The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

Battleground Gaza
Hamas and Israel should now sue for peace

THE escalating conflict in Gaza has resulted in little change in the ground situation, and the death toll is mounting. It is certainly lopsided, with a large number of dead, often estimated to be above 500, being Palestinian, as compared with Israeli defence forces causalities which are in low two digits. The ground offensive that started a few days ago marked a new level of engagement. This has resulted in a higher number of causalities on both sides.

In spite of a UN Security Council appeal for an immediate ceasefire, neither the Hamas nor Israel appeared ready to cease fighting each other. The Hamas forces continue to send rockets into Israel, largely ineffectual, whereas the retaliatory Israeli fire is deadly even as Israeli soldiers in Gaza face increasing danger. The only causalities on the Israeli side have been since it put soldiers on the ground. Gaza is a densely populated area, and the collateral damage caused by Israeli jets, tanks and artillery has continued to rise steeply, taking many Palestinian lives.

India has strong ties with the Palestinian people, and with Israel. The recent conflict figured in Parliament and India has made a strong plea for both sides to accept the Egyptian peace talk offer. Egypt has now said that it is willing to make the required changes in the truce initiative it had offered earlier. Hamas wants that the Israeli and Egyptian blockade on Gaza be lifted and hundreds of Palestinians arrested by Israel be released. Mounting international pressure on Israel will surely begin to make its impact as more and more civilians succumb to Israeli guns and shells. India, along with the UN, the US and other major powers, needs to be proactive in helping to end the worst violence in the region in the last five years. The wounds of war are, otherwise, too difficult to heal, as the region knows too well.

Thought for the Day

If you want to annoy your neighbours, tell the truth about them.

— Pietro Aretino, an Italian author

On this day...100 years ago

Lahore, Thursday, July 23, 1914

Grievances of the Kangra people

HIS Honour the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab has been visiting Kangra in his tour and we hear that his visit was looked forward to with a certain amount of anxiety by the people. It appears that for some time past the people have entertained certain grievances against forest administration. Scores of Zamindars from Dehra, and Hamirpur have, we understand, arrived at Dharmsala to meet His Honour and represent their complaints regarding the proposed resumption of proprietary rights on cultivated and uncultivated lands left undisturbed since the last settlement. Proprietary rights in the hill districts are believed to be different from those in Canal Colonies.

"Komagata Maru" passengers

A PRIVATE message received from Vancouver by the "Khalsa Akhbar," Lyallpur, says that an "unsuccessful midnight attack was made by 400 armed police on the "Komagata Maru" passengers and it is not known how many died or were wounded." This is a distressing piece of news. What was the necessity for the use of any force we cannot say, but we think that the use of armed force should have been avoided. If as the telegrams suggest the passengers on the "Komagata Maru" had done anything likely to give the impression that they were challenging the Canadian Government, we consider they were very ill-advised. But knowing their feelings as we do, we believe they acted in good faith and took the assurances given in the Great Proclamation of 1858 too literally. Like the rest of the people of India they imagined they had equal rights with the other British subjects. If the Chinese and the Japanese are allowed to enter and settle down in British territories, how can the Indians be turned out?

ARTICLE

Framing anti-Taliban policy
India should take the initiative to get America on board
Kuldip Nayar

IT is a pity that India refused to have any truck with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who was Pakistan's confidante. No doubt, he is a nasty person to deal with, but if we had fixed our eyes on the situation a decade later, we should have swallowed some of his anti-India rhetoric. But all this is now history. The two countries, particularly India, should formulate some strategy to thwart the Taliban onslaught, which is bound to take place once they are sure that the Western forces are not in a position to match their weapons.

I find it strange that New Delhi is not seriously considering the pros and cons of what happens once the American and NATO forces reduce their presence in Afghanistan only in the shape of a few thousand troops. US Secretary of State Kerry has visited Kabul to devise the policy after the withdrawal. But New Delhi is not in the picture.

No doubt, the Afghans have the best goodwill towards India because it has helped them set up hospitals, schools and build roads. Yet Islamabad, which considers Afghanistan its “strategic depth,” wants the country to be its satellite. New Delhi has tried to persuade Islamabad to let Kabul be independent and sovereign, but Pakistan has not bitten the bullet.

It all started when the Soviet Union sent its forces to Afghanistan to impose their ideology on a state which was saturated with Islamic ideas. America used the opportunity to bleed the Soviet Union by training the fundamentalists in Pakistan to make inroads into Afghanistan without considering the long-term repercussions. And once the Soviet Union started retreating from Afghanistan, Washington lost all interests in the territory leaving behind arms and other equipment in the field itself. The fundamentalists used those weapons to propagate their strict and disciplinarian interpretation of Islam.

Islamabad had in its mind the armed and trained Taliban against India and there are numerous examples to testify that the insurgency in Kashmir was nothing but a byproduct of a bigoted stance to shut out the participation of non-Muslims in governance, however unwittingly demanded. I recall when I met in Kabul a leader from the Masud group, anti-Taliban in ideology and pro-India in its approach, he told me that the road to Kabul goes through Islamabad and if New Delhi is really interested in stopping the tide of fundamentalists, it should have a serious dialogue with Pakistan.

The most disconcerting aspect is the birth of Tehrik-e-Pakistan Taliban (TTP), an indigenous group which is in a position to strike wherever it wants and whenever it wants. It has proved this again and again. The recent attack on Karachi airport is an example. However, the Karachi happening is only the symptom, not the disease. The disease is fundamentalism which, to the horror of even middle-of-the-road Pakistanis, is spreading rapidly.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has opted for an easy path. He has been negotiating with the Taliban to accommodate their aspirations. The reason why the talks have not gone very far is that the Taliban's insistence on Pakistan giving proof of its sincerity of taking measures like closing institutions for female literacy and making “hijab” (veil) a compulsory outfit for women in Pakistan. No doubt the next step they would demand is a ban on women car drivers, just like in Saudi Arabia. Music has already been sacrificed on the altar of extremism. The old-time singers or instrument players have no market in Pakistan. How ironic that they come to India to earn a livelihood.

The past, however bitter, should not now be recalled at a time when both India and Pakistan have a few option except to organise a joint front to defeat the Taliban. New Delhi should not forget that the Taliban would be at the Attari (Amritsar) border if they are not defeated in Afghanistan itself. If it is embarrassing for the two countries to talk about their strategy in the open, they can establish a back channel as they have done in the case of Kashmir.

The repercussions of the Taliban gaining the upper hand, first in Afghanistan and then in Pakistan, are so inimical to the defence and development of India that it should go out of the way to befriend Pakistan on a joint approach towards Afghanistan. Since no serious talk takes place between the two because of Kashmir, they should keep this problem aside and allow the two army chiefs to sit across the table and devise a long-term strategy which would enable Afghanistan to stay independent.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, otherwise liberal, was the person who began placating the fanatics. He is the one who started a government stipend for the head maulvis in mosques and declared Ahmediays as non-Muslim. Today the graves of Ahmediyas are being dug and the remains of whatever is left are thrown out. The Pakistan establishment did not think even for a minute in humiliating Sir Zafrullah Khan, a prominent Ahmediaya, who turned the tables against India at the UN on Kashmir. In fact, the complaint which Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made at the UN about “Pakistan's aggression” in Kashmir went against New Delhi largely because of his efforts, blessed by Britain.

Of course, this means that Islamabad would have to change its policy and not consider Afghanistan their “strategic depth.” This is in Pakistan’s own interest. The manner in which the Taliban have begun to count in the affairs of Pakistan should be a warning that the Taliban would not allow Pakistan to be a liberal Islamic state.

It is being interpreted that India is not seeing the writing on the wall. At least Prime Minister Narendra Modi, said to be a strong ruler, should pick up the threads with Nawaz Sharif on his matter. Both hit it off well when they met in Delhi. Nawaz Sharif has even said so in a letter to Modi. Can things in the same vein go ahead in the interest of policy to contain Talibanisation, already quite assertive in Pakistan?

New Delhi should take the initiative to get America on board regarding anti-Taliban policy. If and when they are defeated in their designs both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they would cease to be a force which is beginning to loom large in other Islamic countries where the Taliban-like thoughts have begun to assert themselves.

MIDDLE

Face to face with a PM-to-be
V.K. Bhatnagar

Himachal Pradesh is a beautiful state and getting a posting as the Deputy Commissioner of the district of Kullu is an additional charm. This was in the mid-eighties. The political as also the ecological setting was much better then. It was a pleasure to work in the saluburious climate and with the local people who were deeply steeped in its old and rich culture and I enjoyed every minute of my stay at this station.

Himachal is virtually a two-party state politically. Attribute it to the anti-incumbency factor or otherwise, since the Emergency days, the Congress and the BJP replace each other in election after election except on one or two occasions. In 1985 the Congress got the majority and it formed the government and its predecessor sat in opposition. In India the party in opposition tends to oppose every move of the government. So the party in opposition can be seen leading one or the other agitation and its most effective tool is road blocks, no matter how much inconvenient to the people whose cause it espouses to take up.

Drinking water shortage in summers is always acute and the summer of 1986 was no exception. There was not sufficient water in the sources. Despite the use of tankers drinking water could not be made available to a number of localities. People would give a memorandum and follow it up with small and big demonstrations. But one day we suddenly got a message that a large number of persons had collected in the densely populated Akhara Bazar and had blocked the main road which connected Manali/Kullu towns with Bhunter as also the airport at Bhunter.

And lo! There came one of the very important and prominent BJP leaders to request us to get the Akhara Bazar road cleared as their beloved and national leader, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who was camping at Manali, had to catch the flight from Bhunter for Delhi. I could not help enjoying the moment and remarked as to whether he could feel how it hurt others when “their Atal ji” had to reach his destination in similar circumstances.

He understood the pun and also the complexity of the problem and left the office, and we in turn reached the spot to pacify the people. There was no progress for quite some time and the time of the flight to take off was nearing. We saw the veteran Atal ji wading his way through the crowd so that he did not miss the flight. It was to the credit of Atal ji that even in that hour, he was his normal self — jovial and patient. He seemed neither worried nor indignant. He gracefully climbed a rostrum-like structure and started talking to the agitating people.

Seeing the veteran leader, we hurried to the spot which was nearby. As soon as he was told that I was the Deputy Commissioner, he asked me rather sarcastically: “In how many years your government will provide water to the people?”

Not used to the sarcastic language, I uttered the words: “Sir, after elections, it is as much your government as mine.”

In retrospect I am grateful to the gentleman leader that he took no offence and, after talking to the people for a while, left for the airport, of course on foot for about 200 metres. Recalling the incident, I at times feel thrilled to have had the opportunity to give rather unwittingly a small but very important explanation to the future Prime Minister of India, of the actual and constitutional position. I wish more leaders maintain their calm while dealing with unexpected obstacles.

OPED — DEFENCE

kargil war 15 years on
Strategic lessons that we need to learn
Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory
General V.P. Malik

Artillery helped the Indian Army to drive away the intruders.

The regiments that took part in the Kargil conflict. Tribune photos

Sophisticated weapons were recovered from various sites that were occupied

THE Kargil war, forced on India by Pakistan 15 years ago, will always be remembered for (a) its strategic and tactical surprise (b) the self-imposed national strategy of restraint keeping the war limited to the Kargil-Siachen sector (c) military strategy and planning in keeping with the political mandate and the (d) dedication, determination, and daring junior leadership at the tactical level.

In fiercely fought combat actions, on the most difficult terrain that gave immense advantage to the enemy holding mountaintops, we were able to evict Pakistani troops from most of their surreptitiously occupied positions. The Pakistani leadership was forced to sue for ceasefire and seek withdrawal of its troops from the remaining areas.

Diplomatic victory

Operation Vijay, the Indian codename of the war, was a blend of strong and determined political, military and diplomatic actions which enabled us to transform an adverse situation into an emphatic military and diplomatic victory. As two Prime Ministers of Pakistan later acknowledged, “Kargil war was Pakistan's biggest blunder and disaster.”

In this article, I will briefly narrate two of the most important battles of the war, some important strategic lessons and how do we look ahead.

The Battle of Tololing

Tololing Top in Dras, occupied by the enemy, interfered with our vehicular movements on the Srinagar-Kargil highway and overlooked the town and our logistic positions. It was necessary to recapture it as early as possible and thus it became the first major battle. After 18 Grenadiers set the stage, 2 Raj Rif finished the task against overwhelming odds on June 13, 1999, after three weeks of bitter fighting. 2 Raj Rif captured a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, including rocket launchers and 81mm mortars held only by Pakistan's regular forces. This large haul of weapons and some vital documents, shattered the myth that Pakistan had created assiduously that the men who had intruded across the LoC were jihadi militants.

Anxiety about battle

We were anxious throughout this battle. As the Army Chief, I could not afford to convey my feelings to anyone, nor could I interfere with the battle which had been planned and conducted at the brigade and division levels. The list of casualties kept growing. We lost three officers, four junior commissioned officers and 16 other ranks. The enemy losses, based on the number of bodies recovered were put at 27.

Tololing Top was the first turning point in the Kargil war. The events that transpired during the battle made me think of the difficult days ahead when we had to clear the enemy from other areas. But realising the determination and the fighting spirit of our troops, I was convinced that we could do it.

Capture of Tiger Hill

The Tiger Hill, an awe-inspiring steep mountain top within our territory, was considered as a major thorn and the most difficult feature occupied by the enemy in the Mushkoh-Dras sector. During my visit to the front on June 28, 1999, Major-General Mohinder Puri, GOC 8 Mtn Div, told me that the Tiger Hill would be his next objective.

The attack on Tiger Hill started on June 30/July 1. The objective was engaged effectively by the Air Force and with intense indirect as well as direct artillery fire. The infantry assault went in on July 3.

At 6 am on July 4, I was informed that 18 Grenadiers had captured the Tiger Hill Top but heavy fighting was still going on the feature. I spoke to GOsC 15 Corps and 8 Mtn Div to learn about the latest situation and asked them to let me know when the objective would be fully secured. At 7.30 am, Mohinder Puri confirmed that the enemy would not be able dislodge our troops from the Tiger Hill Top.

I then informed the Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee who was scheduled to address a public meeting at 10 am. The Defence Minister was flying to Amritsar. I gave him this news when he landed at the airport.

Blow to Pakistan

That date became important for one more reason: Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was to meet the US President Bill Clinton. Before their meeting, the National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra and I made sure that the whole world came to know about the recapture of Tiger Hill and thus the likely outcome of the war.

The loss of Tiger Hill was a hard physical and psychological blow to the Pakistan Army. In India, jubilation and relief replaced the earlier gloomy mood of the people. After the entire Tiger Hill feature had been cleared by 4 Sikh and 2 Naga battalions, 18 Grenadiers proudly hoisted the Indian tricolour on the Tiger Hill Top.

Holistic national review needed

Many lessons have emerged from the Kargil war which necessitated a holistic national security review as well as rethinking on the nature of conflict in the new strategic environment and the conduct of such wars.:

n There may be remote chances of a full-scale conventional war between two nuclear weapon states but as long as there were territory-related disputes — currently we have them with China and Pakistan — the adversary can indulge in a proxy war, a limited conventional border war, or both.

n A major military challenge in India is the political reluctance to a proactive grand strategy or engagement. It has invariably led us to a reactive military situation. This disadvantage is enhanced manifold because no loss of territory is acceptable to the public and the political authority. This is a strategic handicap and a risk in any war setting, which increases in a limited-war scenario. To deal with such situations, it is essential to have credible strategic and tactical intelligence and assessments, effective surveillance and close defence of the lines of control.

n The successful outcome of a border war depends upon our ability to react rapidly. The new strategic environment calls for faster decision making, versatile combat organisations, rapid deployment and synergy amongst all elements involved in the war effort, particularly the three services.

n Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This can be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies and defence planning.

n Any war in future will require close political oversight and politico-civil-military interaction. It is, therefore, essential to keep the military leadership in the security and strategic decision-making loop.

n India has a National Security Council but there is no official document outlining its broad national security (including defence) policy and strategy. The government has hesitated in spelling it out due to the lack of political consensus on its policies and the inability to address the crucial issues of coordination to formulate and address national security. The absence of a coherent policy tends to make our responses ad hoc and less convincing.

All-weather surveillance

Kargil war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic aperture radar. We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles, and most importantly, acquired and deployed hand-held thermal imagers, surveillance radars and ground sensors along the lines of control. Individual service and joint services doctrines have been revised. Some Special Forces units have been added to the strength of each service.

At the politico-military strategic level, however, the situation is dismal. Most of the reforms recommended in the National Security Review in 2002 to improve the higher defence control organisation, its systems and processes were either not implemented or implemented only cosmetically.

There is no policy document or a white paper on broad national security policy and strategy for the near or long term.

The Ministry of Defence has not been integrated meaningfully nor is there any improvement in defence planning and procurement systems. The civil and military relations have worsened.

Over the last 15 years, due to reactive security postures, our deterrent capabilities have been eroded. This tends to encourage our adversaries to take liberties on the disputed borders or through cross-border proxy war. We need to build credible deterrence at the political as well as military levels.

In June 2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to carry out yet another national security review. Till date, its recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented. A strong, competent and committed political leadership is required to bring about improvements in the security policies, higher defence control organisation and its systems, including its rules of business.

— The writer was the Army Chief during the Kargil war

After the conflict

The Kargil war had highlighted gross inadequacies in all-weather surveillance capabilities. Since then, this capability has been made up with indigenous satellites and aerial imagery with synthetic aperture radar.

We have also acquired effective unmanned aerial vehicles,

In June 2012, the government appointed the Naresh Chandra Committee to carry out yet another national security review. Till date, its recommendations have neither been de-classified nor implemented

Military capabilities cannot be built when the conflict is on. This can be done only through careful assessment of likely contingencies and defence planning.