The betrayal of the soldier
By K.S. Bajwa

IN the 50 years of Independence, Indian soldiers have served the nation with loyalty and diligence. Even when poorly provided for, the soldier was not found wanting in valour. Thousands amongst them have sacrificed their lives and many more have cheerfully borne, injury and hardship.

When we take a critical look, we find that the political leadership often threw away what the soldier had achieved. Invariably, the political, economic and diplomatic follow-up has been lacking in vision and national purpose. It seems that the sacrifice of the soldiers has been, many a time, in vain. The feeling that the soldiers have been betrayed has become an uncomfortable reality.

Armed power was employed to solve the problems of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Goa with surgical precision. It is in tackling Jammu and Kashmir, both in the initial approach and subsequently, that our political leadership bungled. Soon after Independence it became quite apparent that though the Maharaja was enamoured of an independent Kashmir, it could not exist as such for long. Even after it became evident that Pakistan wanted to gain control of the state by any means, our leaders continued wearing moral blinkers.

A clear-cut grasp of the situation, under the then prevailing confusion and uncertainty, was not easy. Nevertheless, long-term national interests require incisive and hard decisions. For our long-term strategic interests, the accession of the state to India was not only desirable but also a distinct possibility. We should have, therefore, done some advance planning. Only in the afternoon of October 26, 1947, 1 Sikh was given a warning to be ready to be flown at short notice to Srinagar. The airlift started at 8 a.m on October 27. We could have saved our armed forces a measure of the crisis response that became necessary. While the armed forces saved a greater part of J&K, the political blunder of a reference to the UN, the enforcement of a ceasefire when we had the military initiative and the acceptance of a plebiscite, committed the nation to a trauma which has defied a solution. The national interests were only safeguarded partly and some of the losses and suffering of our soldiers seem to be in vain.

In the 50s, our dominant political leadership failed to fully grasp that global interaction was actuated by considerations of national interests. All other factors, including moral righteousness, even when subscribed to, was largely a window dressing. Take the case of our northern border with Tibet. It was not firmly defined on the ground. Moreover, the Chinese had laid claims to large tracts of traditional Indian territory.

When China actively canvassed our support for her claim over Tibet, our leadership miserably failed to extract a settlement of the northern border as a quid pro quo. The decision of not yielding an inch of Indian territory, robbed us of flexibility to be able to carry out a trade-off between Chinese requirement of an approach to Tibet through Aksaichin, and our interest in protecting our eastern states by settling the northern border. Our national interests were poorly formulated and even more inaptly pursued. The nation grieved and rallied behind the soldier but did nothing to enforce the accountability of the political leadership that had failed the people and soldiers.

In sharp contrast is the oblivion to which the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was consigned after his appeasement of Nazis at Munich, which whetted their appetites and led to the rape of Europe. But then we find it hard to dethrone our national icons.

The year 1965 was interregnum in the development of military power as a vital instrument of state policy. Though militarily we had achieved an upper hand despite our as yet incomplete reorganisation, the untimely death of Lal Bahadur Shastri robbed us of a firm follow-up that was in the national interest. In the war against Pakistan in 1971, Indian armed power had found it’s rightful place in the formulation and conduct of state policy.

The strategic design of an offensive in the east and an offensive-defensive in the west, was well-conceived. The armed forces decisively achieved the assigned national objectives. Bangladesh was born and conditions created for the return of over 10 million refugees and the two-pronged threat from Pakistan restricted only to the West. In the West, a truncated Pakistan was effectively contained. Despite holding all the trump cards, including over 93000 Prisoners of War, our political leadership did not extract any enforceable forward movement in the settlement in J&K. Today we have only the Simla Agreement to parrot about. The soldier was betrayed again.

The worst betrayal was yet to come. In 1982, under the stewardship of Indira Gandhi, the LTTE was provided sanctuary, material support, arms and training facilities in India. This exercise continued under Rajiv Gandhi. In cajoling and brow-beating both Jayawardene and Prabhakaran to accept the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in 1987, Rajiv Gandhi might have believed that the IPKF would protect the Tamils and extend Indian influence. In the beginning the Jafna Tamils too felt the same. Jayawardene’s cabinet, led by Premadasa, was strongly opposed to the accord. Premadasa, apprehensive that the IPKF might remain in Sri Lanka indefinitely, opened direct negotiations with the LTTE. It is evident that Rajiv Gandhi and his government failed to forsee and handle this development.

The armed confrontation between the IPKF and the LTTE, a force which both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi had helped to equip and train, became an unpleasant reality. The worst betrayal of the Indian soldier and the nation now occurred. While the LTTE was killing our soldiers, the central intelligence agencies continued to provide support to the LTTE to do so. It is on record that the LTTE cadres continued to operate from Tamil Nadu. Their wounded were being treated in same hospitals in Chennai as were the Indian soldiers. A more glaring irony is difficult to find.

There have been strident demands for apologies for wrongs committed against the nation. Why has no Indian demanded a similar accounting and apology, for the purposeless killing of so many soldiers in Sri Lanka? Do we regard our soldiers as mere cannon-fodder to be wasted at the whim of a Prime Minister? What national purpose was served by the IPKF in Sri Lanka? Would the Indian government explain this to the dependents of those who did not come back or those maimed for life? Sundarji, the then Chief of Army Staff, too must explain to the people and their soldiers, for being acquiescent to this senseless massacre of our soldiers. Are we, who wore and those who continue to wear the uniforms of our soldiers with great pride and devotion, going to be betrayed time and again? We must get some answers.