The theme of leadership
By K.S. Bajwa

THE British Indian Army was an extra-ordinary institution. Raised by an alien power, out of a subject people, it proved its mettle as a fighting force against the best of the soldiers of what was commonly known as the free world. What makes the achievements of the Indian soldier even more remarkable is that his adversaries were invariably fighting to uphold their well-defined national causes. The Germans, the Italians, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Turks and many more of the worlds renowned fighting men, wilted against the fierce combat spirit and the staying power of the Indian soldier. Given the origins and the circumstances of creation of this force, there has been no parallel in the global history of arms.

What were motivations that animated this unusual army? Was it the Indian military tradition shaped and evolved by centuries of turmoil fed by the regional disparities within the country and the hordes of foreign invaders that time and again plundered the land? Was it the fusion of the centuries old Indian martial experience with the concepts of warfare that shaped disciplined standing armies and the fire power of gun-powder, evolved in the continental conflicts of Europe that the British and the French bought with them? Or, was it that the Indian soldier and the officers who led him in battle, were exceptionally gifted with courage, steadfastness, and a devil-may-care attitude to life?

A positive affirmation to all of the above directions of enquiry will undoubtedly emerge from many vantage points of history. While our military tradition is replete with chronicles of chivalry and valour, the thrust was invariably for a halo of individual glory. Our military organisations lacked the unifying theme of a central purpose on which to hang loyalty and endeavour. The humility, deep faith, fortitude and a moral back-bone embedded in ancient Indian culture, provided exceptional human resources. Yet in the history of indigenous warfare, treachery, defections and desertions had been common place.

The fragmented Indian society, the regional and local pulls and the lack of a unifying theme, nurtured personal loyalties to immediate leaders. This spawned a siladari system, in which each notable raised his own force and placed it at the disposal of his liege lord in times of need. These loose unit organisations failed at critical junctures to measure up against better organised, led and motivated foreign invaders. It were only the Marathas under Shivaji, Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan and the Sikhs under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who displayed a grasp of military organisations and concepts, that matched those of the foreign intruders. Their failures lay in a lack of a unity of purpose.

Those who wielded British power shrewdly assessed the strengths and weaknesses of the vast Indian human resources. To an Indian soldier, who neither fought for a hearth and a home, nor for a flag that symbolised the pride of his nation, they assiduously cultivated and gave two tangible articles of faith; a leadership they could admire and a regimental spirit on which to hang their hopes and pride. Weapons, equipment and training changed decade after decade. The ability to move quickly on the battlefield and the force that can be brought to bear at the point of decision, have also undergone quantum jumps. The most important ingredient of victory is the spirit which makes an army effective, runs as a constant thread. This spirit is born, nurtured and sustained by mutual confidence between officers and the men. This, in turn, depends on the virtues of loyalty, mutual care, fidelity and courage.

The British were adventurers, who exploited the disunity of India to their advantage. They were rudely shaken by the eruptions of 1857, but they learnt their lessons well. Identification of the military leaders with their men, while maintaining a tone of unquestioned moral authority, fierce downward loyalty and a regimental spirit (that nearly transcended all except the supremacy of the crown), became guiding spirits. Diligence is precept and practice bred a tradition of mutual belogingness. Long after the British had departed the shores of India, it has not been uncommon to see erstwhile British officers on their annual jaunts to spend some time amongst their old regiments.

It emerges that the peerless soldiers, the equation of faith between him and his officers and the pre-eminence of the regimental spirit, were what gave a unique character to the British Indian Army. Given the same human resources, how do we then explain the dismal episode of 1962 against the Chinese? The Indian officers, who were overnight catapulted to positions of high authority after Independence inherited very exacting traditions and practices. Considering their lack of actual experience in the higher echelons of military command, they did a creditable job of preserving the fabric of the Army.

With great gusto, they applied themselves to discipline, the preservation of authority and the sanctity of traditions. Keeping intact the rhythms and patterns of social life were their special concern. Theirs was a holding operation and they did not involve themselves too closely with the soul of the Army, yearning to discover the new vistas that Independence had opened up.

The calculating British had struck a blow, even before these well-meaning leaders had taken a grip over their new responsibilities. In 1946, on the event of independence, the pay and allowances of the Indian commissioned officers were drastically reduced while the pelf and privileges of KCIOS (Kings Commissioned Indian Officers) were fully preserved. The chosen few fell for this self-serving carrot, while the rest of the officer crops was beaten down with the stick of authority. A wedge had been driven into the cohesion of the corps of officers. It also heralded a new tradition of compromises and the decline of moral authority.

The Indian leadership that came into power after Independence did not quite understand the vital necessity of creating an effective armed power as an instrument of state policy. From their pacifist moral standpoint, armed power was a burden on the state which could be dispensed with. At the same time, they developed a coup syndrome and distrusted the soldiers. Both these factors combined to promote a neglect and degradation of the armed forces.

The debacle of 1962 against the Chinese was a rude shock. However, by this time, with a view to assert very tight civilian hold over the armed forces, such control structures had been created that the military leadership specifically and the man in uniform in general had been effectively downgraded. The control over the budget including even the allotments on revenue account and promtions and postings of officers of colonel and higher ranks (and their equivalents in the Air Force and the Navy) were tightly controlled by the Ministry of Defence.

Over the years, under a succession of indifferent defence ministers, the whole structure degenerated and came to be ruled by the civil service. The Ministry of Defence grew into an octopus to exercise a stranglehold over the armed forces. The sensitive area of the regimental spirit too was not spared. Both the policy of recruitment based on state quotas and an ill-conceived raising of mixed class units without first fostering their raison de etre struck body blows.

The level of disillusionment with service, reluctance to choose careers in uniform, increasing recourse to courts to seek redress for some of the grievance, the very visible downgrading of service chiefs and other senior officers who invariably set the role-model tone and a beginning of a lack of cohesion in units are clearly indicative of the damage that has been done to the credibility of military leadership and the regimental spirit, the two vital factors for developing a battle-winning combat cutting edge.

There is an urgent need for an exercise of soul-searching to define and launch measures to rejuvenate the equation between the leaders, the men and regimental spirit.

This feature was published on May 9, 1999