E D I T O R I A L P A G E |
Wednesday, September 8, 1999 |
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weather spotlight today's calendar |
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Sugar
vs Bofors: a poll treat NEW
CONTOURS OF INDO-U.S. TIES |
For
peace in the north-eastern states Dividing
pension among Gorkha widows Jerusalem
syndrome
Sept
8, 1924 |
Sugar vs Bofors: a poll treat EVERYTIME the BJP fires a Bofors-tipped arrow at the Congress, the rival replies with a lethal sugar-coated fusillade. The latest shootout was on Monday and the Congress scored a few technical points in a contest which is petering out into a dreary draw. Bofors is a saga yellowed with age by constant retelling. But sugar is a thriller. Price fluctuation beyond a point will arouse the ire of urban consumers and whet the greed of traders and stockists. An artificial depression of the price will affect the growers who will get less for selling more and after a long delay. Traditionally the cane growers are the object of hypocritical sympathy of policy-makers who in private are keen to protect the interests of sugar mills. If all this were not enough, the commodity flowed from Nawaz Sharif land, and a whopping 5.4 lakh tonnes at that. The Pakistan Prime Ministers family mills not only accounted for a good chunk of the exports but he also gave a handsome subsidy of Rs 6 a kilo to the exporters to sweeten the deal.All this while his country was preparing to send intruders into Kargil. This is the Congress claim, a transparent attempt to build a case of kickback and garnish it with nationalist spirit. The BJP has been callous in preparing its defence brief. It said sugar was opened for unfettered import by the Congress government in 1994 and it merely continued the policy. It is partly true and partly obfuscation. Imports were liberalised at the height of a huge shortfall and the price was soaring in the open market; in other words, it was the Kalpnath Rai style of management. Since then production has vastly improved, prices have stabilised and the justification for import has just vanished. So this defence will not do. The BJP spokesman also
messed up the volume of imports and rhetorically asked
how 2500 tonnes brought in by a Delhi rice mill would
entail an outgo of Rs 900 crore in foreign exchange. The
Congress scenting a nervous quarry, flaunted official
figures. Nor was the repeated increase of import duty a
sufficient counter-measure; other countries impose three
or even five times the 27.5 per cent the Indian importers
pay. The truth lies elsewhere and that would have been
the clinching defence. Last year the domestic product was
selling at nearly Rs 19 a kilo, buoyed up by a general
fear of a production shortfall. And it was the election
year October-November, 1998. Onion was a crushing
problem and sugar would have made it a two-horse drawn
rollar-coaster. And Pakistan automatically suggested
itself as the source of import. Its proximity, the need
to practise economic diplomacy (remember it was well
before the Lahore bus ride?) and to bring into play the
oft-used instrument of imports to rein in prices. The
only snag is this policy goes against the grower but as
they say, something got to give. |
Mulayam's crumbling fort MR Mulayam Singh Yadav may have to pay a heavy political price for not supporting Congress President Sonia Gandhi's effort to form a "secular" government after Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee was defeated in the Lok Sabha by one vote. The so-called betrayal of the "secular forces" may continue to haunt him throughout the three-phase Lok Sabha elections beginning on September 18. That the Samajwadi Party led by him is not in robust political health is evident from the decision of 13 party MLAs to part company with the process of elections having begun. They have decided to leave him because in their eyes his secular credentials have become suspect following his refusal to support Mrs Sonia Gandhi. The clumsy attempt by his poll managers to project the exodus as an expression of disappointment by a section of the Muslim members of the party cannot conceal for long the disturbing cracks in the walls of his once seemingly impregnable secular citadel. Only five of the 13 Samajwadi MLAs are Muslims. What should be a source of even greater worry to the self-appointment subedar of secular forces in Uttar Pradesh is the fact that the Samajwadi deserters - unlike those in the Janata Dal [United] who found comfort in the company of the Bharatiya Janata Party - have joined the Congress to add to the growing reputation of UPCC President Salman Khursheed as the leader who put back life into a party which in the state was declared dead. A number of factors seem to have combined to make Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav lose his grip over the constituency which very nearly helped him become Prime Minister. A primary reason for the desertion has something to do with his autocratic style of functioning. On this count there is little to differentiate between the Samajwadi leader and Ms Mayawati of the Bahujan Samaj Party. That is, perhaps, the
reason why the disgruntled Samajawadi's did not join the
BSP for that would have been akin to jumping from the
frying pan into the fire. Of course, the great betrayal
of the "secular cause" too is a factor which
the Samajwadis should not ignore for understanding the
reason why the minorities, particularly the Muslims in
UP, are not too happy with their messiah of yesterday.
They cannot forget that Mr Mulayam Singh Yadav, as Chief
Minister of UP, had stopped Hindu fundamentalists from
destroying the Babri Masjid. But a lot of political water
has flown down the Saryu and the Gomti since his
emergence as the only political hope of the Muslims,
particularly in UP. Chief Minister Kalyan Singh's direct
question to the Muslims about what their
"messiah" had done for them seems to have set
them thinking. It is indeed a fact that the "Yadav
rate of employment" shot up substantially when he
was in power while the Muslims were made to do with the
promise of a better tomorrow under Samajwadi rule. As
electioneering for the 85 Lok Sabha seats from UP hots
up, what can be said at this point without fear of
contradiction is that the Congress is the only party
which has literally nothing to lose and politically much
to gain from the last Lok Sabha election of the
millennium. If the Muslims return to the Congress in
substantial numbers, it may even cause a major political
upset. However, their return should not be misread by the
Congress as a sign of their having forgiven the party for
its past political sins. They may return because the
Samajwadis have treated them no better than the Congress
used to when they were with it. |
Peace process back on rails THE signing of the Wye-II peace accord between the Israelis and the Palestinians on Saturday, with US mediation, has brought back on the rails the process that got derailed because of the intransigence of former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. After implementing a part of the Wye-I agreement he developed cold feet on the crucial issues of the withdrawal of his country's troops from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian prisoners now in Israeli jails. Since Mr Netanyahu had refused to honour the commitment he had made, the Wye-II document, signed by new Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat at Sharm- el-Sheikh (Egypt), has clauses to ensure that this does not happen again, and from any side. This is an achievement in itself, besides the defreezing of the peace process. Also, this is in accordance with the pre-election promises made by Mr Barak. The latest accord has a clear time-frame for its implementation. Thus when the agreed transfer of control to the Palestinian Authority over certain West Bank areas is finally effected by January 20 next year, 13.1 per cent of this disputed territory will have gone into the hands of the Palestinians. Israel had captured the West Bank areas and the Gaza strip in the short 1967 war against the Arabs. The second most sensitive issue relating to the release of the Palestinians in Israeli jails has also been handled to the satisfaction of both sides. It has been agreed to constitute a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee to identify the prisoners to be set free. It is believed the Palestinians will be able to influence the Israeli decision on the matter as they wanted. Perhaps, this is the reason why the Palestinian side did not protest much over the reduction of the prisoners' number from 750 to 600, as given in the new document, including the 250 already released by the Netanyahu regime. Now the Palestinians will have the advantage to secure freedom for such persons as had been taken in custody along with the real culprits involved in bomb blasts and other such incidents. The questions relating to the demand for safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank, and initiating the construction of a port at Gaza have also been answered tactfully. However, given the
extremely bitter history of the relations between the
Arabs and the Israelis, accords do not bring as much
happiness as is normally expected from such developments.
Extremist groups on both sides have already started
firing verbal missiles to destroy an otherwise historic
process. How much capacity Mr Barak has to withstand
pressures from the Israeli public following any untoward
incident masterminded by the extremist fringe of the
Palestinians will be known in the days to come. On this
factor and on the success of Mr Arafat to incapacitate
the destructive elements depends the future of the Wye-II
accord. There are two highly sensitive issues which still
remain to be resolved: the claim of the Palestinians to
make East Jerusalem their capital and the future of the
Jewish settlements in the areas to be handed over to the
Palestinian Authority. Though these may be taken up after
the implementation of the Wye-II accord, these are of a
greatly explosive nature and can prove to be the most
difficult roadblock in establishing a full-fledged
Palestinian state. |
NEW CONTOURS OF INDO-U.S.
TIES THE recent cooling off of relations between New Delhi and Washington may prove no more than a temporary setback to an otherwise growing warmth in relations between the two countries, witnessed in the wake of the Kargil happenings. Hardening of stances by the two countries after New Delhis declaration concerning the draft nuclear doctrine is not likely to lead to a freeze in the dialogue the two countries are holding to recast and renovate their mutual ties in accordance with the demands of the new millennium. Even a cursory glance shows that new contours are developing in Indo-US relations. There are also a new set of problems. The surprising American support for India over Kargil, extending full endorsement of the Indian stand over inviolability of the Line of Control in Kashmir, has, of course, been heartily welcomed here. But, side by side, it has apparently created a degree of anxiety as to the quid pro quo that America may want to extract in lieu of its support for India against Pakistani intrusions in the area. Will the price that USA may want affect Indias basic interests in Kashmir? Or is the price Indias nuclear weapon status? Mandarins of the Indian Foreign Office say that posing questions this way betrays an isolationist syndrome ignoring global currents and the wider concerns of the big powers. The fact of the matter is a multitude of factors has been influencing Indo-US relations lately. The Kargil episode has stimulated this process of change in Indo-US ties. Imperceptibly perhaps irrationally Indo-US relations are headed towards a new elevated interaction, shedding the style and agendas of the past. It is ironical that this new phase has been triggered by the Indian nuclear tests of May 11 and 13 last year that initially evoked a ferocious reaction from Washington. The eight rounds of Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks are a piece of this new style India-America engagement. Closed-door negotiations and bargaining, without inhibitions of their public postures, have helped in establishing a good deal of mutual understanding though several big concerns on both sides remained to be sorted out. There is need to continue this style of confidentiality-locked dialogue. On the nuclear issue, the Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks seem to have led the USA to the conclusion that India has come to stay as a nuclear weapon state with a limited arsenal, but backed by indigenous nuclear technology of a high order. The assessment flows from monitoring networks, scientific think-tanks and American scientific assessors in the IAEA having full know-how of Indias nuclear capability. At the end of the talks, the principal American anxiety remained on the limits of Indias nuclear deterrence, and the prospect of futuristic advances by the Indian nuclear establishment. Events have moved on Kosovo, the bombing of the Chinese embassy and Chinas sharp reaction, the Taiwan imbroglio, the widening of the Sino-American hiatus, and then the Pakistani intrusion into strategic heights in the Kargil sector of Kashmir. The Clinton Administrations role in the Kargil episode paving the way for Pakistani withdrawal has left an imprint on Indian foreign policy thinking. Is there a corresponding shift in US policy? The question being asked is whether there is a paradigm shift in US policy in Indias favour? Not yet, say analysts here. But there are major factors, pushing Washington in this direction. Along with larger global factor, there is a feeling of a change in Washingtons perspective of the Indian subcontinent, a change that downgrades Pakistans role and a corresponding elevation of Indias stature. This has something to do with economics plus dislike for old-time favourites the Taliban whom Pakistans army Generals and the ISI, backed by American largesse and equipment, helped install in power. The Osama bin Ladens are making sure that Islamic fundamentalism is no longer privately favoured in the State Department. More significant is the economic factor. American munificence is drying up when Pakistans economy is tottering. The option of propping up the edifice of a failed state by pumping in another billion dollar loan is hardly attractive, certainly so after the Kargil adventure which showed unacceptable recklessness on the part of Pakistans rulers, the army as well as the political class. India presents a contrasting picture, military restraint combined with strength, an expanding economy with a higher growth rate, an all-time high in foreign exchange reserves and technology advancement in the new millenniums fast track areas infotech and Indian software explosion along with strides in nuclear and space technology, which are Indias strong points. International financial institutions also note that despite the stress and strain of two successive crises, first the sanctions after Pokhran and now the Kargil battle, India has roughed it out to be accepted as a favoured destination for investors world-wide. All this matters a great deal, in a world where economic growth is the core issue. Analysts say, after the recent events Kosovo, Kargil etc and with new flash-points such as Taiwan hovering like a Damocles sword, Washington appears keen to reinforce its pattern of alliances in the West and in the East. It might explore the prospect of a closer relationship with India. It is interesting to hear Secretary of State Albright accepting Indias role as a democracy, joining hands with other democracies to strengthen world peace and security. The habit of viewing developing nations from narrow self-interest preferring dictators to assertive democracies seems to be petering out, at least so far as India is concerned. What are the looming hurdles in closer Indo-US ties? Rapport on the nuclear issue first and foremost. Although the gap in the positions of India and the USA on Indias nuclear weapons status is formidable; in the context of today this should be possible to bridge provided both countries display resilience. The USA and India have to pick up the threads from where the Talbott-Jaswant Singh talks left them. While India understands its strong points, it has to take a forthright stand in pursuing nuclear non-proliferation. The CTBT is favourable to India and there should be no hesitation in acceding to it as an equal with the five weapon powers. According to observers, if India teams up with the USA to achieve the goals of non-proliferation it would be easier for Washington to accommodate Indian anxieties on the score of its security concerns. Unreserved acceptance of the CTBT and indication of New Delhis cooperation in the ongoing negotiations for the FMCT would give a big push to an Indo-US rapport on the crucial nuclear issue. Washington, on its part, has to realise that the ground realities being what they are, India cannot afford to accept a discriminatory position on weapon status vis-a-vis other weapon powers, especially its big neighbour on the east. Indias second point of concern in its engagement with the USA is the Kashmir issue. In the context of today, the obsession and worries about internationalisation are diminishing. It is India that is likely to seek a quid pro quo from the USA for partnership in securing common global aims, the terms being a favourable approach towards the Kashmir issue. In keeping with Indias secular and democratic values, this role is not mediatory but can nonetheless be helpful in the evolution of a fair solution in the interest of the peoples of India and Pakistan. Realism says that a solution can only be based on the existing de facto border, the LoC, with inbuilt provisions for democratic rights of the Kashmiri people on both sides of the border. The third and perhaps
the most potent issue in the Indo-US engagement relates
to the vast and expanding economic sphere. The points of
contention that need to be sorted out relate to advanced
technology and the patents regime. In respect of
restraints on technology acquisition by India, the quest
from the Indian side is to be placed in the same bracket
as China. As an inducement, India can offer a big deal
for the induction of American light water reactors
which even North Korea is being provided on
appropriate commercial terms. Indian irritants on the
patents regime relate to the American patenting of such
traditional products as neem, jamun, karela and brinjal
for centuries a part of the Indian menu and
medicinal applications. |
Australia: to be, or not to be? TO be, or not to be? On November 6, Australians will finally be able to resolve this dilemma. That is to say, they will vote in a referendum to decide whether or not their country should become a republic. Australian Parliament has approved the referendum question for popular adjudication. People will be asked to decide if they would want a republic, with the Queen and Governor-General being replaced by a President appointed by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Commonwealth (of Australia) Parliament. If they decide against it, the constitutional status quo will continue with the resident Queen of Britain doubling up as Queen of Australia. While the republican debate is now in full swing in the media and among the politicians, popular apathy still reigns. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, people dont sense any urgency about the issue. As Robert Manne, a prominent media analyst, has pointed out, Republicanism (in Australia) did not emerge out of any social crisis. It did not reflect any change in relations with Britain. Its roots are to be found, rather, in certain unfinished national business, in the quest for a secure post-colonial identity. But here too the political establishment was divided. The promotion of a republic was largely seen as the handiwork of the Labour Party and its then Prime Minister, Mr Paul Keating. With their usual political cynicism, people simply tended to switch off. The issue didnt seem to concern them. Second, people have been utterly confused by the politicians. The monarchists, for instance, tell them that the Governor-General of Australia is really their Head of State. Therefore, they argue, what is the point in replacing him with a President? Prime Minister John Howard, an avowed monarchist, has said: I think we have about the most stable political system in the world, and I cant for the life of me see why wed want to change it. We are a completely independent country, we have got a very good system, why muck around with it? On the other hand, one of his ministers, Senator Vanstone, is a republican who would want to cut the strings with Britain to make Australia a nation in our own right... (The ruling coalition of Prime Minister John Howard has a conscience vote on the republican question.) To add to the confusion, the mainstream republicans tend to understate their case by emphasising its symbolic and minimalist nature. What they mean is that their brand of republicanism will simply replace the Queen and the Governor-General with an Australian President, with no other changes to the constitution. The obvious question: if the change is simply symbolic, why change at all and create unnecessary confusion? In any case, people do not like the idea that the politicians should appoint the countrys President, if Australia were to become a republic. This, in their view, would mean another politician at the top. And they are not enamoured of such a prospect. They, therefore, favour a republic with a directly elected President. But this is not a choice being offered to the people by the countrys political establishment. It is feared that this might subvert the countrys parliamentary democracy by creating a competing centre of power around an elected President. Which only tends to reinforce popular political cynicism. Therefore, even though poll suggest that most people would favour a republic with a directly elected President, this is not an option in the scheduled November 6 referendum. By voting no to the republican model on offer (a President appointed by a two-thirds majority in parliament), these republican voters are likely to tip the balance in favour of the monarchists and hence the constitutional status quo. They contend that it is better to wait for a future referendum on direct election than to have a half-baked republic currently on offer. Prime Minister John Howard has further complicated the republic referendum by simultaneously seeking peoples approval for a new constitutional preamble. The republicans fear this would detract the people from the main issue of a republic. They would have liked the preamble question to be taken up separately at another time. But Mr John Howard was insistent. And was able to have his way by cobbling together a deal with the minority Democrats on the wording of the preamble. The opposition Labour Party, though not actively promoting the preamble, will support it in the referendum. In other words, because of the broad political support cutting across party lines, the preamble has a better chance of popular acceptance than the republic. It looks like a win-win
situation for the Prime Minister. The way he has steered
the republican question through a partially elected
constitutional convention last year and limiting the
choice of a republican model, he might succeed in sinking
the republican issue. At the same time, he will relish
the prospect of giving Australia a new constitutional
preamble of noble sentiments without substance. |
For peace in the
north-eastern states THE recent spate of killings, kidnappings of tea garden officials for ransom, and bomb blasts and sabotage of railway property in Assam, are really symbolic of the long drawn out problem of the simmering unrest, and alienation of most of the seven sister states of the North East from the mainstream of Indian life. The odd accord between the Centre and one or the other of these states, the cease-fires that are affected from time to time and the occasional foray by individuals and NGOs to bring about peace and stability in this geo-politically important strategic part of the country, have never really borne fruit so far. The deployment of the Indian Army, and other paramilitary forces while temporarily arresting the insurgency and other depredations of the ultras, has done little, from the times of Jawaharlal Nehru to date, to curb the dissidence and the strife that has continued to plague the daily lives of the common people who live in these hilly tracks and fertile plains. Today Assam is in the news, for quite obviously the wrong reasons, and tomorrow it could be Manipur or Mizoram, with the involvement of the ISI elements reportedly operating from safe havens from within and outside the country. Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan straddle one of our states or the other in the north-east, and this creates its own arc of responsibilities and security concerns. Though each of these states have their own peculiar issues that need a resolution, by and large, a common thread of grievances and aspirations, (no matter how ill-founded), binds them together. In Nagaland the NSCN (IM) group has somehow, for reasons best known to them felt that the Naga region was never a part of India, and therefore the question of its demanding a secession was in itself irrelevant! The NSCN (Khaplang) faction, which formed the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front (IBRF) in 1990 in league with the ULFA of Assam and the United National Liberation Front of Manipur on the other hand, claims that it is absolutely necessary to clear the last remains of the colonial influence from the Indo-Myanmar region by use of force. Now both these highly polarised and misconceived views can only be resolved politically, (within, of course, the confines of the Indian Constitution), in mutual discussions, that will necessarily be long and time-consuming. One is sure that once both the factions have accepted the realities of modern statehood and governance where the territorial integrity cannot be questioned, a satisfactory political solution can be found to integrate Nagaland within the countrys mainstream. In Assam too, there are basic differences in perception, of the kind found in Nagaland. Both the ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), do bring up from time to time the question of the sovereignty of Assam and any talks for reconciliation being held on foreign soil. Even otherwise, both the ethnic Assamese and the tribals keep clutching at each others throat, in their struggle for exclusive space, because it must not be forgotten that an Assam of a 2.7 lakh sq km five decades back has now shrunk to a paltry 70,000 sq km today. The migrations and unlawful entries into the state, further aggravate the situation. The rise of certain religious fundamental groups now active in Dhubri and the border-belt with Bangladesh, and the spreading influence of the ISI-trained outfits, has all queered the pitch in this oil and mineral rich state. And to compound it all, is the ever present call by many to protect, the state from foreigners and outsiders. The ethnic cleansings in the Bodo and non-Bodo areas, the fear of the migrants taking away the livelihood of the locals, and the Unified Command of the Army and the Assam State security machinery fighting a prolonged counter-insurgency, have all led to some uncertainty and unrest in this state. Yet like-minded people who do not wish to see the North East bleed away, should surely be able to think of a workable solution to this impasse. It has been often seen that in the far-flung areas and states of the north east, the communication modes are antique, there exists a certain distrust between the tribals and non-tribals, and exploitation of the simple hillfolk by the political parties for their vote banks, is a well known fact. The lack of adequate economic development and allied infrastructure, coupled with the above-mentioned negatives, does spread a wall of alienation between those who govern and the ones being governed. Once the latter are convinced that talks without any preconditions are to he held, by the Prime Minister or his emissaries within a businesslike and positive framework, (and where one side will not let down the other later on), I see no reason why this vital part of India cannot live in peace again. Once a durable solution
is worked out, it will also release the Indian Army from
the task of counter-insurgency, and enhance further its
operational standing, and ability for playing its primary
role on the international borders of the country. |
Dividing pension among Gorkha
widows IN the summer of 99, they brought home dead, from the British and Indian Gorkha regiments, Sgt Balram Rai from Kosovo and Ram Kumar Pradhan from Kargil, to grieving widows and families in Nepal. For each, there was only a single widow to mourn. But as the news filtered through of a dozen Nepali Gorkha casualties from Kargil, the Indian armys military wing in Kathmandu got ready to deal with the claims of dependents who might turn out even to be multiple wives. In law in Britain, India and Nepal, polygamy is illegal. But Nepali Gorkhas in the British and Indian armies often have a senior wife, a junior wife and even a third wife. Given this socio-cultural reality, the military establishments, de facto, recognise multiple wives in the distribution of family pensions. Indeed, it is an acceptance of the widespread socio-cultural practice of polygamy in Nepal. The human rights organisation INSEC, in its 1999 Yearbook, documents 95 cases of polygamy. But as these are based on legal complaints made against the husband because of his failure to maintain the first wife, evidently, it is but the tip of the iceberg. Nepals Mulki Ain (civil code), while inscribing polygamy as a punishable offence, also enjoins that property be shared between the two or multiple wives. Evidently, the Indian and British military establishments have respected this practice. The Indian military wing in Nepal, at its pension disbursement centre in Kathmandu, has eight cases in which it is dividing the pension three ways, i.e. 331/3 per cent to three widows. The number increases substantially in the other pension disbursement centres in Pokhra and Daharan. It is estimated that in over 150 cases pension is split 33 per cent. And this includes officers and jawans. There are a few examples of officers of the rank of Lt-Colonel in the Gorkha regiment whose pension is split three ways. In many cases, the widows are in their seventies. However, with polygamy still common, the problem is by no means confined to the earlier generation of Gorkha soldiers. As long as the soldier/ex-serviceman is alive, the familial obligations are his to determine. However, in the case of the Indian army, the identity card for the family provident fund and such schemes carries the name of a wife. The question of polygamy arises at the time of death. When the investigation is carried out about legitimate claimants, often there is more than one widow,more than one family, living remote in the hills. After the Indian army introduced the family pension scheme in 1986, while sorting out the claims of widows, the military wing evolved a de facto system of recognising multiple wives. The system exists nowhere else in the Indian army. For it is only in Nepal that there is a military wing where serving men from the Gorkha regiments are directly involved in an interface with ex-servicemen from the same regiments, explained Captain Vasudevan of the Indian military wing in the Indian embassy in Nepal. The situation dates back to the unique bond forged by the 1947 tripartite India, Nepal and British agreement which laid the basis for the recruitment of 25,000 Nepali Gorkhas to the Indian army. The ratio is 60:40 Nepali and Indians in the Gorkha regiments. It is not therefore like an impersonal bureaucrat in the Ministry of Defence handling family pension claims. These are our men, their families. We have to humanely respond to the reality of their situation, Capt Vasudevan said. Ironically, while Gorkha ex-servicemens organisations have been agitating against the discriminatory treatment on pay and pension meted out to the Gorkha soldiers in the British army, a rigid application of identical treatment would squeeze out any recognition of the cultural specificity of the Gorkha soldiers lifestyle, including polygamy. The death of Sgt Rai, one of the two British casualties in the NATO operation in Kosovo, drew the spotlight on the discrimination in compensation his widow would get, i.e. only 7.5% of what a widow of a British Sergeant would get. Many people are of the opinion that this is a violation of Britains Race Relations Act. What then about the de facto recognition of polygamy? It is one thing to cater for freedom of religious practices and provide for a Pundit for the Gorkha Field Squadron, but where should the line be drawn on respecting cultural specificity? Not recognising the claims of a second or third widow could mean condemning her and the family to destitution. However, womens activist Anjana Sakya rejected this defence of de facto recognition of polygamy in the name of being humane. The problem is that the law against polygamy in Nepal is so weak, people think nothing of taking more than one wife, she said. Under the Mulki-Ain, polygamy, polyandry, child marriage and zari are illegal. Zari is a custom that permits a man to take over anothers wife by compensating him financially for the loss. In the case of polygamy,
if a complaint is brought against the man and
established, the punishment is imprisonment for 1-2
months and a minimal fine. It has not been an effective
deterrent, nor has there been prosecution of ministers in
the government or senior bureaucrats who are known to
have more than one wife. Far from there being any social
ostracism, multiple wives continue to be a status symbol.
WFS |
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