Thursday, August 31, 2000, Chandigarh, India
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Adding insult to injury ADHOCISM rules the Centre’s agriculture policy. There is no well-thought out or integrated long-term approach with the result that each issue is seen in isolation, and the solution to one area triggering a problem elsewhere. Take the minimum support price (MSP) for kharif crops announced on Tuesday. Violence in Cyberabad Exporting AIDS |
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Proxy war in Kashmir Time for proper unified command by Harwant Singh WE are now in the eleventh year of insurgency in J and K. A coordinated, cohesive and coherent action plan to fight insurgency is still lacking. A multitude of security agencies and intelligence organisations are at work in a disjointed and uncoordinated manner, often operating at cross purposes and in petty rivalries. At the other end there is confusion and uncertainty both in Delhi and Srinagar. How to meet the IED threat
Power of prayer
In support of the world’s poor From Suman Guha Mozumder in United Nations A GRANDDAUGHTER of Mahatma Gandhi has urged the United Nations to take up the issue of debt burden of poor countries next week, when the heads of state and government from all over the world assemble at the United Nations for the Millennium Summit. Addressing the Millennium Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual leaders, Ela Gandhi from South Africa said that something should be done in the next few weeks when political leaders meet here.
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Proxy war in Kashmir WE are now in the eleventh year of insurgency in J and K. A coordinated, cohesive and coherent action plan to fight insurgency is still lacking. A multitude of security agencies and intelligence organisations are at work in a disjointed and uncoordinated manner, often operating at cross purposes and in petty rivalries. At the other end there is confusion and uncertainty both in Delhi and Srinagar. While Delhi may be wanting in the formulation of a comprehensive and long-term Kashmir policy and merely catching straw, at the Srinagar end not only has the basic administration fallen by the wayside, the compelling need for a unified command has also found a compromise in the form of two working groups or committees (one for 15 corps and the other for 16 corps areas) under the chairmanship of the state’s Chief Minister. When the Chief Minister is not available, the problem of chairing the meetings becomes a source of major friction between various security and civil agencies. You could lay the blame at many doors for this sordid state of affairs, but the mischief of periodic lowering of the position of senior military commanders is a more relevant cause. Where seniority is claimed over those with twice the length of service and with much greater experience and in responsible positions, even compromise does not seem to come about. What we are witnessing in J and K is not simply terrorism or insurgency, but a war and you can call it a proxy war. If that is so, then in such a situation who should be in command of all those fighting that war at the ground level ? The very act of calling out the military is synonymous with and an acknowledgement of the state of affairs where other government agencies are simply unable to measure up to the situation. Anyone even remotely familiar with the nature of insurgencies, even when foreign inspired, would know that these require centralised control of all elements involved in the fight against them. The accountability must be to the one central authority controlling the operations. In Punjab, the decade-long terrorism was finally brought under control once the Army came to the assistance of the administration. In the larger national interest, the Army high command decided (in the face of protests from the lower echelons) to play second fiddle allowing the police to remain up-front. The rationale behind this arrangement was the need to restore the confidence and morale of the state police, which lay in tatters and it was grovelling for cover in abject fright of the terrorist and night-patrolling had simply ceased to be there. The size of security escorts with police officers and the large-scale bullet proofing of vehicles was an indication of the level to which they had scared themselves. Even when the situation had been brought well under control and the GOC, II Corps, expressed his desire to get the troops back into the barracks, Chief Minister Beant Singh, perhaps at police chief K.P.S. Gill’s prodding, begged the Defence Minister not to withdraw the Army. That is when Mr Sharad Pawar’s crudity came through the thin ministerial veneer at Jalandhar as he scoffed, “fauji is not to decide on these issues.” What we are faced with in J and K is not a mere mix of terrorism and insurgency but a proxy war. Unless all state agencies shed their individual egos, false notions of self-importance and artificially created perceptions of status, act in unison and under centralised control in the best national interest, the proxy war now in full swing in J and K is difficult to win. The security forces can bring the situation under control for a period of time only and cannot provide a permanent solution, because basically there is no military solution to such problems. Their resolution lies in political domain, and in the case of J and K in the diplomatic field because of the Pakistan factor. Be that as it may, here we are more concerned with the issue of containing insurgency and of centralised command and control of all intelligence agencies and security forces. In an enlightened democracy placing all state organs under the Army (other than security forces and intelligence agencies) in situations besides martial law, for which incidentally there is no provision in the Indian Constitution is not desirable, but cooperation and coordination between all state agencies is mandatory. If this has not happened so far it is the weakness of the political executive both at the state and the Central level to make the police and intelligence agencies accept the compulsions of a unified central command under the Army. Increasingly impression is gaining ground that there are many vested interests and powerful groups who do not wish to see the end of trouble in J and K. In the period 1989-1991, when insurgency had taken a virulent form in the valley, areas of Poonch-Rajouri-Naushera were also getting activated. There were unending reports of a few thousand Pakistan-trained insurgents waiting to be inducted across the LoC and some pockets of influence of Pakistan in the area were already noticeable. With the willing help and cooperation of all security, civil and intelligence agencies, we were able to create a unified command under the General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) of the division. The Commissioner, the police, the BSF and the officials of various intelligence agencies worked in a spirit of complete understanding and cooperation under the command of the GOC. This spirit of camaraderie percolated all the way down and there was free flow of information, and a spirit of willing cooperation and coordination universally prevailed among various agencies. The GOC called the meetings once a week or more often as required, and orders emanating from the group were implemented without any reservations. Army patrol, called “Mail Jhol” criss-crossed the interior of the two districts, interacted with the locals and the panchayats of outlying villages, picked up information, their problems and grievances. These were taken up in the unified command and action initiated within a week. Composite teams of doctors, revenue officials and the police, depending on the nature of complaint, visited the village concerned and, where possible, attended to the problem on the spot. Schools which were without teachers and dispensaries without any medical staff for years saw a positive response from the administration. The villages which had not been visited by any civil official for decades saw droves of them descending on these areas. The effect of this ordinary action was indeed amazing, and brings out the simple fact that our people ask for very little and how even simple and almost inconsequential steps satisfy them. The end effect was that the conditions for the germination of Pakistan sponsored discontent were arrested. Willing cooperation was forth-coming from the locals, and our intelligence gathering saw a sea change. We were able to intercept most of the infiltrating groups due to the help of the locals and coordinated actions of security forces, and the area remained peaceful. This experiment of the unified command, though on a limited scale, was successful and contained the problem almost completely in the districts of Poonch and Rajouri during the years 1989-1991. The purpose of this long narrative is merely to bring home the simple fact that we cannot fight a proxy war of the type now prevalent in J and K in the manner presently being attempted, with the sham of a unified command cobbled together. Not only is the unified command anything but unified, but the areas of responsibility between various security and intelligence agencies are also not well delineated. In fact, these overlap, with the result that the responsibility gets diffused and with it accountability disappears. That is how no one can be hauled up for the laxity in the protection of pilgrims at Pahalgam. There is a lack of cooperation. Rivalries also exist between various intelligence agencies and the security forces. The resolution of the Kashmir problem has to be looked at both in the security and political perspective. Since there is no synergy within these two, the problem has become endemic. There have been periods when insurgency was brought well under manageable proportions, but the necessary political initiative was missing. Here the political initiative within J and K on one side and on the other diplomatic steps involving Pakistan, within the ambit of the Simla Agreement, have to be taken up almost sequentially. But there is some serious disconnect within the functioning of the Government of India. Just to give an example, the release of Kashmiri terrorists in exchange for the hijacked passengers at Kandahar was, on all counts, done without consultations with the military, which is directly involved in a fierce struggle with the insurgents in J and K. It is the military which is now facing the after-effects of that folly. Azhar Masood, one of the terrorists released in exchange for the Kandahar hostages, is a fundamentalist jehadi leader of the first degree and now a key player in organising the more virulent terrorist group called Jaish-e-Mohammed. The fallout of Rubia Sayeed’s exchange for a number of terrorists is too well known. At that time, too, the military was not consulted. The recent developments in J and K have made matters more complicated. We can get lyrical and recall Sahir Ludhianvi’s optimism and turning of a new leaf after the partition of the country: “Voh vaqt gaaya, voh daur gaya/veh log gaye is dharti se ....” But the fact is that those blood-thirsty people of the Partition days are very much there, shooting down our folks in J and K and we cannot wish them away. Their ilk is available on this side of the divide too. They will have to be neutralised. The approach to the political and diplomatic issues need greater resolve, an open mind and a spirit of understanding and cooperation, in the larger interest of the people of the two countries. We will have to fight the proxy war firmly with all state organs acting in unison and the security forces in a coordinated and purposeful manner, and extricate the blighted state from this nightmare. Ignoring the pressing need for a proper unified command will be at our peril. It has to come about sooner than later. The intelligence agencies and all security forces operating in J and K will have to be brought under the full and complete control of the unified command. A proper interface between the unified command and the civilian administration will need to be created. No half-hearted measures will meet the requirement. Only the corps headquarters (luckily whose boundaries conform to the geographical compulsions of J and K) have the command and control structure, staff support, the expertise, the communication set-up and the motivation to fight the proxy war. The over-all control of the unified command (s) would rest with Headquarters, Northern Command. Increasingly, the demand to hand over J and K to the military is gaining ground in the nation. A unified command meets that demand within the democratic framework of the country. The writer, a retired Lieut-General, is a frequent commentator on strategic issues. |
How to meet the IED threat THE killing of Brigadier Shergill and Col Rajender Chauhan in a recent landmine blast activated through an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) by Kashmir militants is not only shocking but also demoralising for the security forces fighting in the valley. The reason is that the clearance for the equipment required for the detection and neutralising of IEDs is still pending with the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The IED is one of the deadliest weapons with militants because it was very difficult to detect unless we have sophisticated equipment. Earlier also a number of Army and paramilitary personnel have been killed with IEDs. However, a senior officer of the rank of a Brigadier has been killed for the first time. The militants detonated a landmine through the remote-controlled IED planted on the road at Warpora village,12 km from Handwara town, in Kupwara district when the Brigadier, having taken over just three days ago, was being driven around by the Colonel on an “area familiarisation tour”, which is normal when a new commander takes over. The Brigadier was going for a briefing by the CO on counter-insurgency operations. When they reached near Jachal Dor, near the RR battalion, the IED was activated by the militants through a remote control and the landmine blasted, over-turning the vehicle killing the two officers and the radio operator on the spot. The continuous attacks on Army pickets and paramilitary forces and the massacre of innocent civilians in J&K show that the so-called unified command has failed to be effective because there are coordination problems. It is also a failure of the intelligence set-up. Standing operating procedures are clearly laid out in counter-insurgency operations for a road opening party. At present in the absence of sophisticated equipment, a road opening party marches out at dawn and checks for grenades, explosives and mines all along and 50 metres either side of the road through manual prodding and mine detectors. Armed soldiers are then stationed along the path until dusk. This happens all along the Jammu-Srinagar-Leh highway. There is an armed soldier every 100 metres on either side of the road. Every few kilometres there is a mounted machine gun, which is ready to move at short notice. The biggest problem in the operation is that the hand-held mine detectors are outdated and obsolete and do not detect modern landmines and explosives because these are plastic types and have no metal part. The second problem is that this routine is being carried out for the last 10 years and the militants are well versed with this tactics. They plant IEDs only when the Army road opening party has completed its job. Thus, they are able to avoid the security net with the help of ethnic civilians. The IEDs can be neutralised only by the use of the devices that jam the radio signal which activates them. Terrorists hide in the forests and villages and stealthily detonate the IEDs through a remote control. The Army has only a few jammers that are being used for VVIPs. However, jammers cannot provide complete protection since they are powerless against weight-activated mines which explode under the pressure of wheels. “Of the total IEDs laid, approximately 35-40 per cent are remotely controlled and used very effectively to inflict heavy casualties with a devastating effect. Although all efforts are made to procure counter-IED equipment, it is never enough to ensure that the area is covered by jammers at all times,” says Col Shruti Kant, an Army spokesman. Electronic-counter measure jammers and pre-detonators, which can jam remote-controlled frequencies and also detonate IEDs, are required immediately. The DRDO has undertaken to produce such equipment indigenously. The Army is trying to acquire more sophisticated landmine sweepers since even the mine-protected vehicles acquired from South Africa are too cumbersome for routine use and are used by road opening parties. These are vehicles with specially fitted armour, which absorbs the shock of the landmine. But India does not have these in sufficient quantity even after more than 10 years of counter-insurgency operations in J&K and 30 years in the North-East. The file in the MoD is gathering dust for the procurement of such equipment. Let us hope and pray that the equipment will be purchased soon either from Britain or from Israel. Accountability for such delays should be fixed and severe action taken accordingly. The writer is a retired Colonel. |
In support of the world’s poor A GRANDDAUGHTER of Mahatma Gandhi has urged the United Nations to take up the issue of debt burden of poor countries next week, when the heads of state and government from all over the world assemble at the United Nations for the Millennium Summit. Addressing the Millennium Peace Summit of Religious and Spiritual leaders, Ela Gandhi from South Africa said that something should be done in the next few weeks when political leaders meet here. “We have spoken about rich and poor, poverty and wealth of the minorities at this session. Many of these people and countries are weighed down by debt burden, which is an issue we should talk about,” Ela Gandhi said. “We need to take up this issue and bring it to the United Nations,” she said, amid thunderous applause by religious and spiritual leaders at the U.N. General Assembly. A number of speakers throughout the day also touched upon the issue of poverty and its relation to the increasing level of crime and violence all over the world. When Ela Gandhi’s name was announced by Indu Jain, chairperson of the afternoon session dedicated to the “World Movement for Nonviolence”, a small group of South Africans began to dance and sing songs in their native language encircling Ela Gandhi, who stepped onto the podium much to the bewilderment of the audience. Ela Gandhi then explained that the people were invoking the spirit of ancestors, which are supposed to give strength and encouragement to her. “It is a privilege for me to address this august summit, more so as an African woman,” Ela Gandhi said. She said South Africa had shown that conflicts can be resolved through non-violence and without bloodshed and it is an example many countries of the world have taken. “There will be conflicts on earth but this can be resolved in a non-violent way,” she said. Ela Gandhi also gave several examples from the life and work of Mahatma Gandhi and the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, describing them as brave and courageous people, who had taught humanity that love can do a lot of things. “Gandhi conquered the British empire through love. People called him “half naked, half civilised” and yet the mighty British empire was scared of him,” she said. Referring to the Dalai Lama, she said, he had dedicated his life to non-violence. “Today had he been here, he would have been one of us, but the fact that he is not here shows he is relevant and he is feared,” Ela Gandhi said. Many among the delegates stood up and clapped in appreciation. Ela Gandhi said that there was no need for a new religion, as the Dalai Lama said once, the need of the hour was for better human beings. She said that the past century had been characterised by war, untold violence against women, against children who have been criminalised, militarised and have been made to act against nature. “Today we need to wonder what we are leaving for the next generation,” she said, adding that if one is concerned then one has to get down to the problem. “The presence of so many religious people here today is an indication that we are concerned today and we need to change,” she said. She made three suggestions for the religious leaders to consider, including poverty eradication and equitable distribution of land. “Our indigenous religion believes that land cannot be owned by anybody and it is for everybody to enjoy. We know we cannot go back to that stage, but let us see why poor people have so little access to the land, which can at least make them survive,” she said. “This is what the U.N. needs to ponder and I want to leave these issues for the U.N. and religious leaders to address and think aloud,” she said. “If we need a non-violent world, we need to think about them,” she added. —
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