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Pendulum swings
Back to vendetta politics? |
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Guru of defections
Instability in N-Pakistan
Blah! Blah! Black Sheep!
India and Pakistan have failed to agree on the modalities for the demilitarisation of Siachen Glacier, at the 12th Defence Secretary level talks in Delhi recently. Our politicians and diplomats should not lose on the negotiating table the hard won gains of the armed forces that give India near total tactical and strategic dominance over Pakistani forces in that sector
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Pendulum swings
The
contrast could not have been more stark. One day, four senior ministers of India rushed to the airport to appease Baba Ramdev, to persuade him not to start an agitation against the black money menace. And a few days later, the government rained lathis and tear gas shells on his supporters in the Ramlila Grounds and bundled him off unceremoniously to Dehradun by plane. Apparently, the attempt was to show that the government was reasonable but tough. However, the actual impression that it may end up generating might be entirely different. While the former action had annoyed many for being an abject surrender to armtwisting, the latter might be seen as brutal high-handedness by a government many of whose leading lights have been found to have siphoned off thousands of crores of rupees. Both actions were eminently avoidable, if only the government adopted a balanced approach, but it is so rattled by the numerous exposes — Commonwealth Games and 2G being the most prominent — and the widespread public support to the Anna Hazare agitation, that it swings wildly from one extreme to another. Like it or not, Baba Ramdev enjoys a huge following. Plus, there is indeed strong revulsion in the public against omnipresent corruption. These two combined can increase the troubles of the government in the days to come. Uttarakhand being a BJP-ruled state can be depended on to support the jet-setting baba fully. That does not mean that the demands made by the yoga guru are reasonable. While the intentions may be sincere, the remedies that he has suggested can be worse than the cure. For instance, demonetising 500-rupee and 1,000-rupee notes would wipe out the earnings of many honest people also. Is this “collateral damage” acceptable to the country? Similarly, at a time when there is a vociferous demand for abolishing death penalty even in the case of a murder, capital punishment for corrupt government functionaries is a far-fetched demand. Not only that, the baba wants all corruption cases to be disposed of within a month. Such pronouncements may draw cheers in a school or college debating society but are malarkey in a real-life situation. But the confrontation that the government action has precipitated may give a veneer of respectability to even such fulminations.
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Back to vendetta politics?
True
to expectations, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J. Jayalalithaa has set about unleashing her vindictiveness against her bete noire and DMK supremo M. Karunanidhi after her landslide victory in the assembly elections. One of her first moves has been to scrap his pet projects. Construction work has been stopped on a Rs 1,200 crore assembly cum secretariat complex with a panel set up to probe irregularities in its making, the Kalaignar insurance scheme for the poor stands scrapped and replaced with a new public health insurance scheme, the Kalaignar Housing scheme for the poor has been replaced by a Green House scheme for the rural poor and the plan to revive the Upper House of the State legislature has been dropped. It is, however, the ‘nationalization’ of the cable TV business that is designed to hit the former First Family of Tamil Nadu the hardest because it is the grandnephews of Karunanidhi — Kalanithi Maran and Dayanidhi Maran — who control 80 per cent of the cable market in Tamil Nadu. With the immediate revival of Arasu Cable TV Corporation in the Government sector, the attempt is to choke the Maran outfit Sumangali Cables. Having run a brazenly corrupt government, Karunanidhi has no legs to stand on when Jayalalithaa takes him on with corruption as the focal issue. Whether Jayalalithaa will now work to put her bete noire behind bars like she did, albeit briefly, in 2001 when she stormed to power and Karunanidhi did in 1996 after he displaced her after her first term is anybody’s guess. There is no denying that Karunanidhi is more vulnerable today than ever before since his party has been booted out on the corruption issue following serious revelations in the 2G scam. But Jayalalithaa will have to make sure that she does not fritter away the huge goodwill by poor governance in her obsession with vendetta. Public expectations from her are high. She must get down to the task of restoring the State’s economy, improving infrastructure especially power and fulfilling her other electoral promises.
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Guru of defections
The
death of Bhajan Lal (81), three-time Chief Minister of Haryana, marks the end of an era in state politics dominated by three Lals — the other two being Bansi Lal and Devi Lal — who together helped Haryana to grow into an economic powerhouse. However, the style of politics they played earned the state national notoriety for promoting a culture of “Aaya Rams and Gaya Rams”, which later led to a law against defections. A part of the blame for the state’s inglorious political reputation rests with Bhajan Lal, an expert in politicking and engineering defections. In 1982 he formed a government — despite being in minority — with help from the then Governor, G.D. Tapase, who was publicly slapped by an enraged Devi Lal — something unheard of in Indian politics before and after. There are more unpleasant events associated with Bhajan Lal’s tenure as Chief Minister. First during the 1982 Asian Games and then in 1984 Sikhs were attacked in Haryana when Bhajan Lal ruled the state. In his sunset years Bhajan Lal must have been a bitter man. After the 2005 assembly elections he was abandoned by the Sonia Gandhi-led Congress. His one son is trying to piece together his tattered political legacy. The other love-lorn son made a laughing stock of himself. Admirers claim Bhajan Lal was not a chief minister of districts as many of the occupants of the top post reduced themselves to being. He evenly invested and distributed state resources. From being a small trader selling cloth on a bicycle in villages to occupying the post of Chief Minister, Bhajan Lal did come a long way in life through struggle and political skullduggery. It was a tough call for someone with no money, political godfather, family or community advantage. He cultivated people he came in contact with, charming them with gifts ranging from jobs to on-the-spot plot allotments. Unlike the usually arrogant Jat chief ministers, Bhajan Lal was humble and courteous.
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A true friend is someone who thinks that you are a good egg even though he knows that you are slightly cracked. — Bernard Meltzer
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Instability in N-Pakistan
A
government unable to control large parts of its territory, a military in disarray, loss of control over nuclear assets, radical Islamists bent on acquiring weapons of mass destruction – it is the stuff of nightmares. And Pakistan’s current turmoil is causing jitters around the world precisely because the nightmarish scenario evoked above might just come to pass as Pakistani security establishment’s dalliance with radical Islamist groups drags the nation to the brink of collapse. Recent days have witnessed major attacks on key Pakistani military and intelligence facilities by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a group that for the past several years has fought an increasingly brutal war in the heart of Pakistan. A handful of militants who attacked the Pakistani naval base PNS Mehran in Karachi on May 22 have also underlined the enormity of the security challenge that violent Islamists pose to Pakistan and the whole region. For long, the US and the West have viewed nuclear weapons in South Asia with dread because of the possibility that a conventional war between India and Pakistan might escalate into a nuclear one. Former US President Bill Clinton called the Kashmir conflict “the most dangerous flashpoint on earth” precisely because of this fear of a nuclear holocaust in the Indian subcontinent. Indian and Pakistani officials, on the other hand, have continued to argue that just as the threat of mutual assured destruction resulted in a “hot peace” between the US and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, nuclear weapons in South Asia will also have a stabilising impact. They point out the fact that despite several provocations, India and Pakistan have behaved “rationally” during various crises by keeping their conflicts limited and avoiding escalation. But since September 11, 2001, the nature of problem for the West has changed insofar as the threat is now more of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal being used against the West by radical Islamists if they can lay their hands on it. The present turmoil in Pakistan has once again raised concerns about the safety, security and command and control of its nuclear stockpile. Though the Pakistan government continues to dismiss media reports that its nuclear weapons are in danger of falling into the “wrong hands” as “inspired,” and stressed that Pakistan provided the highest level of institutionalised protection to its strategic assets, the credibility of such claims remains open to question. Instituted in 2000, Pakistan’s nuclear command and control arrangements are centered on the National Command Authority, which comprises the Employment Control Committee, the Development Control Committee and the Strategic Plans Division. Only a small group of military officials apparently have access to the country’s nuclear assets. However, these command and control arrangements continue to be beset with some fundamental vulnerabilities that underline the reluctance of the Pakistani military to cede control over the nation’s nuclear assets to civilian leaders. It is instructive to note that of all the major nuclear states in the world, Pakistan is the only country where the nuclear button is in the hands of the military. Moreover, senior civilian and military officials responsible for these weapons have a problematic track record in maintaining close control over them. A.Q. Khan was the head of the Pakistani nuclear programme (and a veritable national hero) but was instrumental in making Pakistan the centre of the biggest nuclear proliferation network by leaking technology to states far and wide, including Iran, North Korea and Libya. Pakistani nuclear scientists have even travelled to Afghanistan at the behest of Osama bin Laden. While its is true that the Pakistani military remains very professional and perhaps the only cohesive force in the country today, it has also become deeply demoralised, reflected in the large number of soldiers preferring to surrender to the militants rather than fight. There are growing signs of fraying loyalties in the Pakistan Army, underlining the danger to its cohesiveness. The growing “Islamisation” of the younger generation of Pakistani military officers is well-recorded. Given the close links between the Pakistani military and intelligence services and the militant groups fighting in Kashmir and the Taliban, it is not far-fetched to assume that there is a real danger of elements within Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex colluding with radical Islamist groups. Pakistan has accepted US help since 9/11 in designing its system of controls for its nuclear arsenal and the prevention of theft. The US has reportedly spent about $100 million in helping Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal, and some reports have suggested that Pakistan has also received technical assistance from the US. Throughout the Cold War years, it was viewed as politically prudent in the West and especially in the US to ignore Pakistan’s drive towards nuclear acquisition, as Pakistan was seen as an important ally of the West in countering the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and elsewhere. Nuclear proliferation has never been a first order priority for the US when it comes to Pakistan. Now the chickens are coming home to roost, as the Pakistani military seems unable and unwilling to take on the Islamist forces gathering momentum on Pakistani territory on the one hand; while on the other, the nation’s nuclear weapons seem within the reach of the extremist forces. The US has suggested that there are contingency plans in place to deal with the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of militant groups, but it remains far from clear as to what exactly the US would be able to do if such an eventuality arises. Meanwhile, India needs to be aware of the potentially catastrophic implications of the collapse of governing authority in Pakistan. A boost to fundamentalist forces in India’s neighbourhood will have serious consequences for the utility of nuclear deterrence in the subcontinent. Irrespective of India’s other problems with Pakistan, Indian decision-makers had little doubt so far in trusting that their Pakistani counterparts would take rational decisions insofar as the use of nuclear weapons was concerned. That assumption might soon need revisiting if the present trends in Pakistan continue for much longer. The present turmoil in Pakistan and all its attendant consequences in the nuclear realm point to the long-term costs of short-sighted policies — the politics of proliferation — followed by the West in countering proliferation.n The writer teaches at King’s College, London.
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Blah! Blah! Black Sheep! Udi
Baba! They are black and blindfolded. So you can’t see the blindfolds. Funny thing is, even they don’t feel their blindfolds. But, that doesn’t mean the blindfolds have turned transparent. They don’t see the world and the world does not see them. So woolly and fat they are! So comforted in their own dark world. So virile! A bumper crop of black sheep! They keep sprouting from the wastelands of muted conscience. Without rain or manure! A miracle of the deep sea and the devil, both! They breed their creed to throttle ordinary sophistry of middle class morality. They look down upon this world with disdain. Why even ask if they have any wool on them! There is aplenty. A lot for their club. The exclusive club of black sheep believes in sharing and caring. They don’t spill out beans. They spin tales. Their fluffiness is indicative of either of the two possibilities; one, they are thick skinned and grow wool in abundance on epidermis; two, they are hollow within, which makes them look bloated and woolly. And, lest you wonder, they never grow bald with age! Black wool grows on black sheep in abundance with growing age! There is a third possibility too. The censored one! They shave off wool from sheep in deep jungles and wear their coat. No, but isn’t it something that the jackals did in parables! These are sheep! You must be out of your mind! Why ask jackals such a question, have you any wool? Questions have become redundant. Just take answers on your notepad for a good PR. When was it last that you heard someone ask such preposterous questions? Nobody does such an old fashioned thing, damn you! There is a thing called tacit understanding. That’s sophistication. You are supposed to give. And give in suitcases, khokas, and through Swiss bank channels. Full. Not three bags full! What will they do with just three bags full! The intelligent question to be asked is, what kind of wool? And never make a foolish statement like; one for my master, one for the dame, and one for the little boy who lives down the lane. Commoners like the boy living down the lane have been struck off the list long back. Dames come and go! Who cares! If you have enough black wool, you get enough dames — that’s the equation. And, we don’t talk about giving the bags to masters. That’s against the code of conduct. That too, in an election year, talking of giving three bags full! Stupid, in an election year you should learn the technique of turning black sheep into white. Find the formula. Prepare you grand children to recite Ba Ba white sheep…so that no one ever recalls that black sheep were
transformed!
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India and Pakistan have failed to agree on the modalities for the demilitarisation of Siachen Glacier, at the 12th Defence Secretary level talks in Delhi recently. Our politicians and diplomats should not lose on the negotiating table the hard won gains of the armed forces that give India near total tactical and strategic dominance over Pakistani forces in that sector
The
12th round of talks with Pakistan on the Siachen issue is over and should be set aside with panache and poetic flourish. Unlike T.S. Eliot’s protagonist, we have this time around, not stooped to folly in the unremitting waste land of India-Pakistan relationships. Instead we have politely agreed to disagree; accepting the Pakistani non-paper laconically; emphasising that our positions held on the Saltoro Ridge be accepted and plotted on maps as a prelude to their vacation, as well as firmly rejecting the brazen Pakistani suggestion that China be co-opted, being a concerned party.
The key to understanding the Siachen conundrum lies in a clinical understanding of its terrain and layout and its geo-strategic significance for the protagonists. The 76 km long Siachen Glacier is sourced at Indira Col (5,753m) in the eastern Karakorams. It is sandwiched between the Saltoro Ridge to its west, and the main Karakoram Range to its east. The Pakistani positions are west of the Saltoro Ridge and have no direct observation of the glacier. The only way they can access it is by crossing the Saltoro Ridge through five passes: Sia La (7,300m), Bilafond La (6,160m), Gyong La (5,640m), Yarma La (6,100m) and Chulung La (5,800m), all held by India. The key Bilafond La (Pass of the Butterflies) is on the ancient Silk Route linking undivided India and China. Domination of these strategic passes is a key to the control of the surrounding areas. The glacier, at its snout (3,620m), converts into the Nubra River. The average annual snowfall on the Saltoro is 10 mts, with temperatures ranging from minus 30 to minus 80 degrees centigrade. The important terrain deduction is that the 110 km long Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL), which the Indian Army occupies on the Saltoro Ridge, is reachable only after a vertical climb and then a suicidal frontal assault. India thus holds the commanding heights while Pakistan is at a severe military disadvantage.
Operation Meghdoot
For tracking how this military feat was achieved, one has to go back in time. Finding in Alpine climbing circles that Pakistan was claiming the area, Col Narendra “Bull” Kumar volunteered and was permitted to lead a fact-finding mission.
Post his path-breaking expedition in 1978 (he trekked along the Siachen from snout to source and climbed the Sia Kangri) and confirmation of Pakistani presence, Army HQ was alerted. With clinching evidence of Pakistani Special Services Group (SSG) presence detected by India’s Ladakh Scouts in 1983, the Army launched Operation Meghdoot on April 13, 1984, inducting 4 Kumaon by using the knowledge base provided by Col Kumar. IAF helicopters dropped the doughty Kumaonis at Bilafond La. Simultaneously, 4 Kumaon secured the two major passes — the Sia La and Gyong La — on foot, establishing posts that put India in command of Siachen Glacier. Today the Siachen Battalion HQ at 4,880m is named Kumar Base in honour of Col Kumar. India, since 1984, has lost 720 soldiers, with 60 per cent falling to General Glacier. Many more have been evacuated due to the effects of serving in super high altitude. In cost terms, analysts estimate that it costs India Rs 1,200 to 1,500 crore annually to maintain its 7,000-plus manpower in the Siachen area. Our strategic interests and national pride demand that we accept this cost.
The Battle for Quaid Post
How desperately Pakistan tried to occupy the Saltoro Ridge as a mandatory prelude to capture of the Siachen Glacier is evident in their bold, surreptitious 1986 occupation by a JCO-led SSG team, of a dominating feature south of Bilafond La. The Pakistanis justifiably called it Quaid Post and the Indians, the Left Shoulder. This post, protected by a 1,500 foot high vertical foot snow wall, overlooked most Indian posts. On April 18, 1987, withering machinegun fire from it mowed down five soldiers of 5 Bihar located at the air-maintained Sonam Post. Amar, Ashok and U-Cut posts, all helicopter maintained, also became untenable. Capturing Quaid thus became very critical for the Indian Army.
The relieving battalion, 8 J&K LI, undertook this challenge. On May 29, the Commanding Officer, Col A.P. Rai, sent a ten-man patrol under 2/Lt Rajiv Pande to fix ropes for ascending Quaid. Unfortunately, the activity of rope fixing was detected and most of the patrol including Rajiv was shot. A specially selected task force of two officers, four JCO’s and 58 men under Maj (later Brig) Varinder Singh was created to capture Quaid and huge air effort expended to bring this force to area Saddle, 1000 metres away. Maj Varinder launched Operation Rajiv on June 23 and after masterminding three days and nights of superhuman effort, without food and water, constant shelling and losses of men, he located the ropes laid by Pande. Nearing the top, he launched Naib Subedar Bana Singh, the last of his four braveheart JCO’s to finish the capture of the depleted Quaid Post. Starting at 12.11 PM, on June 26, Bana and his four men finished off the job by 2 PM, shooting the last two defendants dead and launching the Indian Tricolor at 21,153 feet. Maj Varinder, though seriously wounded, followed and took charge. Quaid became Bana Post, with Bana being awarded the Param Vir Chakra.
What do India & Pak want?
Tim McGirk and Aravind Adiga in a May 4, 2005 article in Time magazine (War at the top of the world) correctly write that while India wants Pakistan to authenticate the AGPL both on the maps as well as on the ground, the latter insists on maintaining the pre—1972 troop position as agreed in the Simla Agreement. That way, say the Indians, if Pakistan does try to seize the Indian positions after a withdrawal, it would attract international condemnation. Analysts feel that Siachen should be linked to the Kashmir solution and that India demand a quid pro quo on Kashmir. The realist school opines that in case of a Pakistani occupation of Siachen, they would be near impossible to evict the, given their easier access to Saltoro from Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. An equally valid argument is that in case we pull out, Pakistan would be able to have access to Aksai Chin. Finally, the reality is that complete withdrawal of the Army and the IAF will not be possible. Thoise (not a real name but an acronym: Transit Holding Of Indian Soldiers Establishment) is a military airfield and small village in Shyok Valley. It enables a quick inflow of men and material from the Indian mainland to Siachen. “Its importance is not only from the strategic point of view, but also as a lifeline to the civilians,” says the IAF. They are right. Pakistan, on its part, shies away from AGPL validation, ostensibly because that would “legitimise” India’s “intrusion” into Siachen. They insist that India has broken the 1972 Shimla covenant, both arguments being contrived. Pakistan’s “China card” opines that the northern part of the glacier abuts the Shaksham valley which is under Chinese control. Hence the need to have Beijing on board. The reality is that Shaksham valley, a 5,800 sq km area located just north of the Karakoram Pass, was part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China in 1959. The Tribune editorial (The Siachen question: Playing China Card won’t help Pakistan, June 2, 2011) that Pakistan invariably brings up China when driven to a wall is spot on. The Indian positions on the Saltoro overlook Shaksgam Valley, and given the recent frenetic Sino-Pak collusion in this area, there is no reason for us to give up this strategic advantage. The specious argument that demilitarization is needed to stop global warming – the glacier is receding 10.5m annually – does not amuse India as her strategic considerations override global warming. Siachen is not, as Tim McGirk and Aravind Adiga have written, the “low-hanging fruit” of the India-Pakistan peace process, in that it is easier to resolve than Kashmir. India and Pakistan must, on the contrary, see its resolution as a break from their current “trust deficit” relationship, and use its resolution for further peace-making. The ball is clearly in Pakistan’s court. The writer is a defence analyst |
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