The triumph and the glory
By K. S.
Bajwa
ON September 6, 1965, 3 Jat had
captured Dograi and put two companies across the Ichhogil
canal practically in the outskirts of Lahore. In a
curious mixture of failure of communications and of
higher command, 3 Jat was pulled back in the afternoon.
This gallant Battalion was to recapture Dograi on the
night of September 21/22 in the face of very stiff
opposition and with heavy casualties. This is the saga of
their exceptional grit and valour.
In the Lahore Sector, in
the hastily launched Indian response to the Pak attack on
Chhamb Sector, 54 Infantry Brigade under 15 Infantry
Division attacked on September 6, 1965, to secure the
eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal including the bridges
at Dograi and Jallo. In the process the commanders and
troops were not physically and mentally prepared for the
battle ahead which was to have serious repercussions
later. In the first phase, 3 Jat bypassed the Wagah
ranger post to its North and suddenly descended upon the
Pak screen at village Dial killing 21 and taking 17
prisoners. By 7 a.m., the Jats had established the
brigade firm base in area Gosal Dial. Lt-Col Desmond
Hayde of the Jats readily agreed to lead the advance from
there as 15 Dogra, suffering from battle nerves after
some minor skirmishes around the Ranger post, were found
unfit to do so. With a squadron of Scinde Horse Jats made
a dash for the canal.
Swinging North from Mile
13 to Lakhanke, 3 Jat attacked Dograi along the eastern
bank of the canal. A Pak covering platoon on the canal
bank and a company of 3 Baluch holding Dograi were put to
flight. The Jats were in full control of the village, the
canal bank and the partially demolished bridge. Just past
mid-day, the enterprising Hayde led two companies across
the demolished bridge into Batapur on the left and Attoke
Awan on the right of the GT Road. Three truck loads of
troops rushing to the canal were destroyed by our
infantry and tank fire. Two Pak tanks that made an
appearance met a similar fate. Undoubtedly, Pakistan was
completely surprised by our attack.
A company of 13 Punjab
sent forwards along the railway line to secure the Jallo
Bridge wilted under artillery fire and rejoined the
battalion which had just hung around the Attari railway
station. Commander 54 Infantry Brigade was out of contact
with the Jats since 9 a.m. By mid-afternoon Hayde,
seriously concerned about the fate of his two companies
across the canal, sent an officer to the Brigade
headquarters. At about 3 p.m. he was instructed through
the tank squadron to withdraw to Gosal Dial. With a heavy
heart 3 Jat abandoned its spectacular operational gains
and were back in Gosal-Dial by 5.15 p.m.
Their achievement of
putting two companies across Ichhogil canal practically
in the outskirts of Lahore becomes even more significant
when it is considered that the Jats had been without
artillery support and that their F-echelon vehicles
carrying defence stores and heavier weapons had been shot
by Pak Sabres soon after they kicked off from Dial. On
this first day of the war, in a depressing operational
scenario of failures of command combined with
non-performance by13 Punjab and 15 Dogra, the gallant 3
Jat led by the dynamic Hayde had stood out alone in the
highest traditions of valour. It was sad that their
outstanding achievement was not exploited and they had to
do it all over again at great cost.
On the night of
September 7 and 8, Pak forces reoccupied Dograi in
strength forestalling an attempt by 13 Punjab to retake
it. On September 10, Pakistanis probed the defence of 54
Brigade with their armour from the direction of village
Mana.
About the same time a
troop of centurion tanks from 3 Cavalry approaching
Attari was mistaken as an outflanking manoeuvre by the
enemy. 13 Punjab and 15 Dogra panicked and abandoned
their defences. They were stopped just in the nick of
time. In the North, 38 Infantry Brigade pulled back from
Ranian to Lopoke, opening a serious threat to Amritsar.
During this critical period, 3 Jatstood firm in their
defences.
The period of September
11 to 18 was taken up by regrouping to improve the
defensive posture on both the Ranian and the GT Road
axes. Aggressive patrolling was carried out to dominate
the enemy and to stabilise the operational situation. In
the meantime, Brig Niranjan Singh, MC, had assumed
command of 54 Brigade. To still secure the eastern bank
of the Ichhogil canal, on September 17, Hayde was given
the task of recapturing Dograi September 22. The
intervening period was spent in making through
preparations for the attack. Hayde and his leaders
carried out detailed observation of the defences of
Dograi from as close as 500 yards at great personal risk.
Officer-led patrols brought in a wealth of information.
Aggressive fighting patrols, some even in company
strength, went out to establish night domination; to
simulate attacks; to gauge the enemy reaction; to force
him to compact his defences, away from the proposed lines
of approach of the battalion and to allow him no rest. As
a consequence, the derelict old village of Dograi was
found abandoned.
By the evening of
September 21, the Jats were fully geared up for the
attack. The plan was simple and had been thoroughly
absorbed by the leaders and men. In the early part of the
night of September 21, 13 Punjab failed to capture enemy
defences in Mile 13. Despite this development, 3 Jat was
ordered to go ahead with their attack on Dograi. 3 Jat
attacked from just North of Lakhanke, along the canal. At
2 a.m., on a signal from Hayde, the Jats rose as one man
to go into the assault. Within the hour all the four
companies were fighting their way through the formidable
defences in the built-up area of Dograi. Many were the
acts of individual and collective valour performed during
this fierce fighting.
Sub Pale Ram leading C
Company charged the enemy firing from the canal bank.
After 10 minutes of fierce combat, a company of 12 Punjab
(Pak) was routed. Sub Pale Ram lay on a bunker he had
destroyed with six bullets in his body (Fortunately he
survived and was decorated with a Vr C). Of the 73 men of
C Company who had charged the enemy, only 21 were on
their feet. Capt Sandhu, leading B Company put to flight
a platoon of 3 Baluch guarding the temporary rope slung
across the canal.
Maj Tyagi, ran on with
super human determination despite receiving two bullets
in his back to hit the likely enemy tank harbour. His
Jats quickly dispatched the crews trying to mount two
tanks. Tyagi bayonetted Maj Nazar, B Squadron Commander
of 23 Cavalry (Pak), who simultaneously shot Tyagi twice
with his pistol. A Pak sowar rushed forward and knifed
the prone Tyagi. Sepoy Zile Singh after killing the Pak
sowar carried the critically wounded Tyagi to safety but
was himself killed as soon as he put him down. The brave
Tyagi died in the hospital five days later and was
decorated with a posthumous MVC. Lance Havildar Randhir
Singh and Sepoy Ram Chander, unmindful of their own
safety destroyed two pillboxes with pole charges from
which machine guns were playing havoc with their company.
Both these gallant men were themselves killed. Capt Thapa
lobbed a grenade through a lop hole but was wounded
himself. Despite his wound, he assaulted single handed
three trenches but was shot through the head (decorated
posthumously with an MVC).
Lance Naik Arjun Ram
grabbed the barrel of a light machine gun firing from a
bunker and silenced it but was killed himself. The
leaders at all levels were at the forefront and the men
followed them without hesitation and with little concern
for their own safety.
By 4 a.m., the Pak
defenders had started running away. Around 4.30 a.m. a
counter-attack by a company of 3 Baluch coming over the
Jalo bridge was decimated by B Company. Maj Durjan Singh
Shekhawat, the second-in-command, with a very determined
effort, brought up the much-needed stores to strengthen
the Jat defences of Dograi. At around 5.40 a.m., Capt
Jagtar Sangha of Scinde Horse, in a battle scenario
reminiscent of cavalry traditions of yore, charged with
his tanks, with guns and machine guns blazing away, to
overrun two companies of 16 Punjab still holding out at
Mile 13. By 6.15 a.m. the battle for Dograi was won.
Three counter attacks during the day and night of
September 22, were beaten back with heavy loss to the
enemy.
The magnitude of the
achievement of 3 Jat is magnified manifold when we
consider the battalion had fought against an enemy not
only superior in numbers and fire power but was also
augmented with additional elements from four other
battalions fighting from very well prepared defences in a
built up area. Jats, had defied the principle that an
attacker should have a superiority of two to one or even
more over the defender. The final outcome was decided by
the high morale, high quality of leadership and an
unflagging fighting spirit of 3 Jat.
In both battles for
Dograi, 3 Jat suffered 88 killed and 231 wounded. Of
these 5 officers were killed and 9 wounded, involving
practically all officers of the battalion, an affirmation
that they had led from the front. Gallantry awards given
were 3 MVC, 4 VrC, 7 Sena Medals, 12 Mention in
Dispatches and 11 Chief of Staffs Commendation
Cards. The casualty figures and the decorations amply
bear witness to the outstanding performance by the
incomparable 3 Jat in the face of very heavy odds.
I learnt some of the
vital aspects of the craft of leadership from the devoted
men of 3 Jat. It is 43 years since I left them and 34
years since the Battle for Dograi took place. The cry
still comes from the heart, "Bravo, the gallant 3
Jat".
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