|
|
|
|
|
Himachal dam deaths |
|
|
|
|
Anatomy of a tragedy The inquiry report submitted to the High Court into the June 8 tragedy, in which 24 students drowned, has indicted various authorities. It also points at inadequate warning and safety systems. The Tribune reconstructs the lapses that led to the tragic circumstances on the fateful day. by Pratibha Chauhan
The view of the Beas as it meanders through Thalot on the Kullu-Mandi highway is breathtaking, particularly at sunset. It caught the fancy of the 48 engineering students from VNR Vigyan Jyoti Institute of Engineering and Technology, Hyderabad, who were on their way from Shimla to Manali as part of their so far fun-filled trip from college in two tourist buses they had hired from Delhi. They persuaded the drivers to stop at 6.30 pm so that they could play for a while on the banks. The Beas was then gurgling peacefully down the rocky bed. Little did they think that it would end up as one of the worst such tragedies that the country has seen — one that will continue to haunt the 24 who survived, the families and close friends of those who never returned home and the nation as a whole. They did not pay heed to the warning by Puran Chand, a roadside tea stall owner, and his wife Puni Devi about the risk in going into the river. Mindless of the fact that the water level in the Beas had begun to rise, the students were engrossed in taking photographs of the last moments of the unforgettable trip even as locals warned them by whistling and indicating them to rush out. They remained oblivious to the threat building up about 3 km upstream at the Larji barrage as the water had begun to build up to dangerous levels. They did not pay heed to the warning by Puran Chand, a roadside tea stall owner, and his wife Puni Devi about the risk in going into the river. Mindless of the fact that the water level in the Beas had begun to rise, the students were engrossed in taking photographs of the last moments of the unforgettable trip even as locals warned them by whistling and indicating them to rush out. They remained oblivious to the threat building up about 3 km upstream at the Larji barrage as the water had begun to build up to dangerous levels.
Larji powerhouse blunder What Raghu and his classmates did not know that just 3 km upstream from where the students were frolicking, a serious situation had begun to develop at the 126 MW Larji powerhouse. It was at about 5.45 pm that Harbans Lal, the fitter on duty at the barrage control room, received a call from Ved Prakash, shift engineer, to keep a watch on the water level as generation was to be reduced as there was a drop in the demand for power. By 6 pm, generation was reduced to 96 MW and then to 64 MW within the next 15 minutes. By 6.45 pm, generation was down to a mere 32 MW.
The volume of water released from the Larji barrage daily depends on the pace of snow melting which is heavier on a warm sunny day and lean on a relatively cold day. The report clearly points that the level rose because generation had been reduced at Larji and Parbati-III project of the National Hydro Power Corporation (located upstream) had started generation without any intimation to the authorities at Larji, as there is no such system of sharing information in place for power projects located upstream. The Larji barrage has a total of five radial gates for the release of water. Normally, the side gates No. 1 and 5 are opened first as the flow of water is slower from here than the ones in the centre. Compared to a dam, it is not possible to impound water in a barrage for a very long period. The Larji barrage has a maximum capacity of 343 hectometres, but on an average about 236 hectometres water is stored there. It takes four to five minutes for the water to reach the site of the mishap and if the volume of water released is more, the time could be even less. According to a statement record in the inquiry report by the Divisional Commissioner, Mandi, at 6 pm, Harbans informed the shift engineer that the reservoir level had touched 969.02 m — just half-metre short of the danger level. According to Harbans, who was alone on duty as Des Raj (the other fitter) was on leave, he did not require formal permission to raise the radial gates to release excess water building up in the dam. So at 6.15 pm, he raised gate No. 5 by half metre and claims to have blared the warning hooter to alert those living downstream. Meanwhile water continued to build up at the barrage at an alarming rate as the power station upstream had further backed down its generation. So much so, that impounded water from the barrage started overflowing onto the Aut-Larji road and even began touching the bridge on the Beas near Aut. Vinod Singh, president, Beopar Mandal Aut, in his statement said people who had gone out for a walk at 6.45 pm on the Aut-Larji road were frightened by the rise in the water level. Water had even entered the house near the temple. This was around the time the students were having fun in the river. Fearing danger to the dam construction, Harbans opened the gates again at 6.45 pm to allow 150 cumecs of water to be discharged. This was the time when the students below began to notice a rise in the water level and got apprehensive. Within minutes — before the students perched atop big boulders could rush to the safety of the bank — the river had swollen and become fierce. It was too late by then as nobody, including their classmates and teachers, could do anything to save them. One of them tried to jump across from the boulder nearest to the river bank but was swept away within seconds, says Mathura Devi, who, along with other villagers who were in her house for a wedding ceremony, watched helplessly. Within two-three minutes, the remaining students who tried to form a chain by holding hands were washed away as their friends looked on helplessly and cried for help. Some of them even ran along the bank as the students were being swept away but within moments, they even lost sight of them. Some of them unsuccessfully tried to swim against the strong current of the raging river. By then, then the river had turned ferocious and swallowed the students as the alarm was raised and the police alerted. Some locals even tried calling up the control room at the Larji powerhouse to stop the release of water which was continuously on the rise, but in vain. For Harbans, the fitter at Larji Dam, was facing a further crisis as the level of the dam had reached dangerous levels. At 7 pm, he released a voluminous 450 cumecs that sent water rushing down with a monstrous roar. The second wave of water wiped out any hope of rescuing any surviving student who had been washed away and was struggling to reach the banks. It was only at 7.15 pm when Harbans got a call from an unknown person saying that some children had been washed away at Thalot that he lowered the gates and kept them at 50 cm. But on receiving a call from a contractor, Inder Singh, at 7.30 pm that water was entering his house on the banks of the barrage in Aut Bazaar that Harbans again checked the reservoir level, which was 970 m. According to him, since the highest reservoir level of 969.50 m had been crossed, he again opened the gates to stabilise the level. Meanwhile, people from Thalot, Aut and adjoining villages rushed to the spot of the accident and traffic on the busy highway came to a halt. What followed was utter mayhem as the district administration and police from Kullu and Mandi tried to reach the spot, 37 km from Mandi. Officials managed to convince the agitating locals to open the highway and join in the rescue operations. The angst of the people was evident as they alleged that no procedure, time or proper warning is ever issued by the Larji authorities and they live in constant fear. A hurried head count by the faculty accompanying the students indicated that 24 out of a total of 48 were missing along with a travel guide. The terrified students were quickly shifted to the nearby Hanogi Mata Temple complex as search for those washed away began. The cause of the rise in the water, as stated in the inquiry report, showed that on June 8, the State Load Distribution Centre (SLDC) had ordered the backing down of power generation by both Larji Project and the Bhawa Hydro-electric project due to load-shedding. On that day, repeated instructions from SLDC engineers overseeing power distribution reduced the load from these two power plants from 138 MW to 96 MW to 64 MW and finally to 32 MW. The log showed that even before the tragedy, water was being released at a gradual pace — 1 am, 230 cumecs were released; 2 am, 220 cumecs; 3 am, 200 cumecs; 4 am, 200 cumecs; 5 am, 180 cumecs; 6 am, 180 cumecs; 7 am, 90 cumecs; 8 am, 90 cumecs; 9 am, 90 cumecs; 10 am, 160 cumecs; 11 am, 180 cumecs; 12 noon, 100 cumecs; 1 pm, 130 cumecs; 2 pm, 130 cumecs; 3 pm, 100 cumecs; 4 pm, 50 cumecs; 5 pm, 30 cumecs and 6.15 pm half an hour before the students went down to the river 50 cumecs was released. Absence of SOP Yet as the inquiry report would later reveal there was a clear lack of standard operating procedure (SOP) for handling such discharges that led to the abnormal rise in the Beas river. For even though there was a steady discharge of water as claimed by officials throughout the day, by 6.30 pm — just before the students started playing in the riverbed — there was panic building up at the Larji control room from where the discharge of water is controlled. In the inquiry report, the project authorities stated that the fitter on duty takes independent and spontaneous decision about the release of water after monitoring the water level. The inquiry report also mentions that the water level rose because while generation had been reduced at Larji, the Parbati-III project located upstream had started generation. The daily log sheets maintained at the Larji barrage indicate that water as usual was discharged from the barrage since 1 am on June 8 and through the day at a steady pace till the sudden rise in water level triggered panic and unannounced release of water caused abrupt rise in the Beas. Harbans confirmed that between 6.15 pm and 6.45 pm, a total of 250 cumecs of water was suddenly released to keep the water below the full reservoir level of 969.50 m. He also states that at 7 pm, another 450 cumecs was released. This was around the time the students were playing in the river. The inquiry report pointed out that question arises if water had been released at a gradual pace from 1 am from the night of June 8 — ranging from as low as 20 cumecs to a maximum of 220 cumecs — why was the rise in level not conveyed in time so that there could have been steady and not sudden release of 700 cumecs between 6.15 and 7 pm? This was the time when the 24 students and the tour guide were swept by the gushing waters that had risen by almost 7 feet. Had there been timely intimation about load reduction, the release of water could have been started much earlier and not suddenly. The inquiry report further adds that, “It appears that the official on duty at the barrage control room failed to assess the accumulation of water and its quantity otherwise within 15 minutes there was no need to discharge 300 cumecs additional water. It is also not an ordinary phenomenon that the reservoir water started touching the bridge on the Beas at Aut and water entered the houses of people living near the barrage. This points towards the carelessness of the authorities of the Arbitration and Maintenance Division to take stock of the situation which resulted in the accumulation of water above the desired level.” The probe report concludes that had they (the officials) acted in consonance with the messages received from the powerhouse in time, they would not have been forced to discharge water to the extent of hundreds of cumecs within an hour i.e. between 6 pm and 7 pm and precious lives could have been saved. Rescue, search operation Even the rescue operations were shoddy. The Aut police station, which was the nearest, was intimated about the mishap at 7.05 pm and the SHO along with others left for the spot. The 108 emergency ambulance service received a call at 7.18 pm and it was only at 8.20 pm that the first ambulance could arrive. The Deputy Commissioner, Mandi, got the first information about the tragic mishap at 7.30 pm, but he did not think it necessary to visit the spot. He directed the District Revenue Officer, who was holding the charge of SDM, to go to the spot. The Deputy Commissioner later asked the Additional District Magistrate (Mandi) to fill in and visit the spot. The ADM, along with other officials, personally monitored the rescue operation and coordinated with the police, home guard, fire department, transport and the SSB to start the search without any further delay. As stated in the inquiry report, which has been submitted to the High Court by the probe officer, there was little hope of any of the students surviving for over 10 minutes. The postmortem report of some of the bodies recovered has confirmed that the cause of death was cardio respiratory arrest, asphyxia due to drowning and multiple injuries. Even though there was little hope of saving the students, the severity of the tragedy could not move the Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent Police, Mandi, to reach the spot. They presented themselves only the next day when the Chief Minister, Virbhadra Singh, arrived to take stock of the situation. Role of load dispatch centres The inquiry report has also come down heavily on the questionable role of the Northern Region Load Dispatch Centre (NRLDC) and the SLDC and even urged the High Court to direct the two agencies to evolve and submit a mechanism addressing the problem. It was the verbal directive from the State Load Dispatch Centre (SLDC) of the Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board (HPSEB) to shed load by scaling down generation that led to the release of water from the barrage. Interestingly, the SLDC only directed government-owned hydro-power projects like Larji, Bhava and Giri to reduce generation on that day, leaving out private power producers in the state. “It is regrettable that reduction of power generation was ordered to a power project (Larji) which is ‘run of the river’ when Baspa hydro-power project, owned by JP Ltd was running full throttle and generated between 300 to 330 MW throughout the day on June 8,” the report states. It said load shedding should have been ordered from projects like Dehar, Bhakra Dam, and Shahpur-Kandi which can store water for weeks together. The inquiry report has said Larji is a run of the river project and every drop of water is of national importance so load shedding directives should have been issued to projects having larger storage capacity. Violation of norms The mishap has exposed the apathy of the state government in sparing a thought for the creation of an authority on hydro power safety, quality control and management of water flow and discharge, laid down in its own State Hydro Power Policy (Chapter 5, on generation). It speaks of a mandatory periodic hydro project safety audit, risk assessment and dam owners’ accountability, including corporate man slaughter on the lines of the International Commission of Large Dams (ICOLD). Even the Central Water Commission (CWC) guidelines in this regard were ignored. It is now after the mishap that the Himachal Pradesh Directorate of Energy has written to 45 power projects to comply with the CWC dam safety guidelines. They have been directed to file a compliance report with a copy of disaster management plans, operation and maintenance procedures and also point out any shortcomings or suggestions. It is because of these of all lapses that the High Court, which took sou motu notice, has now made the SLDC and NRLDC respondents in the case. Eyewitness account ‘No hooters were heard’ We did not hear any hooters on that day. We have not heard one in the last several months as the hooters have been non-functional. If the hooters were functioning, the villagers would have dragged the students out even if it had to be done forcefully. Had there been prominent warning boards, both in English and Hindi, probably the students would have been alive as they did not understand warning signals by villagers in Hindi and Pahari. ‘Tried to alert them’ I was doing videography of a wedding in a house nearby. Those at the wedding place (about 300 m from the riverside where the students were) tried to alert the students by shouting and whistling, but because of the distance and language problem, they paid no heed. I captured the tragedy in a four-and-a-half minute
video. ‘Life will never be the same’ None of us present there had the faintest idea that the water level in the river could rise due to water release from the dam. We did not hear any hooters and there were no warning notice boards. By the time we realised that the water was rising, it was too late for my friends who were taking pictures atop boulders in the river. I am appalled at the callousness of the project authorities in releasing such huge volumes of water without prior warning signals, endangering lives. Each one of them must be made liable for their action which has left 24 families totally devastated, so that no parent has to go through this painful ordeal of losing a child. We had left home on June 3 on a 10-day trip, not knowing that when the college reopens on July 7, half of us will be gone forever. Life will never be the same after this terrifying incident. Those horrid moments will haunt me
forever. The lapses Hooters, sirens not used Though the fitter Harbans Lal has claimed that he sounded the hooter each time water was released by him, the statements of the eyewitnesses taken by the inquiry officer contradict these claims. The eyewitnesses include tea stall owner Puran Chand and his wife Puni Devi (Thalot), Manoj, Jagdish, Manglu Ram and Mahesh (staffers at the 33 KV substation at Thalot), and presidents of the Aut and Thalot Beopar Mandals. Unreliable warning system The inquiry report points towards the presence of inadequate warning system having three hooters, which are sounded one after the other. These are located at the reservoir control room, connecting tunnel and residential colony. The visiting team found that the sound of the hooters was too feeble, and in case of power failure, hooters No. 2 and 3 cannot even be blown. Missing warning boards Of the 12 warning notice boards about the threat of water from the project, only four remain. The project authorities never bothered to replace the missing eight so that tourists could be alerted before they step into the river. Illegal mining The spot where the mishap took place does not have a trail, but a proper road leading to the river bank, which has been created by the mining mafia indulging in the lifting of sand and gravel from the riverbed. Trucks ply on this road which made it possible for the students to venture to the bank. No water release procedure The report says there is no procedure for the release of water. Work of utmost importance like the discharge of water from the reservoir cannot be entrusted only to a fitter, who are generally not much educated. It has been stressed that a foolproof arrangement to regulate the water discharge must be devised in all projects across the state so that there is coherence among various projects. Load centres The role of the SLDC and NRLDC of the HPSEB has come under scanner for directing only the government-owned power projects to scale down generation to save the grid from collapse as there was no demand for energy.
What probe report suggests
The probe report emphasises that an SOP must be put in place for all hydro-power projects in the state and a clear-cut hierarchy must be defined in situations like the one that took place at Larji on June 8.
many probes into mishap
 |
|
| HOME PAGE | |
Punjab | Haryana | Jammu & Kashmir |
Himachal Pradesh | Regional Briefs |
Nation | Opinions | | Business | Sports | World | Letters | Chandigarh | Ludhiana | Delhi | | Calendar | Weather | Archive | Subscribe | Suggestion | E-mail | |
“It was a little after 6.30 pm as I stood on the bank clicking pictures of my classmates having fun standing on the boulders when suddenly the water level started rising at an alarming pace. Within seconds, it became so frightening that nobody knew what to. Our friends were shrieking for help and we helplessly watched them being swept away one by way,” says Raghu Vamsha, who was part of the trip, while recalling those frightful moments. 
