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Case for impeachment
UP is unwieldy
Waiting for pension |
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B’desh has strategic importance
Trans-Siberian railway
Pokhran N-tests were a success
Chatterati
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UP is unwieldy Uttar
Pradesh Chief Minister Mayawati may be playing politics while demanding the trifurcation of her state into Harit Pradesh, Bundelkhand and Poorvanchal, but the time has come to look dispassionately into the issue. The demand had been raised on these lines by others too, but in vain. Despite the carving out of Uttarakhand as a separate state comprising the hill districts of UP, the latter still remains as unwieldy and ungovernable as it ever was. Its huge size with a population of 22 crore, sending 80 MPs to Parliament, has definitely been a major hindrance to the development of all regions of the state. Providing an effective administration covering 800 km from Noida to Ballia is a nightmare for any head of the government. In such a big state, development is bound to be the first casualty. UP can give birth to, in fact, four states if the case of Avadh with the Avadhi-speaking districts surrounding Lucknow is taken into consideration. It will be difficult to ignore the case of UP by the states reorganisation commission if it is constituted in the wake of the claims for statehood made by different regions after the Telangana development. There are no emotions involved in keeping UP as a laggard one state. It is the other way round. People of western UP will be happier if they get Harit Pradesh. Those belonging to Bundelkhand (which has seven districts in UP and six in Madhya Pradesh), Oudh and Poorvanchal will also react in the same manner if they get what they want. The population complexion of all four regions is such that Ms Mayawati’s BSP may be a major gainer. The Dalits are in an overwhelming majority in Bundelkhand, which has been in the grip of drought for many years. Ms Mayawati’s primary support base is quite strong in Oudh and Poorvanchal too. The situation in Harit Pradesh is different. Yet she is not prepared to get a resolution passed in the state assembly for the purpose. She has her own game-plan and wants the Centre to initiate the process. The Congress, which is busy reviving its state unit, may have difficulties in going in for converting UP into four states. But it can ultimately gain as this will lead to a considerable improvement in the economic profile of the different areas that together are what is at present UP.
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Waiting for pension As
many as 26,597 applications for pensions by the aged, the handicapped, widows and destitute are pending with the government, according to a statement made in the Punjab Vidhan Sabha on Friday. They are all needy people and deserve whatever little the state can do for them. It should not take too long to weed out unentitled applicants, if any, and there is no point in sitting over the remaining cases. It is not enough to announce welfare schemes for the downtrodden. The authorities concerned must ensure that the benefits are actually delivered without putting the beneficiaries to unnecessary inconvenience. Pensioners can often be seen making rounds of government offices for petty sums passed on as pension. Although media reports do not carry the Social Security Minister’s explanation for the pile-up of applications, there can be two reasons for the enormous backlog: administrative and financial. For one, government machinery moves terribly slow. For another, official procedures are so complicated and tedious that it quite often becomes difficult for an ordinary citizen to get relief in his/her lifetime. Being unorganised, the poor cannot plead their case effectively before the powers-that-be and, because of poverty, they cannot approach the court for justice. Those at the helm of affairs, therefore, should understand their plight and go out of their way to help them. Many of the Punjab government’s welfare schemes have collapsed for want of funds. “Shagun” is one. High food prices have hit the plan to offer subsidised rice/wheat and dal to the poor. Pension delays may also be attributed to the acute resource crunch in the state. The state kitty is seriously depleted. The government is taking loans to partly meet its day-to-day commitments. The extravagant political leadership and bureaucracy must do serious cost-cutting and use the limited state resources for development and helping the needy.
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There are several good protections against temptations, but the surest is cowardice.
— Mark Twain
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B’desh has strategic importance Most
discussions on India-Bangladesh relations revolve around issues like river-water sharing, illegal migration and the sanctuary and assistance given to secessionist rebel groups in north-eastern India by Dhaka. Little attention has been paid to the wider question of Bangladesh’s strategic importance to India. An understanding of its significance must play a defining role in formulating India’s position on the specific issues between the two countries. The first thing to consider is geographical location. India’s land link to seven of its north-eastern states is a narrow passage running above Bangladesh’s northern border. Its narrowest stretch, the 50 km-long Siliguri-Islampur corridor, is only 20 km wide at most places. India’s vulnerability here does not normally feature in public discourse because of this country’s vastly superior military strength compared to Bangladesh’s. That problems may arise when this country is engaged in military conflict in other areas was underlined by the bomb explosion at New Jalpaiguri railway station on June 22, 1999, when the Kargil war was at its height. Two of the 10 killed and 16 of the 80 wounded were men of the Gorkha Regiment on their way to Kargil for deployment. The blast, which was traced to ULFA terrorists aided by Pakistan’s ISI operating from Bangladesh, was aimed at disrupting the transfer of Indian troops from the country’s north-east to the north-western border. That it was not followed by other blasts and guerrilla operations was the result of several factors. First, it was a localised war and India was not fully extended. It had enough troops to retaliate in the eastern sector if things took a serious turn. No government of Bangladesh could risk such a development, however intense its hostility toward India. The Awami League government, in power in Bangladesh at the time, was certainly not hostile toward India, though it was not effective in preventing Pakistan’s use of its territory for launching cross-border terrorist strikes in India or the DGFI from assisting rebel groups from the north-eastern states based on its soil. Things can, however, turn out very differently in future if there is a hostile government in Dhaka and India is so fully extended in a war with Pakistan or China that it can hardly strike back at Bangladesh for cross-border terrorism from its soil. Or it may be even worse if Bangladesh is then at war with India in alliance with the countries fighting the latter. It will be unwise to dismiss such a scenario as being too far-fetched. Strategic projections must take all possibilities into account. Besides, that such a development is well within the range of possibilities will become clear if we take other likely developments into account. Much would depend on what happens in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is by no means certain that President Obama’s Af-Pak policy will succeed. The deployment of 30,000 more US troops and between 5,000 and 8,000 more NATO troops in Afghanistan may not be enough. According to American troops, the Taliban contingents confronting them are, despite significant inferiority in firepower, highly skilled and motivated, and have been matching them move by tactical move. Also, the resumption of operations in Kunduz in Afghanistan, where peaceful conditions had led to a reduction in the levels of NATO and US forces, reflects sound strategic thinking aimed at spreading out the anti-Taliban forces so thin that they become vulnerable to concentrated Taliban/Al-Qaeda attacks at particular points. The Taliban fighters, therefore, are highly unlikely to be defeated by the middle of 2011 when the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan is slated to begin. On the other hand, the knowledge that the US would begin withdrawing from that year would boost their morale immensely and persuade them to fight tenaciously to maximise US casualties in the hope that this would increase the pressure on President Obama to hasten the withdrawal, particularly since powerful elements in the Democratic Party want a quick end to the war. Or they must just melt into the local population to resume their offensive once the US and NATO forces leave. On the other hand, personnel of US and NATO forces may be less inclined to risk their lives knowing that they just need to be safe till 2011 when the withdrawal would begin, and even Pakistanis opposed to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda may refrain from acting against them for fear of post-withdrawal reprisals. The planned increase in the strength of the Afghan Army to 240,000, and the Afghan police to 160,000-from their present strength of 90,000 and 93,000-- to replace US and NATO forces is unlikely to materialise. People are unwilling to join. Also the quality of the officers and men of the army is poor. The Obama administration’s reassurance that 2011 would mark only the beginning of the withdrawal whose pace would depend on the developments on the ground, and the US would not leave its allies in the lurch, is not cutting much ice given its virtual abandonment of Afghanistan to its fate after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989, and its diversion of attention, energy and resources to the war in Iraq in 2003. This and the sanctuary and assistance provided by Pakistan substantially accounted for the Al- Qaeda and Taliban forces, shattered and ousted from Afghanistan in December 2001, to recover and pose the serious threat they now do to the Karzai regime. The beginning of a US withdrawal without a definite indication that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda face defeat would cause demoralisation in Kabul and Islamabad. This and the accompanying surge in the spirits of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda may enable them to win the war and establish control over both Afghanistan and Pakistan and the conventional and nuclear arsenals of both countries, with the former vastly expanded with US military aid. India will then face a sharp increase in cross-border terrorism and several attacks on the scale of 26/11, backed by the military might of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and nuclear blackmail. Things will become infinitely worse if a coalition government headed by Begum Khaleda Zia, with her Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh, among the constituents, is then in power in Dhaka. This may well be the case because the developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan are likely to come to a head in a few years after the beginning of the US withdrawal. The next parliamentary elections in Bangladesh are due in 2013. The pathological hatred the Jamaat and the BNP harbour toward India is no secret, nor how Bangladesh had become an important hub of cross-border terrorist strikes in India and of global terrorism, when a coalition government, comprising both and with Begum Khaleda Zia as Prime Minister, was in power from 2001 to 2006. Hence the critical importance for strengthening the position of the Awami League, which has sharply demonstrated its commitment to combating terrorism and friendship with India by rendering Arabinda Rajkhowa and other ULFA leaders to this country along with the functionaries of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland. New Delhi needs to give serious thought to this as Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s rescheduled visit next month draws
near.
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Trans-Siberian railway Diesel-electric submarines had already joined the Indian naval fleet at Vishakhapatnam when Admiral Sergei Groshkov, supreme naval chief of the Soviet Union, arrived there. He stayed in Palm Beach hotel where my wife served as senior housekeeper. The Soviet naval fleet had about 500 operational submarines at that time. India’s heavy aircraft carrier, now under modernisation in a white sea shipyard in Russia, had been named after this Admiral. I had the privilege of meeting the Soviet naval chief almost every morning when I used to drop my wife in the hotel. Admiral Groshkov was very informal and casual about protocol, sometimes to an embarrassing extent. One day during breakfast time he caught hold of me and asked me to sit next to him on the dining table for breakfast. This was a privilege which many serving rear admirals of Indian navy could not have! I was also carrying out liaison duties with dozens of soviet specialists residing at Vishakhapatnam. Their interpreter Anatoli had studied Hindi in Tashkent University. He invited me to meet him at his home in Moscow whenever I happened to be in that area. I casually mentioned to him about my desire to have a look at the famous Trans-Siberian Railway spread between Vladivostok and Leningrad. This railway had been an engineering marvel and a symbol of the Soviet Union since its inception. During 1976 we made a trip to Stockholm from Mumbai via Tashkent and Moscow. At Mumbai airport we felt the difference as we boarded an Aeroflot plane after security clearance. Air crew declined to have a look at our air tickets and asked us to be seated at any empty seat available. Confusion regarding handbags lying at several places remained till we reached Tashkent. During the two-day halt enroute at Moscow we met our friend Anatoli who was ever keen to learn more of Hindi throughout our association. Anatoli had his hometown in Omsk located on Trans Siberian railway close to Kazakhstan border. It had a very pleasant climate. Anatoli suggested to visit his home town Omsk and thus experience a ride in the Trans Siberian railway too. Our rail coach was well heated. Meat, bread, non-vegetarian soup, tea, boiled eggs were there for all meals. We managed with only loaf bread and tea in this prestigious train. Just before boarding train at Moscow a young passerby asked me to change my US dollars currency into Russian roubles. I did that after consulting Anatoli and thereby got four times the prevailing official bank rate. Inside our coach there were two large framed photographs of places of tourist interest. One of them was that of a famous church. Curiously enough for us there was a printed headline underneath stating: “house of god” with word “god” in Italics only and not in capital letter. On our querry regarding this discrepancy Anatoli smiled and pointed out that Russia as per prevailing concepts in those days did not recognise god as supreme power but only as a respectable deity not entitled for a capital letter! During our two-day stay in Omsk we visited a tourist restaurant where we saw plates full of artificial rice, fish, meat joint and eggs in various forms prominently displaced in glass showcases with tags indicating price in US dollar currency. One had only to point at the item and real food in exactly the same quality and quantity as displayed was served. This helped in overcome language
problem!
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Pokhran N-tests were a success
How credible is India’s thermo-nuclear deterrent? That is the key issue Karan Thapar discussed in the CNN-IBN’s "Devil’s Advocate" programme, broadcast on Sunday, with the former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr Anil Kakodkar. He speaks comprehensively, authoritatively and powerfully to clear all the doubts raised by Dr Santhanam and three other leading scientists about the credibility and success of India’s thermo-nuclear tests of 1998. Here are excerpts from the interview:
Question: Dr Kakodkar, four leading
scientists —- Dr Santhanam, Dr Iyengar, Dr Sethna and Dr Prasad —-
have raised serious doubts about India’s thermo-nuclear tests of
1998. Dr Santhanam says, "we have hard evidence on a purely
factual basis that not only was the yield of the thermo-nuclear device
far below the design prediction, but that it actually failed". Do
you have a problem on your hands? Answer: No, I think this is a
totally erroneous conclusion. The yield of thermo-nuclear tests was
verified, not by one method but several redundant methods based on
different principles, done by different groups. These have been
reviewed in detail and, in fact, I had described the tests in 1998 as
perfect and I stand by that. Q: I am glad that you began by talking
about the yield because both Dr Santhanam and Dr Iyenger have
questioned the yield of the thermo-nuclear tests. Dr Santhanam says
that the DRDO seismic instruments measured the yield as something
between 20-25 kilotonnes which is hugely different from the claim put
out by the Atomic Energy Commission that it was 45 kilotonnes. How
confident are you of the 45 kilotonne yield? A: Well, let me first
of all say that that the DAE and the DRDO both work together as a
team. The DRDO did deploy some instruments for measurements but the
fact is that the seismic instruments did not work. I myself had
reviewed all the results immediately after the tests and we concluded
that the instruments did not work. Q: Dr Santhanam says that the
Bhabha Atomic Energy Centre accepted the DRDO’s instruments and
their estimation for the yield of their fission bomb but not for the
fusion or the thermo-nuclear. He says how can it be that the
instruments worked in one case and not the other. A: Well that’s
not true because the instrument measure the ground motion at the place
where the instrument is located. We had to separate out the
information which was coming out from the thermo-nuclear and which was
coming from the fission test. So the point that I am making is that
the seismic instruments did not work. So there is no question of the
yield of the fission test being right and the thermo-nuclear test
being wrong because no conclusion can be drawn from those instruments
either way. Q: But do you have proof that the yield of the
thermo-nuclear test was 45 kilotonnes? A: Yes. In fact, we have.
Within limits of what can be said and I must make it clear here that
no country has given so much scientific details on their tests as we
have given and this we have published with the maximum clarity which
could be done. Q: The problem is that even in 1998, foreign
monitors questioned the yield of the thermo-nuclear tests. At that
time, Indian doubts were only expressed in private. Now, Indian doubts
have burst out into the open and they are being heard in public. Does
it not worry you that these doubts continue —- now both abroad and
at home —- and that they have continued for 11 years? A: Well, it’s
unfortunate but it doesn’t worry me because facts are facts and
there is no question of getting worried about this. The point is that
the measurements which have been done, they have been done — as I
mentioned earlier — by different groups. People who carry out the
measurements on seismic instruments are a different group. People who
carry out the measurements on radiochemical instruments are a
different group. There are other methods that you can use — for
example, the simulation of ground motion. That’s another group. And
all these groups have come to their own conclusions, which match with
each other. Q: And all these five or six different ways of
measuring the yield have come to the conclusion that the yield was 45
kilotonnes for the thermo-nuclear device? A: That’s right. Q:
So in your mind there is no doubt about it whatsoever? A: Absolutely
not. Q: Now, Dr Santhanam, in addition to disputing the yield has
other reasons to believe that the thermo-nuclear device failed. He
says that given that the fission device, which produced a yield of
around 25 kilotonnes, created a crater of 25 meters in diameter, then
if the fusion bomb had been successful and produced a yield of 45
kilotonnes it should have created a crater of around 70 meters in
diameter. He says that that didn’t happen and there was, in fact, no
crater at all. A: That’s a layman way of looking at it. The fact
of the matter is the fission device yield was 15 kilotonnes, not 25
kilotonnes. Q: So he’s wrong in saying that it was 25 kilotonnes?
A: That’s right and secondly although the two devices were about
1.5 kilometers apart, the geology within that distance changed quite a
bit, partly because of the layers that exist and their slopes but more
importantly because their depths have been different. So the placement
of the device of the fission kind is in one kind of medium and the
placement of the device of the thermo-nuclear kind is in another
medium. Q: So, in fact, what you are saying is that Dr Santhanam is
making two mistakes and possibly making them deliberately. First of
all, he’s exaggerating the yield of the fission device and secondly
he is completely ignoring the fact that the geology of the placement
of the fusion was very different. A: That’s right. Q: And both
of those have led him to an erroneous conclusion? A: Yes. And, in
fact, we have gone through detailed simulation. For example, in
simulation you can locate the thermo-nuclear device where the fission
device was placed and you can locate the fission device where the
thermo-nuclear device was placed. And you get a much bigger crater now
because the yield is higher. Q: This is a very important point that
you are making. A: Yes. And the fission device, which is now placed
in the thermo-nuclear position, produces much less ground
displacement. Q: So if in simulation you place the thermo-nuclear
device where the fission device was placed, you would get a much
bigger crater —- much closer to the 70 metres in diameter that Dr
Santhanam would like to see? A: Well, I don’t remember how much it
was but this is actually true. This has been verified by
calculations. Q: Dr Santhanam has yet one more reason for
believing that the thermo-nuclear device failed. He says if it had
succeeded, both the shaft and the a-frame would have been totally
destroyed. Instead, writing in The Hindu, he says, the shaft
"remained totally undamaged" and as for the a-frame, he
says, it "remained completely intact". A: Well, I think
you must understand the phenomena of ground motion when a nuclear test
takes place. Depending on the depth of burial and of course the medium
in which it is buried, you could get several manifestations on the
surface. You could get a crater and there are different kinds of
craters that one could see. You can just get a mound —- the ground
rises and remains there. And on the other extreme it can vent out. So
in case of the thermo-nuclear device, the placement was in hard rock
—- granite —- and with the depth and the yield for 45 kilotonnes,
one expects only a mound to rise, which is what happened. Q: And
not a crater? A: And not a crater. Q: Clearly you are dismissive
of Dr Santhanam’s doubts. Now let me quote to you what one of your
predecessors —- former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Dr
P K Iyenger —- said in a statement he issued on September 24, 2009.
He says: "The recent revelations by Dr Santhanam are the
clincher. He was one of the four leaders associated with Pokhran II,
the team leader from the DRDO side, and he must certainly have known
many of the details, particularly with regard to the seismic
measurements. If he says that the yield was much lower than projected,
that there was virtually no crater formed, then there is considerable
justification for reasonable doubt regarding the credibility of the
thermo-nuclear test." Does it worry you that your predecessors
seem to disagree with you but agree with Dr Santhanam? A: Well,
first of all I respect everybody. I respect Dr Iyenger, I respect Dr
Santhanam, but the fact is that Dr Iyenger was nowhere involved in the
1998 tests. He was, of course, a key figure in the 1974 tests. Also,
the fact is that before the 1998 tests, all work was done under cover
—- we were not in the open —- and we required a lot of logistical
support and that all was being provided by the DRDO. But things were
still being done on a need-to-know basis. So, to assume that Dr
Santhanam knew everything is not true. Q: You are making two
important points. One you are saying that the DRDO and Dr Santhanam
did not know everything —- the fact that he was the DRDO team leader
does not mean that he knew everything that was happening. A: He knew
everything within his realm of responsibility. Q: You are also
saying that Dr Iyenger isn’t fully in the picture and, therefore,
his opinion is not necessarily valid. A: He is not in the picture as
far as the 1998 tests are concerned. Q: So, he doesn’t really
know about the 1998 tests. A: Well, he knows only as much as has
been published and nothing more. Q: Let’s pursue the credibility
and the doubts surrounding India’s thermo-nuclear deterrent in a
somewhat different way. Dr Santhanam says that these doubts were
formally raised by the DRDO with the tovernment as far back as 1998
itself. And in a meeting arranged by the then National Security
Advisor Brajesh Mishra, they were brushed aside in a manner which Dr
Santhanam compares to a sort of frivolous voice vote. A: Immediately
after the tests, we carried out a review with both teams present —-
BARC team as well as the DRDO team. We looked at the measurements done
by the BARC team and we looked at the measurements done by the DRDO
team and I told you the conclusions and on the basis of that review it
was clear what instruments we could go by and what conclusions we
could draw. Now, the question is that if the instruments didn’t
work, where is the question of going by any assertions, which are
based on (that). What is the basis of any assertions? Q: In an
article that Dr Santhanam has written recently (on November 15, 2009)
for The Tribune, he says: The Department of Atomic Energy —- the
department to which you were ex-officio secretary —- has, in fact,
been hiding facts from successive Indian governments, from Parliament
and from Indian people. How do you respond to that accusation? A:
Well, as I said earlier, we are perhaps unique in giving out the
maximum information and that too very promptly —- immediately after
the tests. Q: There is no hiding? A: There is no hiding. Q:
Let me put to you two or three critical issues. Given the fact that
although you have concluded several reviews —- including one
recently after the doubts were raised —- the doubts continue. And
given that these are doubts about India’s one and only
thermo-nuclear test, do we need more tests? A: Well, I would say no
because the important point to note is that the thermo-nuclear test,
the fission test and the sub-kilotonne test all worked as
designed. Q: You are saying that India doesn’t need more
thermo-nuclear tests but the truth is that all the established
thermo-nuclear powers needed more than one test. Can India be the
exception? A: Well, if you go by "Dil Maange More", that’s
another story. Q: I want to pick up on that last point that you
have just made. Given that doubts continue and given that there are
going to be no further tests and you are not saying that there is any
need for further tests, can you say India has a credible
thermo-nuclear bomb? A: Of course. Q: We have a credible
thermo-nuclear bomb? A: Why are you using singular? Make that
plural.
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Chatterati Over a hundred members of Parliament opened their home doors to groups of school students. The students were rating the carbon footprint on the adoption of eco-friendly steps. They were keen to know whether the MPs had switched to e-bills as opposed to paper bills, recycling paper, rejecting plastic bags and switching to solar power. Surprisingly, many MPs were politically correct while some were so ignorant that they did not even know that the Prime Minister was leaving for the climate change conference in Copenhagen in a few days. An MP from Chhattisgarh told to them that “The sal leaves from my constituency are used to make containers for prasad in Tirupati, so we have to be aware of environmental issues. When I was a young boy, it was never very hot in my constituency but now everyone uses fans and coolers. I believe the climate is changing”. Others too, while being aware of environmental problems in their constituencies, were unaware of the larger debate regarding climate change and India’s stance. The Rashtriya Janata Dal – believes Copenhagen would be a “good tourist opportunity”. An MP from Jammu and Kashmir confessed that he did not like e-bills. While he may not know India’s position on climate change, however, he has switched to CFL. Obama’s Hindi Seeking to strike a chord with Indians, Barack Obama twice turned to Hindi as he hosted Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the White House. Obama set the mood for the day when he greeted everyone at the beginning of a joint press conference with a “Namaste”. In the evening, as he raised the toast along with Singh at the high-profile state dinner, Obama greeted the audience in Hindi “Aapka swagat hai”. Obama has always been fascinated by different aspects of India. A picture of the Mahatma adorns the President’s office. During election campaigning the President had a Hanuman picture in his pocket. As Senator, he kept a picture of Mahatma Gandhi in his office. Michelle Obama is a great believer in Indian herbs. She has them planted now in her kitchen garden at the White House. Namrita Bachchan Madhushala” showcases works by artist Namrita Bachchan. Inspired by excerpts from Harivansh Rai Bachchan’s poetry, Namrita’s works are evocative. Attending the do were some of Delhi’s best-known people. Priyanka and Robert Vadra walked with their children, Raihan and Miraya. Namrita is an independent artist. Her aunt, Jaya Bachchan, and daughter Shweta Nanda, also came to cheer the youngster in their family. Namrita is the daughter of Ajitabh Bachchan. Priyanka, as usual, stole the show with a long skirt and a
muffler. |
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