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Bhopal and Kanishka tragedies
Warnings ignored in both cases
by Kuldip Nayar
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one way, the Air India Kanishka bombing and the Bhopal gas tragedy are entirely two different incidents, far removed in distance and time. Yet both of them, occurring within a year of each other, underline the same point: criminal neglect by the authorities that led to scores of killings. Ignoring the timely warning that the catastrophe was imminent, both the Canadian government and Union Carbide at Bhopal did nothing to avert the tragedies. Even warnings through email were deliberately ignored. It is all right for Justice John Major, who headed the probe in the Kanishka sabotage, to say that “this is a Canadian atrocity” or for the magistrate at Bhopal to take the operators of the plant to task for negligence. But hard words do not minimise the crime, nor do they crush bones. They do not serve even as a balm on the wounds inflicted through sheer carelessness. In both cases, there is no running away from the fact that they were deliberate, intentional murders. As many as 329 passengers, mostly of Indian origin, died in the Kanishka crash. The number in Bhopal was between 15,000 and 20,000. In the first case, a group of extremists planned and executed the bombing of the plane through a time device. The authorities, as the probe reveals, were aware of how the plan was hatched. A person had also reported to the police how he heard a bomb exploding in a nearby forest. The extremists were rehearsing the plot. Still one intelligence agency did not pass on the information to the other and allowed the crime to be committed. A better coordination, as suggested by the probe judge, or an overall supervisory outfit contemplated by the Canadian government, would help. But that is all for the future. What about punishing those who sensed the tragedy was waiting to happen and still kept quiet? Their hands are as much tainted with blood as those of the extremists who had the plane blow-up device. They cannot be allowed to go scot-free. If their crime goes unpunished, as it appears from the immediate reaction by Ottawa, it would amount to condoning murder. And if no head rolls, the government would be seen shielding the men working for police and intelligence agencies. Nothing has been heard about the action on those who planted the bomb. They are said to be roaming free in Canada and thriving without a qualm of conscience. The Ottawa government has to look into the case de novo after the verdict from the fresh probe. It is strange that the Government of India has not taken up the matter with Ottawa. People of Indian origin have been killed. If we are thinking of giving them the right to vote in Indian elections, we consider them Indians in the larger sense. The Canadian government should realise that India cares for the people of its origin. It is a pity that New Delhi does not rise to the occasion when India’s prestige is challenged. The way in which it has ignored racial attacks on Indians in Australia gives little hope of action on murder which was planned and carried out from the Canadian soil. This type of timidity has emboldened the Dow Chemicals, which has taken over Union Carbide but has refused to own responsibility, at Bhopal where thousands were killed and lakhs affected health-wise. While Justice Major rightly put the blame on the Canadian government, the Group of Ministers went out of the way to exonerate Rajiv Gandhi, India’s Prime Minister, at the time of the Bhopal tragedy. They behaved like loyal members of the Congress party. When the then state Chief Minister, Arjun Singh, says that he had no locus standi, then who allowed Warren Anderson, then chief of Union Carbide, to escape from Bhopal? Anderson was flown to Delhi by a state plane. I do not know whether Rajiv Gandhi was responsible or not. Yet the reason given by the GoM is flimsy. That there was nothing on the record of the archives of the Ministries of External Affairs and Home Affairs is no proof of his non-involvement. A CBI official has said that he was given written instructions by the External Affairs Ministry to go slow on the case. Why has the GoM not commented on that? The report is eyewash and does not hold Dow Chemicals responsible, the company which took over Union Carbide. The GoM, headed by Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram, has talked about compensation. But who will pay the compensation? Dow Chemicals, not the Indian exchequer. But when he and Kamal Nath, a member of the GoM, were once trying to see that Dow Chemicals was not responsible for any compensation, the Prime Minister was unwise to appoint one as the chairman and include the other as a member of the group. New Delhi must make Dow Chemicals pay the compensation and hold it responsible for removing the toxic material from the site at Bhopal. We should tear a leaf from President Obama’s book. He has made London’s BP to allocate $2 billion for the damage that the oil spill has created on the American coast. Why should India behave as if it is a client state of the West? We owe them nothing. In fact, they should be tiptoeing to placate a country that has more than a billion people and a huge market. Canada has at least committed itself to compensating the families of those who died in the Kanishka air crash. Dow Chemicals, on the other hand, has refused to do so. Let its conduct - it wants to make huge investment - be its credentials. India does not want it if it is not willing to own the responsibility of rehabilitating and compensating the Bhopal gas victims. Truth will some day catch up with the Congress. It may meet is nemesis in the general election when the Bhopal gas tragedy will reverberate like the Bofors gun scandal did in the country. Rajiv Gandhi lost the polls. Congress president Sonia Gandhi should read the writing
on the wall.
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MIDDLE |
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Emergency & anarchy
by Ravi K. Mahajan
Thirtyfive
years ago, when as a teenager I was preparing to leave for my nani’s house in Delhi, my parents cautioned me to be extra careful as ‘Emergency’ had been clamped. I had no clue what they were talking about. I found nothing unusual at the Chandigarh bus stand. But as the bus approached ISBT, Delhi, it halted at the specified spot. I moved to the spot where my ‘maamu’ used to pick me up. I waited for him for about an hour but he did not turn up. I then decided to take a DTC bus but the thought unnerved me. One needed the ability to sprint and the skills of a good wrestler to get into a DTC bus. But to my surprise, there was a long queue. Two well-dressed officials in uniform were guiding people to various queues and warning them against jumping the queues. The arrival of the local bus on time was another surprise but that surprise was shortlived as I was overwhelmed to find that the door of the bus opened at the exact point where the first person in the queue was to board the bus. In the bus, both the driver and the conductor were in uniform. They were at their best behaviour and were guiding passengers with do’s and don’ts. How could the “Emergency” change people so much, I wondered. Once I reached my naani’s house, I was told that “maamu” could not go to pick me up because of the “Emergency”. He had to be in the office and could not leave on any pretext. Life looked unbelievably organised. Shopkeepers kept proper records and displays. No adulteration, no dilution of duty and no beneath-the-table transaction. Cleanliness and courtesies were the norm. Frankly, it was much better than what I recently experienced even in Singapore. Finally, in March 1977 the Emergency was lifted. There were celebrations all around. “Restoration of Fundamental Rights” and “Freedom” became the buzz words. What followed is well known. We have reached a stage now where our “fundamental rights” are not always righteous. We are so free that more than half of India is clamouring for peace. The farmers are forced to sell off their land and encouraged to buy flats and cars; the policemen are more interested in catching those who defy the yellow light, while saluting cars with beaconlamps even if they jump the red light. Babus have become bosses. Auditors now expect honorariums. Serious students are treated at par with those who believe in drinking, dining and dancing rather than studies. Teachers discuss their pay packages more than deliberations on their subjects. Anarchy is the rule and we probably need another “emergency” minus
excesses.
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OPED
DEFENCE |
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KARGIL REVISITED: NEED TO REMEDY THAN DEFAME
Premvir Das
Eleven years on, the Armed Forces Tribunal has cast aspersions on the integrity of the army’s hierarchy. Actions that tend to denigrate the military, which its leaders symbolise, can damage an institution that is critical to the health of the nation
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Photo: Manoj Mahajan
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The
recent judgment of the Central Armed Forces Tribunal (CAFT) casting aspersions on the integrity of the Army's higher commanders and requiring 'the history of the Kargil operations to be rewritten' is as worrisome as it is saddening. The crux of the matter is that the Brigade Commander in the Batalik Sector, Devinder Singh, had given certain advice in April 1999 which was 'brushed aside' by the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Kishen Pal; that consequently, he had few troops to respond to the enemy presence which was much larger than that estimated by Pal and more in line with his own assessment resulting in needless casualties; that the Corps Commander then 'doctored' the 'After Action Report' (AAR) to show that much of the action had actually been carried out by another officer deputed for the purpose; and, in summation, that this 'falsified' reporting had resulted in Brig. Devinder Singh being overlooked for promotion despite his 'bravery and courage'.
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First, no troops are moved from one formation to another without the knowledge, if not approval, of the Army headquarters, more so during an operation such as Kargil. To say that Pal could doctor his AARs without the knowledge of his Northern Army Commanders or even Army HQ is being utterly naïve of ground realities. So, if command of part of the sector with a certain number of battalions belonging to 70 Brigade (Singh's formation) was assigned to another officer deputed from higher headquarters, it is inconceivable that this fact and, indeed, the reasons for it and the period for which the assignment was being made, had not been discussed between the Corps Commander and also the Director General Military Operations (DGMO) in New Delhi. In all likelihood, the Army Vice Chief was also aware. To say, therefore, that Pal could hoodwink all others by claiming that the deputed officer had conducted the operations, and not Singh, is something utterly unbelievable. So, if a doctored report was put up and allowed to pass, the entire Army's hierarchy should be called to question from top downwards. It is not possible for the Northern Command to allow Pal's report to pass knowing it to be incorrect, if not false. Even if for some reason, both the Northern Army Commander and the Corps Commander were in connivance, the 'mistake' would have been spotted by the DGMO. It defies logic that the entire Army was acting in concert to 'fix' one brigadier. This does not mean that Singh, himself, was not doing a good job or that Pal is not accountable for some serious errors of judgment. But these are two different things. This brings us to the aspect of promotions. In the armed forces, there is need for bravery as well as leadership. It is seldom true that both go 'hand-in-glove'. Very few non-posthumous Victoria Cross winners got promoted to high ranks. It is likewise for our Param Vir Chakra, Mahavir Chakra and Vir Chakra awardees. Bravery and courage are spur-of-the-moment attributes. Leadership allows these qualities to be generated. Just because a brigadier does not get promoted does not mean that he is wanting. After all, only four out of 20 brigadiers might get promoted. One can argue that the selection system should be more 'transparent and fair'. But it cannot change the fact that there will still be 16 'failures' for four promotions. So, if Singh did not get promoted, he was just one of the unfortunates. Kargil is only one relevant part. His annual confidential reports over at least three assignments would have been considered by the Promotion Board alongside those of other candidates of matching experience and performance. This is not to suggest that there are not occasional aberrations. It is precisely in order to provide remedy to such an eventuality that the government has established a recourse to review by an independent authority. Until recently, aggrieved officers could approach the High Court. This process inevitably resulted in delayed redressal by already over-burdened courts. The constitution of CAFT and other AFTs is, therefore, welcome. The CAFT would have considered the issue. After all a former Justice of the Supreme Court was presiding with a former Army Vice Chief as member. They must have found that the brigadier's promotion was justified and this is a valid proposition. Based on this finding, the CAFT should have directed the government to promote the officer with retrospective effect and to give him the consequent financial benefits. But it may have exceeded its jurisdiction in saying that the history of the Kargil operations, as written, was 'malafide' and that it ought to be rewritten. The judgment casts serious aspersion on the integrity of the entire military hierarchy. This aspect should get careful and critical scrutiny and perhaps needs to be appealed before the Supreme Court. On the other hand, if it is now established that several rungs higher than the Corps Commander were in the know and had actively or passively allowed a less than factual report to pass through unchallenged. Action should be initiated against them. Actions which tend to denigrate the military, which its leaders symbolise and represent, can only be counter-productive, and damage an institution which is critical to the health of the nation. (The writer is a former Director
General Defence Planning Staff)
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Though there is consensus over the grit displayed by the Indian soldier, opinions vary on strategy and aspects of higher defence management in the country.
I feel that there was one failure overall in the entire episode and that was intelligence failure. Had the intelligence system, which comprises a host of agencies, worked in unison, the outcome would have been a lot different, especially in terms of casualties. As for the operational part, the nation fought well and the Indian soldier proved mettle. There are a lot of lesions to be learnt from the conflict like having multiple access roads and logistic infrastructure in that region, reliable and timely intelligence, maintaining optimum trop levels and finally having a determined approach towards defined objectives. –Lt Gen BS Randhawa
(Retd)
Former Director General Rashtriya Rifles  The performance of troops on the ground was highly commendable. But after having won a victory, we as a nation of fools ordered an inquiry into it instead of undertaking a quiet internal assessment into the shortcomings. No war anywhere has been fought without having foul-ups and there have been a series of failures even in the most powerful and advanced nations and its intelligence agencies. Also, the air force participation in the conflict did not come in time for which the government is partly to blame.
— Brig Kiran Krishan
(Retd)
Defence Analyst  The biggest problem with our strategy in Kargil was that we did not open up another front in an area of our choosing. This would have created pressure on the enemy to vacate the occupied heights and thus significantly reduced casualties. Also, our stand on not crossing the LOC was questionable when the enemy had already crossed over into our area. Despite heavy casualties, it was diplomatic pressure that finally prevailed upon Pakistan to withdraw. Even then the Kargil sector is still not fully cleared of enemy occupation. Given the end result, the entire operation and the consequent cost appear to be an exercise in futility
— Col
P.K. Vasudeva (Retd)
Defence Analyst
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Army’s Internal Assessment
A secret internal assessment undertaken by the Army in 2004 on the directives of then Army Chief, Gen N.C
Vij, who was the Director General of Military operations during the Kargil conflict, has revealed several shortcomings in the rank and file as well as operational preparedness. These include:
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Senior commanders were late to assess and react to the situation. Many senior officers, including battalion commanders, had an older age profile and were physically unfit for the terrain, climate and the type of operations.n
JCOs, the junior commanders, whose experience and bonding with the troops form the Army's cutting edge failed to deliver. There was a severe lack of initiative among the
JCOs. Troops rushed in to the war zone were not acclimatised. n
A sense of complacency prevailed among officers and men on the belief that the terrain was so tough that there could be no be incursions. Vacating critical posts during winter, lack of ground sensors and the inability of the Military Intelligence to analyse certain inputs proved to be the undoing. n
Indian troops maintained a defensive posture and lacked adequate firepower and poise. As the war broke out, the Army concluded that it did have adequate troops in the region to tackle the emerging threat. In addition to inadequate higher caliber artillery guns, the Army did not have committed and trained force levels to deal with Pakistan. n
The
Udhampur-based Northern Command was stretched and unable to cope with the emerging threat of war as it had to oversee Kargil operations, man the entire stretch of the
LoC, the LAC and the International border as well as conduct counter- insurgency operations in the state. n
Special Forces were misused. Many SF units were used as regular infantry to capture objectives. Not only were they lacking in key equipment, but were deployed for a role they were neither equipped nor trained for. |
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