Wearing strategic blinkers
By K.S. Bajwa

IN September 1947, General Sir Rob Lockhart, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army after Independence, sought the government’s specific assessment of military threats likely to be faced by the country. Nehru told Lockhart, "We forsee no military threats to the country..." The subsequent unfolding of events clearly (and rather forcefully) showed how naive and wrong Nehru was in arriving at this estimation. Within a month, we were fighting to defend Kashmir, which had acceded to India. The decades that followed have witnessed the Indian armed forces almost continuously engaged in defending the country against external aggression as well as foreign abetted terrorism.

Whether it was the revival of Indian military power leading to successful defence of the nation in 1965 or the decisive military victory in 1971, we have failed to usher in a durable peace. Today, despite our considerable armed power, our security environment has become increasingly fragile.

Neither our leadership nor the people at large have clearly grasped the essential nature or armed power and its effective integration into state policy initiatives to defend national interests. This, when other means have failed to achieve desired results.

Armed power is a forceful instrument of state policy. For every nation, there are economic, political and territorial interests that are vital to its survival and progress. It is, however, inevitable that interests vital to one nation would impinge upon and come into conflict with those of another nation. Every state deploys a combination of political, economic and diplomatic initiatives to attain such objectives as would protect and promote its interests.

Armed power in-being adds convincing weightage to such initiatives. Equally, it insulates the country from intimidation and coercion by threatened use of armed power by other nations. When a military option is resorted to, the military objectives chosen should force the adversary to concede conditions, courses and developments which lead to the fulfilment of immediate as well as long-term national aims. When faced with a potential aggressor, all those objectives which may strengthen its bargaining position have to be stoutly denied. Recourse may also be taken to a well chosen pre-emptive spoiling military strike.

However, military success by itself is not enough. It primarily creates the conditions and favourable openings for all the other tools of statecraft to promote national interest. In this context, there is much to learn when we carefully consider the performance of our political and military leadership after Independence.

Immediately before and soon after Independence, the affairs of the state of Jammu and Kashmir presented the first real challenge before our policy-makers. This state was of considerable geo-strategic importance on two main counts. The Gilgit Agency provided a window to China (Xinjiang), Asiatic Republics of the erstwhile USSR, Afghanistan and North West Frontier Province, that became part of Pakistan. After Pakistan acquired control over this area in October 1947, it exploited its strategic potential to the USA in the cold war equation against the erstwhile USSR to extract substantial military and economic aid as well as a visible tilt in its favour in the world forums.

The area Bhimber-Mirpur-kotli-Hajipur Pass-Domel-Muzaffarabad was of vital importance for the security of Pakistan especially since a very grave threat could be easily mounted from this area to its heartland and the main North-South communication artery. This strategic sensitivity is made crystal clear by an impassioned plea made in April 1948 in an appreciation of the strategic situation by General Gracey, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan Army." If Pakistan is not to face another problem of about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the door steps of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank, at liberty to enter at her will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent and if subversive political forces are not to be let loose in Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naushehra."

Conversely, had this area been controlled by India, a strategic threat from this area would have effectively restrained Pakistan from its hostile military adventures. In the period between August 14 and October 22, 1947, when it invaded Kashmir, Pakistan, by enforcing an economic blockade of the state and other hostile actions had blatantly tried to coerce the state into acceding to it.

Indian political and military leadership seems to have worn strategic blinkers in that they failed to grasp the importance of this state and to divine Pakistan’s intentions. When viewed against the smug reply given by Nehru to Lockhart in September 1947, quoted above, the geo-strategic grasp of the Indian leadership is shown in even poorer light. Even more so is the conditional acceptance of the accession of the state. The rider that the wishes of the people of the state will be ascertained showed a moral romanticism which is out of place in the hardnosed pursuit of national interests.

Military planners too cannot escape blame. Even if they had realised that strategic national interest lay in securing the acccession of the state to India and when it did take place, unconditionally treating the state as an inalienable part of the Indian union, they do not seem to have made it their professional business to impress this upon Nehru and his political colleagues. Even by now well known disdain of political leadership to involve the top echelons of the military into national planning, does not materially absolve the military leadership of their failure to forcefully highlight the strategic importance of the state.

Indian military intervention in Kashmir was totally reactive to Pakistan’s invasion of the state and hardly any anticipatory planning had been done for such an eventuality. However, by the end of December 1947, by a very remarkable military effort Kashmir valley was liberated, Ladakh and approaches to it secured and forces poised to conduct offensive operations in the Naushahra Sector. It is at this stage that a lack of clarity in strategic considerations in the selection of military objectives becomes painfully evident.

It would have served our strategic interests better, if we had concentrated our resources to mount operations to secure areas Domel-Muzaffarabad and Bhimber-Mirpur-Kotli. Instead, after the rout of the raiders from the valley in early November 1947, bulk of troops then assembled in the valley were diverted to the relief of Poonch which could have been ensured by securely holding Hajipur and by mounting operations to capture Bhimber-Kotli. The fear that any advance towards Bhimber-Kotli would invite a major intervention by the Pak army was quite unfounded.

The Pak army was in no position to undertake such an operation as is borne out by candid views subsequently expressed by some of the senior Pak officers. We went to the UN and further operations into the Mirpur-Kotli belt were capped. We threw away our military advantages. It is so painfully evident that the Indian political and military leadership had not fully grasped the strategic national interests at stake in Jammu and Kashmir. Equally, when we were forced to defend the state, the political direction and (to a considerable extent) the choice of military objectives did not lead to retrieval of the situation to our maximum possible advantage.

The Indian planners also seem to have failed to correctly assess the military value of the Chhamb area, North West of the vital bridge over the Chenab River at Akhnur. By holding this area, the strategic loss of area Bhimber-Mirpur could be made up to some extent. In both 1965 and 1971, Pakistan launched strong attacks to capture this area and develop operations to capture the Akhnur bridge. Unfortunately, we have lost most of the area West of Munawar Wali Tawi in 1971 and with it much of the military advantage that this area provided.

Here too, the choice of a military objective, (which in this case was the proper defence of area Chhamb) was not appreciated. This failure is especially glaring in view of our experience of Pak sensitivity to our presence in this area clearly demonstrated by its attempt to capture it in 1965.

Consequent to our failures, defence of the state has become a strategic millstone around the neck of Indian military planning. By controlling PoK, Pakistan has acquired a sustained capacity to threaten the security of the state as also create security problems for the whole country. We are paying for our strategic myopia in our approach to Kashmir from the very beginning and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.

This feature was published on January 31, 1998