Reviewing the aid to war widows
By Pritam Bhullar

IN a letter to the Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, several parents of the soldiers who fell while fighting in Kargil, have suggested that the current policy of providing aid to the war widows alone, should be changed and the aid should be distributed in three equal shares to the widows, minor children and parents of the deceased soldiers.

They say in the letter that in most cases the widows return to their parents after getting a handsome amount as aid and the soldiers’ parents not only lose their sons but also daughters-in-law. Besides, they say, the minor children are neglected, especially in case of those young widows who remarry.

In a number of cases, what the parents have stated has already happened and the sore point is that the new husbands of war widows get a bonanza and become rich overnight. Another dismaying factor is that when the widows are invited to receive gallantry awards, the parents of the war heroes are not even informed. In most cases, those who accompany the widows to these functions are their parents.

Incidentally, in the wake of the Kargil conflict a substantial increase was made in financial aid to the widows. And now including all financial benefits granted by the Centre, states and Army Group Insurance, it works out to about Rs 25 lakh for JCOs’ and jawans’ widows and above Rs 35 lakh for officers’ widows.

With the values of life having undergone a sea-change, the old rules should also change. The parents of war heroes who spent a lot of money on the education of their sons and, in some cases, even sold their land and property to educate and settle their children in life, should not be left in the cold when they lose their soldier sons. Similarly, minor children of the war heroes must be provided with some proportion of the aid for their maintenance and education.

Fostering discipline

What makes the Army different from all other organisations is its discipline. But discipline in the Army of about one million in a country like India with a population of one billion, does not help in improving the national discipline which is at its nadir today.

What needs to be done to improve national discipline is compulsory military service for our youth, who join various civil services and other organisations, as is done in some other countries e.g. South Korea, Israel and Italy.

Besides, schools can help a great deal to inculcate discipline in children in their formative years. Happily there are some schools in the country which are laying great emphasis on discipline.

A few weeks ago, this writer happened to visit one such school i.e. Dalhousie Public School where children were going through their routine in a very orderly manner. The cook house, dining-hall and ration store gave one the impression that one was in an Army unit.

Dr (Capt) G.S. Dhillon, from the Parachute Regiment, is the director and principal of the school.

The majority of the administrative, reception and security staff is also from the Army. In addition, six to seven ladies among the teaching staff are always from the three Services. All this goes a long way in laying the foundation of a disciplined life.

Bofors’ efficacy

In his recently published book, How the Bofors affair transformed India (1989-99), Lt Gen (retd) M. Mayadas, who was Director Weapons and Equipment at the Army Headquarters in 1984, says: "I wish to make one thing abundantly clear that apart from agreeing hastily to sanction the Bofors deal, Rajiv Gandhi was not responsible for introducing the Bofors gun into the Army". He blames the then Army Chief the late General K. Sundarji for forcing this weapon onto India and says that Bofors was "one hundred per cent Sundarji’s baby".

The Swedish Bofors FH-77 gun kicked off lot of controversy in the late eighties, for it was felt that the Swedish firm was favoured by Rajiv Gandhi.

However, Gen Mayadas reveals in his book that when the pros and cons of all the guns were being discussed "We discovered that contrary to all norms, no General Staff Qualitative Requirement (GSQR) existed for the 155mm (Bofors) gun system".

Granted that the Bofors gun was preferred over the French TR Sofma gun for some reasons. But what can be said is that the Bofors controversy made even the Army sceptical about its efficacy so much so that we did not go in for import of ammunition and spare parts for the guns. The effect of this was felt in the Kargil conflict when we hurriedly started negotiations for ammunition and spare parts for the guns.

Be that as it may, the Bofors gun has proved its effectiveness beyond any doubt in the Kargil sector as per the opinion of a number of senior commanders.

Physical fitness

Inthe Kargil operations, young officers earned praise by providing excellent leadership to the troops who followed them blindly. Apart from this, what went in their favour was their physical fitness.

One of the major factors that contributed to the capture of the Tiger Hill top was the physical fitness of the junior leadership and the troops. This is what the Brigade Commander who had planned and conducted this operation tells this writer.

According to this Brigade Commander, a number of Commanding Officers (COs) were not able to influence the battle because of their higher age group. "It is felt that there is a need to rethink about the age factor of the COs" he quips.

In infantry, more than in any other arm, a CO should be physically fit to lead his troops. This requirement becomes more pronounced in the mountainous terrain, especially at a high altitude.

In most armies of the world, the COs are in the age group of 32 to 36 years, while in the Indian Army, their age ranges between 44 to 46 years. The two years extension of age has made things much worse, for it has lowered the physical fitness standard of the COs and the formation commanders.

It is time we reverted back to the earlier retiring age and compensated the retiring soldiers with much higher scales of pension than what their civilian counterparts get; as used to happen in the pre-Partition days.

This feature was published on October 3, 1999