The Tribune, Chandigarh, India

Not ‘chop’ or ‘body’ shops
US bias against Indian IT firms self-defeating

Reeling under the impact of the global meltdown, the US is tilting at windmills. It wants to blame countries like India for everything, be it increasing unemployment, lower wages or students not taking up technical education. The tendency to take potshots at the resurgent Indian industry has increased as the November Congressional elections draw near. First came allegations that Indian factories producing goods for internationally renowned labels like Marks and Spencer, Gap and Next were being run like “sweat shops”, meaning thereby that they were flouting regulations on child labour and forced labour. As if that was not enough, New York Senator Charles Schumer upped the ante even further by branding top Indian IT firms like Infosys as “chop shops”. The term is not much used in India, but is highly derogatory, referring to those dubious companies which break stolen cars to sell parts.

When this remark caused outrage in India – and rightly so – he backtracked, and said what he meant was that these were “body shops”. Accusing top Indian IT companies, which are among the best paymasters in the country, is no less insulting. But what better can be expected from a senator who is the prime mover behind the recent legislation which would steeply increase application fee for H-1B and L-1 visas, used largely by Indian IT companies like TCS, Infosys, Wipro and Satyam Mahindra for their on-site engineers deployed in US firms?

Moreover, the funds thus raised are to be used to boost security on the porous US-Mexico border, thus linking India to border security with Mexico. The protectionist move that will cost Indian companies an extra $200 million a year would also be harmful to American interests. Indian IT firms have been contributing to the US economy through innovation and job creation. The fee increase of at least $2,000 would deter many US firms from hiring talent needed to expand and create more jobs. The US is thus hurting its own cause.

A Nandigram in UP
Mayawati bows to conquer

The UP government has mishandled the farmers’ agitation. Where was the need to open fire? For 19 days the farmers had been protesting peacefully to demand higher compensation for the land being acquired for the Yamuna Expressway connecting Noida and Agra. The agitation became violent after a leader was arrested. The firing and the subsequent deaths, including that of a 12-year-old, fuelled the agitators’ anger. This galvanised the disparate anti-Mayawati parties into action. They acted the only way they know: stop work in Parliament. However, Chief Minister Mayawati was quick to realise the danger of uniting the Opposition over an emotive issue. On Tuesday she doubled the compensation for the deceased farmers’ kin to Rs 10 lakh and hiked the land acquisition rate by 20 per cent.

Whether these reconciliatory moves will douse the raging fire in UP is not yet clear, but Mayawati has exposed herself to arm-twisting. Cowering to the protesters’ demand may buy her temporary peace but this could provoke others to resort to similar tactics to get what they want. There are allegations of forcible land acquisition by the UP government for the benefit of the private builder. Farmers are losing the means of livelihood without having any stakes in the projects coming up on their land. It is strange that post-Nandigram, the UP government has learnt no lessons and formulated no clear-cut land acquisition policy.

Most state governments now avoid confrontation with farmers while acquiring land for special economic zones or smaller commercial projects. Forcible land acquisition is totally ruled out. The Mayawati government has realised this rather belatedly. Haryana has a farmer-friendly land policy under which the loss of land is compensated with inflation-linked royalty for 33 years and a job for one member of the family if an industrial project comes up on its land. Minimum rates payable are fixed depending on the location of the land. The Punjab government, on the other hand, invites bids from farmers willing to part with their land. It dropped the Mohali-Phagwara expressway after some farmers protested. Such caving in to pressure is also unhealthy for growth.

Thought for the Day

Intolerance of groups is often, strangely enough, exhibited more strongly against small differences than against fundamental ones. — Sigmund Freud

ARTICLE

Unending crisis in Nepal
The options before India
by K V Rajan

Any Indian visitor to Nepal these days would be aghast to note the depth and intensity of Nepalese resentment against India, seemingly cutting across party lines, and encompassing vast sections of the media and civil society elite.

In Kathmandu, India is widely accused today of being patronising, arrogant, insensitive, inconsistent and insincere. The most recent episode of the visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s special envoy ran into a controversy despite the fact that all sections of Nepalese society, including the Maoists, were agreed that his credentials for the job were impeccable and that India’s concern at the prolonged political stalemate in Nepal was justified. If eyebrows were raised, it was because of the timing, of the fact that for some reason the host government was not consulted on the visit, and due to insinuations that the Madhesi parties were urged by India to be “united” — meaning against the Maoists in their bid to form a new government.

The Indian Embassy has also become a special target for criticism; but this is by no means a rare occurrence. Every Indian Ambassador to Kathmandu — the present writer not excepted — at one time or another has been accused of harbouring pro-Consular aspirations. The seriousness of the charge at any given time is usually in inverse proportion to the degree of political stability in Kathmandu.

If Nepal’s “psyche” is one side of the coin, India’s policy is the other. India’s ”two-pillar” policy towards Nepal-of strengthening multiparty democracy while supporting the monarchy — implemented with inconsistency for over a decade, became part of history with the arrival of the Maoists and abolition of the monarchy in 2006, a development towards which India incidentally contributed by helping to bring the Maoists and mainstream parties together against the Palace. When the Maoists actually emerged in the Constituent Assembly elections in 2008 as the single largest party, India was stunned, but feigned satisfaction, much as did Mark Twain after being bashed up badly by a bully in school (Young Twain is supposed to have said proudly: “I did it! I put my nose firmly between his teeth, and brought him down heavily on the ground on top of me.”)

Unfortunately, deep down, India could not digest the prospect of the Maoists becoming a decisive force in the evolution of “New Nepal”. It, therefore, (at least in Nepal’s perception) supported the successful bid to replace the Prachanda government last year with a rather unwieldy coalition under Mr Madhav Kumar Nepal of the mainstream CPN (UML). It has stood by this coalition until the resignation by Prime Minister Nepal recently, as part of the UML deal with the Maoists to extend the life of the Constituent Assembly for one more year beyond May 28, when it would have expired without completing the task of writing the Constitution.

In the absence of a coherent long-term policy suited to the evolving situation in Nepal, India’s recent actions, as Nepal moved from one unsuccessful election for a new Prime Minister to another, appeared to many to have been guided by the need to prevent the Maoists from returning to power, rather than by any steadfast vision of how it could assist Nepal as a nation to overcome its challenges and achieve sustainable peace.

Ironically, even as India is criticised for interference in Nepal's internal affairs, most political leaders, including the Maoists-indeed most sections of society — seem to acknowledge the need for India to use its leverage in facilitating a freely arrived at, Nepalese-owned, end to the present crisis.

Should the Maoists be given a second opportunity on the basis of their verbal assurances? Should India seriously explore the possibility of creating an environment of what one could term “strategic trust” with the Maoists, in which Indian sensitivities on core issues of security concern would be respected, while giving the Maoists space in which they adjust to the needs of being a progressively more responsible and moderate democratic force? Or should it throw its weight behind the mainstream parties, which insist that they are not against the Maoists coming back to power, but would like to see some evidence that this time around, they are serious about disarming and fulfilling their other commitments under the peace agreement? This is the dilemma India faces.

In a sense, both sides are right: the Maoists in pleading that they should not be cornered, that it would be difficult for them to give up their only trump card-an armed militia---without first coming to power; and the traditional parties, in asking for a prior time-bound Maoist road-map towards transformation into a normal civilian party, before letting them in. Some middle ground will have to be found.

The main task now is to save the prevailing peace and proceed with the task of constitution building. There may be no alternative to allowing the Maoists as the single largest party to be accommodated in the power structure on terms the Maoists consider to be acceptable, but on the basis of credible commitments of cooperation in the peace process. India should persevere in making whatever contribution it can towards this end, without being unduly distracted by the anti-Indianism currently polluting the bilateral atmosphere. It may need to adjust its diplomatic style, but should be clear about the real priorities.

Even as the political situation is being tackled, India needs to think innovatively about bilateral cooperation. The experience of the Mahakali Treaty has shown that political instability need not come in the way of developing cooperation on the basis of transparency and cross-party consensus, Nepalese ownership and interest, and shared perceptions of a stable mutually beneficial relationship based on trust and interdependence. A massive programme for accelerating inclusive development in Nepal, in which the Maoists as well as other parties would have a stake and shared ownership, and for which Nepal’s voters would eventually give all of them credit, would also help address the problem of anti-Indianism that erupts every now and then, like Old Faithful at Yellowstone.

An Indian effort that is aimed at improving the economic prospects of the Nepalese, irrespective of the political situation, should go some way in removing the perception that political expediency is the sole basis for Indian policy. It would also stem the increasing exodus of people from Nepal by offering them the hope of a better future in their own country.

The writer was India’s Ambassador to Nepal from 1995 to 2000.

MIDDLE

Thanks for the “lesson”
by Pravin Vasisht

Just last evening when I was sitting pensive all alone in my office, having returned from a ‘condolence’ of a departed soul at Kasauli, in peeped a familiar friend from my school days. She used to top in class, and not surprisingly is a senior teacher now in a school in Singapore. Along with her husband (who is a banker) and daughter, she visits and stays in Kasauli for a few days each year, and comes to Sanawar too almost as a pilgrimage for a day.

Quite naturally, we reminisced about the ‘good old days’ at school but soon the topic of discussion turned serious to what ails the education system in our country and the world. She surprised me by saying that she wouldn’t mind quitting her high paying job in Singapore to teach at Sanawar in our Prep Department free of cost, and I did tell her that it was not worth it to leave her husband alone at Singapore to which he responded with a very broad and satisfying grin.

Anyway, she recounted how one of her ex principals in a school at Delhi once said that all he looks for in a teacher (while interviewing them for a job) in his school were two things, none of which had anything to do with qualifications, experience, knowledge or age. First, whether there was joy in their eyes, and second when he discussed children, did they break into a smile.

This was absolutely amazing. I remember how once Sri Sri Ravi Shankar was asked in a gathering as to who is successful, and was it based upon the amount of money one earned and accumulated, high status and position in society, good health, family, peace etc, and his answer was ‘Happy is he/she whose smile you cannot snatch away.” It was Buddha who centuries ago had said that, “there is no way to happiness, but happiness is the way”.

Uma and I did eventually feel that it is for our teachers to be all the more happier than others, because we nurture small saplings in our care, and they need a lot of love, and understanding. When I queried as to how do teachers remain happy when there is so much of indiscipline and pain all around in society and even in their personal lives, she said, “Well, that’s the difference between a good teacher and a bad one”.

Why can’t we be the catalysts, I thought, harbingers of a better world by being the ‘Change’ that we want to see in the world. As a parting shot, she said: “Peeks, whenever you get too distressed because of the pressures of your job, just go out and talk to small children, listen to the birds singing in the sky, or better still, take a walk in the rain”.

Thanks a lot, Uma Sarna, for this lesson. I needed it.

OPED NAXALITES

The Maoists, unlike the LTTE, do not have a political base and their growth in one area has followed their decline in another. It is only a matter of time before they are cornered
The Dust will settle down
Anjani Kumar

Policemen survey the scene of a Maoist massacre inside a forest in Jharkhand

Few had imagined the ramifications of the merger of Peoples War Group (PWG) with the MCCI and the formation of Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004 just before the Lok Sabha Elections. It was multi dimensional. One of it was the enrichment of the tactical experience of the two organisations which were hitherto operating in different terrain and diverse milieu. Though the new " Revolutionary Organisation" gained momentum, yet the cherished dream of establishing a "New democratic society" by the path of a protracted war appears to remain at best a utopia. In the process the country may have to lose many more lives and drain out huge amount of resources combating the menace of what is commonly called Left Wing Extremism (LWE).

The tactical experiences which the PWG had in Andhra Pradesh before the merger in 2004 and the field experiences of MCCI in other parts have made the CPI (Maoist) much richer and stronger in order to take on the security forces. The Maoists have learnt from their mistakes in Andhra Pradesh. From the late 1980s when PWG cadres were moving in North Telangana in very small groups ( ranging from 5 to 8), poorly armed, to the present time when in Dandakarnya and in the forests of West Bengal and Jharkhand, the CPI (Maoist) cadres are moving in larger formations of a Platoon and a Company and have also claimed to have formed Battalions, and with better weapons; it has been a long journey of learning from mistakes and improvising.

The response of the State in Andhra Pradesh was not confined to mere better tactical manoeuvrings in the jungle but also extended to issues like development of economic infrastructure, better employment opportunities and inculcating a sense of involvement with the developmental process among the people of remote and interior areas. The specialised units of the Police Department certainly played a very significant role but the response at the level of the lowest unit of administration i.e., Mandal was also very crucial. It was made possible only because of the unhindered support and guidance of the major political establishments of the State.

The contemporary scenario in the theatre of LWE gives the impression that perhaps it has reached a kind of peak from where movement in any direction will only lead to descent. Tactically the CPI Maoist does not have the wherewithal to sustain this level of Guerrilla activity over such a vast area simultaneously. The experiments of the LTTE in Sri Lanka have indicated that when Guerrilla Warfare moves from one stage to another, though it has some inherent advantages , it is fraught with many risks and contradictions. The LTTE was quite successful tactically till they were following the time-tested method of 'hit and run'. The moment they decided to manoeuvre their cadres in larger formations, they themselves became bigger targets for the conventional Sri Lankan forces.

Sooner rather than later, the Maoists in Central India may also fall prey to such inherent contradictions once the security forces operating there master the subtle nuances of unconventional jungle warfare. Furthermore, unlike the LTTE which had a very strong political base, the CPI (Maoist) have completely failed in India to have any such kind of a parallel set-up. Their support is limited to a few human rights groups, arm- chair thinkers and a handful of casual visitors to the forest.

The Guerrilla warfare perpetrated by CPI Maoist is being continued not by popular pressure but by the whims of its leaders, their number dwindling fast. In the last one year, they have lost more than a dozen of their top leaders. The remaining leaders have been working to maintain a system of ideological justification for waging war against the State. It is like imposing a dogma on a captive audience in the remote forest. Without a popular political base, such movements cannot spread beyond the remote and interior areas.

Gradually as the State reaches these remote and interior areas in a better and effective way, the Guerrillas will have no option but to shrink or move to new theatre as it happened in Andhra Pradesh. When the Maoists have to move from a situation of warfare on favourable grounds to the one which are not so favourable to them , they will find it extremely difficult to survive as it happened during their so called tactical shift from Telangana to the Nallamalla forests in the present decade of their struggle in Andhra Pradesh. Whether it is Ernesto Che Guevara in South America or Mao in China, it was a movement from one base to another after due consolidation of the first. Such a scenario is not developing in India despite the best efforts of the Maoists. Their growth in new areas has been at the cost of loss of influence in the areas where they had earlier been strong like Andhra Pradesh.

In 1961 Ernesto Che Guevara, while describing Guerrilla warfare after the Cuban victory, had mentioned that there are three fundamental lessons for conduct of revolutionary movements. They are:

1) Popular forces can win a war against the army.

2) It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection itself can create that.

3) In under developed State the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

Of these prepositions only the last one has some semblance of existence in India with reference to the contemporary developments in the forests of Bastar, Palamu, Malkangiri or Midnapore.

The security forces in India have the capacity to take greater loss and come back with rejuvenated spirit compared to the very small and poorly trained forces of the then Cuban establishment of Batista's dictatorship. The guerrilla fighters need tremendous help and support from the people of the area. This is an indispensable condition. However, the experiences in Andhra Pradesh have shown that the CPI Maoist could not sustain such a support for a reasonable length of time. The Maoists found themselves shifting bases repeatedly, from North to South Telangana to Nallamalla forests and finally to the AOB ( Andhra Orissa border). Sooner rather than later, they would find themselves in a similar situation in Dandakaranya.

Another advantage which the CPI Maoist is enjoying currently in the hot theatres of action is a good knowledge of the surrounding country side, particularly the approach and the escape routes. However, with fresh batches of trained security personnel coming out of the portals of various training centers, particularly in Chattisgarh, it would not be long before the Maoists would find themselves cornered.

The progress of revolutionary movement seems to have deviated from the envisaged path of their thinkers and planners. Furthermore, the periodicity of the setbacks of losing top cadres defies any progress of the kind explained above . It is just a matter of time before the country sees such movement largely contained and the dust settled down. A few successful ambushes in remote forest areas of Bastar do not convey any real " revolutionary advance ". It only reiterates the need to have better training of our security forces and a proper orientation on the counter Guerrilla operations where deception plays a key role.

The writer is in the IPS working as IGP Greyhounds, Andhra Pradesh. The views expressed in the article are his own and in no way represent the official understanding of any department or Government.

Extravagant but useless
The so-called ‘surrender policies’ for Naxalites are unlikely to work, partly because they are flawed and partly because it is the government that appears more keen to surrender
Uttam Sengupta

A blindfolded Naxalite after his arrest

State governments afflicted by the Maoist menace have tried very hard to formulate ‘attractive’ surrender and rehabilitation packages for underground Naxalites. Starting with Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Bihar, Jharkhand and West Bengal have all announced such packages from time to time. Some have revised and upgraded the offers and made them even more attractive, whenever necessary.

Most such packages offer a cash incentive to the rebels who choose to surrender and pay them a one-time grant and monthly stipends. Some of the packages offer land, houses and government jobs to family members while others stipulate that if they surrender with arms, they would be paid ‘extra’ depending upon the kind of arms they bring with them. A few such packages have tried to be innovative and offered to build a corpus for a few years, releasing the amount if the surrendered rebel behaves for a certain number of years.

Yet there have been very few takers. And the few hundred ‘Naxalites’, who have opted to surrender so far, have by and large been small fries working on the fringes. In any case, such surrenders have made little or no difference to the underground movement.

Even as a principle, ‘surrender policies’ look flawed. While it can be argued that elected governments have the right to declare an amnesty, condone criminal acts and discriminate between murderers and Maoists, the distinction is rarely sharp and clear. There is a thin line dividing a criminal, who kills for money, and a Naxalite who ostensibly kills to further the cause of a ‘Revolution’. While the criminal, once apprehended, is tried and punished, the Maoist can arguably walk out of his hideouts, surrender and , theoretically at least, live happily ever after under the terms of these surrender policies.

An insight into the underground movement was provided by a senior rebel leader , who once told this writer that he did not expect to see the ‘Revolution’ in his own lifetime. “ It would perhaps take 50 years or more,” he had said quietly but firmly, “ and we may not be alive to see it; but our job is to steer it to a higher level.” He readily admitted that the state had the wherewithal to crush them. “ But others will come up and take the movement forward,” he asserted. There is clearly a method in their madness. And unlike the popular presumption, generally Naxalites who matter are not bandits. They do not, therefore, behave like the dacoits from Chambal and jump at an opportunity to come out of the jungles.

A recent Press Trust of India (PTI) report quoted unnamed Bihar government officials confirming that several thousand Naxalite prisoners, 5000 to quote the report, paid tributes to one of the founders of the movement, Charu Majumdar on the same day. Incarcerated in prisons all over the state, they reportedly sang revolutionary songs and listened to speeches delivered by ‘senior’ partymen on the movement and Majumdar.

That even in prison the Naxalites are capable of such coordinated action is a significant pointer that strengthens the proposition that they be treated like political prisoners. If at all a dialogue is to be initiated, it should possibly start with this captive but committed audience.

A dialogue is of course not going to be easy, despite the President and the Prime Minister both calling upon Maoists for a dialogue in their Independence Day speeches. It is difficult, if not impossible, to hold such talks. There is, after all, no meeting ground between the elected government and Naxalites determined to overthrow the same government at gun-point.

The resources that the government seems willing to set aside for rehabilitating Naxalites, can be better spent on improving the ground situation. People at the village level need money, occupation and employment besides education and health services.

The government can certainly reward whistleblowers in the villages. Why cannot tribals hope to be rewarded if they detain a corrupt forest guard, timber smugglers or poachers ? Is it possible to reward them for information about illegal arms ? Can they actually get away if they raise their voice against policemen who frame villagers in false cases or point out the delinquent teachers and doctors who are missing from the villages ?

It is not poverty but injustice that often drives a man to join the underground. The government must, therefore, ensure justice and a clean and fair administration at the village level. It is only when the government dispenses justice, regains a position of strength and isolates people from the Naxalites that surrender policies will work, not otherwise.