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prime concern KASHMIR
Army tells the Shalabato story, but numbers don’t add up |
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Expect more heat on the LoC The repeated breaches of ceasefire on the LoC by Pakistan and militants backed by it form a pattern that indicates a return of terror groups’ focus on Kashmir. By Majid Jahangir & Azhar Qadri
The
ceasefire agreement on the Line of Control (LoC) on Kashmir’s western front seems a distant memory, with the gun rattle getting more frequent and ominous with every passing month this year.
The fortnight of battle over September-end and early October in a remote abandoned village, dangerously close to the LoC in a mountainous terrain, has come as a warning, even as it has left those outside the military establishment wondering what exactly transpired. The duration of the confrontation is what has raised the most questions. As conflicting reports trickled out, three top generals — Army Chief Gen Bikram Singh; Lt Gen Gurmit Singh, commander of the corps in Valley; and Lt Gen Sanjeev Chachra, who heads the Northern Command — tried to clear the air by making statements. But all that’s still understood is that ‘something serious’ happened in Keran sector. It was the decade’s longest military operation against militants, who were part of the largest infiltration bid in recent years. The militants were highly trained, Lt Gen Gumit Singh told the media at Srinagar. The Corps Commander even suspected that some of them could have been Pakistan’s special troops who have received training with US and NATO troops as part of the US-led “war on terror”. To make sense of the battle at Shalabato — in the midst of miles of wilderness — an analysis of militancy’s trajectory thus far has to be made.
Local start
The violent movement in Kashmir has gone through a generational shift. The first generation belonged to the batches of Kashmiri youth who crossed the LoC to Pakistan in the 1990s, where they were briefly trained using AK-47 rifles and making bombs to carry out a basic level of asymmetric warfare. The second generation came in the post-Kargil War period with ‘fidayeen’ (suicide attackers). Aafaq Shah, a teenager from Srinagar’s old city area, first among them, rammed an explosive-laden car into the gate of the Corps Headquarters in Srinagar. Suicide squads would carry out deadly raids on security installations — killing themselves as well as causing a high casualty among the security forces. In the post-9/11 world, the militant dynamics changed yet again, as the Pakistan establishment withdrew its active support to many militant groups. Though a few groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were still being promoted by Pakistan, there was an overall shift. Militant activity dropped to record lows. The number of militants fell as many were killed and infiltration of fresh numbers diminished drastically. Among the reasons for drop in the infiltration were the 2003 India-Pakistan ceasefire agreement along the LoC. This facilitated raising a powerful fence on the LoC. Another reason was the militants’ attention shifting away from Kashmir to the Af-Pak region.
Resurgence
This pattern of decline in militancy hit a break in 2013, a year ahead of the scheduled US withdrawal from Afghanistan. With a series of deadly attacks on the police, paramilitary and the Army this year, which claimed a large number of lives, the surge is getting obvious. This year has also recorded a reversal in the militant-security personnel death ratio in the region — for the first time since 1990 more of the latter have got killed in the hinterlands. After the 2003 ceasefire and the fence coming up in 2004, infiltration attempts dropped each year. In 2005, as many as 597 attempts were made; in 2006 it was 573; dropping to 247 in 2011, the lowest. In 2012, the infiltration bids at 264 were slightly higher. In 2005, as many as 189 security personnel were killed, against 917 militants, according to the Home Ministry. In 2012, when the active conflict seemed to be coming to an end, the number of security personnel killed had dropped to 15, compared to 72 militants killed that year. But 2013 has changed all that. The numbers have jumped drastically to 51 security personnel killed so far this year — 25 Army personnel, including one lieutenant colonel; 18 policemen; six CRPF men; one BSF trooper; and one CISF man.
Pak hand
Lt Gen BS Jamwal (retd), former chief of the Northern Command, says all militant groups are “on board” with the Pakistan army. The militants at Shalabato knew how to survive in hostile conditions in the most inhospitable terrain. “The fact that they stayed on for so many days shows they knew how to survive,” he says. He believes the large number of militants trying to infiltrate in a single go suggests they may have employed the “burst-through technique”. “The bigger question is why 40 people? In the entire history of insurgency in Kashmir, this is the second or third time [that such a large group has infiltrated]. May be they decided to go for a ‘burst through’ to make contact at multiple points and try to break in at some point,” General Jamwal says. He adds “Since the snow is coming, you will find the LoC getting hotter. Thereafter, the focus will shift to the south of Pir Panjal.”
Why large infiltration
There are several explanations given for the militants trying to infiltrate in such large numbers:
Snow: Before the onset of winter, when the mountain passes get closed, they want to send in as many cadres as possible. This year, 70-80 militants are reported to have managed to infiltrate into the Valley till August-end. Suicide attacks: Militants are desperate to carry out attacks on the security forces. They could be planning more suicide attacks to inflict more causalities on security men. Talks: As India and Pakistan Prime Ministers were scheduled to talk in the US, some militants in Pakistan who did not like the development may have tried to sabotage the dialogue.
Keran sector
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The question being raised in this regard is how porous is the security system on the 743-km LoC. After the 2003 ceasefire on the LoC, India erected a massive fence on the line, also known as the ‘Anti-Insurgency Obstacle System’. It was completed all along the LoC in September 2004. The fence is 9-foot high, after which there are two barbed wire obstacles with a concertina wire roll in between. Besides the barbed-wire fence, a three-tier security is in place along the LoC. The Army has also installed Israel-made sophisticated equipment, called the Surveillance Grid, in sensitive areas to stop infiltration. The Army men who patrol the LoC — which runs across high peaks, rugged mountains, thick forests and even streams — use night vision equipment, thermal imagers and ‘Long Range Observation Systems’. ‘Unmanned aerial vehicles’ are also used for surveillance. “Still, zero infiltration is not impossible,” a senior army official said, “though we can minimise it.” “The militants are given training on how to cross the LoC. There are fence-crossing training camps held in PoK. Even in Shalabatu the militants had tried to evade thermal sensors by camouflaging themselves by using grass and bushes,” the officer said. Worse ahead Even as the country wakes up to the end of the relative calm in the Valley, it is something senior Army commanders had been regularly warning of. A scenario linked with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan scheduled for next year, as militants engaged there turn their attention to Kashmir. Threats to that effect have also come from militants, including those linked to the Al-Qaida and Taliban. The year ahead could well bring more of the violence witnessed since March.
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Army tells the Shalabato story, but numbers
He reported that on September 24 night an attempt had been made by a large number of militants to infiltrate at multiple points along the LoC. “We had advance input about the attempts from our integrated intelligence network. We knew it was a mixed group of militants from Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Al Badr and Hizbul Mujahideen, and a heavy fire-fight is going on. My troops have reported seeing 10-12 bodies of the terrorists,” General Singh said on September 26. “We are in no hurry to retrieve the bodies of the terrorists,” he added. However, he refused to give the exact number of infiltrators. On October 2, there were reports in the media that militants had occupied a few posts of the Army at Shalabato at a height of above 10,000 ft. It was said the militants had taken advantage of the replacement of an Army unit and occupied the huts between the LoC and the border fence. It was suspected they had occupied the huts in the first weeks of September. The Army, however, refuted media reports about incursion or occupation of any post. The area was difficult to access, and the state police and civil administration maintained silence. Queries were referred to the Army. Amidst ‘incursion’ rumours, General Singh again appeared before the media in Srinagar to say any violation of India’s territorial integrity would never be accepted and the reports were false. This time, however, he was categorical about the number of militants. “Infiltration was attempted by 30-40 militants from multiple points,” he said. The Corps Commander stopped short of blaming Pakistan for this massive infiltration. “Analysing the methodology, this is a BAT (Border Action Team) action-cum-infiltration.... It is not an ordinary infiltration. The pattern shows there were some special troops behind the bid. It was different from earlier attempts,” he added. When asked why no militant body had been retrieved days after the operation was launched, he said the bodies of militants were of no consequence to the Army. He denied the possibility of bodies having been removed by the militants. The question remains: Where did the bodies vanish once the Army called off the operation. It contradicts the Army’s version of events. Parallel bids While the longest counter-infiltration operation was going on in Shalabatu, three militants trying to infiltrate in Gujjardur, 8 km from Shalabatu, were killed on October 4. A day later, another infiltration attempt was reported in the Fateh Gali area, 25 km from Shalabatu. Four militants were killed in this. Of the seven militants killed, six bodies were handed to the police. The Army, however, maintained the two bids were not part of the Shalabatu operation. All of a sudden, the Northern Command chief, Lt General Sanjiv Chachra, announced on October 8 the Shalabatu operation had been called off, claiming the area had been cleared after a fortnight of the operation. No body or weapon had been recovered, which raised serious questions, with New Delhi also seeking answers. “Some of the infiltrators might have gone back earlier. Some were used (killed) in the subsequent operations. The area has been cleaned up,” he said. The abrupt closure of one of the biggest counter-infiltration operations in recent years has raised many questions, like why it took the Army 15 days to clear the area, without retrieving any militant’s body. There is still no independent confirmation of the Army claim that 12 militants had been killed in Shalabato. Five soldiers were injured in the gun battle, one of who said he had seen 30-35 militants. If that’s true, then the total number involved might have been much more than the 40 suggested, as the exchange of fire was taking place at four different points along a 5-km stretch. Another question that remains unanswered is how could such a large number of militants cross the LoC, which is patrolled round the clock.
Violent Valley-2013
March 2: Two policemen shot in
Handwara. March 13: In a suicide attack after three years, five CRPF men, two militants killed in
Srinagar. March 21: BSF man killed and two injured in an ambush near Nowgam on
Srinagar-Jammu bypass. March 24: Police party attacked in Sopore in north Kashmir's Baramulla district; civilian killed, cop injured. April 26: Four policemen gunned down near Sopore. May 10: ASI shot at point-blank range in Pulwama. May
24: Four Army men and a local militant of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen killed in search operation in Tral area of Pulwma district. June 22: Two policemen killed in Hari Singh street in the heart of Srinagar. June 24: A day ahead of Manmohan Singh’s Srinagar visit, eight Army men killed on Srinagar-Jammu highway. July 2: Three militants and a cop killed, three troopers injured in gun battle in Tral. July 9: Soldier killed in ambush in Uri sector. July 10: Army jawan killed in gunfight in Kupwara district. July 13:
Suspected militants behead head constable in north Kashmir. July 18: Cardiologist and former Director of Kashmir’s only tertiary care hospital Dr Jalal-ud-din injured and two of his guards killed in an attack in Pampore. July 28: A Special Police Officer is shot at his home near Sopore. Aug 5: Heavily armed Pakistani intruders kill five Indian soldiers in Poonch sector. Aug 26: CRPF man shot in Awneera, Shopian. Hours later, a Special Operations Group member is killed in Arwani, Bijbehara. Sept 23: CISF jawan killed in Srinagar city. Sept 25: Police constable shot outside his house in Naina-Batpora, Pulwama. Sept 26: Three ‘fidayeen’ storm police station and then an Army camp in Samba, killing 10 people, including a lieutenant colonel.
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Nearly 130 km north-west of Srinagar in the extreme west of Kashmir, Keran sector has been one of the key infiltration routes of militants as dense forests, thick undergrowth and a treacherous terrain provide a perfect cover.
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