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Telangana
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Politics
over e-trip Litter-happy
Indians
Change-of-heart
in Pak?
Love
over logic
Why the
IPKF went to Sri Lanka
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Politics over e-trip
It
is rare that the Shiromani Akali Dal-BJP government in Punjab takes a tough decision. But whenever it does, forced usually by financial constraints, it often ends up bowing to pressure from those affected. The Akali Dal has its vote bank among farmers and it nurtures them with sops like free electricity and opposes any move that may hurt their interests as it did in the case of wealth tax on agricultural land falling in the urban areas. The BJP, on the other hand, has its vote bank among traders and businessmen, and it fights tooth and nail any move to tax them. This time it has come to the rescue of tax evaders. The BJP first agreed to the implementation of an online system under which traders are supposed to inform the Excise Department about the sale above Rs 50,000 of any of the six items - mustard, cotton, yarn, vegetable oils, plywood, iron and steel - within the state. This system called "e-trip" (electronically transporting information within Punjab) was widely welcomed in the hope that it would check tax evasion of about Rs 300 crore. However, when traders protested, the BJP took a U-turn. Deputy Chief Minister Sukhbir Singh Badal, who handles the Excise Department, has softened his stand to placate the coalition partner, which brazenly cites the coming elections as a reason for patronising tax evasion. Ideally, the political leadership should downsize the government and cut unproductive expenditure so that the burden of taxes on people is lessened and limited resources can be spared for education, health and infrastructure. But Punjab’s extravagant ruling politicians do not believe in simple living or their own Narendra Modi’s policy of “minimum government, maximum governance”. To finance their lavish lifestyle and a large, top-heavy administration, they have piled up a huge debt, which has touched Rs 1 lakh crore in the current year. Not to be left behind, a desperate Congress too has come to the support of tax evaders.
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Litter-happy Indians
Litterbugs
in Panchkula should be ready to face the music as the municipal corporation is all set to fine those littering and discharging water on the roads. Indeed, in a country where garbage dumps are as ubiquitous as ugly, any punitive step that could deter the “litter-happy” Indians seems appreciable. While employing fines as a measure to deter offenders is an acceptable practice the world over, in India the big question always is how and whether it would be implemented in earnest. In Surat, which saw the epidemic plague, offenders are penalised for littering and the city has largely cleaned up its act. If the consequences were not so serious, the pan-Indian habit of littering and spitting would almost be laughable. However, as things stand, our disdain towards public spaces, evident in ungainly sights of garbage spread across the country, has serious health ramifications and often is the cause behind outbreak of diseases. In fact, it's not just our by-lanes and roads that cut a dirty picture. Even our historic sites, tourist places and pilgrimage
centres are littered with trash. Sadly, even though more Indians have access to mobile phones than toilets, sanitation and hygiene seem to be the least of our concerns. The so-called upper echelons of society are as guilty of polluting the environment as the slum-dwellers and urban squatters. Besides while it's all very well for the civic bodies to devise new ways to tackle the problem, it's about time they also took their role of clearing off garbage seriously in which both technology and mobility can play a crucial role. As for the citizen Indians, fine or no fine, we need to wake up and realise that keeping our neighbourhood, cities and country (not necessarily in that order) clean is a societal responsibility that we must honour. The right to a clean environment comes with an automatic obligation of making it possible.
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Love is the silent saying and saying of a single name. — Mignon McLaughlin
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Change-of-heart in Pak? Overoptimistic
assessments about a “change-of-heart” in the political elite in Islamabad and in Pakistan's de facto rulers, its khaki uniformed military, reinforced by self-serving “they-are-now-good-boys” certificates from the Americans and the British have often led to erroneous assessments by the Indian establishment of Pakistan's political imperatives and policies. The present narrative emerging from New Delhi's starry-eyed Wagah “candle-light brigade” is that with Nawaz Sharif, a Punjabi with a strong political base in the Army-dominated Punjab province, now Pakistan’s Prime Minister, we are assured of terrorism-free ties and blossoming bonhomie and friendship. It is true that Sharif is keen that nothing should come in the way of his efforts to set the Pakistani economy in order, or set right the power crisis in his country. Tensions with India will be an avoidable distraction for him and should, in his political perspective, presently be avoided. A good beginning has been made to normalise ties with Pakistan after the recent elections there. The Prime Minister's special envoy Satinder Lambah, who is a hard-headed realist on relations with Pakistan, met Mr. Sharif in Lahore, even before Sharif assumed office. Nawabzada Shahryar Khan, a suave and sophisticated Pakistani diplomat was, in turn, sent to New Delhi. It has been agreed that that “back-channel” talks will be resumed between the designated special envoys. The back-channel talks, which earlier took place between Mr. Lambah and his then counterpart Tariq Aziz, did make substantial progress in devising a framework to deal with the Kashmir issue by arriving at common ground between General Musharraf's proposals for “self-governance” and Dr. Manmohan Singh's assertion in Amritsar that borders cannot be redrawn, but we can work towards making them “just lines on a map”. The “back-channel” talks between 2005 and 2007 took place after General Musharraf assured Mr. Vajpayee in January 2004 that “territory under Pakistan’s control will not be used for terrorism against India”. This was preceded by an agreement for a ceasefire across the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir — an agreement that has broadly been observed by both sides, with violations occasionally occurring, when Jihadis are sought to be infiltrated across the LoC. Moreover, General Musharraf did, for various reasons, rein in his Jihadi groups till his power progressively eroded in 2007. While he did keep his Corps Commanders informed about the back-channel talks, I was not surprised when two of his favourites, whom he made 4-Star Generals, subsequently insisted to me that they were unaware of what had transpired. The Pakistan army is quick to disown whatever it finds inconvenient. We should have no doubt that the Sharif government will not agree to start “back-channel” discussions where they concluded in 2007. We can, at best, expect some progress on Kashmir-related CBMs. Disowning past agreements is a trademark of Pakistani foreign policy. General Zia was determined to disown the Simla Agreement and Benazir junked the Ministerial Joint Commission set up by Zia. Pakistan is going to be primarily focused on developments on its western borders across the Durand Line. While lip-service is paid to non-interference and respect for Afghanistan's sovereignty, Pakistan appears determined to ensure that even as the American withdrawal proceeds, the Taliban takes control progressively of parts of South-Eastern Afghanistan, while keeping the entire Pashtun belt under its pressure. In their desperation to cut their losses and exit from Afghanistan, the Americans appear quite reconciled to this happening. I was interested in taking note recently of sneering references by some Pakistani friends asking how India would ensure the safety of its nationals spread across Afghanistan, once the Americans left. More importantly, whether it is on issues of dealing with terrorist groups like the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan, the Quetta and Peshawar Shura of Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, or the Lashkar-e-Taiba, the real driving force will remain the Pakistan army. The constant refrain of Pakistani interlocutors now is that India “should forget the past,” and “put Mumbai behind” and move on with “business as usual”. In effect, the message is that we should forget any possibility of Pakistan bringing the perpetrators of 26/11 to book. We should never forget that apart from being the most trusted asset of the ISI in waging Jihad against India, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed has enjoyed the patronage of two generations of the Sharif family and even today receives funding from the Punjab Government headed by Shahbaz Sharif. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is slated to meet Mr. Sharif in New York in September. It is imperative that he makes it clear to his counterpart that India will not "forgive or forget"" what transpired during the 26/11 attack and that terrorism cannot go hand in hand with dialogue and normalisation. There is much that India and Pakistan can do to move the process of normalisation forward. The ministerial-level Joint Commission set up in 1983 can be revived and reinvigorated. There could be greater energy cooperation involving the supply of electrical power and finished petroleum products across the Punjab border. Group tourism and pilgrimage, easing of visa restrictions and more extensive contacts between academics, youth and wide cross-sections of civil society need to be promoted. While welcoming improved trade relations, overzealous sections of India’s business community should avoid giving the impression that the grant of obligatory MFN treatment to our exports is of vital importance to us. The Pakistan military seems to have some “bright ideas” to scare the Western world and India by threats of using tactical nuclear weapons against India, if India retaliates following another 26/11 style terrorist attack. I responded to such threats recently telling Pakistani military officials that we were not impressed by such bluster, adding that while the Pak army was “adventurist,” its officers lived too comfortably to be “suicidal” ! The Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board, Shyam Saran, has addressed this quite bluntly, while explaining the tenets of India's nuclear doctrine. A wide-ranging defence dialogue with Pakistan, including more regular contacts between the armies, navies and air forces, will be useful. There appears little prospect of any movement on issues like the demarcation of the land boundary around Sir Creek and beyond, or on the the Siachen issue. One will have to live with the status quo on such issues, while ensuring the existing CBMs are respected. It would be imprudent to rush into summit-level bilateral visits till there are clear indications that our concerns on terrorism are being irreversibly addressed. The Lahore Summit was followed by the Kargil conflict and the ill-planned Agra Summit by the attack on our
Parliament.
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Love over logic It
was mostly like this while growing up that parents would set a goal for you enveloped in some easily gullible incentive. Like the time when all the boys in the family had learned to drive the car when they were still breaking acne, and I too wanted my share of fun. But as the only girl in the family after four generations I probably had to prove my reasons. So I left the proposal with my father at age 12, reasoning that I too, if taught by him alone, would turn out be the ablest driver in the family. With love swept over by logic, my dad agreed, saying if only I'd be up by 4:30 throughout the summer holidays would the deal be struck. So it was, every (early) morning I took my driving lessons at the abandoned-looking university campus, taking special turns at the Law Department. One morning he asked me, would you like to be a lawyer one day? I thought I’d be damned, but replied in the negative. No specific reason though, I just didn't want to be a part of a profession which at age 12 I thought took my dad away from me for hours. Six years hence though, the tables were to turn. Dad passed away suddenly, leaving me to decide what I was to do. My mentor, guide and everything else worthwhile had left me to think over what was to be done now. One evening back from college, I remembered one of our conversations at the university, and decided Law was the answer. Many years later backed with a Masters from London (he wanted me to), I came back to Chandigarh and “joined” the profession. On the first day at our “temples of justice”, I roamed about the corridors, sat in various courts, thinking all the time of what he used to tell me about their working on our daily (morning) lessons. Wondering if he’d walked through the same halls, sat on the exact place on the sofa in the courtroom, perhaps struck some conversation with the person seated right next to me. So it is now, the goal: a tribute to him, the incentive of being closer to
him.
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Why the IPKF went to Sri Lanka
On
July 29, 1987, the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was signed in Colombo. The euphoria this evoked was marred by a sailor from the Sri Lanka Armed Forces (SLAF) attempting to hit our then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, while he was inspecting a guard of honour. The agreement had three components — modalities of settling the ethnic conflict, guarantees by India in regard to implementing the Accord and an undertaking by the Sri Lanka Government in regard to India's security concerns. In consonance with Clause 2 of the accord, an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) announced its landing in Sri Lanka on July 30, 1987. Reasons for the intervention There were many reasons for an armed intervention. I will concentrate on three — strategic, humanitarian and linguistic. Taking the first reason, i.e. strategic, not only is the Indian Ocean vital for India's lifelines but most of the wherewithal needed for its economic development is concentrated in these waters. Our industrial growth, economic development and even meaningful association with the rest of the world depend upon a secure Indian Ocean. For this a friendly and stable Sri Lanka is vital. Moving on to the second aspect i.e. humanitarian, the conflict in Sir Lanka saw many ups and downs. However, till around February 1987, one constant remained - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) dominated the hinterland and the SLAF operated from the coastline where they could be supplied
from the sea. In February 1987, they moved inland, imposed an economic embargo and intensified indiscriminate air, artillery and naval bombardment, resulting in a massive exodus into India. Stories of the inhuman conditions they had faced spread like wild fire, leading to the third season for our intervention. Tamil Nadu, the state most affected, was ruled at the time by a remarkable man, M.G. Ramachandran. He was a staunch ally of the Congress, then in power in New Delhi. To illustrate the power he wielded, let us recall the incident where, from a sickbed in the
US, he issued orders for his entire cabinet to resign. Everyone did. His repeated pleas to the centre finally tilted the scales. I will add one more reason. The SLAF were fighting insurgency in the north and insurrection against the Janath? Vimukthi Peramu?a (JVP) in the south. Understandably, the officers and soldiers were tired. Add to this a high desertion rate and a reluctance to enroll and you have a very dangerous environment, with rumours of a coup being staged mounting by the day. In these circumstances was it any surprise that it was difficult to judge who between the SLAF and the LTTE was more grateful and relieved over the Indian presence. What were the tasks given to the IPKF? A little later, when rioting started and I refused to intervene as the maintenance of law and order was not my job, another task, maintenance of law and order was added and a battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force was allotted to the IPKF. The force structure of the IPKF kept fluctuating depending upon envisaged contingencies. Since the intervention was by invitation, the force level, keeping in mind the peace keeping nature of the operation, was about a division plus, with minimal air and naval components. A neutral posture was adopted. SLAF were provided all assistance in their re-grouping including security to ensure they were not engaged by the
LTTE. Concurrently, a massive rehabilitation programme was started to get the towns and villages, completely
devastated by the fighting, into habitable entities. Jaffna town was the model, brought back to its fractioning feet by the tireless efforts of Brigadier R.I.S. Kahlon (later to rise to the rank of Lieutenant General and, alas, no more). This achievement needs to be studied in greater details so that those who run our cities and towns can learn valuable lessons. This and many other steps taken to win the minds and hearts of the local population proved effective and paid the IRKF dividends in the form of information regarding the LTTE, arms caches and so on. Meanwhile, consultations on the formation of the IAC continued apace and after much "chopping and changing" an acceptable formula was knocked out and an agreement signed by the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE on September 28, 1997. Before the celebrations could commence, a message was received from the now deceased LTTE chief V. Prabhakaran in Jaffna, that the LTTE would not accept the agreement. What promoted the change of heart was a mystery as Prabhakaran had himself signed the agreement after all his objections to the original draft had been met. Was this another instance of LTTE obduracy? The LTTE’s turnaround A little earlier, whispers from the local population started coming in indicating LTTE directions to the locals to stop fraternising with the IPKF. When I confronted Prabhakaran with this respect, he denied it completely. He did, however, tell me that he heard reliable reports indicating that one of our intelligence agencies was instigating the other Tamil militant groups to stop handing over of weapons and when the LTTE was sufficiently weakened by handing over their weapons, they would be signaled to take revenge from the LTTE for all past massacres. This was, of course, news to me and all I could do was tell him that I would check with Army Headquarters. I did this and was informed the next day that there was no truth in the apprehension. When I explained this to Prabhakaran, be smiled and said that he still stood by his allegation. The truth will have to be ascertained by someone else. As far as I was concerned; this was the event that created the rift between the LTTE and the IPKF. On October 10, 1987, the LTTE turned against us and the fighting started. The writing had been on the wall and so reinforcements started pouring in. Overconfidence led the LTTE to initially fight set piece battles, but after Jaffna fell on October 20, 1987, LTTE cadres melted into the forests and fell back on tactics that had borne fruit earlier i.e. guerilla operations. For some days the messages we intercepted indicated desperation. Calls for medicine for causalities would be met by the reply, in code, "Give him cyanide." Calls for food would receive the reply that there was no food. Later, as succour arrived; the situation improved in LTTE ranks. I returned from service on
February 29, 1988 and thereafter from being in command I had to rely on media reports. These showed that despite the vicious fighting, the
IPKF continued to display professionalism and gallantry while completing all tasks entrusted to it with admirable efficiency. I will conclude with a few observations. Higher direction lacked focus and this was summed up admirably by Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw in the foreward he wrote for my book, quoting the Bible, "For if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle." To my mind there should have been no ambiguity. While the welfare of the Tamils in Sri Lanka was important, the national integrity of Sri Lanka was vital. National policy is formulated by the Centre, not by states in relation to neighbouring counties. The evolving of the LTTE from a handful of school dropouts to the
fearsome militant group that it eventually became deserves study. Except when Karuna broke away in the east, they maintained their cohesion and their motivation and discipline. In the process, to quote Dr Rajini Theranagama from his book, "The Broken Palmyra", the LTTE religion was hierarchal. Militants from other groups, whatever their contribution, were counted as criminals. Only LTTE members could make sacrifices, be counted as martyrs and become Gods. The power of such a religion to captivate men's minds, make them forget all norms of civilisation and morality and to hold them together as a hysterical and destructive force is enormous". The writer was GOC-in-C Southern Command and Overall IPKF
Commander till February, 1988.
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It is not my intention to repeat how the ethnic conflict developed as that aspect is well documented. My aim is to describe why the IPKF went to Sri Lanka and what it did there. It is my hope, further, that this narrative will correct most of the ill informed criticism of the IPKF operations.