Separate pay
commission is justified
By Pritam Bhullar
REPEATED entreaties of the top brass
that in view of the distinct nature of work of the armed
forces they should have a separate pay commission have
not found favour with the government.
Before Partition, an Army
officer had a higher starting salary as compared to
civilian officers and this edge was maintained throughout
the service. After the rank of Major, an officer was
governed by the policy of "up or out" which
meant that if an officer could not be promoted, he
retired with a compensatory pension.
While a Major at the age
of 45 years of service retired with a pension which was
75 per cent of his pay, a Lt Col retired at the age of 48
years or after a four-year tenure whichever was earlier
with a pension which varied from 76.7 per cent to 88.9
per cent of his pay. Incidentally, no pension on the
civil side was higher than 50 per cent of pay.
In 1949, the compensatory
pension was done away with. Though in 1959, the
Raghuramiah Committee had recommended that a
comprehensive examination of the terms and conditions of
the armed forces be carried out at a time convenient to
the government, no government has found time to go into
this important issue for 30 years.
This reminds one of what
K.M. Panikkar has written in his book, "Problems of
Indian Defence". He says: "It is necessary to
emphasise that unless the officer cadres feel that their
interests are safe in the hands of civil authority, the
whole morale of the Army as an instrument of civil
government may be undermined."
A jinxed
MBT
In January 1996, our main
battle rank (MBT), Arjun, was dedicated to the nation by
the then Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao. Was it a
political stunt? Understandably it was, for the then Army
Chief, General Shankar Roy Chowdhury, who was an armoured
corps officer, had commented on Arjun at the time of its
unveiling thus: "It still needs enhancing and fine
tuning".
This "so called"
indigenous project which has about 40 per cent imported
components, including its engine, was planned in 1974 at
a cost of Rs 15.50 crore, but we have already spent Rs
400 crore on it. Though during the trials, Arjun has not
come up to the expectations of the Army, permission for
its limited series production was granted by the Ministry
of Defence (MoD) in August 1996. This proves beyond doubt
that in pursuing the Arjun project, we have been doggedly
reinforcing our failure.
Is Arjun our MBT for the
next millennium? If so, then why is the government
finalising a Rs 5,000 crore deal with Russia to procure
300 T-90 tanks?
Ironically, the MoD has
suddenly switched its choice from T-72s, which is a
highly improved version of T-72 tank, to T-90 tank. T-90,
no doubt is a much lighter and a better tank, but its
cost is three times that of T-72s.
Admittedly, if we had not
wasted all these years on the jinxedArjun project and had
focused on the modernisation of our frontline T-72
indigenous tank, it would have served us well at a much
lower cost.
Neglected
war widows
The sad plight of war
widows reminds one of what is written at the war cemetery
in Kohima: "When you go home, tell them of us and
say that for your tomorrow we gave our today."
Little did those brave
soldiers know that by sacrificing their lives for the
country, the widows and orphans that they were leaving
behind would become the victims of neglect at the hands
of the politicians and bureaucrats.
The Punjab Government had
undertaken to allot 10 acres of land to the
widows/orphaned children of soldiers or parents of
unmarried soldiers, who were killed in the wars against
Pakistan and China. The provisions of this letter for the
submission of applications were extended up to September
15, 1974.
Of the 800 such cases, 229
widows were not allotted land and their cases came to
light only in 1987. Most of them being uneducated did not
know about this provision. After this point was
repeatedly discussed in the Rajya Sainik Board meetings,
the Director Sainik Welfare Punjab submitted a
district-wise list of these widows to the Secretary,
Department of Defence Services Welfare, Punjab in May
1996. Hapless widows are still waiting to get the
promised land. It is time Parkash Singh Badal stepped
into help these widows to get either land or the cost of
land at the prevailing rates.
There is another case of
23 widows who are fighting court cases because the
possession of the land allotted to them has not been
given to them so far. They too deserve all help.
The kisan-jawan
nexus
Those soldiers who fought
in the 1965 and 1971 wars from the soil of Punjab, are
aware of the love and affection that flowed freely from
the civil population towards the Army.
In the 1965 war, when the
Army started moving in strength into Punjab, the soldiers
were not only greeted with a smile by the people but also
with traditional hospitality. And when the troops moved
into their assigned locations on the border, a regular
supply of milk, lassi, saag and makki ki roti began
coming to them. Not only that, it became a problem for
the Army units to dissuade the villagers from coming with
them when they started moving into the Lahore sector.
Unfortunately, Operation
Bluestar in 1984 turned the people, especially the rural
population against the Army. What further antagonised
them was Operation Woodrose. This relationship continued
until October 1988, when Punjab witnessed the worst
floods of its history. From then started improvement in
the relationship once again.
What came as a goodwill
gesture to the villagers in 1988 was the adoption of
those villages by the Army which were badly affected by
the floods. Besides giving all help to reconstruct the
damaged houses, rations and medical aid were liberally
provided by the Army to the villagers.
Since then this adoption
has become a norm to help the villagers in the
construction of anti-flood bunds, construction and
improvement of roads and tracks, holding of medical and
veterinary camps, development and construction of
schools, health centres, playing fields, etc. This
measure has gone a long way in fostering a nexus between
the jawan and the kisan.
|