The military command system
By K.S. Bajwa

THE military command system, and exercise of leadership, is structured to meet the vital requirements of economy and concentration of force. There is a well-defined executive leader at each level of the organisational pyramid. The sphere of command of each leader and the scope for exercise of authority, is well delineated. Similar executive structures do exist in spheres of organised activity outside the armed forces, but in one very important respect the military system is different from them.

In the military system, the authority of the executive leader on the organisational levels below him is practically absolute. Moreover, authority and responsibility are not always coterminous. While, authority is nearly always delegated, the primary onus of responsibility rests at the level of the eventual decision making. This creates a special environment for exercise of executive leadership. While the system is tailored to meet the particular command needs of battle, it has inherent to it, considerable potential for ‘noise’ inhibition and frustration.

Economy and concentration of force are complementary. In a war situation, armed forces can never hope to have a surfeit of resources. Adequate resources have, therefore, to be concentrated at the critical points of decision. Desired concentrations are easier to achieve in the opening round by the side, which has the initiative to start hostilities.

To a considerable extent, this initiative related advantage continues to be operative even during the course of the battle. The side which lacks initiative at the outset or has lost the initiative in the course of a battle faces many problems in exploiting its resources to the maximum. Time to react to the opponents’ initiative, assess the situation command the resources needed and to take decisions is invariably limited.

Time, space, resources and decision making become critical. Consequently, there is a need for rapid centralisation of decision making in an ascending order till a level of resources and command capability of a matching response is reached. To ensure the desired result and prevent divergence of effort, the leader’s authority over all levels subordinate to him, has to be practically absolute. This is well recognised. Exercise of such dominant authority is backed by a legal code.

The system must, therefore, permit flexibility in command. This would enable timely employment of resources available at each level or a concentration of larger resources consistent with the requirement. Changing situations must be met with a mounting intensity of res-ponse, till a status of matching effectiveness is reached or the situation contained without being allowed to escalate. In the event the situation is contained or could be foreseen at the outset, superior resources can be concentrated in time. It is evident that military commanders must act on their own, with the resources at their command as well as be prepared to subordinate themselves to superior levels of command when the situation demands. Under these requirements and parameters, institutional delineation of where one responsibility ends and the other starts is neither feasible nor practicable.

In trade and industry, authority and responsibility go hand in hand. The fall out of success or failure emanating from decision making is correlated. This is not so in the military system. Authority and responsibility tend to be centralised at a fairly high level. However, execution of plans and coping with changing situations is feasible only if the bulk of the authority is decentralised. Consequences of a major failure in battle are generally irreversible and the cost very high.

The final authority and the matching responsibility for success or failure must stay at the top. This creates its own special burdens, pressures and a syndrome of concern. Far too often, this tends to lead to over centralisation and exercise of excessive authoritarianism. This tendency (if unchecked), inhibits initiative, deprives the command system of its flexibility and makes the organisation less productive. It may be argued that considerable decentralisation of authority is built in the system.

Admittedly, this is so in the matters of peace time administration and similar logistic command functions. In the sphere of situational responses in battles, adequate rules and regulations can neither be framed nor are desirable. Doctrines and concepts only exist to produce a community of thought and approach. In practice, the dominant position of the leader at each level of command provides to him not only an opportunity for intervention when needed, which is essential, but also power of interference and veto which is undesirable.

To a large measure, the authority of subordinate commanders becomes a form of perpetual delegation, which introduces a potential to make the command system unstable.

In essence, the military command system is highly personality intensive. While personal equations are important in all walks of life, these are much more so between commanders in the armed forces. A leader has a dominant impact on the organisation and on the personnel subordinate to him.

In turn, he is subject to a similar domination by the leader above him. In the absence of institutional regulation of inter-leader relationship, a lack of adequate quantification of performance and the disproportionate value acquired by confidential reports, which are largely opinion based, there is a potential and a demonstrated tendency to form master-slave relationships.

In order that the assignment of tasks to subordinate commanders is sound and the delegation realistic, the executive leader must consider capabilities and break down of the task two levels below him. Since the eventual responsibility of achievement of the task rests with him, he must approve the plans at the level just below him. Thinking any further down the chain or approving plans of levels lower than the one below him, results in interference and can only paralyses the organisation.

By selection of higher commanders of the right temperament and ability; by training and education and by regulatory patterns and usage, we must reduce excessive authoritarianism of the military system. The principle of "think two below and approve one under" could be profitably applied to information gathering, participation in operational designs, intervention and even leadership assessment.

Emphasis should be on gearing up an unobtrusive monitoring system and a timely intervention as against interference or even a premature intervention. Cultivation of sound and dependable human equations, regulated by self-restraint and mutual confidence will go a long way to ensure smooth flow of leadership throughout the military organisations.

This fortnightly feature was published on January 3.