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Malfeasance in the military
It can be relied upon to apply the correctives
by Lt-Gen Harwant Singh (retd)
For some time the military has been much in the news for almost all the wrong reasons. With the increasing number of scandals and scams being reported by the media, one cannot help but suffer the sinking feeling that the Indian military, too, along with almost every other constituent of the government is on the downward slide. Some may argue that the military can be no other than a mirror image of society from which it draws its manpower. Even so the ethos, the sense of honour and discipline in the military make it apart from society at large and as such can be relied upon to apply the correctives and stay on course.It may be instructive to put in the right perspective some of the scams which have in the recent past drawn attention of the media and seem to tarnish the military’s fair image. Take the case of Sukna scandal. It relates to the issue of the No-Objection Certificate ( NOC ) to a private party for building a school on a piece of land outside the cantonment (not Army land). This NOC contravened a law that no civil construction can be allowed within 1000 yards of the cantonment boundary, but there has to be a notification to that end by the civil authority. In this case,there was no notification. Even so, the NOC issue was taken as an improper act and disciplinary action initiated against the officers concerned, including three general-rank officers. In the Tehelka episode, one senior officer was put behind the bars and the career of another general came to an end for merely accepting dinner from a Tehelka team. Some others suffered various degrees of punishment. As against this, those from the Ministry of Defence and involved in the case are yet to be punished. The additional secretary who accepted a gold chain from the Tehelka team was soon promoted. One defence secretary charge-sheeted in the Bofors case, instead of facing proceedings against him, was given the assignment of a Lt-Governor, placing him outside the reach of the long arm of the law. Another defence secretary was indicted by the Delhi High Court for altering the annual confidential report (an official document) of an air force officer. He was merely shifted to another ministry. Then there was the case of a defence secretary who on his own went ahead and entered into a dubious deal for the purchase of one lakh rifles for the Army for which no ammunition was available in the world market. Nothing happened against him. It would be interesting to note that none of these cases were brought to light by any internal mechanism of the Ministry of Defence. This was done by outside agencies. In the case of some other scandals and fake encounters by Army men, which have been in public domain, action was taken and those involved were arrested, including a few senior-level officers, while some others were given a range of punishments. A number of cases reported later have not seen timely disposal, as the officers concerned have been seeking relief from civil courts, resulting in delays. They may be able to buy time, but in no way will they escape the wrath of the military law. In the high-voltage case relating to the Adarsh Housing Society flats in Mumbai, the malfeasance is far more serious than the Sukna scam. In this particular case, the land (named Khukhri Park) was given to the Army by the civil administration a few decades earlier in exchange for some land of the Army elsewhere, taken by the civil administration to make a bypass, etc. Since this land was given to the Army, in the first place it should have come on the land records of the Defence Estates Department (a department of the MoD). This was obviously not done and the land remained on the records of the civil administration, though ipso facto the land belonged to the military and was in its possession. There is no provision under which this piece of land could be given to anybody, even to Kargil widows/heroes, without sanction from the Union Cabinet in Delhi. Putting the label of “Kargil war widows/heroes” on the Adarsh Housing Society appears to have been a later-day innovation. It was the implied ambiguity in the ownership of the land which was exploited by RC Thakur, a functionary in the Defence Estates Office ( DEO ) at Mumbai. Though the military was the de-facto and de-jure owner of this land, slip-up, intentional or otherwise by the Defence Estates office, in not taking it on its records was of little consequence. While the military land records are maintained by the Defence Estate Office, it is the Army Commander who is the custodian of all kinds of military land within his command. The sub-area commander of the military station at Colaba (who later came back as area commander after an NDC course), the subsequent area commanders and some others most shamefully collaborated in this nefarious scheme. They also roped in some of their greedy seniors. Not to be left out, those in the politico-bureaucratic set-up who were to give various clearances for the project picked up slices of the cake for themselves, friends and relatives. Eventually they formed the majority. Some others who could and were equally desperate for that piece of cake too joined in. Since this building was originally meant to have only six floors, its foundation would have been laid to cater to that requirement. Therefore, how could the building with the same foundation be raised to 30/31 floors? The mischief runs deeper. From the large number of cases that have been brought to light, the impression seems to prevail that the military, too, has gone under. With officer-strength of over 35,000, even dozens of cases should not cause any alarm. The environment in the country is conducive to corruption, and an increasing number of Army men are not able to resist the temptation. It would be interesting to note that only the military organisations that come in contact or deal with the civilian contractors and wheeler-dealers of civil organisations are affected by the corroding influence of corruption. All the others in the military abide by high standards of integrity and honesty. Therefore, it would be seen that it is the military’s own internal mechanism which invariably brought these cases to light and then proceedings were launched against the suspects. One can be certain that in the Adarsh Housing Society case, too, those whose actions are still governed by the military law (military law continues to operate in the case of an individual up to two years after retirement ) will face the military’s music. While the military can be relied upon to routinely deal with the rot that seems to be creeping into its system, more vigorous and determined efforts will have to be made by the top brass to dig out every suspected case of corruption and misconduct and promptly dealt with. The exaggerated notion of scale and scope of privileges which supposedly go with higher ranks needs to be curbed. The present Army Chief is known for high integrity, probity and moral values and will surely clean up the Augean
stables. The writer is a retired Deputy Chief of the Army Staff.
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Walker bureaucrats
by P.R. Chari
ONCE upon a time the middle-rung bureaucrats in X — one of our provincial capitals — were struck by a common malaise. Individually and severally, they were found to have high blood pressure. Not surprising. Late nights, gorging foods brimming with fat and drinking to excess will exact their toll. All leading to rotundity, politely described as being slightly overweight, or somewhat obese. The surprise element was that the bureaucrats were diagnosed to be having the same condition at the same time. Discreet second opinions only confirmed the earlier diagnosis. So, what to do? Medicos of all persuasions — allopathic, homoeopathic and Ayurvedic — were consulted, but were unanimous on the line of treatment. The bureaucrats must lose weight. A healthy diet was prescribed: the usual thin slice of bread, sugarless tea, salads, uninteresting fruits, plenty of water without alcohol and so on. But this had to be coupled with exercise. Taking relevant factors into account like age and shape of the bureaucrats, walking was prescribed as the ideal exercise, starting gently and for 20 minutes, but increasing eventually to one hour of brisk walking. Plus the usual homilies — take the stairs and not the elevator, walk to work, and so on. That is where our tale begins. The bureaucrats started walking in the early mornings before setting forth to the Secretariat. Great surprise was expressed on meeting each other in these unusual non-office circumstances. But, some careful, over-casual probing of one another’s intentions revealed the disconcerting truth that they were individually and severally, afflicted with high blood pressure and needed to walk to shed the excess kilos. So, they decided on a cooperative effort. They would walk together, discuss their files and career strategies and, of course, talk about who was being posted where and when and why. In time, walking became a relaxation, and not a deadly chore. All was going well until nemesis struck. How? It happened one day when one of the bureaucrats made an innocuous suggestion at the end of the walking. “Guys,” he said, “come in for a cup of tea.” The lady of the house was most hospitable and, along with the tea, came the biscuits — two kinds. Gratefully appreciated, since there is nothing like morning walking to make one peckish. Everyone departed that fatal morning with the resolve that they would take turns to host the walkers’ cooperative union to tea after concluding their exercise. And, since the ladies were in touch with each other, an element of healthy competition crept into the snacks department. Neither were the bureaucrats remiss in expressing their preferences. Suggestions like “Bhabhiji, let’s send out for jalebis”, or “Bhabhiji, let’s have pakodas today” were made, and complied with. This is a sad tale. At the end of a few months, nobody lost weight; indeed, some gained weight. The medicos, being savvy persons, opined that the high blood pressure of the bureaucrats had now stabilised.
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Not much is known about the Indian position and other issues at the just-concluded UN Climate Change Conference at Cancun. In a letter to the members of Parliament Union Minister for Environment and Forests Jairam Ramesh has clarified climate change policies and negotiating positions. Here are excerpts:
Conundrum at Cancun
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Jairam Ramesh
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All parties agreed on a set of decisions, known as the “Cancun agreements”, for further discussion on the two tracks of negotiations, namely the Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol.
A shared vision for long-term cooperative action was a matter of intense debate with the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and the Association of Small Island States countries pushing for much more ambitious targets. In the end, a goal of restricting temperature rise to below 2 degrees Celsius, with a provision for review at a subsequent date was agreed upon.  Significantly, the agreed final text makes no mention of either quantitative targets for emission reduction by 2050 or global peaking year, thus protecting the interests of developing countries. Largely due to India’s efforts, references to “equity” and “equitable access to sustainable development” were included in this section as the basis of working towards this goal. A Cancun Adaptation Framework was agreed upon. It exhorts developing countries to prepare and implement national adaptation plans and at the same time calls upon developed countries to provide finance, technology and capacity building support for the same. It also decides to establish an Adaptation Committee to promote implementation of adaptation actions. Under the Cancun agreements, the developed countries, including those that are parties to Kyoto Protocol or otherwise, will list their economy-wide emission reduction targets for the period from 2013 onwards and implement the targets according to the agreed rules. For the first time, and on India’s insistence, the agreed text calls for an “international assessment and review” of developed country emission reduction targets, which means that there will be a mandatory in-depth review of implementation of the commitments by developed countries, including assessments by experts and consultations with developing countries. At the same time, the parties to Kyoto Protocol have agreed to continue to work towards finalising their targets for the second commitment period (post-2012 period) with the aim to ensure that there is no gap between the first and second commitment periods of the Protocol. Under the agreements, the developing countries will also list their nationally appropriate mitigation actions (not mitigation commitments or targets) in a document under the convention, and implement them with the financial, technological and capacity building support provided by developed countries for such actions. The text also calls for “international consultation and analysis” of developing country actions in a manner that is non-intrusive, non-punitive, facilitative and respectful of national sovereignty. This will apply to nationally determined actions, implemented on a voluntary basis in pursuance of the domestic mitigation goal and reported through the official national communication of the country concerned. This was a key area where India played a crucial role in mediating an agreement that was acceptable to both developed and developing countries. The agreement encourages developing countries to undertake actions on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of forest stocks, and sustainable management of forests (the latter being most relevant to India, where we are actually increasing our forest stock through sustainable forestry). It calls upon developing countries to prepare national strategies/plans for the same. The agreement also asks for full and effective participation of indigenous people and local communities in developing and implementing these strategies. An assessment of financial options to support these actions is also to be worked out. The developed countries were urged to ensure that their climate actions avoid negative consequences on developing countries. On unilateral trade measures, it notes that measures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. This seeks to address an important concern of India and other developing countries that climate change should not be used as an excuse to impose unilateral trade measures on developing countries. The developed countries will provide “fast start finance” of $ 30 billion in 2010-12 to developing countries and submit transparent information regarding the provision of these resources. The agreements also recognize the need for providing long-term finance by the developed countries and inscribe their commitment of raising $100 billion per year by 2020 for supporting adaptation and mitigation actions in developing countries. Most importantly, the parties have decided on the establishment of a Green Climate Fund as the operating entity of the financial mechanism. The agreement decides to establish a technology mechanism for supporting research, development, demonstration, deployment, diffusion and transfer of technology in the area of mitigation and adaptation. The mechanism will be governed by a Technology Executive Committee with 20 members — 9 from developed countries and 11 from developing countries — and its functions will be implemented by a Climate Technology Centre and Network. India was the key player in drafting the text on the technology mechanism.
India’s contributionIndia made some specific contributions to the final agreed text in addition to its contribution to the process over the entire period of the conference. India ensured that for the first time the phrase “equitable access to sustainable development” found mention in the shared vision text (para 6). This is critical as climate change is largely a problem caused by historical emissions and late developers like India need this equitable access to address their development priorities and to eradicate poverty. The phrase “equitable access to sustainable development” is superior to the phrase “equitable access to carbon space” which connotes a fundamental “right to pollute” that is seen today as negative and insensitive to the global challenge of climate change. India ensured that the mention of 2015 as a peaking year and the mention of a quantitative target of emissions reduction by 2050 did not find mention in the final text. This is important as such conditionalities could have imposed emission reduction commitments on developing countries like India too early and could compromise their development prospects. India’s detailed formulation on international consultation and analysis of developing country mitigation actions in a manner that is non-intrusive, non-punitive and respectful of national sovereignty was the key input that broke an important deadlock and helped achieve progress on issues relating to mitigation. It was India that ensured that for the first time developed country mitigation actions will be subject to “international assessment and review”, which means that experts, including those from developing countries, will have the right to review whether developed countries are living up to their commitments. India’s formulation on technology development and transfer through a technology executive committee and climate technology centre and networks formed a critical component of the final text, and a major win for developing countries. Due to India’s insistent efforts, the parties avoided a decision at Cancun on the phrase “legally binding agreement”. Instead, the Ad Hoc Working Group has been requested to “continue discussing legal options” with the aim to reach consensus, if possible, on this issue by the next conference of parties. At a press briefing on India’s proactive domestic actions on addressing climate change I highlighted the (i) National Action Plan on Climate Change; (ii) Indian Network for Comprehensive Climate Change Assessment; (iii) Expert Group on Low-Carbon Strategy for Inclusive Growth (iv) activities being undertaken by various state governments; and (v) our regional initiatives in SAARC and with countries like Nepal, Bangladesh and the Maldives.
Binding commitmentsAt the high-level segment, I made a detailed statement which highlighted India’s efforts on addressing climate change. In this statement I also said that “all countries must take on binding commitments in an appropriate legal form”. This statement has formed the basis for much discussion at home. So I feel that I must clarify what I intended to convey and the context in which this statement was made. There appeared to be a view being pushed by a majority of developing and developed countries at Cancun that all countries must agree to a legally-binding agreement. Most countries, including our BASIC partners Brazil and South Africa, our developing country partners in AOSIS, LDCs, Africa, and four of our SAARC partners (Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan) shared this view. The only countries opposing this were the US, China, India, the Philippines, Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Saudi Arabia. It was, therefore, important for India to demonstrate that it was not completely oblivious and insensitive to the views and opinions of a large section of the global community. First, I have called for commitments in an “appropriate legal form” and not a legally-binding commitment. This is an important distinction. My statement leaves open the need for differentiation between Annex I (developed) countries and non-Annex I (developing) countries. Annex I commitments could be legally binding with penalties. Non-Annex I actions could be purely voluntary and without penalties. Moreover, the reference to an “appropriate legal form” is a very broad one. Indeed even decisions of the Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC are of an appropriate legal form. Similarly, commitments that our government makes to our Parliament are also, in our view, of an appropriate legal form. In fact, on October 5, 2009, I had mentioned the idea of introducing domestic legislation that will not contain explicit emission reduction targets but will have implicit performance targets for mitigation and adaptation (such as mandatory fuel efficiency standards by 2011, mandatory energy conservation-compliant building codes by 2012, 20% contribution of renewables to India’s energy mix by 2030 etc.). Many countries like Brazil and Mexico already have such laws and others like China and South Africa are also considering such legislation. Secondly, contrary to some misquoted references in the domestic media, I did not make any commitment on India undertaking absolute emission cuts. India has made it very clear that while it will undertake voluntary mitigation actions, including reducing the emissions intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020 on a 2005 reference year, India will not take on any emission cuts or agree to any peaking year for its emissions. There is no change in this position. Thirdly a legally binding agreement is not acceptable to India at this stage. Unless we have clarity on (a) what the substance of such an agreement is, (b) what the penalties for non-compliance are, and (c) what the system for monitoring is, we will not be able to even consider a legally binding agreement. This position remains unchanged. My effort was to walk the thin line between safeguarding our position while showing a level of sensitivity to the view shared by the majority of countries at Cancun, including many of our developing country partners. I believe we have been able to walk this thin line effectively with this stand. This nuancing of our position will expand negotiating options for us and give us an all-round advantageous standing. My constant effort has been to ensure that our negotiating stance on climate change is guided by three principles: (i) the need to protect our economic growth, inclusive development and poverty eradication agenda; (ii) the pursuit of our domestic environmental policies; and (iii) the achievement of our foreign policy objectives, in particular that India be seen as a constructive, solution-oriented player in global negotiations. I believe we have managed to accomplish these three objectives at Cancun.
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