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Overhaul
sports bodies Unrest in
Egypt again |
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Skewed
sex ratio
Whither
India-China ties?
Antithesis
of their names
Why
India should look at Vietnam more keenly
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Unrest in Egypt again
The
Egyptians who fought together against the dictatorship of Hosni Mubarak are now in two camps and ranged against each other. The cadres of the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters are on the one side and the leftists and minority groups on the other. They suspect each other’s intentions and hence the fresh crisis, threatening to disrupt Egypt’s march on the road to democracy. Demonstrations in Cairo last Friday and elsewhere in Egypt against President Mohamed Mursi’s referendum plan for getting people’s mandate for the new constitution, drafted hurriedly under his guidance, show deep distrust between the two sides. Mursi’s opponents fear that he is trying to become a new dictator in the garb of a democrat. President Mursi is attempting to control the situation like a faction leader, not as the head of state. Through a televised speech last Thursday he invited opposition leaders, including former International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei, for a national dialogue to end the crisis, but did not ask the supporters of his cadre-based organisation , the Brotherhood, to avoid protests in response to the demonstrations spearheaded by his political opponents. Both sides are accusing each other of being traitors and working at the behest of foreign forces. The truth, however, is that both sides are not observing restraint to ensure that the country does not lose the gains of the Arab Spring and slide into chaos. At the moment, President Mursi appears to be on the losing side. His claim of working to lay the foundations of a democratic political order in Egypt became meaningless when he issued a few days back a decree arrogating to himself powers which could not be challenged in a court of law. Though on Sunday he announced to modify the controversial decree, the situation is unlikely to change because of his referendum plan remaining intact. Nine top officials of his regime have resigned over the issue of constitutional referendum, to be held on December 15. His commitment to the cause of tolerance and plural society has been exposed with the resignation by Rafiq Habib, a Christian and Vice-President of Mursi’s Freedom and Justice Party, floated by the Muslim Brotherhood. Now, therefore, in the interest of peace and stability in his country, President Mursi should cancel the referendum on the constitution as a first step towards reconciliation.
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Skewed sex ratio
The
state government of J &K is trying to give more teeth to the existing PC & PNDT (Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act by making some amendments to check the dwindling sex ratio that has come down to 883 girls for 1000 boys in the state. The amendments include three years’ imprisonment and fine up to Rs 50,000 once the Act is implemented. The State Supervisory Board, constituted for the PC &PNDT Act, has also recommended medical audit of all the ultrasound clinics in the state. These are well-meaning steps but, going by the experience of states like Haryana and Punjb where the sex ratio has touched a dangerous mark, measures like medical audit and imprisonment barely helped. Reason: the conviction rate in such cases remained less than 5 per cent with a high number of decoys and witnesses turning hostile once the case reached the court. Some states like Andhra Pradesh also experimented with mandatory installation of a silent observer (a software that keeps track of all scans) in ultrasound machines, but not much was gained by using high-end technology for the misuse of ultrasound machines. In June this year, the government restricted the number of clinics a medical practitioner could operate from within a district and also raised the fee for the registration of ultrasound clinics. But not much has changed. By a rough estimate, the country has 35,000 registered ultrasound clinics, which cater to the demand for aborting between 5 to 7 lakh female foetuses every year. Then, there are thousands of mobile “on call” ultrasound clinics, offering discreet ‘service’ at the doorsteps. The desire to get only sons continues to challenge planners and medical authorities for its social and cultural dimensions. Therefore, the state health minister has rightly stressed the need to involve civil society and religious leaders to mobilise public opinion against female foeticide. For the eradication of social ills, best solutions come from within society.
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No winter lasts forever; no spring skips its turn. — Hal Borland
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Whither India-China ties?
ONCE again, Sino-Indian ties present a strange spectacle. On the one hand, India and China have signed 11 agreements entailing an investment of over $ 5 billion during the second India-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in New Delhi while on the other India had to protest vigorously against China’s newly revised passports that show disputed territory near their shared border as part of China and respond by issuing Chinese citizens visas embossed with New Delhi’s own maps. For a long time, the idea that economic ties will lead to a maturing of political ties was a mantra that serious policymakers in New Delhi were willing to consider. But clearly the argument was a specious one and anyone with even an iota of understanding global politics would have known that this trade leads to peace thesis rarely works. There are multiple levels — diplomatic, economic and cultural — at which China and India are engaging each other. Sino-Indian economic ties are at an all-time high with annual bilateral trade expected to reach around $100 billion over the next three years. Yet despite that pretence of a sustained engagement, suspicions of each other are at an all-time high with the two states sharing one of the world’s most heavily militarised border areas. Alarmed by China’s reiteration of its claims over the whole of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, India is expanding its military deployments in its north-eastern region. If China has deployed around 300,000 troops across the Tibetan plateau, India is responding by raising its military deployment from 120,000 to 180,000 along with two Sukhoi-30 fighter squadrons in the region. And the issue is not merely about the border and Tibet anymore. Today, New Delhi and Beijing both view themselves as rising powers and as a consequence, their interests and capabilities are rubbing off against each other not merely in Asia but in various other parts of the world as well. The two countries do not fully comprehend the complexities of each other’s domestic politics either. China’s opaque political system festers a lack of transparency that can only be dangerous over the long term. India’s, often cacophonous, domestic political system seems perpetually unable to attain a seriousness of purpose vis-a-vis China. As if this were not enough, popular opinion in both countries is rapidly turning against each other. A recent Pew Research Center poll found that two-thirds of Chinese respondents viewed India unfavourably. The feeling is mutual with only 23 per cent of Indians describing their relationship with China as one of cooperation and only 24 per cent viewing China’s growing economy as a good thing. So much for the trade leads to greater understanding thesis! Alarm bells are ringing all around India’s periphery as China’s growing military might is allowing it to dictate the terms of engagement to its neighbours. A comprehensive programme of naval development is underway with some warning of a Chinese Monroe Doctrine taking on a new degree of salience. Last month, China unveiled its first aircraft carrier — the Liaoning — with five more reportedly under development. China is busy developing an extensive near-seas capability allowing it to pursue its ambitions unhindered even from the influence of the world’s reigning heavyweight, the US. Yet India has found it difficult to articulate a China policy that can go beyond clichés. It’s not about matching China weapon for weapon. It is about managing China’s rise in a manner that does not lead to India giving up its vital interests. There is no likelihood of border settlement anytime soon, but the infrastructure upgradation on the Indian side of the border has only just begun. Despite 15-odd rounds, the border talks between China and India have not led to anything substantive. Rising nationalism and the increasing sway of the PLA in policymaking in China will make it even more difficult for the two sides to reach a diplomatic solution. As China and India have risen in the global hierarchy, their bilateral relationship has become uneasy as they attempt to come to terms with each other’s rise. The distrust between the two is actually growing at an alarming rate, notwithstanding the rhetoric of official pronouncements. Growing economic cooperation as well as bilateral political and socio-cultural exchanges have done little to assuage each country’s concerns about the other’s intentions. Indian policy trajectory toward China is evolving as India starts to pursue a policy of internal and external balancing more forcefully in an attempt to protect its core interests. The government is trying to fashion an effective response to the rise of China at a time of great regional and global turbulence. Though it is not entirely clear if there is a larger strategic framework shaping India’s China policy, India’s approach towards China is indeed undergoing a transformation, the full consequences of which will only be visible a few years down the line. With Sino-Indian friction growing and the potential for conflict remaining high, the challenge to India is formidable. India is increasingly bracketed with China as a rising or emerging power — or even a global superpower — though it has yet to achieve the economic and political profile that China enjoys regionally and globally. India’s main security concern today is not the increasingly decrepit state of Pakistan but rather an ever more assertive China, whose ambitions are likely to reshape the contours of the regional and global balance of power with deleterious consequences for Indian interests. India’s ties with China are thus gradually becoming competitive, with a sentiment gaining ground among Indian policy elites that China is not sensitive to India’s core security interests and does not acknowledge its status as a global player. As a consequence, India is belatedly gearing up to respond to China’s rise with a mix of internal consolidation and external partnerships. The latest row over Chinese passports is not limited to India. They also show images of the disputed, resource-rich islands in the South China Sea as Chinese territory, islands that Vietnam and the Philippines also claim. India has done well to respond forcefully to the latest Chinese challenge. As China’s behaviour becomes more and more difficult to predict, New Delhi will have to ensure that it has sufficient diplomatic and military firepower in its arsenal to deter Beijing from being too
adventurous. The writer teaches at King’s College, London.
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Antithesis of their names I
have
been suggesting, albeit a bit unkindly, that people are generally opposite of their names. This has been an observation that at least in 90 per cent of the cases appears true, my own case included. 'Chetana', the name given to me by my parents several decades ago, does not describe me well. I am completely opposite of what I am meant to be — that is — unaware/unconscious of things around me. One woman I know has a name meaning “one who always speaks the truth”. But contrary to her name, she is well known in her circle to be the most conniving and manipulating being one can ever imagine. Thus, there are scores of such people I know who are complete antithesis of their names. What is in a name? A name should actually indicate what it means. A name is the most precious thing a person enjoys. A name means an identity. How we hate a person with our namesake? They steal all your limelight, if you happen to be a celebrity or a VIP. I recently went to a shop to buy tiles for my home. The shopkeeper with a proud smile gave his name as Pawan Kumar Bansal, imagining him to be a Union Cabinet Minister. Similarly, several years ago I had been to watch a Rajesh Khanna- starrer movie (in a South Indian theatre) after attending college. When the movie was over, a small child was smiling shyly at me while walking with his mother. "And what is his name?" I asked the South Indian mother, reciprocating the smile I received. Proudly, she bragged “Rajesh Khanna!” I was simply taken aback. Many a time a namesake makes you uncomfortable, particularly if he is a criminal or a vile person. Talking of South India, an amusing incident comes to my mind. “There comes Miss Coconut!” said my classmate to our college teacher. “And why do you call her so? I inquired. “Because, her name is Tenginkai (coconut)!” she laughed. Then I was exposed to several South Indian names such as Hurikadle (roasted gram), Mavinakuli (mango seed), Menasinakai (chilli), etc, each amusing me no end. A name has a lot of meaning. During the aftermath of Operation Bluestar, I lived in the PGI's Doctors' Hostel with my husband and son. One afternoon when both were away, there was a knock at my door. I opened the door and was aghast. There were two Nihangs dressed in blue with their traditional swords. They were demanding money for some issues related to Bluestar. We did not earn much those days, but as I was too scared, I tried to give a 50-rupee note to get rid of them. Happily, they took the money and asked my name. “Surrinder,” I huskily blurted out my HoD's name to safeguard my own. “Oh ye hamari hi beti hai!” (Oh she is our own daughter!). They exclaimed with pride and refused to accept the money. What is in a name? Dear Shakespeare, aplenty! And please believe me
now!
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Why India should look at Vietnam more keenly “Vietnam
values India’s friendship most. India has always stood by us in our difficult times and we can always depend on India,” said Truong Tan Sang, the then President designate of Vietnam, at a meeting with me on 23rd June 2011 in Hanoi. After an excellent overview of the current strategic and political environment in Asia-Pacific region, he made a forceful point: “India is a responsible stake holder in the peace, stability and security in the region and has a unique role to play in the security architecture of Asia.” Within three months after becoming the President, Mr Truong travelled to India last year in October to reaffirm Vietnam’s consistent policy of giving high priority to the strategic partnership with India, elevate it to a higher level and to promote the two countries’ cooperation in all fields and at regional and international forums. Since then there has been a spurt in high-level visits from Vietnam to India, supported by business and government-level delegations. The latest is Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, who is coming on December 19 to Kolkata first to meet business leaders and then to New Delhi to attend the anniversary of the India-ASEAN summit to be held on December 20-21. Strategic location Vietnam is important in the promotion of India’s political, economic and security interests in South-East Asia, and in turn, in the success of our Look-East Policy. Vietnam's strategic position — as a neighbour of China, situated parallel to the great sea trade routes of Asia — always made the country tremendously important. Vietnam’s geographical configuration with a coast-line of over 3.300 km in length gives it a strategic footing in the naval waters extending from China’s doorstep in the Gulf of Tonkin, a long littoral on the South China Sea, and ending with another dimension in the Gulf of Thailand. Its size and resources make it the politically and military predominant country in the Indo-China peninsula. While the above was earlier significant only to the United States and Japan in terms of lifeline sea-lanes running parallel to the Vietnamese littoral, it is also increasingly becoming important to India, as a major part of its trade takes place through the seas. India, therefore, has a stake in helping Vietnam emerge as a strong regional power and invigorate an Asian order that rejects hegemonic dominance by any power, not at least by China. The two countries have a common stake in the safety of the Sea Lines of Communication, particularly in South China Sea. Vietnam's strategic significance has increased dramatically, owing to huge — and not always widely recognised — transformations in its economic performance and foreign-policy orientation. Reinvigorated by two decades of rapid economic growth and a broad-based opening to the outside world, Vietnam is now an emerging player in regional economic and security affairs. Indeed, in recent months the country has played a pivotal role in helping to establish Asia's emerging security order. In October 2010, Hanoi hosted the East Asian Summit, a meeting at which the US and Russia were recognised as Asian powers with vital national interests in the region. A reliable supporter On political and foreign policy issues Vietnam had been a consistent supporter of India, including our scheme for the reform of the United Nations and our recent bid for permanent membership in the Security Council. Apart from cooperation in the bilateral framework, the two countries have maintained close cooperation and mutual support at the regional and international fora such as the UN, NAM and other mechanisms in the ASEAN like the ARF, East Asia Summit and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. Vietnam along with other Southeast Asian nations perceive India as a benign power whose peaceful rise accrues significant strategic benefits for her to play a larger role in the region. This is in contrast to their perception of China whose emergence as a major economic and military power together with its irredentist claims over the whole of South China Sea and exclusive economic zones have created apprehensions in Asia about China’s future ambitions and intentions. Economically, Vietnam with its stress on economic liberalisation offers very attractive preferential prospects for Indian foreign direct investment in fields such as information technology, electricity, oil and gas, metallurgy, coal, transport, agriculture, fisheries, food processing, health care and medicine. In terms of India’s energy security, Vietnam’s offshore oil deposit offers opportunities for exploration and eventual supply to India. Oil exploration Indian companies, including ONGC Videsh (OVL) and Essar Oil subsidiary Essar Exploration and Production Limited, are expanding energy cooperation with Vietnam. OVL along with Vietnam's PetroVietnam joined hands to bid for the British Petroleum’s stake in Nam Con Son gas fields spread over 955-square kilometre include two offshore gas fields, a pipeline and power project. OVL is reported to have invested $217 million on the gas fields and could invest up to $377.46 million. OVL also has stakes in two other exploration blocks 127 and 128 in Vietnam. Even while China has raised objections to these explorations on the ground that the areas fall within the Chinese waters and has repeatedly warned India against such moves, New Delhi made it clear that its state-owned firm would continue to explore in the South China Sea. And Navy chief D.K.Joshi said a few days back that Indian warships would be prepared to set sail for the South China Sea if the country's economic interests there are threatened in any way. The exploration projects do not violate international law, and that China’s opposition has no legal basis. Defence cooperation While politically India and Vietnam were always very close, economic and strategic aspects were missing from that cordial relations until about 2000 when the then Defence Minister George Fernandes visited Vietnam in March that year and agreed for a periodic security dialogue, thus creating an institutionalised framework for regular meetings between the defence ministers to discuss matters related to shared threat perceptions. In the 2003 joint declaration, India and Vietnam envisaged creating an "Arc of Advantage and Prosperity" in Southeast Asia. The New Strategic Partnership signed in 2007 further strengthened multifaceted ties ranging from political and economic engagements to security and defence cooperation, science and technology and close cultural contacts. Since then defence cooperation has increased considerably, particularly in jointly combating the menace of piracy and co-operation in ship building and hydrographic survey, joint naval training, joint anti-sea piracy exercises in the South China Sea, jungle warfare training, counter-insurgency training, air force pilots training in India and assistance to Vietnam in establishing defence production. Vietnam’s offer of port In the context of its growing tension with China in the South China Sea Vietnam requires the support of a more credible naval power to intercede on its behalf to prevent the Chinese from upping the ante any further, and expects India to be one. Vietnam has given India the right to use its port of Nha Trang just south of China’s new naval base at Sanya on Hainan Island.; the Indian Navy has already made a port call. The Indian Navy was perhaps the only foreign navy in recent times to have been given this privilege by the Vietnamese at a port other than Halong Bay, near Hanoi. Vietnam has sought Indian help for augmenting the size and capabilities of it navy by supplying offshore patrol vessels and fast attack craft. India is already training Vietnamese naval personnel and helping maintain any equipment that Vietnam sources from Russia. New Delhi has also agreed in principle to sell Vietnam the Brahmos supersonic anti-ship missile and possibly Prithvi surface-to-surface missiles. Less visible, but no less critical, is the Indian IT industry’s involvement in devising network-centric solutions for the Vietnamese armed forces. Vietnam expects India to play a vital role in the capacity building of its military deterrence capabilities, and work together to address regional and global challenges. The evolving strategic partnership is meant for mutual benefit and is not meant for an alliance against any third country. Bilateral trade The India-Vietnam bilateral trade volume has increased from US$50 million in 1991 to over $2.7 billion in 2010 and is targeted to reach $7 billion in 2015. If direct flights between the two countries come into force by the beginning of next year, the trade might even jump to $15 billion. India pledged to take necessary measures to enable Vietnamese products to enter Indian markets so as to balance the two-way trade. India has offered Vietnam a US $45 million credit with preferential treatments for the building of a hydro-electricity power plant. The list of major Indian exports to Vietnam includes animal feed, pharmaceuticals, medicinal materials, plastic, iron and steel, seafood chemicals, chemical products, machinery and equipment, leather and leather garments, motorcycle parts, fertilizers, and automobile parts. While India’s import pepper, tea, coffee coal, rubber, cinnamon, and electronic components from Vietnam. The writer is a Distinguished Fellow, Institute of Peace and
Conflict Studies, New Delhi
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