity
Rape
is without a doubt an act of utmost depravity and the most heinous crime committed against women. Yet in a country where a woman is raped ever 20 minutes, our insensitivity towards rape victims is in direct proportion to the crime’s widespread prevalence. What else can explain the callousness with which those who matter treat rape victims? While in Fatehabad, Haryana, the village head tried to pressurise the victim’s family to hush up the matter and put a “price” on the rape victim’s honour, the people in high positions of power often try to dismiss rape as consensual sex. Society’s apathy towards both the victims and their families as evident in The Tribune reports on Haryana is no less distressing. While the unending spate of rape incidents in Haryana calls for the strongest condemnation, the fact is that women are not safe in other parts of the country as well. The shocking incident in Bangalore where a 21-year-old South Asian law student was allegedly gang-raped is further proof that the perpetrators of crime care two hoots about the law. Not surprising, for more often than not rapists are allowed to roam free and find impunity in the low conviction rate. Distressingly, the number of women standing at the risk of being sexually assaulted has increased in recent years, while the chance of rapists’ conviction has declined considerably. In fact, the sexual violence scenario is rather disturbing. Reports show that 20 children are raped every day. The social profile of the rapist indicates that he could hail from any section of society. Instead of making ludicrous suggestions like lowering the age of marriage for girls, what India needs is a stronger law against rape and even more stringent implementation of it. Measures like teaching self-defence skills to girls, as proposed by the National Commission for the Protection of Child Rights, cannot be a solution since girls cannot counter rapists on their own. Till rape is not understood as a weapon of terror against women and tackled accordingly, the crime will continue to grow as it has been for the past so many years.
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If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking. — George S. Patton
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Warnings from rating agencies The
only thing positive about the Indian economy today is that it has not collapsed like some of the European economies — Greece and Spain. India still has a reasonably high positive rate of growth though the latest IMF forecast predicts GDP growth for 2013 to be 4.9 per cent only. Yet there is much hope that the economy would revive and India would launch again on its high growth path. Much will depend on how quickly growth in industrial, service, agricultural sectors and employment generation picks up. Right now there are very few rosy prospects. The twin deficits — the high current account deficit and the fiscal deficit — are again surfacing as major problems and international credit rating agencies are threatening that there might be a downgrade. India already has a pretty precarious BBB-(negative) rating which is just above the ‘junk’ rating. This warning has come despite the fact that the government has opened up multi-brand retail to foreign direct investment
(FDI) as well as the aviation sector. It has also tried to cut the fuel subsidy by raising kerosene prices and put a cap on gas cylinders per household. But still the rating agencies are not satisfied. The real reason behind the threat of a downgrade is the huge fiscal deficit of 5.8 per cent of the GDP. It is unlikely that this gaping deficit will be reduced anytime soon and is largely due to the government’s own policies of the past in the form of big subsidies, generous employment generation schemes and, above all, the mismanagement of government (Central and state) finances. Graft and corruption have drained the exchequer as is evident from the scams unearthed frequently. Everyone knows that by opening up multi-brand retail and inviting Walmart will not solve India’s basic and deep-rooted problems of inadequate infrastructure, corruption, lack of adequate social infrastructure and slowdown in manufacturing and export growth. Though Walmart can probably bring in some amount of
FDI, other EU multi-brand retail companies like Carrfoure may not have the funds to go for large-scale investment in India. This is because the EU’s domestic demand is under stress and times are bad. The companies are not making huge profits and there would be a financial constraint in their expansion plans. As for reducing the waste of agricultural produce by establishing a cold chain, it will take time. Why didn’t FDI come into cold storage all these years despite its being open to investment? Similarly, it has been suggested by various economists that opening up FDI in retail will bring down inflation as it will cut out the margins of numerous middlemen. All this will involve direct buying from farmers and contract farming with the multinational retailers. Even this process will take time and we may not see the direct impact of opening up retail with lower inflation immediately. It is true that inflation has been a major problem and for the last three years, it has been in double digits. The rising prices of all essential goods have created a huge burden on the poor and have led to much distress in average households and this is now reflected in slow growth in demand for consumer goods and consumer durables. To control inflation, the RBI raised interest rates 13 times and this has actually affected industrial investment adversely which has translated itself to a serious slowdown in manufacturing. This, in turn, is affecting employment growth for semi-skilled
labour. Inflation has been fuelled by high food prices and high international oil prices. Both are continuing to be high and so there is little prospect of inflation coming down even after the opening of
Walmart. The current account deficit will remain wide (around 4 per cent) if oil prices continue to be on the high side because India imports 80 per cent of its oil requirements. Exports, on the other hand, are sluggish (they declined by 11 per cent in September this year) because of slack demand from the EU and the US. Subsidies have been blamed for the big fiscal deficit. They have been meant for the poor since the beginning of the planning process in India, and subsidies were meant to have a cushioning effect on the unaffordability of food and fuel by the poor. But unfortunately it is ridden with leakages and corrupt practices which make a mockery of the various subsidy schemes because they hardly reach the poor. In food, fuel and even in
MNREGA, there are various problems and loopholes in their delivery. The government cannot rectify these in a hurry as corruption has become endemic and entrenched. The fiscal deficit could have been reduced if the revenue collection was better. It was hoped that with the introduction of a simplified goods and services tax
(GST), there would be more revenue collected, but it has been fraught with problems and complications. There have been several postponements and its introduction is awaited next year. Thus, the revenue collection, which depends on only a minuscule percentage of the population paying direct (income and corporate) taxes and the rest of the population paying indirect taxes, is unlikely to meet the colossal needs of the government’s expenditure
programme. The government is faced with the options of cutting subsidies, which will definitely hurt the poor, and imposing austerity measures that will mean cutting often essential government expenditure. The easiest targets would be social expenditure which will take a heavy toll on the welfare of the people. The whole of EU is reeling under austerity measures, and in some of the worst affected countries it is leading to high suicide rates and high rates of joblessness among the youth. It seems inadvisable that a huge country like India where development largely depends on government expenditure, to follow the same path and make the same mistakes. It will lead to a big rise in unemployment. There are 200 million youth in India in the job market. Already recruitment in the organized sector is getting slower. The only alternative for young people would be to join the informal sector which absorbs around 92 per cent of the labour force. It is also the least job secure, the low income sector and workers do not have any safety nets. Should India pay heed to the warnings of the rating agencies or go it alone and do things that are good for the country? It would depend on the policy makers because more austerity measures and belt-tightening will hit hard on the lower income groups who are already fed up with high inflation, corruption and rising
inequality.
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Landing in trouble Asses are made to bear, and so are you,” said William Shakespeare in “Taming of the Shrew.” Though the ass here means a cross of horse and donkey, Shakespeare wittingly referred it to a character who was more an idiot than anything else. The classic banter is visible in most of Shakespearean comedies. In fact, since days immemorial, banter has been used effectively in literary works and during day-to-day conversation. However, in recent times there have been instances when people in high places have got into trouble while trying to be comic. Most recently, a Union Minister created a stir with his remarks that there are more temples than toilets in the country. Another minister got embroiled in a major controversy saying that “wives lose their charm with the passage of time”. That triggered a tsunami of criticism from women’s groups, social organisations and political parties. Although the minister beat a hasty retreat, apologising for the “light-hearted comment”, the controversy is far from over. Speaking during a “kavi sammelan” at a girls’ college in Kanpur, the minister stopped midway on hearing celebratory fireworks after India beat Pakistan in the T20 World Cup. Unable to resist a dig, the minister said, “Nayi jeet aur nayi shaadi ka apna mahatva hota hai. Jaise jaise samay beetega, jeet ki yaadein purani hoti jayengi; jaise samay beet-ta hai, patni purani hoti jati hai, voh maza nahi rehta hai.” (A new victory and new marriage have their own importance. With time, memories of victory dim. With time, wives lose their charm). The comments were aired on TV channels, and women activists as well as NGOs demonstrated outside the house of the minister, burning his effigies. His photographs were garlanded with shoes and slippers. National Commission of Women chief Mamta Sharma slammed the minister for his “unfortunate, abusive and insulting” comment and sought an apology from him. On his part, the minister said, “There is humour, satire in a kavi sammelan; it must be seen in that context. I am a member of a political party, which respects women, mothers and sisters. I don’t want to comment on those adding political colour to this. However, if I have even remotely hurt their (women’s) sentiments, I apologise.” A few months down the line, it was another minister who had antagonised the country’s middle class, saying that the people who could afford to spend Rs 20 on an ice-cream cone, should not talk about rising prices or inflation. If a small thing like ice-cream could give one momentary happiness, what business had the minister to ridicule common people for a small luxury like an ice-cream. Loose talk, not banter, had started with another Union Minister equating non-executive class air-travellers with cattle class. Making fun of this class cost him dear and he was shown the door from the Cabinet. Surely, wit ignites happiness but riling and loose talk create problems. Remember the golden principle imbibed in the Shakespearean quote, “Do not talk just to talk.” Even famous essayist Thomas Carlyle said, “Speech is great but silence is
greater.”
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Tribune Special
The
India-China war in 1962 was independent India’s most traumatic and worst-ever security failure. The war has left an indelible impression on our history and psyche which impacts India-China bilateral relations. The resultant geographic surgery continues to fester in the form of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) till date. This October marks its 50th anniversary. It is an appropriate occasion to reflect on the strategic lessons from the war and our current politico-military status vis-a-vis China. Its seeds were sown when China incorporated the de-facto independent Tibet into its sovereign territory. In October 1950, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) vanquished a feeble Tibetan opposition in the Battle of Chamdo and thus put an end to all ongoing diplomatic negotiations on the status of Tibet. Five years later, China started the construction of the 179-km long western Tibet-Sinkiang road passing through Aksai Chin, part of J&K and claimed by India. The Government of India took two and a half years to confirm this information. It was disclosed to Parliament after another one year, on August 31, 1959. Pandit Nehru’s remark that ‘not a blade of grass grows there’ did not cut ice with the much agitated Opposition in Parliament. The India-China dispute over the undemarcated border came out in the open. In March, 1959, the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet and took shelter in India. China suspected that India was helping the Khampa rebellion and had assisted the Dalai Lama to escape to India. The disputed border and hardening of attitudes on both sides led to skirmishes on several border posts. The Government of India adopted a strategically flawed ‘Forward Policy’ of erecting isolated check posts on the border without improving infrastructure or the armed forces’ capabilities.
China’s grand strategy
According to a de-classified Pentagon historical study paper on the Sino-India border dispute, ‘Developments between late 1950 and late 1959 were marked by Chinese military superiority, which, combined with cunning and diplomatic deceit, contributed to New Delhi's reluctance to change its policy toward the Beijing regime for nine years’. The study records that ‘the Chinese diplomatic effort was a five-year masterpiece of guile, planned and executed in a large part by Zhou Enlai. The Chinese Premier deceived Nehru several times about Chinese maps and carefully concealed Beijing's long-range intentions.’ He played on ‘Nehru's Asian, anti-imperialist mental attitude, his proclivity to temporize, and his sincere desire for an amicable Sino-Indian relationship’ and strung along Nehru by creating an impression through an equivocal language that: (a) it was a minor border dispute (b) Beijing would accept the McMahon Line, and (c) the old Kuomintang period Chinese maps would soon be revised. The study concludes that ‘In the context of the immediate situation on the border where Chinese troops had occupied the Aksai Plain in Ladakh, this was not an answer but rather an implicit affirmation that India did not have the military capability to dislodge the Chinese’. Many researchers have pointed out that the then raging Sino–Soviet ideological war also played a role in the Chinese decision-making leading to the Sino-Indian 1962 war. Chinese leaders were also concerned that the US might use a Sino-Indian war situation to unleash Taiwan against the Mainland. It has now been revealed that China used diplomatic subterfuge and obtained reassurances on both these issues before initiating the border war with India.
India’s security policy
When China occupied Tibet, Sardar Patel had warned Nehru on its security implications for India in a letter written on November 7, 1950. (Contents of this letter were kept secret by the Government for 18 years!) Despite that advice, Nehru continued to support China’s political position and declared publicly that Tibet should be handled only by the parties concerned i.e. Beijing and Lhasa. The Indian delegation in the United Nations blocked a proposal to censure China when the Chinese forces were on their way to Lhasa. India allowed Chinese food material for its troops located near Yatung to go through Calcutta and Gangtok. Later, the Government agreed to withdraw its military-cum-diplomatic missions in Tibet without any fuss. In the decade preceding 1962, the Indian ruling elite was convinced that having woven China into the Panchsheel Agreement, it had managed to craft a sound China policy. The Government was neither alert to the Chinese military developments in Tibet nor to the construction of the Tibet-Sinkiang road. Even after 1959, when China displayed its aggressive designs, Indian leaders were profoundly affected by the remoteness and difficulties of Aksai Chin and Tibetan terrain. Evidently, India did not display any strategic foresight or planning. Due to ideological, short-sighted and emotional reasons, the Chinese geo-strategic challenges and threats were either not accepted or under-played till Parliament and public opinion forced the Government to adopt a military posture against China for which it was never prepared. In September 1962, Prime Minister Nehru ordered the Indian military to throw the Chinese out from the intruded Indian territory -- a task that was well beyond its capability.
China’s military tactics
Towards the end of 1961, Mao convened a meeting of China’s Central Military Commission and took personal charge of the ‘struggle with India’. Mao asserted that the objective was not a local victory but to inflict a defeat so that India might be ‘knocked back to the negotiating table’. By September 1962, China was fully prepared (this is evident from the video recordings of that war released by China recently) and warned that if India ‘played with fire; it would be consumed by fire’. On September 8, 1962, 800 Chinese soldiers surrounded the Indian post at Dhola. Neither side opened fire for 12 days. The dice was cast for a showdown. China had conveyed its intention. India thought that it was bluffing. On October 6, 1962, Mao issued a directive to his Chief of Staff, Lou Ruiquing, laying down the broad strategy for the projected offensive. The Chinese military knew that the Indian Army’s main defences in the East lay at Se La and Bomdi La. The concept of operations was to advance along different routes, encircle these two positions and then reduce them. Indian positions were split into numerous segments and then destroyed piecemeal. Chinese troops’ long outflanking of Indian defences, river crossing and simultaneous road construction activity indicated detailed operational planning and preparedness. The speed and ferocity of the attacks unhinged Indian defences and pulverised the command. This resulted in panic, often contradictory decisions, and a military route in the East. On account of better leadership, particularly at the tactical level, our units performed much better in Ladakh. The Cabinet decision not to use combat air power was yet another unforgivable error of judgement. Beijing justified the invasion as a ‘defensive act’. In the current military parlance, they call it ‘active defence’ strategy. It must be noted that China, involved in maximum number of military conflicts in Asia, has always carried out military pre-emption in the name of strategically ‘defensive act’ with no forewarning: Tibet invasion, entry into Korean war, the 1962 conflict with India, the border conflict with the Soviet Union in 1969 and the attack on Vietnam in 1979.
Civil-military relations
The Indian debacle was more due to failure of its grand and military strategy and military preparedness than at the tactical level. Throughout the 1950s, the Indian government had paid scant attention to its armed forces. In May 1957, strength of the Indian Army was 450,000. The government contemplated downsizing it to 150,000 and converting the rest into Labour Corps. General Shrinagesh, then Army Chief, wrote in his diary later, ‘He (Nehru) agreed that Pakistan was making military alliances, had been contemplating rearming with modern weapons, and had by no means forgotten Kashmir. But when it came to China, it drew a firm "No" because the Chinese were our trusted friends; and we (army commanders) were foolish, hot headed, and needlessly belligerent. Unfortunately, perhaps, China had not yet built the Aksai Chin Road. We came away with the agreement to a 300,000 force, less than what we had contemplated, but still a force and a military one — not a Labour Corps!" Prior to the war, there was a steep erosion of every aspect of India’s military capabilities: civil-military relations, military leadership and morale, force levels and armaments. This neglect led to a steady deterioration of their fighting capacity and skills. Like any other rot within, these remained hidden till they were brutally exposed by the war. This period also saw Nehru’s disdain and Krishna Menon’s acerbic wit and rude behaviour with senior military leadership. There were several incidents indicating poor civil-military relations at the highest level, such as Thimaya’s retracted resignation, 15 Corps Commander Lt Gen SD Verma’s disagreement over Nehru’s misleading statement in Parliament on the situation in Ladakh leading to his supersession and resignation. Political favouritism had allowed Kaul’s elevation, direct access to Nehru, and his arrogant behaviour amongst senior officers. These events sent the message down the line that one could stand up only at one’s own peril. It affected the military leadership and performance in the field. Are we seeing a similar dissonance in civil-military relations today? A major cause for the fragility of India’s politico-military relationship since Independence has been that instead of maintaining ‘political control’, it practises a unique system of ‘bureaucratic control’ over the military. The rules of business of the Government of India lay down that the Defence Secretary is responsible “for the defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence… and for the Armed Forces of India, namely Army, Navy and Air Force”. There is no mention of the role of Service Chiefs! In 1962, a Joint Secretary verbally conveyed government orders to General Thapar, the then Army Chief, to evict the Chinese from the intruded territory. He asked for this in writing because he had not been in the decision-making loop. A major reason for our debacle in 1962 was the isolation of the military from decision-making. Unfortunately, such a state continues. With bureaucracy ensconced in-between, there is hardly any discourse between political and military leaders on geo-political and security-related environment, defence planning and service conditions of the armed forces. The writer is a former Chief of Army Staff
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The way
ahead After three centuries, China is enjoying the shengshi — a golden era, an age of prosperity. In the next decade, it would become the world’s largest economy — a progress that also reflects the rise of China’s comprehensive national power. On the defence industrial front, China has displayed exceptional pragmatism, self-reliance and pride. It has been able to demonstrate its ability to produce aircraft, ships, submarines, tanks, artillery and other weapons, and develop/manufacture missiles, information warfare capability and its civil space programmes. There is little doubt that with such a rise, the balance of power continues to shift inexorably in China’s favour. On the face of it, India and China have cordial bilateral relationship with burgeoning economic cooperation; even some sort of military cooperation. But as Aaron Freidburg states, “Relations between great powers cannot be sustained by inertia, commerce or mere sentiments.” The deep strategic fissures cannot be ignored. Some Sinologists say that China does not nurse extra territorial ambitions. There are more who feel that China never gives up its border claims. The problem is that most of China’s neighbours do not know which Chinese era is its territorial benchmark. What exactly is the Chinese territory? China recognizes McMahon Line as its boundary with Myanmar, but not with India. Till date, it has not revealed its perception of the LAC which will reduce frequent local tension and allow implementation of confidence-building measures envisaged in Article 3 of the ‘Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC-1996.’ In recent years, China has been vocal and assertive on its claim over Arunachal Pradesh. It is non-committal over the nuclear arming of Pakistan and induction of PLA into the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). The latter provides further security to Aksai Chin and Shaqsgam valley under its control and improves Pakistan’s military capability in POK. By issuing stapled visas to Indian passport holders from J & K and Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing is virtually questioning the status of these Indian states. China now has the benefit of an extensive military oriented infrastructure in Tibet which provides capability for rapid build-up of forces and a smooth chain of supply, supplementing its power projection capacity. With addition of its first aircraft carrier, the PLA Navy is developing blue water status gradually. Its submarine and sea domination patrols are gradually extending their ranges to Spratley Islands and in the Pacific Ocean area. Unlike India, China has an integrated defence structure wherein the Army, the Navy and the Air Force function under a single Military Region Commander. It has common logistics for all three Services, which is more economical than the system followed in India. The PLA has a young age profile as 50 per cent personnel of its personnel are drawn from those attending compulsory military service. China’s refusal to indicate its version of the LAC is pointing towards a larger ploy of progressively building up a case of its claims over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Its inroads into India’s neighbourhood and assertive maritime dominance in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean echo its long-term strategic motives. These developments will give it a wide array of options, including military coercion. It could then attempt to resolve impending disputes in its favour while bargaining from a position of strength. China’s relations with Pakistan are driven by a strong politico-military calculus to keep India’s second front alive. During visit to Islamabad in December 2010, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao had highlighted China’s economic solidarity with Pakistan and the growing strategic partnership and military relations between the two countries. Addressing a joint Parliament session, Wen Jiabao stated, “To cement and advance the all-weather strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Pakistan is our common strategic choice… The two neighbouring countries are brothers forever. China-Pakistan friendship is full of vigour and vitality, like a lush tree with deep roots and thick foliage. China-Pakistan relationship is strong and solid, like a rock standing firm despite the passage of time.” While a full scale two- front war on India’s borders with China and Pakistan is unlikely, such a scenario in the Gilgit-Baltistan area cannot be ruled out. That is one reason why the vacation of Siachen Glacier makes no strategic sense at present. Need for foresight & vision
Strategy and diplomacy in international relations is based on the art of possible and the advancement of national interests. At the strategic level, we require a long memory and a longer foresight and vision. Despite several foreign aggressions in our pre- and post-independent history, we seem to lack realism. There is a sense of self-righteousness and singular faith in words, without looking for underlying falsehoods and incompetence. In his recent book ‘On China’, Henry Kissinger treats the India-China border war of 1962 as an important illustration of the Chinese statecraft wherein ‘deterrent co-existence’ and ‘offensive-deterrence’, defined as ‘luring in the opponents and then dealing them a sharp and stunning blow’, are important components. There is no ‘consistency’ in Chinese strategic history. An important lesson that emerges from this episode is about political realism versus ideological wishful thinking. Strong national defence enables strong diplomacy! India may not use force to settle its boundary dispute with China. But can that be said about China tomorrow? India must pay greater attention to its defence capabilities in the Himalayas while continuing improvement in its political, economic and cultural relations with China. There is an urgent need to build defence infrastructure along the northern border. Lack of infrastructure creates huge logistic difficulties and restricts military deployment and manoeuvre. Our border road construction programmes in the North are running way behind schedule. While continuing our political, economic and cultural engagement policies, we must prepare ourselves for any eventuality, develop military infrastructure, put in place synergised border management operations, and build greater surveillance (satellite, aerial and ground level), night fighting and rapid deployment capabilities in the mountains. We must modernise our armed forces and be able to convince the other side that any aggressive moves will invite counter moves. Tomorrow: Failures in the decision-making process For part-1 & 2 of the series on the 50th anniversary of Sino-Indian war log on to www.tribuneindia.com
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The
After
