The friendly gesture cements the accord signed during Mr Vajpayee's visit that border trade will be conducted through Chhangu in Sikkim. Bilateral trade has already crossed the $ 5-billion mark and can grow to $7 billion in the near future with the reopening of the Nathu La trade route linking Gangtok with Lhasa. At the same time, border talks have also been proceeding satisfactorily between Special Representative Brajesh Mishra and his Chinese counterpart, Senior Vice-Minister Dai Bingguo, despite the compulsions of the election year in India. The third round of talks scheduled to be held at this high level sometime next month is likely to further narrow down the differences.

Notwithstanding these and a few other legal glitches, the Patna High Court ruling as such cannot be dismissed outright because it raises serious questions of constitutional law and practice. It is in the fitness of things that even while granting a stay on the Patna High Court ruling, the Supreme Court has kept open, for future consideration, the question of whether an undertrial prisoner, who has no right to vote, could contest an election.

As highlighted by The Tribune report on Tuesday, rocks in the forest range of Sundarnagar and Mandi have been defiled by painting on them a candidate’s name along with the party’s flag and election symbol. This is in violation of the Election Commission’s clear directions to the Chief Secretaries and the Chief Election Officers. This was bad enough. Worse is the attitude of the officials concerned. They have failed to act. How can one expect district-level officials to protect far-away rocks when they are blind to the defacement of public property right outside the office of the Mandi Deputy Commissioner, who also happens to be a Returning Officer?

The second stage is when violence has been adequately controlled. In this stage, the paramilitary and civil police forces get a more prominent role. The Army is readily available to support operations but is less visible. There is much greater visibility and action by the civil administration. The political leaders also become more visible.

In the third stage, it is possible to conduct elections at different levels —parliament, state, municipalities and village panchayat. The civil administration and the police forces are fully active. The Army goes back to barracks.

To oversee operations, it is essential to have a unified command structure working under a Governor/Chief Administrator who must ensure total coordination and cooperation among different functioning agencies — intelligence, military police, and administrative and political agencies. The elected political leader should replace the Governor or Chief Administrator’s rule as soon as it is possible to conduct elections and be accountable thereafter.

Counter-insurgency operations are very difficult, troops intensive, and time consuming. The transition through these three stages is seldom clearly discernible. The role of the four major players that I have mentioned i.e. Army, police, state civil administration and the state political authority, has to be finely orchestrated with careful reading of the ground situation.

The aim of military operations should only be to isolate and arrest or eliminate the hardcore secessionist elements and to deter their supporters. The security forces have to use a stick-and-carrot approach. It is essential to employ the principle of ‘use of minimum force’. During such operations, security forces not only fight militants and anti-social elements, but also reassure innocent people feeling insecure or neglected due to inadequate civil administration.

The security forces should involve senior and respected citizens and professionals during their operations as a link between them and the locals. They should also form citizens’ committees to learn about their difficulties, and hold meetings with them as frequently as possible. Along with counter-insurgency operations, small and large-scale civic action programmes need to be undertaken. The Army has often formed the Army Development Group and launched Operation Sadbhavana for this purpose. The overall aim is to win the hearts and minds of the populace. It is counter-productive to alienate hundreds and thousands in order to arrest or kill a suspect.

At no stage, therefore, can any nation afford to give a full licence to the security forces to operate freely. There is a requirement to define their responsibility, authority, legality, and accountability clearly.

With experience, we have realised that we need specially organised, equipped and trained, areas-oriented army and police forces to deal with insurgencies. Special Forces, Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles, Rapid Reaction Force, etc are some examples. These forces, and those who work alongside, need training for local terrain, people, their language, customs, and traditions. Special training schools have to be established for this purpose. The Army insists that every soldier, deployed for such operations, carries a Do’s and Don’ts card on his person.

As stated, there is no military solution to an insurgency/secessionist problem. The military can only create conditions wherein the insurgents are inclined to or feel it necessary to come to the negotiating table. The solution ultimately lies in the political domain; within national constitution or modified constitution.

It is always a long process. There may be some political agreements or declarations in between. What happens if the insurgents violate that? Who is to ensure its compliance? I believe that only the security forces with political clearance and enough strength can handle that. Third party mediation seldom works.

A gray area in our country has been in expeditiously prosecuting antinational elements arrested by the security forces. One can appreciate the difficulty of doing so in open courts where no one is likely to give evidence. And yet, one cannot afford to let those who commit heinous crimes to get away without due legal punishment or just remain in jail till bailed out. It is then necessary to constitute special courts and legal procedures to process such cases.

There is also the question of human rights. Human rights are defined in the UN Charter. But it would be too much to expect their uniform application in all societies. Institutions like Amnesty International and World Watch are not fully justified in looking at violation of human rights in all parts of the world through a single prism. Constitution of indigenous and effective Human Rights Commission at the state and national level works better. All forces must respect its enquiries.

It is essential to stop all external support to secessionist groups and deny them establishing roots. This has to be done through bilateral or multilateral diplomatic means, as well as with aggressive counter-infiltration military operations on the ground. Total denial of infiltration and exfiltration, particularly in snow-bound mountainous terrain, however, is seldom achievable.

Let me state a few words about the Indian armed forces and the Army in particular, to be able to highlight the reasons for their success in such conflict situations.

The Indian armed forces are a truly people’s force, with recruits from all over the country and different strata of society. They are a true reflection of the basic national concept of unity and diversity: an example, where soldiers of all classes, creeds and religions serve the nation loyally, effectively, and with total dedication. The people of India look at them as secular, fair and impartial. Indian armed forces revel in their status as role model for national integration and meritocracy.

Also, an important legacy of the Indian armed forces has been their apolitical outlook. Their oath is to the Constitution of India and to the constitutionally elected central government. They have always stuck to the concept of loyalty to the constitutionally elected government and thus enabled the nation to develop its unique democratic political ambience. They have actively supported the democratic electoral process. They do not interfere in the electoral process but when required in disturbed areas they ensure a conducive and peaceful atmosphere for the conduct of free and fair polls.

Second, excessive and continuous involvement of the Army in internal security is neither good for the Army or for the nation. There are several reasons for it (a) such duties have an adverse impact on our combat deterrence and dissuasive posture and thus serve the aim and objectives of our potential adversaries. (b) High military casualties during peacetime affect the morale of the troops and the civil population (c) Over-dependence on the Army reflects lack of trust and faith in the capability of the state and central armed police and paramilitary forces. This is not in the interest of our states or the central government. (d) During a war or a war- like situation, the army needs the support of the people. It cannot afford to alienate the local population.

“You are so lucky you live alone,” some of my friends tell me and others say: “Living alone is not the worst thing in the world.” I’ve never said it is but it’s strange that only friends who live with their spouses and their children make these remarks.

I keep a beautiful home. I’ve made an obsession of my interest in antique blue and white Chinese porcelain. I spend an hour everyday working out in a gym or cycling through the quieter parts of the town where I live. I enjoy my teaching and enjoy running the school that I head. I go to the movies fairly often and I read a great deal and when I can find the time and the inclination, I write.

I do not socialise much but when I do go to attend a social event there are always a few old students there who make it a point to come up to me to tell me what a wonderful teacher I was. I am flattered and in return for this praise I ensure that I do not hold them for more than a minute or two — I know they have other more interesting people waiting for their attention. All in all I lead a full life and I am really surprised how quickly each day comes to an end and how smoothly the days flow one into the other.

There are a few distractions but I try not to dwell on them too deeply and so spoil the even flow of my grey years.

When I sit reading late in the evening, I glance from time to time at the telephone. When it does ring it is usually a wrong number and I cannot hide from myself the wistful wish that the voice at the other end would say something more than: “I am sorry to have bothered you.” When I go to return the books that Rajiv so kindly lets me borrow from his shop each week he smiles and says: “You are an avid reader!”. I wonder why I feel no pride at this praise but only a swift, sharp stab of pain. And on the rare occasion at the movies when people returning to their seats after the interval, brush against my knees the sensation is so unusual that I am painfully aware of how chronically untouched I remain for most of the time.

This is despite the fact that the Pakistan Army launched a combat operation (March 16-29, 2004) against Al Qaida elements in South Waziristan.

The South Waziristan operation is a typical case of missing the wood for the trees which obviously prompted Afghanistan-based American troops to feign an unitended incursion into Pakistani territory. The terrorists, particularly the “high value targets” (read Arab nationals) got away with the help of the tribals after paying large chunks of money, leaving their poorer brethren— the Chechens and the Uzbeks — in the hands of the Pakistan Army. Many of them were believed to have shifted to Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad and other cities after sending families back to their native countries.

The operation thus followed the revolving door policy, a covert military strategem which Islamabad has perfected in past two decades. The operation has raised questions on the entire strategy of the government in the tribal areas and renewed criticism as to how far President Pervez Musharraf could go to appease the US.

Pakistan intelligence agencies claimed that they were unable to pay adequate compensation for reliable information that could lead them to the militants. It also brought into sharp focus the inadequate intelligence available with the government. Amidst reports that the terrorists were using money power to manoeuvre the tribals, Gen Musharraf called upon the international community to provide greater aid for development work in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

In an attempt to regain the trust and goodwill of the tribals, Pakistan Prime Minister Mir Zafrullah Khan Jamali announced a Rs 999 million development package for the area, most of which would go towards compensation for loss of life and property to civilians during the operation.

Though the Pakistani Government has tried hard to project the exercise as a success, its dependence on the tribal jirgas to secure surrender and the heavy casualities has done no credit to the professional image of the Pakistan Army, which, after a tactical retreat, is reported to have reinforced its deployment in the region. There were suggestions that the action was a result of US pressure.

Consider these facts. About 70000 Pakistani troops were reported to be involved in the operation, backed by helicopter gunships and fighter aircraft. Heavy artillery, mortar and rockets were also used. A total of 63 militants were killed and 163 apprehended while 46 Pakistan security personnel were also killed, as per Pakistan government figures.

The operation was launched two days before the visit of the US Secretary of State Colin Powell to Islamabad on March 17-18, 2004.

Earlier, in October 2003, Pakistan armed forces had launched a similar operation “Mizan” in South Waziristan Agency when US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was in Pakistan on an official visit.

Similarly, in June 2003, just two weeks before President Musharraf’s visit to the US, a major military operation was undertaken involving two Divisions of the Pakistan Army and a Brigade of SSG in the Mohmand Agency in the FATA region, in which a large number of tribal and about 25 Pakistani Army personnel were reported to have been killed.

On March 15, 2004 Gen Musharraf addressed a tribal Jirga in Peshawar in which he said that there would be serious repercussions for Pakistan if foreign militants were not expelled from the tribal regions. He said that there was confirmation that 500-600 foreign militants were being sheltered in the South Waziristan region.

Three days later, the General said that troops had surrounded a “high value target” fuelling speculation that the target could be Al Zawahiri, second-in-command within Al Qaeda. Subsequently, it was believed that the Uzbek extremist, Tohir Yuldashev, had been injured in the fighting, but that he eventually escaped.

President Musharraf warned the ‘foreign’ militants to surrender, leave or be killed. The government claimed to have cleared around 40 square miles around the areas of Azam Warsak, Kaloosha and Sheen Warsak (near WANA) but announced that troops would remain deployed in South Waziristan Agency for an ‘indefinite period’. It extended the deadline to May 1, 2004 for the tribesmen to hand over the terrorists under their protection and offered amnesty and assured that those arrested would not be handed over to any foreign authority.

At the same time, Pakistani officials also started to echo the need for finding “political solution” to the issue. A grand tribal Jirga of all tribes and a tribal Jirga of Zalikhel tribe was constituted. They worked out a “reconciliation agreement” between the government and the wanted tribal leaders (April 24). Under this “agreement”, government granted amnesty to five tribal leaders, wanted for giving shelter to Al Qaida elements, after they surrendered arms and vowed to support government in its efforts to fight terror.

The BRO has been entrusted with the task of constructing the strategic 219-km stretch, which would provide India with a window to Iran, a strategic partner, and other Central Asian Republics, specially for operational and trade matters.

India is already on the way to position itself as a major regional power and this road—from Velaran to Zaranj, linking the Garland Highway in Afghanistan—will help in strategic movements.

The BRO Director General, Lt. Gen Ranjit Singh, says that the road will be constructed in the next three years at an estimated cost of Rs 377.47 crore.

The BRO, which is celebrating its 44th anniversary, started with just two projects in May, 1960. Now it has as many as 13 projects spread over 25 states, mostly in the North and the North-East.