Wearing
strategic blinkers
By K.S. Bajwa
IN September 1947, General Sir Rob
Lockhart, the British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian
Army after Independence, sought the governments
specific assessment of military threats likely to be
faced by the country. Nehru told Lockhart, "We
forsee no military threats to the country..." The
subsequent unfolding of events clearly (and rather
forcefully) showed how naive and wrong Nehru was in
arriving at this estimation. Within a month, we were
fighting to defend Kashmir, which had acceded to India.
The decades that followed have witnessed the Indian armed
forces almost continuously engaged in defending the
country against external aggression as well as foreign
abetted terrorism.
Whether it was the revival
of Indian military power leading to successful defence of
the nation in 1965 or the decisive military victory in
1971, we have failed to usher in a durable peace. Today,
despite our considerable armed power, our security
environment has become increasingly fragile.
Neither our leadership nor
the people at large have clearly grasped the essential
nature or armed power and its effective integration into
state policy initiatives to defend national interests.
This, when other means have failed to achieve desired
results.
Armed power is a forceful
instrument of state policy. For every nation, there are
economic, political and territorial interests that are
vital to its survival and progress. It is, however,
inevitable that interests vital to one nation would
impinge upon and come into conflict with those of another
nation. Every state deploys a combination of political,
economic and diplomatic initiatives to attain such
objectives as would protect and promote its interests.
Armed power in-being adds
convincing weightage to such initiatives. Equally, it
insulates the country from intimidation and coercion by
threatened use of armed power by other nations. When a
military option is resorted to, the military objectives
chosen should force the adversary to concede conditions,
courses and developments which lead to the fulfilment of
immediate as well as long-term national aims. When faced
with a potential aggressor, all those objectives which
may strengthen its bargaining position have to be stoutly
denied. Recourse may also be taken to a well chosen
pre-emptive spoiling military strike.
However, military success
by itself is not enough. It primarily creates the
conditions and favourable openings for all the other
tools of statecraft to promote national interest. In this
context, there is much to learn when we carefully
consider the performance of our political and military
leadership after Independence.
Immediately before and
soon after Independence, the affairs of the state of
Jammu and Kashmir presented the first real challenge
before our policy-makers. This state was of considerable
geo-strategic importance on two main counts. The Gilgit
Agency provided a window to China (Xinjiang), Asiatic
Republics of the erstwhile USSR, Afghanistan and North
West Frontier Province, that became part of Pakistan.
After Pakistan acquired control over this area in October
1947, it exploited its strategic potential to the USA in
the cold war equation against the erstwhile USSR to
extract substantial military and economic aid as well as
a visible tilt in its favour in the world forums.
The area
Bhimber-Mirpur-kotli-Hajipur Pass-Domel-Muzaffarabad was
of vital importance for the security of Pakistan
especially since a very grave threat could be easily
mounted from this area to its heartland and the main
North-South communication artery. This strategic
sensitivity is made crystal clear by an impassioned plea
made in April 1948 in an appreciation of the strategic
situation by General Gracey, Commander-in-Chief Pakistan
Army." If Pakistan is not to face another problem of
about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes; if
India is not to be allowed to sit on the door steps of
Pakistan to the rear and on the flank, at liberty to
enter at her will and pleasure; if civilian and military
morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent and if
subversive political forces are not to be let loose in
Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is
not allowed to advance beyond the general line
Uri-Poonch-Naushehra."
Conversely, had this area
been controlled by India, a strategic threat from this
area would have effectively restrained Pakistan from its
hostile military adventures. In the period between August
14 and October 22, 1947, when it invaded Kashmir,
Pakistan, by enforcing an economic blockade of the state
and other hostile actions had blatantly tried to coerce
the state into acceding to it.
Indian political and
military leadership seems to have worn strategic blinkers
in that they failed to grasp the importance of this state
and to divine Pakistans intentions. When viewed
against the smug reply given by Nehru to Lockhart in
September 1947, quoted above, the geo-strategic grasp of
the Indian leadership is shown in even poorer light. Even
more so is the conditional acceptance of the accession of
the state. The rider that the wishes of the people of the
state will be ascertained showed a moral romanticism
which is out of place in the hardnosed pursuit of
national interests.
Military planners too
cannot escape blame. Even if they had realised that
strategic national interest lay in securing the
acccession of the state to India and when it did take
place, unconditionally treating the state as an
inalienable part of the Indian union, they do not seem to
have made it their professional business to impress this
upon Nehru and his political colleagues. Even by now well
known disdain of political leadership to involve the top
echelons of the military into national planning, does not
materially absolve the military leadership of their
failure to forcefully highlight the strategic importance
of the state.
Indian military
intervention in Kashmir was totally reactive to
Pakistans invasion of the state and hardly any
anticipatory planning had been done for such an
eventuality. However, by the end of December 1947, by a
very remarkable military effort Kashmir valley was
liberated, Ladakh and approaches to it secured and forces
poised to conduct offensive operations in the Naushahra
Sector. It is at this stage that a lack of clarity in
strategic considerations in the selection of military
objectives becomes painfully evident.
It would have served our
strategic interests better, if we had concentrated our
resources to mount operations to secure areas
Domel-Muzaffarabad and Bhimber-Mirpur-Kotli. Instead,
after the rout of the raiders from the valley in early
November 1947, bulk of troops then assembled in the
valley were diverted to the relief of Poonch which could
have been ensured by securely holding Hajipur and by
mounting operations to capture Bhimber-Kotli. The fear
that any advance towards Bhimber-Kotli would invite a
major intervention by the Pak army was quite unfounded.
The Pak army was in no
position to undertake such an operation as is borne out
by candid views subsequently expressed by some of the
senior Pak officers. We went to the UN and further
operations into the Mirpur-Kotli belt were capped. We
threw away our military advantages. It is so painfully
evident that the Indian political and military leadership
had not fully grasped the strategic national interests at
stake in Jammu and Kashmir. Equally, when we were forced
to defend the state, the political direction and (to a
considerable extent) the choice of military objectives
did not lead to retrieval of the situation to our maximum
possible advantage.
The Indian planners also
seem to have failed to correctly assess the military
value of the Chhamb area, North West of the vital bridge
over the Chenab River at Akhnur. By holding this area,
the strategic loss of area Bhimber-Mirpur could be made
up to some extent. In both 1965 and 1971, Pakistan
launched strong attacks to capture this area and develop
operations to capture the Akhnur bridge. Unfortunately,
we have lost most of the area West of Munawar Wali Tawi
in 1971 and with it much of the military advantage that
this area provided.
Here too, the choice of a
military objective, (which in this case was the proper
defence of area Chhamb) was not appreciated. This failure
is especially glaring in view of our experience of Pak
sensitivity to our presence in this area clearly
demonstrated by its attempt to capture it in 1965.
Consequent to our
failures, defence of the state has become a strategic
millstone around the neck of Indian military planning. By
controlling PoK, Pakistan has acquired a sustained
capacity to threaten the security of the state as also
create security problems for the whole country. We are
paying for our strategic myopia in our approach to
Kashmir from the very beginning and will continue to do
so in the foreseeable future.
|