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Missing wood for trees
Focus on the larger picture in Kashmir
by Lt Gen (retd) Syed Ata Hasnain
The
Indian public and the media have taken an unusually intense interest in the incidents along the LoC in Kashmir. Much of this interest seems to arise from emotions and salability rather than informed knowledge of the ground situation. There is a certain romantic aura linked to the LoC - the known unknown about which everyone likes to comment. After all, on the LoC there is blood and gore, shelling and shooting and everything macho, something missing in everyday mundane life in our cities except on roads and in films. Media commentaries rarely analyse the linkage of these incidents with the internal dynamics of Kashmir. The Indian Army tries to be neutral by refusing to comment or join issue with the media and is reluctant to be transparent on its actions at the LoC or within Kashmir, and there are reasons for it which can be well appreciated. Let us recall the facts. Kashmir's strategic environment arises from proxy support to terrorism by Pakistan's inter-related entities -- the Pakistan Army, separatists, the ISI (as distinct from the Army) and terrorists. The aims of India and of Pakistan collide at the LoC. For Pakistan the aim is to wrest Kashmir from India through the continuation of turbulence in any form, keeping the people enthused and motivated for separatism, not necessarily pro-Pakistan, as also for drawing the attention of the international community. For India it is thus far an unstated aim: integrating Kashmir with the rest of India, politically, socially, economically and psychologically. To ensure the achievement of our aim and the defeat of Pakistan's aim, there are four distinct areas of concern. First, it is the LoC, which must remain stable without leaking any infiltration so that terrorist numbers in the hinterland remain within a given threshold. Secondly, the resident terrorists have to be marginalised to allow the writ of the state and the people to run. Thirdly, the ideologues and the radicals have to be neutralised to prevent them from spreading their wares and creating triggers to keep separatism alive while placing the security forces on the back foot. Lastly, and most importantly, it is the people of Kashmir who need to be empowered with enhanced dignity to start taking pride in being Indians. Noticeably, only the first of the above factors alludes to the LoC which has excited the Indian public and the media so much. The rest is all about the internal battle, not necessarily in the physical domain but more in the attitudinal and psychological. It is this which will contribute to the final victory but it is all in the realm of the unromantic where battles of the hearts and the minds have to be fought. This excites very few and in fact only those who realise that the war is almost over; it is the peace which has to be won, a task always more difficult than the war itself. For Pakistan it is necessary to upset the apple cart of Indian success if Kashmir has to be relevant in the international domain. It would be a commentary on their maturity if the Indian media and the public are more excited by the prospects of the final victory, debate the efforts which need to be put in, assist in building public opinion to back the security forces and political initiatives and counter Pakistan's well-nuanced propaganda. The Army is well in control of the LoC, notwithstanding some negative incidents which it knows how to convert to the positive. It needs no nitpicking and no non-professional advice being the only entity which truly knows what the LoC is all about. It needs the entire intellectual and physical backing in the internal domain where it continues to perform the difficult task of integration. The experiment of 2011-12 was a fresh approach towards the people of Kashmir, a changed force ethos, high-profile social initiatives and integration between the security forces across task boundaries which all added up to the success story; this needs revival. It cannot happen if the professional and nationalistic intentions of the Army are viewed with suspicion and its assistance to the state government in the social field is considered as politicisation. The unfortunate and completely untrue allegations against the political set-up of Kashmir are only assisting in widening the cleavage among all stakeholders. Pakistan is hastening this by taking away the attention from the peace-building efforts in the hinterland by refocusing us all towards the LoC. Surely, the Indian state has the ability to see through this and ensure that it is not ensnared; and the Indian media and the public have the maturity to view the larger picture where they appear to be missing the woods for the trees. The Army once again needs to get into the saddle and provide the much-needed direction to support the state leadership. Very little has been lost. Any further hesitation of getting right back there is likely to result in losing the initiative and thus the battle. What must this involve? Although this needs a separate and detailed answer, the initiation is done here. First, a completely new and baggage-free examination of the tasks of each stakeholder needs to be initiated. Secondly, a renewed and continuous vigour on the part of New Delhi in coordination with Srinagar is necessary. Thirdly, freedom for the Army on the LoC, and more importantly, to take on the stabilisation of the hinterland; this must be accompanied by a campaign to restore the pride and dignity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and an addressing of the youth to de-radicalise them. The de-radicalisation model adopted by Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, recently discussed at a seminar in Singapore, needs a serious look. "Sadbhavana", the Army's hearts and minds programme, needs to be given its primacy without attaching labels after the recent controversy of its funding. For 15 years it has been the Army's flagship for outreach and has achieved much. However, to move to the next level of achievement "Sadbhavana" has to be taken well beyond with attitudinal change and emotional outreach. A repeat of the success of 2011 is necessary to show the way and cement the final
integration. The writer is a former Corps Commander of the Srinagar-based 15(Chinar) Corps
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OPED
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India needs a progressive strategic culture
As India continues to modernise its armed forces, it needs to build its own capabilities in cutting edge military technologies since it remains heavily import dependent. It needs to give attention to shaping its strategic thinking.
Dinesh Kumar
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Tribune photo: Mukesh Aggarwal
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For
over a decade now, India has been engaged in a major defence modernisation programme. India has inducted new capabilities that have considerably enhanced the military’s reach, endurance and firepower. For example, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has acquired Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), which is a powerful eye high in the sky that has given the dual capability of detecting and identifying enemy aircraft well in advance and at the same time coordinating strike missions. The IAF has inducted mid-air refuelling aircraft which has enabled fighter aircraft to travel longer distances than ever before. In a few years from now, the Navy hopes to take possession of the first ever indigenously built nuclear powered submarine (INS Arihant), a formidable stealth weapon system that can remain undetected underwater for weeks on end and strike the enemy with conventional or nuclear missiles. In less than ten days, India will be taking delivery of a 44,500 tonne aircraft carrier from Russia (Admiral Gorshkov rechristened INS Vikramaditya) which will be equipped with the newly inducted naval variant of the MiG-29 fighter, also imported from Russia. India has signed contracts for purchase of advance conventional submarines (Scorpene) from France; is in the process of negotiating purchase of multi-role combat aircraft (Rafale) also from France; has inducted both maritime reconnaissance-cum-strike aircraft (P-8I) and heavy lift transport aircraft (C-17 and C 130J Hercules) from the US; Unmanned Aerial Aircraft or UAVs in addition to numerous surveillance equipment, sensors and electronic warfare systems from Israel; more long range Sukhoi-30 MKI multi-role aircraft from Russia, T-90 main battle tanks, an Akula class nuclear powered submarine on lease, joint production of land, air and sea version of the BrahMos cruise missile along with an agreement to jointly produce a fifth generation strike aircraft among other defence ventures with that country. The above is a listing of just a few deals and agreements. For, the list of weapons and weapon systems either inducted or still in the pipeline is long and enormous and is valued at between a staggering $50 billion and $100 billion. For some years now, India has been figuring among the world’s topmost arms importers, a trend that is likely to continue for some years yet considering that India’s military modernisation has been sorely lagging owing to a range of reasons starting with the resource crunch and disintegration of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s which was both preceded by and followed by procedural irregularities and allegations of bribes related to defence procurement. On every Republic Day India showcases its armed forces, the world’s fourth largest, with some of its newly acquired arms with much fanfare to the delight and awe of the public thus giving the impression that India is a powerful military nation. Such an assumption necessitates two questions: (a) to what extent has India developed its military capability and, more importantly, (b) does India have the will and strategic thinking needed to go with its military power in the making? As for capability, the stark reality is that India is almost entirely an import-dependent military power which after over six decades of Independence does not have a significant armament industry of its own. This, as the Ministry of Defence (MoD) admits, ‘can land the country and the armed forces in deep trouble in crucial times’. India has eight state-owned defence public sector units, 39 ordnance factories and a gigantic defence research and development organisation (DRDO) with 50 government owned research and development laborataries all of which combine to make tall claims. Their claims comprise making fighter aircraft, T-72 and T-90 tanks; helicopters, a light combat aircraft or LCA named Tejas with plans to make its naval variant; an advance light helicopter (ALH), a main battle tank named Arjun; and small arms known as the Indian Small Arms Systems (INSAS)……the list is just as endless as it is supposedly impressive. Most regrettably, India does not make aircraft; it only assembles or, at best, license produce them. The LCA, conceived 30 years ago in 1983, has an engine and flight control system from the US and even then is still some years from induction. The ALH has been inducted but with a foreign made engine. The Arjun tank, conceived 39 years ago in 1974, is largely confined to being paraded down Rajpath in New Delhi every Republic Day with only a few dozen forming part of the Army’s armoured fleet. India is unable to make an engine for a tank let alone a helicopter and a fighter aircraft, which undoubtedly is a difficult technology available only to a few countries. The INSAS automatic rifle has been handed over to central police organisations such as the CRPF and the BSF after the Army, which has inducted a limited number, has largely found them to be unsuitable and been forced to turn to foreign vendors for rifles. India’s success, however, lies in building warships (but with imported electronic warfare and weapon systems) and missiles. But the missile systems that have been inducted can only cover a little beyond Pakistan and, is as yet, nowhere near targeting the Chinese military-industrial complex or key cities such as Beijing and Shanghai located at some 5,000 km distance. While also being a major importer of weapons, China is also a major exporter of armaments. India, in contrast, has virtually nothing to export. There are several fundamental flaws in India’s indigenous capability which range from the structural to the functional. But one severe deficiency, as the MoD admits, is the country’s lack in capability in ‘strategic technologies’. For some years now, there has been some debate on whether or not India has a strategic culture and strategic thinking, and, if so, what is that strategic culture and thinking. The question has relevance since it gives both an insight into a country’s will and intentions, which in turn is important given India’s geographical size and location, geopolitical ambitions, military strength and the increasing interest India’s defence imports and modernisation has generated in the country’s neighbourhood and beyond. Many commentators, mostly Indian, tend to be dismissive of India’s strategic culture arguing that it does not have one while some cite Kautaliya’s Arthashastra as the holy bible of Indian strategic thought. India does have a strategic culture, which, however, is still evolving considering that India as a modern and post-Westphalian nation-state in its current form is only 66 years old after having been under colonial rule for almost two centuries with a long history of being an advanced civilisation with a complex society structure. What is of import is the pace and quality of our learning curve; the direction that this strategic thinking is taking – whether traditional or pragmatic; and the factors, both internal and external, that are determining this strategic culture Not surprisingly, much of the country’s strategic culture, defined broadly by as ‘a set of shared beliefs, assumptions and modes of behaviour derived from common experiences and accepted narratives that shape collective identity and relationships and which go on to determine the ends and means for achieving security objectives’, has been steeped in history and pre-conceived notions. Two examples should suffice. One, as George Tanham states in a landmark article published in 1992, Indians have a nonlinear view of time with no past and no future wherein life is a series of cycles in a continuous present. This in modern times is exemplified by the DRDO which is plagued by time and cost overruns that keep getting overlooked. Two, we believe that we have a rightful place as a geopolitical power based on the firmly held belief that India’s status is considered by us as a given just as it is in a caste based society. India’s post-Independence history has shown an interesting contradiction: that it can be just as bold and brash as it can be passive, slow, reactive and hesitant. Soon after Independence, New Delhi sent the Army to Jammu and Kashmir to fight Pakistani invaders and did force posturing against the Nawab of Junagadh and a ‘Police Action’ against the Nizam of Hyderabad and his forces to get them to accede to India. In 1961, the armed forces were sent to fight Portuguese colonial forces to wrest control of Goa. In 1971, India dismembered Pakistan by assisting in converting East Pakistan into an independent and sovereign Bangladesh. In 1984, Indira Gandhi sent the Army to wrest control of the Saltoro Ridge ahead of the Siachen glacier and then two months later sent the Army into the Golden Temple to flush out Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his armed militia. In 1987, Rajiv Gandhi sent the Army to Sri Lanka for two-and-a-half years from 1987 to 1989 to fight the LTTE after first having trained them. And finally in 1998, India conducted nuclear tests and declared itself to be a nuclear weapon state. But then India, with hindsight, has made some major strategic errors – approached the United Nations in 1947-48 following Pakistani sponsored invasion of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed to stop the war mid-way without wresting complete control of the state; returned the Haji Pir Pass (since 1990 a major infiltration route by terrorists into J&K) as part of the January 1966 Tashkent Agreement even though that Pass had been taken by the Indian Army prior to the start of the war with Pakistan in September 1965; failed to settle the Kashmir problem with Pakistan during negotiations leading up to the signing of the Simla Agreement after having earlier accorded Pakistan a stunning defeat during the 1971 Bangladesh war; expended precious lives of Army soldiers while sullying the nation and the Army’s image by sending in the latter to fight the LTTE after having first supported them; buckled to secessionists in the Kashmir Valley by releasing terrorists in December 1989; and by continuing to follow a policy of a thousand bandages in response to Pakistan using terror and proxy war as a means of ‘continuing policy by other means’. These are but a few examples. India’s feudal and dynasty politics, the lack of inner party democracy in almost all political parties, a frightfully fractured polity and vote bank politics along sectarian lines such as caste, religion, class and ethnicity, the lack of the proverbial Clausewitzian overlap between the government and the military, the supremacy of a generalist bureaucracy in almost all spheres of government functioning, the lack of knowledge and interest in defence strategy among the political executive, inter-service rivalry, turf wars, and more will continue to come in the way of India attaining great power status. These negative factors are more likely to shape and influence India’s strategic thinking and strategic culture in the years ahead. Will India become a tiger to be taken seriously or will it remain a lumbering elephant that cannot quite get its act together is a question for the present and future generation of leaders and thinkers to ponder over and decide.
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