The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

Organ transplant
Law must stop rackets, promote donations

Parliament has made some far-reaching amendments to the Transplantation of Human Organs Act, which provide a ray of hope to hundreds of thousands of people waiting for a transplant. The list of the relatives who can donate an organ has now been expanded to include grandparents and grandchildren. To exclude the possibility of rackets and exploitation of the poor, it was so far limited only to parents, sisters, brothers and spouses of the patients. Formalities have also been reduced for all other donations by “near-relatives” (related by blood). These will have to come through authorisation committees but the donors need not undergo screening as the submission of a birth certificate will suffice.

Other laudable steps include the setting up of an organ removal and storage network and a national registry of donors. To weed out illegal commercial dealings, the punishment has been enhanced from five to 10 years of imprisonment and the fine from Rs 10,000-20,000 to Rs 20 lakh-1 crore. What has to be borne in mind is that there are thousands of people in dire need of not just kidneys but also hearts, lungs, livers and pancreas etc. It is necessary not only to keep away the ghoulish racketeers, but also to extend a helping hand to the patients.

Because of the lack of public enthusiasm about organ donation, there is an acute shortage. According to the Indian Chronic Kidney Disease registry, 74.5 per cent of their patients do not receive any form of renal replacement therapy. The hopeless situation can be remedied only if there is a sustained public awareness about the urgency of cadaver donation. Just as the resistance about blood donation reduced gradually, the organ donors too would shed their inhibition slowly. There should be trained counsellors in intensive care units to support the deceased organ donation programme. India sees about 114,000 deaths in road accidents annually, of which nearly 67 per cent are brain deaths. A column in the application for the driving licence asking whether a person is willing to donate his organs may help.

Alarming lawlessness in Pak
Lessons from abduction of slain governor’s son

Suicide bombings, abductions, kidnappings, murders and other such incidents have become almost a daily occurrence in Pakistan. Anything can happen to anybody, anywhere, anytime irrespective of how big or mighty he is. Thus, the abduction of assassinated Punjab Governor Salman Taseer’s son Shahbaz Taseer in broad daylight in Lahore is not a surprising development. He was forcibly taken out of his Mercedes car on Friday as he was about to reach his office and bundled into another vehicle, a Land Cruiser, by a few armed persons. According to the present Governor of Punjab, Sardar Lateef Khosa, there was no proper security arrangement for the Taseer family. That may be the reason why there were no security guards with Shahbaz to challenge his abductors. Yet the provincial government claims that it had posted security guards for the protection of Shahbaz Taseer. The case may take a more curious turn if there is substance in Mr Khosa’s allegation that elements in the provincial administration may be involved in the incident.

Shahbaz Taseer’s abduction came despite intelligence reports that sons of influential personalities might meet such a fate at the hands of banned extremist organisations. The Taseer family had been receiving threats from extremists ever since Shahbaz’s father, Salman Taseer, was assassinated by his own security guard because of his controversial stand on the blasphemy law. And the assassin got widespread appreciation for what he had done. This showed that anything could happen to any member of the Taseer family in a country where law and order was there only in name.

Thought for the Day

Honest disagreement is often a good sign of progress. — Mahatma Gandhi

ARTICLE

Normalising Indo-Pak ties
Intimations of a new beginning
by Maharajakrishna Rasgotra

The visit of Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Ms Hina Rabbani Khar, went off better than one had expected. She struck the right notes when she spoke of “changed mindsets”, the need to “shed the burden of history”, and the young generation’s desire for peace and friendly relations with India. She owned up, without the least hesitation or embarrassment, Manishankar Aiyar’s idea of “uninterrupted and uninterruptible” India-Pakistan dialogue to resolve problems.

After Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna’s bad experience in Islamabad with Shah Mehmood Qureshi last year, a gesture from Pakistan was called for to restore civility and a modicum of mutual courtesy and respect between high-level interlocutors. Ms Khar made the gesture with commendable dignity and grace. Her poise and youthful charm and the candour and transparent sincerity of her public pronouncements have warmed many hearts and won her a large constituency in India. All this augurs well for a sustained effort to make the dialogue “uninterruptible” and result-oriented.

I was dismayed by the huge play in our media of Ms Khar’s Birkin handbag and Jimmy Choo shoes, and her meeting with Hurriyat leaders. The first is pardonable, because she came here at the end of Delhi’s Couture Week and dazzled the Capital as no ramp-walker had done. The media should have paid more attention to the elegance, warmth, simplicity and conviction in which she clothed her words and her mission of peace. The tone of voice and feelings of Pakistan’s youth she brought to us merit India’s serious attention. A fast globalising world is no place for abiding animosity, and it was a particularly touching gesture on Ms Khar’s part to pray at the two famous dargahs in Delhi and Ajmer for India-Pakistan peace.

I personally attach no importance to her meeting with the Hurriyat leaders. It needn’t have caused the kind of flutter it did in government circles and in our media. These gentlemen are known to be Pakistan’s constituency in our country. It was not entirely inappropriate for Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary to describe the event as “democratic reach-out”. We should have laughed the matter off, instead of expressing concern over it. Ms Khar herself, having done the chore, was dismissive of the event. Perhaps, the Generals back home, who must have concurred in her peace mission, needed a mollifier.

Pakistan is in a difficult internal situation and growing isolation externally. At home, it is ravaged by violence on the part of a whole generation of young jehadis raised in Pakistan’s madarsas. They will be around for another decade or two; this is, therefore, a problem for the long haul. Externally, the ISI and the army are engaged in a running feud with the US and are, seemingly, unwilling or unable to stabilise Pakistan’s turbulent western frontier to prevent the Taliban’s depredations in Afghanistan.

There is some muted appreciation in Pakistan that while its army is engaged in action in the west, India is not giving them cause for concern in the east, but well-meaning Pakistanis are looking for more tangible support for Pakistan’s fragile democracy. Many Pakistani friends have told me in recent months of a mood-change in Pakistan in regard to India, even in sections of the Pakistan military. In Pakistan’s list of enemies, they say, India has been downgraded to the lowly third position, after the US and the indigenous terrorist organisations!

There isn’t much India can do to help Pakistan in its ongoing spat with the US: they are allies of long standing, need each other and are bound to make up as the situation becomes clear in Afghanistan. Nor can much be done to allay Islamabad’s unwarranted concern over India’s development work in Afghanistan. But a lot can be done to forge a good neighbourly relationship through greatly enhanced people-to-people contacts, sports links, trade facilitation, joint economic activity, student exchanges and cooperation in ending the menace of terrorism. This last is a core issue with India and the onus to resolve it lies on Pakistan. What is needed is a visible dismantling of the whole India-focused apparatus of terror created and nurtured by the ISI since the 1980s.

Both China and the US have exploited Pakistan’s geo-strategic importance, in parallel ways at different times, during the last six decades as an armed balancer against India in South Asia, and as the base for jehad against the erstwhile USSR. Unanticipated consequences of Pakistan’s enthusiastic participation in those ventures is now threatening its stability; none of it has really enriched or strengthened Pakistan.

Pakistan’s truly geo-strategic role lies in its as-yet-unrealised potential as a highway for the flow of trade and commerce, thought and culture between Central Asia and India. Activation of that role would enrich Pakistan and eliminate its aid-dependence in no time. In the bargain, it would make two vast regions dependent on it. But realisation of this potential also requires a stable, tranquil and cooperative Afghanistan.

India and Pakistan need not be at odds with each other in Afghanistan. We should be working together to safeguard Afghanistan’s independence and integrity, its development and stability. Pakistan’s suspicions of an Indian pincer on its left flank are totally misplaced. Sadly, Afghanistan did not figure in the Foreign Ministers’ talks last month.

Of course, there are issues between our two countries, and Kashmir is the foremost among them. It is not a core issue only for Pakistan; Islamabad’s illegal occupation of a part of the Indian state is a core issue for India as well. But the short-point about Kashmir is that India cannot give it to Pakistan, and Pakistan cannot take it by war or by turning its back on India. And clearly India is not going to war with Pakistan over PoK. Therefore, the only viable solution lies in restoring the freedom of movement and cultural and economic intercourse across the LoC: then it wouldn’t matter very much which part of J&K belonged where. Our joint endeavour should be to make J&K a free-trade area and reduce the LoC to a line on the map. Rightly, therefore, the central focus in the Foreign Ministers’ talks was on Kashmir-related CBMs. The CBMs they agreed on, though, are too slow-moving and much too limited in scope and in the areas they cover.

The dialogue on security issues should not remain confined to Kashmir, terrorism or the slow-moving Mumbai trial in Pakistan. Pakistan’s security concerns vis-a-vis India, which keep General Ashfaque Parvez Kayani so distressingly India-focused, should be addressed in candid talks. Why can’t the Chiefs of Staff of the Army of the two countries meet to allay each other’s concerns? War is no longer an option for either country; so, why don’t we invite General Kayani over for a visit and reassure him of India’s peaceful intent? And why not go a step further and invite President Zardari to be the Chief Guest during the Republic Day celebrations in 2012 or 2013?

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s initiatives at Sharm-el-Sheikh (Egypt), Thimpu and Chandigarh, viewed with much skepticism at the time, were far-sighted. It is time now for even bolder steps.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary of India.

MIDDLE

A man named God
by Harish Dhillon

His college mates named him God. They did so teasingly. But years later when I reestablished contact with him, I felt that his friends had known, even then, of his many godlike qualities and had named him aptly.

The organisation that he headed ran amongst other things, an excellent multi-speciality hospital. So when one of my employees had exhausted all possible financial resources, including help from the teachers and students, and was still nowhere near the end of his wife’s medical treatment, I thought of this wonderful hospital and rang him up. He asked me to fax him all the papers and the next day he called to say that his cardiologist had confirmed that both the diagnosis and the course of treatment being followed were right. Unfortunately his hospital did not have the facilities for the procedure that needed to be followed.

I thanked him but he must have sensed my frustration because he rang me up the next day to say that he had made arrangements for the girl’s treatment at a hospital in Delhi. Everything would be taken care of, the transportation to Delhi, the board and lodging for the patient and her attendants, and of course for the procedure and the medication.

The girl was ferried to Delhi and the procedure was successfully carried out. Unfortunately she developed some post-operation complications and died. The doctors hinted that it was because of the delay in carrying out the procedure. I rang him up to thank him for all that he had done, I broke down and wept. I wept for the loss of a young life, I wept in gratitude for all his kindness, and I wept for the futility of it all.

He came up the next day, sat me down on a chair, knelt on the floor in front of me and holding my hands said: “Old man, I never want to hear you weep like that again. What can we do to avoid this kind of situation in the future?”

“I have tried very hard to persuade the subordinate staff to use their medical allowance towards medical insurance. But their needs for the present preclude all thought of what might happen in the future. I would like to set up a corpus, the interest to be used for just this kind of emergency.”

Though his organisation did undertake a great deal of charitable work, their rules did not permit them to give away money in such a manner. But within the month he had spoken to people and I received enough money from various sources to set up my fund.

It has been many years since this happened. The fund has helped many people in distress. And in all these years he has not once referred either to the incident or to what he did for me. I know he has forgotten all about it. I like to feel that there is something godlike about this behaviour.

OPED DEFENCE

The probability of the next major conflict breaking out in the mountains is high due to unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan. Immediate steps are needed to build and enhance the capabilities necessary for defeating future threats and challenges
Capacity Building for Future Conflict
Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (Retd)

Indian troops train for conventional warfare in the plains. It is necessary to substantially upgrade capabilities for achieving victory through the orchestration of overwhelming firepower or India will have to be content with a strategic stalemate

The key geo-strategic challenges in South Asia emanate from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and on the Af-Pak border; unresolved territorial disputes between India and China, and India and Pakistan; and the almost unbridled march of radical extremism sweeping across the strategic landscape. In May 1998, India and Pakistan had crossed the nuclear Rubicon and declared themselves as nuclear weapons states. Though there has been little nuclear sabre-rattling, tensions are inherent in the possession of nuclear weapons by neighbours with a long history of conflict. While the probability of conventional conflict on the Indian sub-continent remains low, its possibility cannot be altogether ruled out. Hence, there is an inescapable requirement for defence planners to analyse future threats and challenges carefully and build the required military capacities if push comes to shove.

In view of India’s unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan in the Himalayan region, there is a very high probability that the next major land conflict on the sub-continent will again break out in the mountains. As it is not in India’s interest to enlarge a conflict with Pakistan to the plains south of the Ravi River due to the possibility of escalation to a nuclear exchange, there is high probability that the next conflict, having broken out in the Himalayas, will remain confined to the mountains. While the three strike corps are necessary for conventional deterrence and have served their purpose well, it is in India’s interest to enhance its military capability to fight and win future wars in the mountains.

A strategic defensive posture runs the risk of losing some territory to the adversary if capabilities do not exist for launching a deep ingress to stabilise the situation. The first requirement is to upgrade India’s military strategy of dissuasion against China to that of genuine conventional and nuclear deterrence and vigorous border management during peace. Genuine deterrence can come only from the ability to take the fight deep into the adversary’s territory through major offensive operations. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to raise and position one mountain strike corps each in J&K for offensive operations against China and Pakistan and in the northeast for operations against China. In addition, as a strike corps can be employed only in a particular sector and cannot be easily redeployed in the mountains, it is necessary to give the defensive corps limited capability to launch offensive operations with integral resources.

In the modern era, military strategists have invariably preferred Liddell Hart’s strategy of the indirect approach through deep manoeuvre, rather than the heavy attrition that used to be routine on the battlefields of World War-I, to achieve a favourable decision. It is necessary to recognise that in the Indian context manoeuvre is extremely limited in the mountains and India’s capability for vertical envelopment is rather low. In the plains too India’s strike corps cannot execute deep manoeuvres due to the risk of Pakistan’s nuclear red lines being threatened early during a war. As firepower is the other side of the coin, it is inescapably necessary to substantially upgrade capabilities to inflict punishment and indeed achieve victory through the orchestration of overwhelming firepower. Unless firepower capabilities are upgraded by an order of magnitude, India will have to be content with a stalemate.

Firepower capabilities that must be enhanced include conventionally-armed ballistic missiles to attack high value targets in depth. Air-to-ground and helicopter attack capabilities should be modernised, particularly those enabling deep ground penetration and accurate night strikes. In fact, the IAF should aim to dominate the air space and air strikes must paralyse the adversary’s ability to conduct cohesive ground operations. Artillery rockets, guns and mortars must also be modernised. Lighter and more mobile equipment is required so that these can be rapidly redeployed in neighbouring sectors. India’s holdings of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) continue to be low. In recent conflicts like the war in Iraq in 2003 and the ongoing Afghan conflict, PGMs have formed almost 80 per cent of the total ammunition used. Indian PGM holdings must go up progressively to at least 20 to 30 per cent in order to achieve high levels of operational efficiencies. Defence planners must recognise that it is firepower asymmetries that will help to achieve military decisions and ultimately break the adversary’s will to fight.

Capabilities for heliborne assault, vertical envelopment and amphibious operations are inadequate for both conventional conflict and dealing effectively with contingencies that might arise while discharging India’s emerging regional responsibilities. Two rapid reaction-cum-air assault divisions, with an amphibious brigade each, need to be raised by the end of the 13th Defence Plan, (2017-22). The expenditure on these divisions will be highly capital intensive and will be subject to the defence budget being gradually raised to first 2.5 per cent and then 3 per cent of the GDP.

C4I2SR capabilities are still rudimentary and must be substantially modernised to exploit the synergies that can be achieved by a network centric force. A seamless intelligence-cum-targeting network must be established to fully synergise the strike capabilities of air and ground forces in real time. A good early warning network will enable the army to reduce the number of troops that are permanently deployed for border management and will add to the reserves available for offensive operations. Infrastructural developments along the northern borders have failed to keep pace with the army’s ability to fight forward and must be speeded up.

During the long history of post-independence conflicts with neighbours and prolonged deployment for internal security, the armed forces have held the nation together. Dark clouds can once again be seen on the horizon, but the efforts being made to weather the gathering storm are inadequate. The government must immediately initiate steps to build the capacities that are so necessary for defeating future threats and challenges. It must take the opposition parties into confidence as a bipartisan approach must be followed in dealing with major national security issues. In fact, there is a requirement to establish a permanent National Security Commission mandated by an act of Parliament to oversee the development of military and non-military capacities for national security.

Army as an instrument of national power
Col B.N. Bhatia (Retd)

Everyone knows the Army’s challenge in countering insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir for over two decades has been enormous. Expansive mountainous terrain favouring the insurgents, an aggrieved population easily swayed by propaganda and an extensive Line of Control (LoC) facilitating infiltration gave Pakistan the ideal “playing field” to up the ante. To bleed India and fatigue its security forces has been Pakistan’s objective.

We have played into Pakistan’s hands all along. The counter-insurgency grid expanded manifold in the Kashmir Valley, in line with the adversary’s plan to make us commit more troops. It later spilled south of the Pir Panjal ranges into the Jammu-Poonch region, consuming more Army formations. The Doda hinterland came next. What do you think should have been India’s response?

Insurgencies cannot be countered by the military alone. A multi-pronged approach using other instruments of national power like economic, political, social and information, if implemented once the situation had stabilised in mid-1990s, would have changed the situation and eased the army’s involvement. If such a plan was drawn at the apex level it left those at the operational level guessing. Was there a vision for peace? Not likely

How did the foremost principle of war – economy of force – get violated? Leadership voids at political levels, including associated diplomacy and administrative services which failed to keep pace with the ground situation, kept the army slogging. And voila! What did we have in 1999?

A fearful Pakistan imagining that its sponsored insurgency in J&K was on the wane, masterminded intrusions across the LoC in the Kargil sector. Surprised both at the political and military levels, the Army went into overdrive to evict the intruders. What followed were a series of sheer frontal attacks a la World War-I. Young officers and men assaulted dominating heights in ways unthinkable by any army in the world. If there was any brilliance in generalship during this war, it was just to move and organise troops who willingly sacrificed themselves to regain the lost territory.

We had again played into the enemy’s hands by joining battle in a place, manner and time of his choosing and advantage. Rather than “economy of force”, we used overwhelming force. When was the last time we thought of dislocating the enemy psychologically? Arguably this cannot be done in the face of political riders, as happened in Kargil.

To secure its own territory, India was forced to launch attacks in such disadvantageous circumstances because of the fear of nuclear retaliation or a flare-up. Nuclear weapons are not what Pakistan got from the bakery down the street while coming into the Kargil heights. They had it much earlier. Did Indian leadership at the core political level ever war-gamed such a scenario in conjunction with the military chiefs?

It was always known that Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would enable it to raise the threshold of tolerance for India, allowing it to resort to more derring-do in its proxy war.

This happened again just a couple of years later. In December 2001 the attack on the Parliament was the highpoint. Yet again we reacted in a huff and mobilised the armed forces. What followed during Operation Parakaram was ten months of strategic stalemate sans any results.

Estimates of total costs of this “misadventure” could touch Rs 10,000 crore. More than that, this self-goal cost us dearly. We lost face and bared our inability to follow through a resolute intention. Terribly blown apart was the credibility of our deterrence. Former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis remarked: “We have shown enormous patience, now it is time to show we have resolve too. Inaction is damaging our credibility; people have begun to believe India is incapable of taking any action.” Strategic affairs commentator Brahma Chellaney wrote: “The harsh truth is that the government played a game of bluff not just with Pakistan but also with its own military… When a nation enjoys credibility, it can usually achieve its objectives with a mere threat to use force. However, when there are serious credibility problems, even modest objectives are difficult to accomplish. Vajpayee ended up practising coercive non-diplomacy.”

Did we end up also fooling ourselves? Probably we’re used to it by now. It’s sad when we realise that Kautilya’s Arthashastra originated here. No matter how powerful an army is and how competent its generals, its effectiveness can be easily diluted as we have witnessed all along.

Leadership at the political level is structurally, mentally, intellectually and emotionally “distanced” from military leadership. The price is heavy. Unfortunately there is no “fiscal” calculation of what it costs the nation. No one knows or cares at the level where it should matter most. To continue to pretend that this callousness can continue indefinitely without affecting either the military leadership or the efficiency of the fighting force would be ineptitude of the highest order.

A friend called up to say that if the “Anna effect” was misjudged in our own country, how can we ever dream of assessing the capabilities and intentions of other nations? A valid point. And, if in our little dream world we imagine that others have not already noted our continued failings it will be compounding the error.