The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

ARTICLE

Devil's brew in Middle East
America's receding ability to bring peace
S Nihal Singh

The tragedy is that the sole mediator remains the United States and it is hamstrung by its own compulsions

The tragedy is that the sole mediator remains the United States and it is hamstrung by its own compulsions

That the Middle East (West Asia of our description) is in a state of flux is crystal clear. We have a three-year-old civil war in Syria, an Iraq wracked by tribal and Shia-Sunni strife, Libya still fighting the post-Gaddafi dispensation and Israelis launching a disproportionate war on Palestinians, not for the first time.

The common thread in these crises is the role of outside powers, both in creating crises in the first instance and in muddying the waters and the inability of local actors to make peace. In Syria, a minority Alwaite regime is seeking to retain its throne in a Sunni-majority country, with opponents of a bewildering variety of moderates and militants ranged on the other side.

In Iraq, after all American troops left, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, belonging to the majority Shia, has been interpreting his role primarily in terms of advancing the interests of his community. The Kurds are asserting their rights while the Sunni, dethroned from their ruling perch, have combined with Islamic militants to challenge the state.

Both in Syria and Iraq the Islamists of the extreme variety, first under the rubric of the ISIS and later under the name of the Islamic State, have carved out an area in Syria and Iraq they rule, with President Bashar Assad's regime in Syria and the Iraqi authorities unable to dislodge them.

Superimposed on these dramatic events is the old Israel-Palestinian conflict, essentially caused by Israeli actions in occupying and colonising vast Palestinian lands and East Jerusalem on the strength of total American support extending to unprecedented military supplies and a generous annual financial subsidy. These actions nullify attempts at finding a two-state solution and the prospect is of one state with a growing Palestinian population living as second-class citizens.

Regional powers belonging to the Sunni and Shia faiths have taken up positions determined in the first category by supporting the anti-Assad forces in Syria, more of them supporting the cause of the newly disenfranchised Sunni of Iraq. On the other side is Iran, the minority Assad regime in Syria and the Hezbollah movement of Lebanon.

After the proclamation of the Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq, the Sunni states led by Saudi Arabia have moderated their somewhat indiscriminate financial and military support for the Islamic militants fighting the Assad regime. Iran has been consistent in its support of President Assad and the Hezbollah.

Turkey’s position has evolved over time, initially the leader of the regime change lobby for Syria, together with neighbours hosting large numbers of Syrian refugees. It is taking time to reconsider its options while deeply disappointed with US inaction in Syria while supporting the cause of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians.

One big change in the regional picture is the anti-Morsi coup that has eventually brought the Army under the guise of a civilian President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi to power. The Brotherhood is classed as a terrorist organisation, its leaders and hundreds of its followers are in prison. The new regime has closed the Rafah border with the Gaza Strip, a lifeline for besieged Palestinians and shut down most of their tunnels.

Speculation is rife in this churning process, with extravagant scenarios of the break-up of Syria and Iraq and other countries essentially carved out by France and Britain out of the end of the Ottoman Empire. Two trends seem clear. The first is a sharpening Shia-Sunni conflict which is taking many forms. Second, the spreading cancer of 21st century Israeli colonization which lies at the heart of the historic Middle East conflict.

There are no easy solutions to either of these problems. Any Shia-Sunni reconciliation assumes a measure of tolerance on the two sides. There are many actors inflaming passions, not least of all Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. On the other side, proponents of the Islamic Caliphate are keeping the fires of intolerance burning.

The major power in the region, the United States, is increasingly compromised by its total support of Israel, largely due to domestic factors, and its desire to reduce its footprint in the region. In hindsight as, many at that time suggested, the US was foolish to invade Iraq under false pretences. And on the Israel-Palestinian conflict, it is on the wrong side of history.

What then can we expect from the devil's brew, which is the Middle East in the coming days and months? There will no doubt be a ceasefire between Israelis and Palestinians even as Israel's isolation in the world increases because of the scale of the carnage it has been inflicting on Palestinians, highlighted by the Human Rights Convention. But the problem will continue to fester because domestic factors compel US administrations to remain captive to the urges of Israeli colonialism.

The other regional crises will run their course, with little prospect of millions of Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries and the internally displaced able to return home soon. In many instances, there is no home to go to. In Iraq, the virtual partition of the state into Shia, Sunni and Kurdish regions will take firmer shape. The new Egyptian regime, in terms of the Palestinian cause, is a tacit ally of Israel and will pose problems for Gazans.

In this tangled mess, one crisis feeds on the other and the resulting picture is far from following a common pattern. The tragedy is that the sole mediator remains the United States and it is hamstrung by its own compulsions. In immediate terms, the future remains bleak.

For the present, there is no countervailing force to take matters in hand. The East-West conflict represented by the growing antagonisms between Russia and the United States over Ukraine make a complementary Moscow initiative impossible. The only bright spot is that since things cannot get worse, they will take a turn for the better.

MIDDLE

Driving J&K vehicle on Delhi roads
Rajesh Bhat

Last year, on my transfer to New Delhi from Jammu, I threw caution to the wind and naively scaled down the threat perception in the accounts of some of my seniors, which they had harboured and confided to me based on practical outcome of spying glances all around while carrying any vehicle from J&K. Along with other baggage, I took my J&K numbered old four-wheeler to ply on Delhi roads.

My seniors had advised me to dispose it of in Jammu itself and purchase a new one with a Delhi number plate to avoid being the odd man out. Being obsessed with this dented but trusted and dependable vehicle, I carried it to the new destination that boasts of a cosmopolitan culture. However, when a J&K vehicle is seen, alarming looks are noticed in every direction.

During the initial days, it was definitely a state of ignorant bliss. The heavy flow of traffic was surely a risk factor but it would shield my identity whenever I would be in the midst of fancy or ugly cars that run on Delhi roads simultaneously.

For me, driving in the national Capital was a life-time experience, full of thrill, which I had not been able to find on Jammu roads. This joyride in the Capital was, however, short-lived. On that fateful day I suddenly became a conspicuous entity due to my vehicle on Delhi’s ring road that leads to my office.

A well-dressed, well-behaved Delhi Police cop, who had been chasing my vehicle from quite some distance, signalled me to halt. Such was the urgency behind his 'mission' that he forced me to park my vehicle even on the wrong side of the road.

With his visibly confusing gait and eyeballs that projected a squint alignment — one focusing on my vehicle's number plate and the other on my reasonably pretty skin — the cop immediately ordered for some original documents for his inspection. As it took some time for him to establish my identity, others of his ilk — some armed and others in mufti — rushed towards the rear in the hope of some `big cache'.

“Khan Sahib, meharbani kar key dickey kholiye” (Mr Khan, kindly open the boot of the vehicle) was the beginning of the conversation.

“No, no, he is not a Khan…” pat came the command from the cop studying my driving licence. “But his surname resembles that of ‘Bhat’….you know Maqbool Bhat?”

“Who is this Maqbool Bhat?” asked the other surprised cop.

The young cops, most of them in their early thirties, wanted to know the difference between my surname and that of this banned Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front co-founder, who was hanged in Tihar jail on February 11, 1984.

I pleaded that it was not the time and place to unfold the wrapped Kashmir history to undo the guilt that the 'Bhat' name had evoked on the occasion. Demure laughs followed and another perspective had been added to the day's events. Satisfied as they were with my identity, they let me off.

It is now almost two years that I have been driving the same vehicle with occasional identical experiences whenever I try to venture around in new and undisclosed localities. I can notice piercing eyes prying on me. I however am, thankfully, supported by my family members who blissfully take the plunge with inflated egos in a cascade of observing looks all around them.

My dear ones have a reason to enjoy the ride. They encourage me to park the vehicle anywhere as no “Delhiwalla” will dare bring his or her vehicle closer to ours, let alone attempt to steal it!

OPED defence

Kargil War
15 years on
How raw courage & grit triumphed
Lt Gen Mohinder Puri (retd)

The daunting task was to militarily reorient the Division operationally from a counter- insurgency role to that for conventional warfare in virtually no time. The operations had to be completed well before the onset of winter

Operation Vijay was a daunting task for the soldiers because they had to deliver results in a hostile terrain within a limited time frame

It was the May of 1999, that the 8 Mountain Division also known as "Forever in Operations" was tasked to move from the Kashmir Valley to the rugged Drass-Kargil axis along the Line of Control (LoC) and be part of Operation Vijay — it was the first call to arms in the conventional matrix after nearly 30 years.

Operation Vijay was launched by the Indian Army to evict the Pakistani Army which had occupied the heights in this terrain. The role of first inducting the entire division, complete with its support arms, equipment and men secondly to fight the battle had challenges which had to be overcome and were done successfully.

I had been in command of the Division in the Valley for over a year when the fresh deployment was ordered. For 10 years, or since 1989, the Division was mandated for Operation Rakshak to fight militancy.

As the Pakistani plan in Drass-Kargil unfolded, the daunting task came with the challenges. The first was to militarily reorient the Division operationally from a counter-insurgency role to that for conventional warfare. All this was to be done in virtually no time and to deliver success almost instantly in view of the tremendous pressure of public opinion at home built up by the media. The second issue was to complete operations well before the onset of winter — that sets in early in the high Himalayas.

Since the operations had to be conducted at extreme high altitudes averaging 15,000 feet, troops had to undergo three stages of acclimatisation spread across 10 days to be able to give their best. In hindsight it was stoic bravery, raw courage and the sheer "will to win" among all ranks that added this glorious chapter to the saga of valour and sacrifice for the Division (now headquartered at Kumbathang some 25 km south of Kargil) and also of the Army.

Counter Insurgency (CI) and conventional warfare are as different as chalk and cheese. While CI operations require immediate and expeditious response with rapid planning lest militants run havoc, a conventional warfare requires deliberation and unwavering co-ordination of not only amongst those assaulting, but also with the array of supporting arms and services, including the Air Force.

The changeover carried out in 12 days was creditable as this entailed configuration with new equipment and a psyche. An inbuilt training and equipment transformation flexibility of the Indian Army helped. Candidly, since the Army was preoccupied with militancy and after 1971 this was the first conventional war thrust on India, there was naturally sombre scepticism whether the change could be effected early enough to match the timeframe expected by the nation to "drive out" the Pakistan Army.

The lone inadequacy of ground troops was the vintage of equipment which was overcome to a great degree as the battle progressed.

Pakistani Army had named its intrusion into Kargil as Operation Badr and it was clearly with a three-fold political aim. The political climate in India was perceived to be unstable in early 1999 ( The Vajpayee Government had lost the Vote of Confidence and elections were slated for September 1999). Pakistan assessed that a major reaction to any military adventure was unlikely. Also it seemed as if there was a perception in the minds of the Pakistani leadership that the Indian polity did not have the political will to militarily react to any armed threat from across the border. A second possible Pakistani aim was to create a situation which would enable them to negotiate from a position of strength by securing large tracts of territory across the LoC, and thirdly by launching a military operation the opportunity was considered suitable to internationalise the Kashmir issue.

Pakistan also took into consideration that its nuclear umbrella gave an option of resorting to limited offensive action with minimal risk and with the operations fought in the nuclear backdrop, the international community would intervene, by which time Pakistan would have achieved its objectives. Militarily, Pakistan aimed to initiate the operation in areas where she would be offered the least resistance and a minimal military response. For this, large gaps in defences were to be exploited.

The heights in the Drass-Kargil area had not been permanently occupied by either side for over 50 years, so the first task for the 8 Mountain Division was to cross the Zoji La. In the process, we were confronted with enormous challenges. The ruggedness of the terrain, the extreme high altitudes at which the battles were fought and the adverse weather conditions, coupled with shortage of critical equipment made the task daunting. A short window available for completion of operations before the onset of winter added to the pressure. Had India not exploited the summer window, Pakistan would have consolidated its gains and would have made it prohibitively costly for us to regain the lost territory in the next season.

Preparations for an operation needed deliberation, planning and the will to succeed. I had given the Drass sector a higher priority as the enemy was effectively interdicting the National Highway from their vantage positions. The attack stopped Indian convoys carrying stocks to Ladakh and also equipment and men sent to fight the battle. It was imperative to clear the highway and this was possible only by recapturing the peaks.

Some miles away from the pounding, Tololing had defied capture for three weeks. Pakistani troops were well entrenched. It was the first target for further ridge hopping and capturing objectives like Point 4875, a tactically important feature and Tiger Hill—the place where Major Vikram Batra (PVC) attained glory. The battles had carried on, men and officers had climbed sheer cliffs to dig out the Pakistanis. The advantage was slowly turning but it took the better part of July to wind up the operations and convincingly defeat the Pakistan Army.

Many would have flinched at the daunting task at hand but the zeal displayed by the country at large, gave inspiration and impetus. Never before did the men in uniform flavour this fevered response from the country.

As we remember the 15th anniversary of the war in Kargil, I would like to commend the courage, gallantry and stoicism displayed by our young officers and soldiers. Sadly, in the process many sacrificed their lives for the glory of their units, the Army and the nation.

The writer was GoC 8 Mountain division during the Kargil war

Kargil panel: No checks & balances in Intelligence system

Status of KCR followup

The Kargil Committee Report (KCR) recommended sweeping changes in India's national security apparatus. While a few have been implemented, some critical requirements like having a Chief of Defence Staff are nowhere in sight.

The integration of the service headquarters with the MoD is not at the desired levels

A lot still needs to be done in the area of civil- military liaison

No headway in lateral induction of ex-servicemen into the para-military.

Defence Intelligence Agency created.
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On July 29, 1999, three days after the Kargil conflict officially ended, the then government, headed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, set up a four-member, high-powered committee to analyse the situation. The terms of reference of the committee, headed by strategic analyst Late K Subrahmanyam, were to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Jammu and Kashmir, and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions. The other members were Lt Gen KK Hazari, former Vice Chief of Army Staff, senior journalist BG Verghese and Satish Chandra, then Secretary, National Security Council Secretariat. The committee had the authority to interview any person associated with the security establishment, including former presidents and prime minister and was given access to all classified documents and reports. The committee presented its findings and recommendations, christened From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Committee Report (KCR), to Vajpayee in January 2000. Some of its key observations are:

Pakistan’s aggression came as a total surprise to the Indian government. Infiltration by armed irregulars was considered to be feasible in the area but not an intrusion and occupation of territory by Pakistani troops.
There were lapses in communication and dissemination of information between different intelligence agencies, which illustrate deficiencies in the system.
There were many bits and pieces of information about activities within the FCNA region. Most of them tended to indicate that Kargil was becoming a growing focus of Pakistani attention which had been clearly demonstrated by the marked increase in cross-LOC shelling in 1998. The reports on ammunition dumping, induction of additional guns and the construction of bunkers and helipads all fitted into an assessment of likely large-scale militant infiltration, with more intensive shelling in the summer of 1999. RAW assessed the possibility of "a limited swift offensive threat with possible support of alliance partners," in its half-yearly assessment ending September 1998 but no indicators substantiating this assessment were provided. Moreover, in its next six-monthly report ending March 1999, this assessment was dropped. In fact, its March 1999 report emphasised the financial constraints that would inhibit Pakistan from launching on any such adventure.
No specific indicators of a likely major attack in the Kargil sector such as significant improvements in logistics and communications or substantial force build-up or forward deployment of forces were reported by any of the agencies. Information on training of additional militants for infiltrating them across the LoC was not sector-specific. Indian intelligence appeared to lack adequate knowledge about the heavy damage inflicted by Indian artillery, which would have required Pakistan army to undertake considerable repairs and re-stocking. That would partly explain the larger vehicular movements reported on the other side. The Indian Army did not share information about the intensity and effect of its past firing with others. In the absence of this information, RAW could not correctly assess the significance of enemy activity in terms of ammunition storage or construction of underground bunkers.
The critical failure in intelligence was related to the absence of any information on the induction and deinduction of battalions and the lack of accurate data on the identity of battalions in the area opposite Kargil during 1998. Several Pakistani units present in the sector did not figure in the Order of Battle (ORBAT) supplied by RAW to the Directorate-General on Military Intelligence (DGMI). In the Committee's view, a significant gap in information prior to the detection of the Kargil intrusion was the inability of RAW to accurately monitor and report changes in the Pakistani ORBAT in the FCNA region during 1998 and early 1999 and to a lesser extent that of DGMI, and field intelligence units to notice the additional forward deployment of troops near the LoC.
Unlike other countries, India has no tradition of undertaking politico-military games with the participation of those having political and diplomatic expertise. If such games had been practised, then the possibility of limited military intrusions to internationalise the Kashmir issue might have been visualised.
The Indian Intelligence structure is flawed since there is little back up or redundancy to rectify failures and shortcomings in intelligence collection and reporting that goes to build up the external threat perception by the one agency, namely, RAW which has a virtual monopoly in this regard. There is a general lack of awareness of the critical importance of and the need for assessed intelligence at all levels. JIC reports do not receive the attention they deserve at the political and higher bureaucratic levels. There are no checks and balances in the Indian intelligence system to ensure that the consumer gets all the intelligence that is available and is his due.
— Vijay Mohan

Changes recommended

Revamping the intelligence apparatus, enhancing information- collection capabilities
Structural reforms. Integrating the service headquarters with the MoD.
Appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff as a single-point advisor to the government on military matters.
Publication of a White Paper on Indian nuclear weapons programme.
Conduct a detailed study on border management to evolve force structures and procedures to ensure improved surveillance.
Restructuring the role, training and tasks of the para-military forces in view of terrorist threats and proxy war.
Examine possibility of integrated manpower policy for the Armed Forces, para-military forces and the Central Police Forces as well as lateral induction of ex-servicemen into the para-military.