The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

Safety first
Aviation authorities must be proactive in conflict zones

Civil aviation took a major hit when Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over Ukraine. The plane that was flying at a height way beyond the range of most of the hand-held missile systems, was downed by a missile designed to shoot down military aircraft high in the sky. It has also transpired that many other aircraft, including those from India, used the same international air corridor — something that has changed only after the disaster.

The American Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) is the default civil aviation institution for the world. It has now banned, albeit temporarily, US flights to Israel's Ben Gurion Airport, Tel Aviv, following a missile attack near it due to the ongoing fighting between the Israeli and Hamas forces. Some non-American airlines too have followed suit. Attacks on civil aircraft in conflict zones have become frequent as it was not too long ago that Karachi airport became a battle zone, and some planes on the ground were damaged by the militants who had stormed the airport.

Hundreds of thousands of passengers travel by air every day. An overwhelming majority of them do so in complete safety. However, over two dozen commercial aircraft are said to have been shot down since World War II, when commercial aviation really took off. The overall safety record of the industry is impressive, but incidents like the latest disaster force us to look deeper into the issue. It is well-known that there is lack of coordination between aviation agencies of various countries and the International Civil Aviation Organisation. The disaster of flight MH17 has shaken up the world, and as a result of that, authorities are more active in ensuring passenger safety. Aviation routes have been changed to avoid flying over dangerous areas, and flights banned at dangerous airports. The profusion of non-state actors with advanced weaponry poses new challenges which must be tackled proactively, more so when passengers fly over or land in conflict zones.

Thought for the Day

Effort only fully releases its reward after a person refuses to quit. —Napoleon Hill, American writer

On this day...100 years ago

lahore, friday, july 24, 1914
The colour-basis of superiority

HERR Dernburg, late German Secretary of State for the colonies, at the London Chamber of Commerce on June 22, paid a tribute to British example of colonial government and said Germany had derived many advantages from British experience and example in her colonial policy. One remarkable statement referred to the colour basis of ascendancy and domination and he seemed to think that God had made the white people in order that they might hold in subjection those of the dark hue.

The parallel case in the Punjab

There was a case of Begar in Gorakhpur District where the Inspector of Post Offices wanted a cart and the local Nazir directed his peon to procure one for him. This case very much resembles the Kangra Begar case, which the Punjab Government said it could not recognise as one of Begar at all. The Tahsildar issued an order to procure 9 camels for the camp of the Settlement Officer, Kangra District. Two peons seized camels which were already under contract to others for the transport of grains. Resistance to impressment led to prosecution. The Tahsildar-Magistrate convicted the owners. "It is generally admitted," he wrote in his judgment, "that officers of Government when touring in their jurisdiction are entitled to obtain transport, and if this principle is violated it follows that the executive officers are entitled to require the owners of such transport to supply it; and if they forcibly refuse to supply it such persons are guilty of an offence." Mr Justice Agnew who quashed the conviction on appeal pointed out that the "law imposes no duty on any revenue official to seize animals belonging to private individuals for purposes of camp transport."

ARTICLE

Disarray after shattering defeat
Congress party's pathetic plight
Inder Malhotra

This week began with the formal announcement of the long-expected collapse of the Congress-National Conference alliance that, under the leadership of Omar Abdullah, has been ruling the sensitive state of Jammu and Kashmir since 2009. Parting is such sweet sorrow, said the Bard, but there is nothing either sweet or sorrowful about the parting of the ways between the two allies in Srinagar. One will say more on this subject presently but first notice must be taken of other developments within the Congress that have overshadowed the political divorce in J & K. In as many as five states — in the east and west of the country — there have been revolts by Congressmen against the party “high command” which really consists of just two leaders, Congress president Sonia Gandhi and her son and party vice-president, Rahul.

During the decade when the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance was in power the party was a fiefdom of mother and son. Power resided in 10 Janpath where Ms Gandhi lives, not in the Prime Minister's House at 7 Race Course Road. The young Mr Gandhi could rudely trash an ordinance that had been approved by not only the Cabinet, headed by Manmohan Singh, who was then in the United States, but also by the Congress Core Committee, presided over by his mother. To an extent the situation remains the same even now. For, no Congressman of any consequence is prepared to serve under anyone equivalent to him but all competitors would meekly submit to the leadership of any member of the Gandhi family. However, there are wheels within wheels. The dynastic leader is deified when she or he leads the party to power but is seen differently when s/he is unable to prevent a humiliating defeat. Even in 1977 when Indira Gandhi was at her nadir something similar had happened to her even though she still had 150 seats in the Lok Sabha and 30 per cent vote. And yet the party split down the middle.

Moreover, Indira Gandhi had spectacularly returned to power in 33 months flat. Four years later it was largely the people's grief over her assassination that won Rajiv Gandhi a mind-boggling mandate. Also, it should not be forgotten that the Janata Party that had defeated her in the post-Emergency polls itself collapsed ignominiously under the weight of its own contradictions, aggravated by the clashing ambitions of its three top leaders with a collective age of 232. For the Congress to hope for any such luck now would be a delusion bordering on lunacy. Above all, none of her present-day descendants has even a fraction of Indira Gandhi's mass following and political skills.

Against this backdrop it is no surprise that Ms Sonia Gandhi has not even held a Congress conclave of any kind to analyse the causes of the drubbing and to decide on ways to revitalise the demoralised party. Consequently, party members, deprived of inner-party democracy, are complaining privately and even semi-publicly, that Rahul’s heavily flawed leadership of the election campaign was the cause of the catastrophic defeat and that he is not the one who can lead the Congress back to power. No wonder, many are demanding that Priyanka Gandhi Vadra be brought into active politics. So far Ms Sonia Gandhi has shown no inclination to do so.

Now that rumblings of dissent, protests and revolt have become public, the party's spokespersons can no longer pretend that there are no divisions within the “disciplined” party. Mr. Gandhi (whose age is exactly equal to the number of seats his party has in the Lok Sabha) has made a terse statement: “These are internal matters of the party; I have made my position clear”. But of what use is this?

In addition to J & K, three other Congress-ruled states — Maharashtra, Assam and Haryana — are going to the polls to elect their state assemblies. In the Lok Sabha elections the party in all these three got a drubbing. Congress ranks in all three therefore demanded a change of chief ministers because the present ones were responsible for the rout and deserved immediate dismissal. At one stage, the Congress president seemed to agree. But she soon changed her mind, reportedly at the insistence of her son, which should explain what a section of the media is describing as a “mini-coup” against Rahul Gandhi.

Two very powerful ministers —Narayan Rane in Maharashtra and Himanta Biswa Sarma in Assam —have resigned from the government but not yet from the party. The situation in Assam, where the Congress won three assembly elections in succession under the leadership of the present Chief Minister, Tarun Gogoi, is worse than elsewhere. For 27 rebel MLAs have assured Mr Sarma that they would join him to overthrow Mr Gogoi's government even before the assembly elections.

As for Jammu and Kashmir, the less said the better. Here, in the parliamentary poll, both the Congress and the NC, permanently at loggerheads with each other, had drawn a blank. Of the six Lok Sabha seats three were won by the Bharatiya Janata Party and the other three by the People's Democratic Party of Kashmir, bitterly opposed to the NC. Ironically, before joining hands with the NC, the Congress had ruled J & K in partnership with the PDP. The old alliance may be back at the time of the election this time around. Until then both the estranged present partners plan to keep the existing government going. Whether it would be possible to do so is a moot point.

Which is the fifth state that has also become a trouble spot for the despondent Congress? It is West Bengal where no elections are due but Congress members of the state assembly are deserting their party to join the ruling party in the state, the Trinamool Congress, led by the feisty Mamata Banerjee. Three did so on Monday. Some more will follow them soon.

MIDDLE

The Sahib’s Calf
ID Shukla

One of the many old scrap books lying in my father's cupboard carried interesting anecdotes about the bureaucracy. Ujagar Singh was a simple farmer from a backward district of Punjab. Despite substantial land and hard work, he remained hand to mouth because of paucity of water in his fields. The rains were scanty and the fields that were situated at the tail end of the channel were invariably denied canal irrigation.

People were required to make fresh applications for water annually. Ujagar’s case failed to find favour with the officers year after year. On one such occasion, waiting outside the office of the Chief Engineer Irrigation, he spotted a liveried peon. Ujagar struck a casual conversation with him only to find that they were from adjoining villages. In the course of the conversation, the peon happened to reveal that the Chief Engineer, an Englishman, was so fond of his cow that he played with its calf like a pet and was not prepared to part with it even after it was two years old. Whosoever came to buy the calf was subjected to intense interrogation and ultimately dismissed as undeserving of owning his beloved calf.

On learning this, Ujagar made up his mind to acquire the Chief’s calf. He presented himself before the Sahib as a potential buyer. On the recommendation of his peon, the Chief agreed to show the calf but not without asking hundred and one questions about the proposed upkeep of the animal. Satisfied with the cross-examination, the Chief finally agreed to part with his precious possession, but with a stipulation that he would meet his calf after two months. In case of any deficiency in the upkeep of the animal, the sale deed was to stand annulled. The animal was given an emotional send-off.

The new owner, happy at the acquisition, had his plans ready. He looked after the calf like his own son. After about six months, the Chief arrived suddenly. It was a big day for Ujagar Singh. After conventional salutations, the officer was ushered into the cattle yard. The glistening calf was resting on a neat piece of ground covered with sand and straw to keep it soft and dry. The Chief patted it with affection and endearments and praised the farmer for his excellent husbandry. Satisfied with the ambience and up keep, the Chief, however, noticed and questioned the total absence of green fodder in the otherwise immaculate provisions. At this the farmer fell at his feet and pleaded, “Sarkar! Fodder does not grow on ‘maru’ (dry) land. If I could, I would have produced green fodder for the entire village.”

In the inimitable style of the British bureaucracy, the Chief sanctioned an irrigation outlet to the farmer there and then. Growing prosperous by the day, Ujagar fondly reared his calf, never forgetting the great fortune it brought. Eventually it was set free as a bull dedicated to the community. Regal in size and strength, roaming free in the countryside, it sired handsome progeny. When it passed away, people even from the adjoining villages assembled for the final farewell. A grave was dug up and the carcass lowered into it, covered with colourful shrouds on a heap of common salt generously contributed by people. For many years the grave carried an inscription “The Sahib's Calf”.

OPED DEFENCE

kargil war 15 years on
How the initiative at sea was seized
The role of the Indian Navy in the Kargil war has not been talked about much. The former Navy Chief gives a first-hand account of the Navy’s Operation Talwar as the Kargil conflict unfolded
Admiral Sushil Kumar

Very little has been spoken or written about what the Indian Navy did during the Kargil conflict of 1999. In fact, it is largely believed and mistakenly so, that the Indian Navy played no role at all. While the Army and Air Force undoubtedly played a stellar role and won the war for us, the Navy, albeit on the sideline, made a silent but significant contribution. And this is a first-hand account of how the Kargil conflict unfolded and what the Navy’s Operation Talwar was all about. I recall the initial phase of how the Kargil conflict began. As the Navy Chief, I was also officiating as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee since General Ved Malik, the Army Chief, was abroad on an assignment.

Specialist hydrographic survey teams of the Indian Navy were conjoined with the Army’s artillery batteries to pin-point gun locations.

The three Chiefs of the Services during the Kargil war: (From left) Admiral Sushil Kumar, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis and General Ved Prakash Malik

The reports that first came in were quite vague and hazy. They alluded to stray incidents along the Line of Control with Pakistan. There was also a report of an Indian Army patrol that had not returned and of shepherds having seen strangers on our side of the Line of Control (LoC). Despite the uncertain nature of these reports, the Army was understandably concerned and requested for air effort by way of armed reconnaissance. At that stage, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis, the Air Chief, quite rightly advised, that hastily inducting the Indian Air Force may send the wrong signal. With scanty reports available, the situation was confused and seemed to be only a minor border incident in an area that had always been regarded as no-man’s land.

More than a border incident

By the time General Malik returned from his trip abroad, it became clear that the incursion on the Himalayan border in the Kargil sector was not just a mere border incident. Not only was the extent of the Pakistani intrusion very vast but it also appeared that something sinister was afoot. The manner in which the intruders had entrenched themselves on our side of the LoC, in well-prepared concrete bunkers at strategically commanding locations, clearly showed that this was a well-planned manoeuvre that had been executed over a carefully calculated time frame. There was no doubt that Pakistani treachery had caught us by surprise. Promptly, the Indian Government swung into action and gave the Indian Armed Forces a clear-cut directive: Evict the intruders. But do not cross the LoC was the Prime Minister’s diktat which proved to be a diplomatic masterstroke. This was the start up for Operation Vijay. For Navymen like me who had been around during the India-Pakistan war of 1965, the lasting memory had always been of the mischief carried out by the Pakistan Navy at sea. When all attention had been on the land war, a couple of Pakistan Navy destroyers had sneaked in one night and lobbed a few shells onto a deserted beach on the Gujarat coast. Ever since then, the Pakistan Navy has celebrated that event as “Pakistan Navy Day.”

By early June 1999, as our Army and Air Force were preparing for action on the LoC, task forces of the Indian Navy’s Western Fleet had already been deployed to their battle stations — to seize the initiative at sea. With the situation getting tense, it was at an important war council briefing that the Prime Minister reiterated his Directive of not crossing the LoC.

Operational constraint

For the Army and Air Force this was surely an operational constraint but not so for the Navy, as we always operate in international waters anyway. Moreover, coercive diplomacy has always been the Navy’s forte and the tactic of exerting pressure from over the horizon has always been a well- tested strategy referred to as gunboat diplomacy from Nelsonian times.

We realised that the Indian Navy’s forward deployment had certainly had the desired effect when we learnt that Pakistan had frantically started escorting its oil tankers at sea, for this indeed was their lifeline for survival.

By the middle of June, the Army and Air Force had scaled up their operations. With tension mounting, the situation looked as though it would escalate beyond a border conflict. At this time the Navy’s Operational Commanders re-appreciated the situation and decided to prepare for hostilities. The Navy’s Eastern Fleet from the Bay of Bengal was rapidly mobilised and deployed in strength to the Arabian Sea.

And so as the operations on the Himalayan heights at Tololing and Tiger Hill reached a crescendo, the Indian Navy remained poised with both fleets in full readiness. As we approached what seemed like the precautionary stage for war, operation orders for combat were issued with the rules of engagement clearly defined for commanders at sea. This was a very important threshold for us. The codename assigned was Operation Talwar.

The silent force
By the middle of June, the Army and Air Force had scaled up operations. The situation looked as though it would escalate beyond a border conflict. The Navy’s Operational Commanders re-appreciated the situation and decided to prepare for hostilities .
The Navy’s Eastern Fleet from the Bay of Bengal was rapidly mobilised and deployed in strength to the Arabian Sea .
As the operations on the Himalayan heights at Tololing and Tiger Hill reached a crescendo, the Indian Navy remained poised with both fleets in full readiness.
As we approached the precautionary stage for war, operation orders for combat were issued with the rules of engagement clearly defined for commanders.
We knew Pakistan Navy was on the defensive when we monitored a special message from the Pakistan Navy high command to all their warships.

Threat of nuclear retaliation

It was around this time that Pakistani generals started resorting to threats of nuclear retaliation. Much of it was rhetoric but it could not be dismissed altogether, as we were obviously dealing with a desperate foe whose misadventure had been exposed, through recovered Pakistani documents and captured prisoners of war. By the end of June 1999, full-scale hostilities seemed imminent. At a crucial tri-Service briefing, the Army Chief General Ved Malik issued an advisory for the Indian Armed Forces — you better prepare for war, be it declared or otherwise. We in the Navy were fully armed and ready for battle.

Here I must add that while our task forces were well poised; we had our fingers crossed. Our warships were vulnerable with no Anti-Missile Defence (AMD) against the Pakistan Navy’s deadly Harpoon Exocet sea-skimming missiles. It was a serious vulnerability but the Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command, Vice Admiral Madhavendra Singh, and I had taken stock of the situation. There is always the fog of war and the adversary may not be entirely aware of the opponent’s strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, we had deployed in preponderant strength and our strike forces were aggressively poised. It certainly had the desired effect. We knew that the Pakistan Navy had gone on the defensive when we monitored a special message from the Pakistan Navy high command to all their warships ‘Remain in harbour’.

Seizing the initiative at sea

The signal from the Pakistani Naval (PN) Headquarters said it all and that day, at the briefing for the Chiefs of Staff Committee, I informed my colleagues that the Indian Navy had achieved what it had set out to do. We had seized the initiative at sea. Tri-Service cooperation had many facets during the Kargil operations and the Navy was able to chip in where needed. The Navy’s squadron of specially equipped electronic warfare aircraft operated extensively along the Line of Control in support of land operations. Specialist hydrographic survey teams of the Indian Navy were conjoined with the army’s artillery batteries to pin-point gun locations. But all this is trivia compared to the overall canvas of tri-service understanding and cooperation that Kargil 1999 portrayed. Many too are the lessons that the Kargil conflict has brought forth. Most important of all being that the Indian Armed Forces have the natural ability and resilience to face adversity when the chips are down. Kargil had caught us by surprise, yet motivated by the Government, the Armed Forces turned the tables onto the Pakistani intruders.

Force-multiplying effect

What Kargil also demonstrated was that when the Service Chiefs are in sync everything falls into place with a force-multiplying effect. General Malik, Air Chief Marshal Tipnis and I had trained together initially at the National Defence Academy as young cadets while still in our teens. In later years we served together on various operational and staff assignments and we also had the opportunity to serve concurrently as Vice Chiefs of our respective service.

When Kargil erupted we finally came together as the three Service Chiefs of the Indian Armed Forces. All this certainly mattered and was in sharp contrast to what happened on the other side of the border.

Undoubtedly, students of military history will remember Kargil as an operation conducted on the snowy Himalayan heights where the Indian Army and the IAF brought glory to the country. The role that the Indian Navy played during Kargil may yet remain lost as a footnote. But that is the way navies operate anyway; over the horizon and unseen. Perhaps, that is the reason why the Navy has always been known worldwide, as the silent service.

The writer was the Navy Chief during the Kargil war