The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

Fresh crisis grips Japan
Anti-nuclear lobby may get hyperactive

THE threat of radiation leakage of serious proportions from two of Japan’s nuclear power plants, crippled by last Friday’s earthquake and tsunami, has sent disturbing signals all over the world. Japan, aided by the US, is trying to prevent the meltdown of the “core” of the affected reactors, but how far it will succeed remains to be seen, particularly after the massive explosions at the nuclear plants. Already reports say that the extent of radioactivity outside the plants is twice the level considered safe by Japan. A complete meltdown of the “core” may result in a major crisis which may take a very long time to bring under control. The Japanese, who initially did not show signs of nervousness, appear to be getting restless. There is no way to prevent the unimaginable loss Japan will suffer owing to the unavoidable release of radioactive materials towards its cities and villages.

The situation is such that the emergency cooling process at the damaged reactors will have to be continued for over a year. As a result, radioactive steam will have to be released into the atmosphere regardless of the contamination to the environment it will cause. One can imagine the catastrophic effect of it all as the wind in the region blows from the sea to the inhabited areas in Japan. Nature’s law under the prevailing circumstances is going to work against all the efforts man is making to fight its onslaught.

The harrowing times being experienced by Japan, having unmatched preparedness to cope with any kind of natural disaster, raise serious questions about the very argument for promoting nuclear power generation. Why locate nuclear power reactors in an area where there is even the slightest chance of their getting damaged by a natural calamity? No country can afford to have such facilities in areas falling in a high seismic zone or near its coastline faced with a tsunami threat. India is one of the countries where the issue will be debated strongly. The anti-nuclear power lobby may become hyperactive in days to come. After all, its argument has got considerable strength from the disaster that has struck Japan.

Unlicensed and dangerous
People’s confidence in pilots nosedives

Pilots have a glamorous image in the minds of the public, and it came as a shock that 3,000 to 4,000 pilots are under scrutiny of the Directorate-General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), which is looking into their papers to identify possible forgeries used to get flying licences. Two pilots have already been arrested and more arrests are likely as the investigation progresses. Ironically, it is the DGCA that has issued the licences in the first place. Instead of scrutinising the documents and checking their authenticity when they were submitted, and then issuing licences to the successful candidates; the regulatory body seems to have done the reverse, given licences first without due diligence. Only after one of the pilots who had alleged forged her papers was exposed, did the DGCA start the drive to check the documents of others.

The Indian airspace is already crowded and there is a serious lack of infrastructure, which has not been able to keep pace with the growth of the nation’s civil aviation sector. It is certainly possible that the DGCA, swamped with the additional workload, gives licences without rigorously checking the papers. However, why the very body responsible for implementing, controlling, and supervising airworthiness standards, safety operations, crew training in India would do something like that is a question which begs an answer.

The DGCA’s role will certainly be questioned by investigating agencies, since it is likely that there was a degree of connivance and looking the other way by officials concerned. Concern has also been expressed in Parliament about the issue. The DGCA needs to restore the confidence of the public by thoroughly checking the documents submitted by all the pilots and identifying those who committed fraud. It needs to reassure the public that pilots who fly them are bona fide, and fully qualified.

Thought for the Day

There is no wealth but life.

— John Ruskin

ARTICLE

India & ballistic missile defence
An uncertain, debatable option
by P.R. Chari

ON March 7 India shot down a mock enemy ballistic missile in an exercise to test its Advanced Air Defence interceptor. A Prithvi-2 target missile was fired from India’s Chandipur test range and another Prithvi missile some 10 miles over the Bay of Bengal was successfully intercepted. The interceptor had been fired five minutes after the target missile was launched. Apparently, several detection systems comprising long-range and multipurpose radars were tasked to detect and identify the target missile within three minutes of its liftoff.

The interceptor achieved a speed of 4.5 Mach (4.5 times the speed of sound per second) before the target was struck. The complexity of this manoeuvre can be appreciated by comparing it to firing a bullet to strike another bullet. But the present exercise is far less difficult than what obtains in a conflict situation. For one, the exact time when the incoming missile is fired will not be known; neither will its direction nor the trajectory be known, making the task of detection, tracking, acquisition and attack infinitely more complex than in a controlled exercise like in Chandipur.

A word about India’s ballistic missile defence programme, which derives from its indigenously designed missiles and indigenously developed and integrated radars. It had employed its short-range Prithvi missile in an exo-atmospheric (outside the atmosphere) mode and an anti-ballistic missile role at the end of 2006, when it intercepted another Prithvi missile at an altitude of 50 km. The virtuosity of this feat can be highlighted by noting that India is the fourth nation in the world to have demonstrated this capability and the third nation to develop it indigenously.

A year later, in December 2007, a short-range missile was tested in an endo-atmospheric (within the atmosphere) mode at an altitude of 30 km. It is claimed that working together in tandem, both these missiles will provide an almost assured kill probability. Two new anti-ballistic missiles (AD-1 and AD-2) are being developed to intercept intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles with a range up to 5,000 km. India already possesses the Russian S-300 ballistic missile interceptors. It is now seeking the advanced Russian S-400 anti-ballistic missile.

This might be the opportune time to reflect on the generic question of ballistic missile defences. Indeed, the strategic instability arising from deploying missile defences had made the United States and the Soviet Union in May 1972 to enter into the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). It limited ABM deployments by the super powers to two sites (later reduced to one site) to protect their national capitals with a maximum of 100 missiles placed on a maximum of 100 launchers. The ABM Treaty began unwinding when the Reagan administration decided in the early eighties to use space to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems — the famous Star Wars modality — that was prohibited by the ABM Treaty.

The then Soviet Union’s efforts to catch up in this costly arms race hastened its economic collapse.

Later, the George Bush Administration abandoned the ABM Treaty altogether. So, a contrarian argument can be made that the high costs of the competition for ABM defences led to the fall of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the American triumph. But these high costs also make the argument against pursuing missile defences. Apropos of this, one-on-one deployments will not work, meaning that every anti-ballistic missile may not destroy an attacking missile. These must, therefore, be widely deployed and fired in salvos to ensure total kill probability.

The allied problem relates to the credibility of missile defences. It would be presumptuous to argue that it is technologically feasible to establish a fool-proof missile defence system to assuredly detect and destroy 100 per cent of the adversary’s incoming missiles. This is virtually impossible, given the vast geographical areas to be defended that permit ingress from all points of the compass and across land and sea frontiers. But even an improbable 99 per cent likelihood of their destruction is not enough in the strategic situation prevailing in southern Asia with India, Pakistan and China possessing nuclear weapons. Even if one nuclear missile escapes detection and destruction, the results could be catastrophic.

The conclusion is obvious; even after astronomical costs have been incurred, missile defences will not ensure 100 per cent security. An argument is sometimes made that even if missile defences cannot provide total security, their presence complicates the adversary’s calculations. This argument overstates the case, since the adversary could position his missiles where the missile defences are either sparse or non-existent.

Finally, the critical strategic issue remains unaddressed, which postulates that mutual nuclear deterrence is premised on the assumption that nuclear adversaries, if attacked, will always remain capable of inflicting unacceptable damage upon each other. Resultantly, great emphasis has been placed on the survivability of the deterrent, and retention of the capability at all times to ride out a first or pre-emptive strike while retaining the capability to launch a devastating second strike on the aggressor. Missile defences complicate this basic nuclear ethic. Theoretically, they could permit the country deploying missile defences to feel confident that it could ensure that its own nuclear force is invulnerable to attack, permitting it to contemplate a disarming first strike. The end result, however, would be a weakening of the entire fabric of mutual assured destruction and nuclear deterrence.

In these circumstances, the adversary would be left with a Hobson’s choice. Either to emplace similar missiles defences with their high costs and uncertain technological capabilities. Or, to increase its numbers of nuclear warheads and launchers to provide for a much larger attacking force to evade missile defences. Both these scenarios would definitely heighten nuclear instability.

Consequently, the downside of missile defences is numerous, but their advantages are uncertain. Whether India should pursue this route to keep up with the Joneses, particularly the United States, is debatable. Why, then, does India want to pursue this expensive, uncertain route? Can this question be asked under the RTI Act?

MIDDLE

I’m glad my kids didn’t have Tiger Mom!
by Punam Khaira Sidhu

WHEN PISA test results showed that Shanghai students’ scores were far ahead of American students, President Obama referred to it as a “Sputnik Moment” — “the humbling realization that another country is pulling ahead in a contest we have become used to winning”. In this scenario comes Yale Professor Army Chua’s book “Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mom”, a ‘politically incorrect’ account of how she raised her daughters with a disciplinarian upbringing, Chinese style. And while it’s got Americans introspecting their parenting styles, Indian parents are using it to strengthen their own mission-mode upbringing of their kids. And that’s got me worried, because I was raised by a “Tiger Dad”.

We all turn into our parents as we grow older and I did too. So there I was, a ‘Tiger Mom’ pushing her kids to work towards A’s, play the guitar, tennis, golf and work at calligraphy and math. But I had not reckoned with the boys’ genes and their ‘Laidback Leo’ father. They had soon replaced my teeth with dentures!. ‘Laidback Leo’, loves, supports and does not judge- B’s and C’s are happily accepted and in fact the boys chide him for not having higher expectation of them. He is proud of their well-rounded personalities and their high emotional quotients (EQs). And the boys love him and would die for him.

When they were growing up, we dreaded PTAs where we got routinely pulled up for the boys’ “attitude” and pranks. But the same ‘attitude’ has helped them excel and adapt to situations, without, parental supervision even while kids raised by ‘Tiger’ parents have floundered. I constantly seek approval, while my boys have a self esteem, you cannot dent. The answer to Chua’s Battle Hymn should be the “Lullaby of the Laidback lion” –my spouse’s ‘politically correct’, account of parenting his progeny, American style. Childhood is a time of ‘nurture’ – why turn it into a ‘battle’?

Indian and Chinese kids grow up with such odds (we are 1 billion plus) that competition is built into their DNA. But it is perhaps incorrect, like Chua, to assume strength when children are fragile in every way. Let the fire in a child’s belly decide where he puts the bar. Would it be fair for a parent to place the bar and push until the child has fractured both legs trying to cross it?

‘Tiger Mom’ or ‘Laidback Lion’ – the jury’s still out. But history is witness that innovation and creativity can be stifled by too much discipline. Bill Gates, Michael Dell and Zuckerberg rejected degrees for creativity- a Chinese Mom would have coerced them into submission and insisted that they finish college, get their degree and put in some piano practice as well!

OPED — internal security

Counter-terrorist operations in response to the carnage in Mumbai over two years ago was an important episode in the history of the National Security Guards. It produced several lessons for the premier anti-terror force, some of which are in the process of being implemented. After a quarter century of existence, it is time for introspection and reorganisation to meet emerging challenges and to optimise the force’s full potential

WHETTING the Black Cats' teeth
Col Ramesh Davesar (Retd)

IT has been 25 years since 1986, when National Security Guards (NSG), the elite commando force for carrying out specialised security tasks was raised. During this period the NSG has more than once proved their mettle and professional acumen. Except for delayed reaction against Pakistani highjackers in December 1999, the NSG successfully executed counter-terrorist operations in Punjab, Akshardham in Gujarat, Jammu and Kashmir and more recently in Mumbai during the December 2008 (26/11) terror strikes. The Silver Jubilee year is aptly timed to carry out reappraisal and review its command and control set-up as well as reorganise to face new challenges.

The NSG is modelled on the lines of Special Air Service (SAS) of the United Kingdom and the GSG-9 (a.k.a. Federal Border Police) of Germany; the former being an Army outfit while the latter is purely a police establishment. The designated role of the NSG is anti-hijacking, hostage rescue and counter terrorists (CT) operations.

NSG Rangers simulate a VIP protection drill.

Primarily, the NSG has two special Action Groups (SAGs), one Special Support Group (SSG) and three Special Rangers Groups (SRGs). Post 26/11, in order to improve reaction capability, four hubs have been created at Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai and Hyderabad, each having a SAG team comprising approximately 250 personnel. The SAGs are trained for CT operations and therefore, are completely staffed by Army personnel including officers, while the SSG supporting the operations has majority Army deputees. The SRGs, meant for VIP security and support operations, have manpower drawn from the central police organisations (CPOs). Thus, the SAGs along with the SSG form the NSG's teeth, as Army personnel are the major component of the force's overall strength of 14,500.

In order to execute its assigned role and tasks, the NSG adopts military tactical battle drills for raiding hideouts, fighting in built-up areas, conducting heli-borne operations and storming high jacked aircraft, etc. It is evident that the assigned tasks and their execution are Army specific or shall we say, an extension of the offensive and specialised operations for which Infantry units in general, and the Special Forces of the Army in particular, are trained. Rightly so, the SAGs are therefore staffed and commanded by the Army personnel. Conversely, with due respect, the state police, the CPOs and the IPS officers are basically trained in maintenance law and order and crime prevention, except for the limited and subsidiary exposure they would have got while operating in the counter insurgency (CI) grid. It is therefore axiomatic that Army operations are best comprehended and conducted by Army officers only. But ironically the overall command of the NSG is with an IPS officer, which is not only surprising but is also operationally untenable. Perhaps we are the only country where Army troops are commanded by police officers.

One may argue that since the NSG is a paramilitary force (PMF) and functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), its command has, therefore, been delegated to a police officer. Conversely, the Assam Rifles (AR) also being a PMF has the complete line and staff appointments held by Army officers. One may further attempt to justify this arrangement by quoting that the GSG-9 (one of the NSG's role models) is also commanded by police officers. This, however, is a wrong comparison because the GSG-9 is totally a police outfit with no elements from the Army. Hence it has been appropriately placed under a police officer. Take a look at the SAS of UK, the other role model. Keeping in view the sensitivities and nature of the specialised tasks, the UK has very rightly branded this force as a regular Army unit as it is strongly felt that that it is an operational necessity. In order to optimise the full potential of this elite force, the NSG must be commanded by an Army officer, preferably from the Special Forces.

The 26/11 terror strike, apart from other things, brought out important lessons and highlighted operational and logistic loopholes such as our sea frontiers being vulnerable to infiltration, the requirement of captive air transport to enhance mobility, deficiency in overall command and control of operations and lack of coordination with local military and state agencies. Presently our coastal defence is woefully porous and needs to be substantially beefed up because the Navy is already overstretched on their conventional role while the Coast Guard and the Navy's Marine Commandos (MARCOS) are inadequate for effective maritime surveillance. With increased incidents of sea pirating it becomes all the more prudent to reinforce our strike capabilities against misadventures from the sea route. Therefore the NSG should raise a marine wing organised on the lines of MARCOS and staffed by naval personnel for carrying out CT tasks in the second tier or in brown waters and relieve MARCOS to operate strategically in the first tier or in blue waters.

As regards providing inherent mobility and improving reaction capabilities, in addition to provision of long-range airlifts, NSG headquarters as well as the new hubs should also have heli-lift capability for faster movement of their teams over short distances.

It must be understood that such military-like operations against the terrorists, whether conducted by the armed forces or by any other agency including the NSG, are executed with the operational and logistics support from the local military formations and the civil administration. Somehow a complacent impression has been created that the NSG can carryout such tasks independently on its own steam, which is ethically incorrect. Going back to 26/11, during the entire operation while the local Army units provided outer cordon at various points of action, the Navy along with MARCOS were deployed to dominate the coastline. Therefore it is a misplaced belief which must be set aside. Further, the local military formations have adequate knowledge of the security scenario and have the professional and administrative wherewithal to conduct such operations. In fact, to optimise the desired success, the NSG operations must be conducted under the overall command and control of local army formations, which are inherently best poised for effective planning and execution of such tasks.

In order to further optimise the operational capabilities of the avant grade force; we must carry out objective analysis of the existing organisation, command and control structure as also taking note of the operational expediencies, handover the overall command of the NSG to an Army officer, particularly one from the Special Forces. Also keeping future threat perception in mind, captive airlift as well as short-range marine special mission capability for the NSG must be considered as an inescapable necessity.

SOME NSG operations THAT ARE IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

THE NSG commenced its charter in 1986 by combating terrorism in Punjab with initial operations in Amritsar. Primarily a counter-terrorist assault, anti-hijack and hostage rescue force, its deployments are usually kept under wraps and most of its operations are classified. Some known and successful operations include:

May 11-18, 1988 - Neutralised terrorists holed-up inside the Golden Temple, Amritsar during Operation Black Thunder- II

April 25, 1993 - Rescued Indian Airlines Boeing 737 hijacked by Islamic militants during Operation Ashwamedh in Amritsar

October 1998 - Combat missions against terrorists in J&K. Black Cats heli-dropped into countryside.

July 15, 1999 - Freed 12 hostages held by armed terrorists who had stormed an apartment complex in Kashmir and killed four people

August 21, 1999 - Neutralised armed terrorists hiding in a house in Delhi

September 25, 2002 - Operation Vajra Shakti to free hostages held by terrorists who had killed 29 people at the Akshardham temple in Gujarat.

November 26, 2008 Mumbai attacks - Operation Black Tornado and Operation Cyclone to flush out terrorists and rescue hostages after multiple attacks across Mumbai.

THE WISH LIST

THERE have been occasions when the functioning of the NSG has come under critical review, particularly over the non-availability of state-of-the-art tactical combat and surveillance equipment as well as poor transport and mobility arrangements. A section of NSG Rangers, belonging to the Special Ranger Group, has been assigned on VIP protection duties. After the 26/11 Mumbai carnage, some of the modernisation programmes include induction of:

Corner shot guns

Laser designators

Advanced communication sets

GPS & GPRS technological systems

Wall surveillance radars

Night vision devices

Protective goggles

Special tactical gear

Thermal imaging cameras

Mini remotely operated vehicles

Non skid shoes

Ghillie suits

Assault helmets with-in built hands-free communications

Level-3 bullet-proof vests

Knee pad and elbow pads

SIG SG 553 guns

Taser electric stun guns

Anti-Materiel Rifles

Chartered helicopters and use of civilian aircraft for emergencies.

— Compiled by TNS