The theme of
leadership
By K.S. Bajwa
THE British Indian Army was an
extra-ordinary institution. Raised by an alien power, out
of a subject people, it proved its mettle as a fighting
force against the best of the soldiers of what was
commonly known as the free world. What makes the
achievements of the Indian soldier even more remarkable
is that his adversaries were invariably fighting to
uphold their well-defined national causes. The Germans,
the Italians, the Chinese, the Japanese, the Turks and
many more of the worlds renowned fighting men, wilted
against the fierce combat spirit and the staying power of
the Indian soldier. Given the origins and the
circumstances of creation of this force, there has been
no parallel in the global history of arms.
What were motivations
that animated this unusual army? Was it the Indian
military tradition shaped and evolved by centuries of
turmoil fed by the regional disparities within the
country and the hordes of foreign invaders that time and
again plundered the land? Was it the fusion of the
centuries old Indian martial experience with the concepts
of warfare that shaped disciplined standing armies and
the fire power of gun-powder, evolved in the continental
conflicts of Europe that the British and the French
bought with them? Or, was it that the Indian soldier and
the officers who led him in battle, were exceptionally
gifted with courage, steadfastness, and a devil-may-care
attitude to life?
A positive affirmation
to all of the above directions of enquiry will
undoubtedly emerge from many vantage points of history.
While our military tradition is replete with chronicles
of chivalry and valour, the thrust was invariably for a
halo of individual glory. Our military organisations
lacked the unifying theme of a central purpose on which
to hang loyalty and endeavour. The humility, deep faith,
fortitude and a moral back-bone embedded in ancient
Indian culture, provided exceptional human resources. Yet
in the history of indigenous warfare, treachery,
defections and desertions had been common place.
The fragmented Indian
society, the regional and local pulls and the lack of a
unifying theme, nurtured personal loyalties to immediate
leaders. This spawned a siladari system, in which
each notable raised his own force and placed it at the
disposal of his liege lord in times of need. These loose
unit organisations failed at critical junctures to
measure up against better organised, led and motivated
foreign invaders. It were only the Marathas under
Shivaji, Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan and the Sikhs
under Maharaja Ranjit Singh, who displayed a grasp of
military organisations and concepts, that matched those
of the foreign intruders. Their failures lay in a lack of
a unity of purpose.
Those who wielded
British power shrewdly assessed the strengths and
weaknesses of the vast Indian human resources. To an
Indian soldier, who neither fought for a hearth and a
home, nor for a flag that symbolised the pride of his
nation, they assiduously cultivated and gave two tangible
articles of faith; a leadership they could admire and a
regimental spirit on which to hang their hopes and pride.
Weapons, equipment and training changed decade after
decade. The ability to move quickly on the battlefield
and the force that can be brought to bear at the point of
decision, have also undergone quantum jumps. The most
important ingredient of victory is the spirit which makes
an army effective, runs as a constant thread. This spirit
is born, nurtured and sustained by mutual confidence
between officers and the men. This, in turn, depends on
the virtues of loyalty, mutual care, fidelity and
courage.
The British were
adventurers, who exploited the disunity of India to their
advantage. They were rudely shaken by the eruptions of
1857, but they learnt their lessons well. Identification
of the military leaders with their men, while maintaining
a tone of unquestioned moral authority, fierce downward
loyalty and a regimental spirit (that nearly transcended
all except the supremacy of the crown), became guiding
spirits. Diligence is precept and practice bred a
tradition of mutual belogingness. Long after the British
had departed the shores of India, it has not been
uncommon to see erstwhile British officers on their
annual jaunts to spend some time amongst their old
regiments.
It emerges that the
peerless soldiers, the equation of faith between him and
his officers and the pre-eminence of the regimental
spirit, were what gave a unique character to the British
Indian Army. Given the same human resources, how do we
then explain the dismal episode of 1962 against the
Chinese? The Indian officers, who were overnight
catapulted to positions of high authority after
Independence inherited very exacting traditions and
practices. Considering their lack of actual experience in
the higher echelons of military command, they did a
creditable job of preserving the fabric of the Army.
With great gusto, they
applied themselves to discipline, the preservation of
authority and the sanctity of traditions. Keeping intact
the rhythms and patterns of social life were their
special concern. Theirs was a holding operation and they
did not involve themselves too closely with the soul of
the Army, yearning to discover the new vistas that
Independence had opened up.
The calculating British
had struck a blow, even before these well-meaning leaders
had taken a grip over their new responsibilities. In
1946, on the event of independence, the pay and
allowances of the Indian commissioned officers were
drastically reduced while the pelf and privileges of
KCIOS (Kings Commissioned Indian Officers) were fully
preserved. The chosen few fell for this self-serving
carrot, while the rest of the officer crops was beaten
down with the stick of authority. A wedge had been driven
into the cohesion of the corps of officers. It also
heralded a new tradition of compromises and the decline
of moral authority.
The Indian leadership
that came into power after Independence did not quite
understand the vital necessity of creating an effective
armed power as an instrument of state policy. From their
pacifist moral standpoint, armed power was a burden on
the state which could be dispensed with. At the same
time, they developed a coup syndrome and distrusted the
soldiers. Both these factors combined to promote a
neglect and degradation of the armed forces.
The debacle of 1962
against the Chinese was a rude shock. However, by this
time, with a view to assert very tight civilian hold over
the armed forces, such control structures had been
created that the military leadership specifically and the
man in uniform in general had been effectively
downgraded. The control over the budget including even
the allotments on revenue account and promtions and
postings of officers of colonel and higher ranks (and
their equivalents in the Air Force and the Navy) were
tightly controlled by the Ministry of Defence.
Over the years, under a
succession of indifferent defence ministers, the whole
structure degenerated and came to be ruled by the civil
service. The Ministry of Defence grew into an octopus to
exercise a stranglehold over the armed forces. The
sensitive area of the regimental spirit too was not
spared. Both the policy of recruitment based on state
quotas and an ill-conceived raising of mixed class units
without first fostering their raison de etre struck
body blows.
The level of
disillusionment with service, reluctance to choose
careers in uniform, increasing recourse to courts to seek
redress for some of the grievance, the very visible
downgrading of service chiefs and other senior officers
who invariably set the role-model tone and a beginning of
a lack of cohesion in units are clearly indicative of the
damage that has been done to the credibility of military
leadership and the regimental spirit, the two vital
factors for developing a battle-winning combat cutting
edge.
There is an urgent need
for an exercise of soul-searching to define and launch
measures to rejuvenate the equation between the leaders,
the men and regimental spirit.
|