The NDA has reiterated its position that the Ayodhya disputants should abide by the court decision. Since court decisions take their own time, an early negotiated settlement of the dispute by the two parties staking claim to the disputed land at Ayodhya is certainly preferable. Few can find fault with such a position, which the NDA has been holding dear ever since it came into being. In fact, the NDA would not have been able to come to power and complete a full term if the BJP had not compromised on its divisive Hindutva agenda. It was the party’s periodic assertions about remaining loyal to the common NDA agenda that enabled the party to provide leadership to the coalition.

Handing over the matter to an enquiry panel should not raise much hope either. Rather, it is the best way to bury the sordid matter under the heap of notorious red tape. By the time a report is out, the affair will be long forgotten and a fresh coat of white paint will ensure that no warts are visible.

The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created the chance for Pakistan to enhance its influence in Afghanistan by precipitating an alliance between Pakistan and the US. Together they built up the fundamentalist Taliban mujahideen as an Islamic force that could dislodge the Soviets. The Taliban were educated in Pakistani madarsahs, indoctrinated with extreme versions of Islam, and imbued with the religious fervour to wage war against the communist superpower. The Pakistani military and intelligence trained them to fight.

Secondly, Pashtuns straddled both sides of the international border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Islamabad played the tribal card to remain on good terms with the Taliban, and it was helped by the fact that most of the Taliban were Pashtuns. But many Pashtuns were not Taliban — Mr Hamid Karzai is one of them. So, 9/11 and Mr Karzai’s electoral success in Afghanistan’s first-ever election may have had far-reaching consequences for Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, the US also fought the Soviets by allying with regional military commanders hostile to the Taliban, thereby facilitating warlordism. Pakistan’s intelligence service was the main conduit to the warlords. Not surprisingly, they selected the warlords that best served their own interests.

Following the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, American interest in South Asia, never very great, declined. The Taliban stepped into the political vacuum created by the Soviet withdrawal. The destructive impact of this fundamentalist regime on Afghan society and politics disgusted most countries, but Pakistan was one of the three countries in the world to recognise the Taliban government.

The incident of 9/11 changed all that. The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington were launched by Al-Qaeda, whose leader, Osama bin Laden, enjoyed the hospitality of the Taliban government — and, according to some reports, is today under the protection of Islamabad. Determined to stamp out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban regime that had housed them, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom in October 2001. Under General Pervez Musharraf, who had come to power after a successful military coup in 1999, Islamabad did a 180-degree turn and gave the US the logistical support it wanted. Spurning the American demand would have pushed the US into an alliance with India, which would have been fatal for Pakistan.

For Pakistan the alliance was not about freedom. The US claimed to be fighting the war in defence of democratic values, but what did that mean to Pakistan? The alignment brought a fresh flow of American arms into Pakistan as America lifted the sanctions imposed after Pakistan’s nuclear explosion in 1998. General Musharraf, whose 1999 coup had made him persona non grata in Washington at a time when democracy promotion was high on the American agenda, was suddenly welcomed by the Bush administration as a moderate and progressive Muslim trying to democratise his country.

In Afghanistan the US overthrew the Taliban regime with the help of anti-Taliban Uzbek and Tajik warlords who formed the Northern Alliance. America then put its energies into hunting down the remnants of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and, along with its European allies and the UN, into initiating the military and political measures that might usher in stability and eventually create conditions for representative government in Afghanistan.

Pakistan stood to lose in any new political dispensation in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the Taliban’s defeat an interim government, with Mr Karzai as its Chairman, was created in Afghanistan in January 2002. It had no influence over Mr Karzai or the Uzbek and Tajik warlords who had joined forces with the Americans to oust the Taliban. So, it tried to persuade Mr Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair that moderate Taliban should be included in the government. Afghanistan’s warlords, jostling for power in a new government, would have none of it. So, Pakistan could pull no strings over Mr Karzai’s government. Pakistan also wanted any new government to cater to the interests of the Pashtuns — or rather the Pashtuns over which it had, or thought it had, influence. Those were the Pashtuns of the Taliban kind — not of the Karzai variety.

In the Pakistani elections of October 2002, the success of Pakistani religious parties in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province gave Pakistan the chance to manipulate Pashtun sentiment on the pretext that they had lost out after 9/11 and that Pakistan wanted to help them. But this does not seem to have inspired any move for Pashtun unity from the Afghan side.

Meanwhile, Mr Karzai had to contend with two main causes of instability. First, his writ hardly ran outside Kabul, and neither he nor the US could persuade warlords to disarm and demobilise their militia.

Warlords also controlled poppy-growing areas and a lucrative opium trade, estimated at $2.5 billion and the major customs posts, including Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar and Balkh, through which goods were smuggled into Pakistan and Central Asia.

The second major source of instability was caused by the remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda who continued to be trained and sustained by Pakistan.

Nevertheless, more than 10 million Afghans turned out to vote on October 9. Their participation in the elections was an act of defiance against the gung-ho tactics of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda militants.

Whatever the ethnic make up of Mr Karzai’s government, it is unlikely to include Muslims dancing to Pakistan’s tune. The chances are that Pakistan will have very little influence over the new Karzai administration.

Mr Karzai wants to use his new mandate to unite a country still riven by ethnic, religious, regional and tribal rivalries. His top priorities will include the curbing of regional warlords, the building of an effective national security force and pursuing international aid pledges to maintain national redevelopment plans. The last thing he will want will be the exploitation of Pashtun tribalism and the export of more religious extremism by Pakistan.

Mr Karzai’s success in breaking the power of warlords and the narcotics trade will not suit Pakistan, which used them as a means to enhance its influence in Afghanistan.

The US has lauded General Musharraf for hunting down Al-Qaeda, but Pakistani intelligence services and Army — or some sections of them — are likely to continue training Al-Qaeda and Taliban extremists who will cross the border and threaten the stability of Afghanistan.

The latter is “ugly” because it means flattery (not appreciation) is insincere, mawkish and motivated.

Some belonging to the latter category combine the gift of the grab with that of the graft. They are more successful ones in the modern world. Glib tongue goes well with the slimy palm.

Nowadays, even a pious festival like Divali is looked upon more as an opportunity to lubricate dry, itching palms. Sweets and sundries in fancifully wrapped covers have become a hallmark of the corrupt (corporate) culture.

Lavish parties are more an occasion for signing deals, where bribes in cash and kind change soiled hands.

Government servants, euphemistically called the steel frame of administration, are bestowed with carloads of gifts in the guise of greetings.

The practice of bribing has acquired alarming proportions because of the lure of the lucre. Everybody wants to strut in others’ furs. And what else can be more enticing than a little greasing of the palms while doing someone a favour in one’s official capacity?

It has also become an art for which one needs some amount of brains though of the dubious and sometimes devilish character as is revealed from the following story.

A contractor and his wife were discussing how to win over an engineer. It was decided that he should meet him on the festive occasion when he would be in a receptive mood.

He packed a bottle of scotch and called at his house at night. The matter having been discussed, the no-nonsense contractor offered his humble gift.

The puffed-up engineer reacted, “You are trying to bribe me.”

“No sir. It is only a gift.”

“Even then, I can’t accept it.”

“Sir, there is a solution. You pay me for it.”

“How much?”

“Ten rupees.”

The integration of the defence services has remained only a cosmetic exercise, despite a debate on the issue over the years. Dr Manmohan Singh's exhortation is likely to remain a sentiment unless it is translated into action both by the government and the Service Headquarters. The first task that merits attention is the long-pending appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). This was also the recommendation of Parliament's Standing Committee on Defence in its latest report.

Most officers of the three services, serving and retired, defence analysts, think-tanks and others have been suggesting to the government the need to formalise the joint structure, in the form of the integrated defence staff, by appointing a CDS, so that the former can start functioning in right earnest. In fact, a major recommendation of the Kargil Review Committee was the restructuring of the higher defence management in which a CDS was considered crucial to achieve coordination and synergy amongst the services and provide a single-point advice to the government. After prolonged deliberations, the government had accepted the recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) in mid-2001.

The recommendation for CDS continues to be conveniently overlooked. No reasons have been assigned, but it is not difficult to speculate on the government's intentions. The many reasons cited by various analysts include an inconclusive dialogue amongst various political parties; the continuing but misplaced fear of the armed forces becoming too powerful; the machinations of the bureaucracy which feels the appointment may reduce its turf and power; institutional opposition from the Air Force; the prevailing status quoist mentality of the leadership; and the inability to decide the service from which the CDS should be selected.

Apparently, the government does not know how to go about it. Should it, for instance, first decide on the services from which the first incumbent be selected or should the selection be on merit or qualification of the selected incumbent? There is also the question of the panel from which the selection should be made. Should it be an incumbent Chief or even a retired one, or should it be a C-in-C? Then, there is the question of timing. An earlier attempt had to be aborted, as it would have had adverse repercussions on the existing hierarchy of the particular service.

The government’s dilemma is understandable. It wants a smooth transition. The problem is not insurmountable, given the political will. But there is a need to be clear as to who all are eligible for the CDS.

According to the GoM recommendations, the CDS would be a four-star flag officer from either of the three services. He will be primus inter pares (first among equals) with the other three Chiefs and function as the Principal Military Adviser to the Defence Minister; who will serve till the age of 62 years like the three Service Chiefs; and who should not revert to his parent service after being the CDS.

Most Service Chiefs have about two years plus service when appointed as Chiefs, and shifting them to the CDS slot midway during their tenures does justice neither to the service concerned nor to the integrated headquarters. Appointing an incumbent or retired Chief as the CDS is thus not a viable option.

Therefore, the panel for selecting the CDS will perforce be from one of the serving Commanders in Chief. In such a case, it is feared that the CDS would not be able to function effectively, as one or more Chiefs would be senior to him. This concern is misplaced, as at that level seniority would only be incidental and is unlikely to create any problem. In any case, all the four Chiefs would be of four-star rank and the CDS will always be the first amongst equals.

It would be in the fitness of the thing if the first CDS hails from the senior and the largest service - the Army. This is not to downgrade the importance of the Navy or the Air Force in any way, but to highlight the fact that the Army will continue to play a predominantly "lead role" in the conflicts we face today and the challenges we have to contend with in the future.

By happenstance a change in the Army hierarchy is also due shortly. Chief of Army Staff General Vij is due to retire on January 31, 2005. Apparently, the process to select his successor must be near completion. There should be no change in this process as the hierarchy should not be disturbed. However, simultaneously with the selection of General Vij's successor, the selection of the first CDS could also be carried out from within the eligible Commanders in Chief of the Army. This will result in smooth succession within the Army. A CDS can be appointed without disturbing the Army hierarchy and without depriving anyone of his dues.

The government should seize this opportunity and appoint CDS. It will translate the Prime Minister's vision into reality, upgrade the decision-making structure of security-related issues, meet the aspirations of the armed forces and ensure a relatively trouble-free transition.

Not that facing crisis is a new phenomenon for the Sikh masses. But for the France’s 7000-strong (read weak) community, it is a disturbing development. As a result of the latest French ruling, Sikh boys have been refused entry into French public schools since September 2 when the schools reopened. To compound their problems further, taking leaf from their public school counterparts, even private schools have started denying entry to Sikh boys.

Even as a visiting Sikh delegation from France sought an appointment with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the expulsion of three students — Gurvir Singh, Bikramjit Singh and Ranjit Singh — from Louise Michel School, situated in a Paris suburb, has come as a bolt from the blue. Last month, the trio was denied entry to the class in their school.

If the impasse persists, the Sikhs may ultimately have to leave France the same way some Sikhs left Uganda when Edi Amin usurped political power in the Sixties. Caught between the devil and the deep sea, some boys have resorted to cutting of hair which has shaken the Sikh religious leaders out of slumber in India. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee Chief Bibi Jagir Kaur has vowed to take the issue to the United Nations to muster global support. Others have pledged unstinted support to the French Sikhs in their own humble way.

However, the French government seems unperturbed. French Education Minister Francois Filon has said that the law had to be applied to everyone and that the Sikhs must fall in line and respect the new French law. This does not augur well for the Sikhs who are now faced with the threat of expulsion from France because of the tough posture of the French government.

That this should happen to Sikhs when our Prime Minister is himself a Sikh is adding insult to injury. Whom they should turn to now? Had somebody else been the Prime Minister, Sikhs would have accused the Centre of soft-pedalling the issue. The community is facing an unprecedented crisis.

Dr Manmohan Singh sent his National Security Adviser J.N. Dixit to Paris to resolve the issue. It may not have occurred to him that turban was a knotty affair. Mr Dixit failed to extract any positive assurance from the French government. Yet, he impressed upon the Prime Minister, who was on a visit to the US then, that the issue has been suitably resolved. It is then that the Prime Minister announced that the turban issue had been tackled.

Dr Manmohan Singh, as the most educated Prime Minister and a highly respected economist in the world, should give top priority to the issue since it is highly sensitive for the Sikhs the world over. After his visit to The Hague, he may have to address the problem himself since it will require immediate attention back home. He will have to persuade the French government to relax the rule in favour of the Sikh students though it is easier said than done. France is a sovereign country and no sovereign nation can be coerced into doing something which it does not want to do. But no one should doubt Dr Manmohan Singh’s ability and sincerity in making the French realise the Sikh point of view.