role of Intelligence agencies has transformed tremendously and their functions have become manifold. In response to the changing security scenario from days of mere surveillance and information-gathering through spies, double agents and police informers, the scene has changed completely with the introduction of new technologies, electronic gadgets and cameras and methods which are not only available to State agencies but also to well-funded terrorist and militant organisations and insurgents. Besides the traditional work involving gathering of information, making assessment and producing actionable reports for those in-charge of taking remedial measures, the agencies have now to manage new areas in a fast-changing scenario.
For instance, highly specialised and trained personnel are needed to read and decode signals, interpret long distance photo-imageries, do forensic analysis of all explosives and other materials, undertake analytics, do horizon-spotting for anticipating emerging problems and connecting the dots coming out of diverse sources of data collection.
The principal challenge in meeting these requirements would be to hire specialised personnel in requisite numbers and train them to the professional level required in the organisation. A comprehensive programme of manpower planning and personnel development is going to be the single-most important issue to be tackled.
It is not necessary to provide for all specialisation and skilled manpower within the agencies and government departments. There are experts and analysts available outside the government in the universities, think-tanks, the scientific community, specialists in business and commerce and journalism.
I think the time has come for those in the government to reach out more and more to these national assets, which are outside the government fold. This can be done not only through cooperative arrangements with necessary safeguards, but also through interchange of specialist personnel between government agencies and non-government institutions.
In times of conflict, many nations have adopted such an approach to great advantage. In the US, interchange between government think-tanks and other non-government institutions is very common. In India, we are yet to utilise the substantial potential that exists in this respect.
REVOLUTIONARY
A revolution in communication and the tremendous expansion of the internet has created a new situation. The utility of monitoring telephonic conversation or intercepting messages on wireless is hardly sufficient any more. Besides the print media and TV, the social media has now a reach which runs into millions with extremely fast communication capable of creating a surge of public opinion and movement faster than any government agency can monitor, let alone control.
We have seen highly centralised governments taken by surprise on movements springing on to the streets in unexpectedly large numbers united with a common intent. This is a new destabilising phenomenon, but the impact of such events is fortunately less in democracies where the media is free and open.
CYber Security
Cyber security threats are very real and pose a serious danger to our security systems. It transcends geographical and domain boundaries and is not subject to control through physical security. The prevalent threats, besides threat and fraud, include espionage, sabotage, psychological war and propaganda.
For adequate cyber security considerable expertise needs to be developed in the areas of cryptography, network security and information security. In fact, establishing and following a cyber security doctrine is the first step to building an effective defence system. Such a doctrine has to be developed for the entire cyber space covering each organisation involved with providing or using internet services. Recent experience has shown that threats and actual attacks are becoming more and more unpredictable. This requires preventive measures and contingency plans to deal effectively with the crisis in quick time.
These new developments call for structures and methods enabling much faster response. The earlier divisions and distinctions in the sphere of security and intelligence are no longer valid. The line between internal and external threats has got blurred. Cross-border terrorism has links in our own country and several internal insurgencies and home-grown terrorism has external ramifications, like sanctuaries, training camps, etc., available in neighouring countries.
Earlier the premier intelligence agencies concentrated mainly on strategic intelligence, leaving technical intelligence mostly to security forces and police organisations. Now there is need for greater emphasis on collecting both strategic and technical intelligence. There is increasing requirement for timely and specific intelligence on which rapid response can be planned and executed.
There is also greater need for effective systems and mechanisms for sharing all worthwhile actionable intelligence without delay and for coordination in the follow-up action or response. This requires a holistic view of the entire network through which information flows to the departments and agencies of the Central and State Governments.
In all spheres it has been found that important bits of information lie unnoticed and unattended while it would have made a crucial difference in the hands of the concerned authority. This aspect needs to be studied by the major departments and agencies to improve the system of collection, storage and retrieval of information across different turfs in a seamless manner. In the case of sensitive information, officials in the hierarchy can be accorded a level of clearance to enable use with the necessary safeguards.
India is steadily building capabilities to take care of its security concerns largely on its own, but some concerns have international dimensions. In this, diplomacy and strategic partnerships would play an important role, but Intelligence cooperation with major powers and countries is also required, particularly in combating international terrorism. We have to always oppose any move to compartmentalise terrorism by considering foreign terrorists as your terrorists and some as ours, depending on their target country. However, we may have to make allowances for each other’s constraints, priorities and areas of divergence of interests.
Suggestions in this regard range from reforms across the board involving setting up of new structures, systems and procedures to the more moderate ones of refinement and modifications of the existing structures and systems, making provision for more radical changes in an evolutionary way.
Diverse views need to be examined and studied carefully. The bottom line is that the measures suggested have to be effective and acceptable in the existing and emerging realities. There is the conventional view that systems and procedures evolve over decades along with periodical reviews and modifications from time to time. The other view is that the present structures and systems are not capable at all to deal with new challenges and threats and there should be a major overhaul.
SECRET SERVICE
The Intelligence apparatus in India conforms to the generally accepted pattern prevalent in democratic countries. Most totalitarian governments and dictatorships follow an integrated system as is the case in communist countries, China, Russia, Pakistan, Myanmar, etc.
In democracies like USA, UK, France, Japan, etc., the security service and the secret service have come to be separated. This occurred in India in September, 1968. Separation of normal police, the security service and the secret service provide necessary safeguards in protecting citizens’ rights and upholding due process of law.
For instance, the Intelligence establishment is not empowered to arrest and detain persons except through and with the help of civil police. The citizen is thus assured that the secret security apparatus cannot touch him directly, but only through normal police where legal and judicial remedies are available. Further, the secret service does not have a role within the country and operates in a manner which is consistent with the overall national security objectives and interests of the country.
First, we need persons of strong nerves who can take care of themselves in unpredictable circumstances and who can work coolly under pressure, and also having the judgement to guard against various risks and retaining the benefit of deniability. They are expected to do whatever it takes to achieve their objective and yet discharge their duties without breaking the law of their own country, although the rules of engagement differ when they have to operate abroad in unfriendly and hostile territory. We have also to choose people from different backgrounds and walks of life with special skills and aptitudes.
Recruitment
Therefore, all recruitment to the organisation may not be best done through the normal selection procedures and bodies or into one or two organised services. We have to study procedures in other countries and adopt some features to suit the conditions in our own country. In the training of recruits, more attention has to be paid to their minds and mental orientation and the overall approach and attitude towards service in the organisation they are joining. Needless to say, much more attention has to be given to the practical side of training in addition to theory. At the same time, besides the need for area specialisation and acquisition of some special skills, there will be obvious need for diversifying their cover and having different criteria for placement, promotions and remuneration.
In the interest of their work, Intelligence agencies have to be provided much greater degree of flexibility and freedom in using public funds and resources. It is not possible to apply the same rules of transparency and audit that are imposed on other departments of the government. On the question of accountability, I find that the views I had expressed several years ago remain largely valid still.
If public servants undertake activity with public funds, then a measure of transparency and accountability are questions which cannot be ignored. Being part of the Executive there is no fundamental immunity available to intelligence agencies from parliamentary scrutiny or judicial review. To an extent, this also goes for audit of expenditure incurred by the Intelligence agencies. It would be clear to the meanest intelligence, however, that there is no way the intelligence agencies can be expected to function in the open for a substantial part of their operations.
Social Audit
If public funds are to be utilised for the purposes described above as functions which Intelligence agencies must necessarily perform in the national interest, then a balance has to be struck between two sets of conflicting considerations. It is no use imposing the standard framework of accountability in a manner which brings essential secret and security services to a halt, causing funds and energy to be expended to no effect. We must remember what we are dealing with and what the other side is throwing at us. So in a democracy run by rule of law, who is ultimately responsible for striking a balance on this issue, and for making a right choice? In Parliamentary form of government this can be only done by the Prime Minister as chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Security with ultimate accountability to Parliament.
There is also the contradiction involved in the spirit that characterises the RTI Act on the one hand and the Officials Secret Act on the other. The generally accepted principle in securing right balance is to weigh the pros and cons of putting information in the public domain, keeping in mind that the same would be also available to the interested diplomatic agents of foreign missions based in India. While Intelligence agencies are exempted from application of the RTI Act, audit and accountability has to be ensured rather carefully to avoid damage to security interests.
At the same time, it is important for Intelligence agencies to devote attention to their image, public relations as well as communication with the media. Failure to do so has on occasion resulted in embarrassment and avoidable burden upon those taking important strategic and tactical decisions. This is an area requiring greater interaction and special handling by trained professionals.
( Excerpts from the 6th R.N. Kao Memorial Lecture delivered in New Delhi by the Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board on January 20, 2012)
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