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Managing
imponderables of war
by
Kuldip Singh Bajwa
IN the planning and conduct of
military operations, the enemy is perhaps the most
significant imponderable. The enemys strength,
capabilities, intentions and his course of action have a
vital bearing on our own plans, their formulation and
execution. Consequently, during peace time, one of the
primary intelligence thrusts of any country is to build
up an accurate assessment of the military capability of
all potential enemies. This is not particularly difficult
in respect of those countries which import the bulk of
their armaments and equipment. Despite this, serious
flaws often creep into our assessments. For instance, in
the period before the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, the
potential of the US-supplied weapon systems with the
Pakistan armed forces was inclined to be over-rated. The
Sabre and the Patton were invested with an exaggerated
mystique. Maybe this was based on the well-advertised
capability of these weapon systems, but what we
overlooked in our assessment was whether in the hands of
the Pakistan armed forces and in the environment of their
employment, this could be fully developed. An aura of awe
was created in the minds of our fighting men, which
nearly led to a disaster in September, 1965.
In the Sialkot sector, our
armoured thrust had achieved complete surprise. In the
first 24 hours, the advance elements of the armoured
division had reached the outskirts of Sialkot city.
Reported presence of Pakistani Pattons precipitated a
hasty pull-back. When we evaluate the overall
achievements of this sizeable offensive, the conclusion
that our rather limited gains were due to a Sabre-Patton
engendered caution is manifestly logical.
It was in the Amritsar
sector that the myth of Pakistani weapon superiority was
exploded. A well-handled combination of good gun power
and superior training of the Centurion crews decisively
humbled the power of the Pakistan armoured forces.
Perhaps an astute combination of our shaky Shermans and
the dour Centurions in the Sialkot sector would have
produced more gratifying results.
The wide and often
one-sided exposure given to the sophisticated arms that
Pakistan expected to get from the USA, held the elements
of an inducement of paralysing awe. It might have served
our diplomatic initiatives to paint the F-16 in the
blackest of colours, but we lost sight of the adverse
impact inside and outside the armed forces. A more
balanced evaluation and exposure was needed.
Our major weakness has
been in the sphere of assessment of enemy intentions and
his design of battle. In 1971, we had failed to
adequately gauge the effect of the freedom struggle in
Bangladesh on the battle effectiveness of Pakistani
formations. A sizeable portion of the infantry formations
not committed to border defence in the western sector had
been sucked into Bangladesh, leaving the two Pakistani
strategic reserves, each of an armoured and an infantry
division, in a state of imbalance and a considerably
impaired capability. Despite this not too far-fetched a
conclusion, our defensive as well as offensive operations
were handicapped by a paralysing calculation of the
various possible courses open to the launching of
Pakistani reserves. Caution, led to lack of economy of
force and in turn to a failure to achieve decisive
concentrations, prevented us from achieving results,
which could have been spectacular. For instance, in the
Amritsar sector a whole armoured brigade was kept tied
down behind a fairly strong defensive posture, based on a
well-developed and closely integrated obstacle system, in
anticipation of a major Pakistani counter-offensive (for
which its capability had been seriously impaired), while
its employment in the Shakargarh sector would have better
achieved both the defensive and the offensive objectives.
Similarly, our only armoured division had stayed out of
battle to counter a possible threat from the enemy
armour-infantry reserve located in the
Multan-Montgomery-Okara area. Interrogations of East
Pakistan defectors had established that this formation
was not really in a fit state for battle. Ordered to move
to the Rajasthan border, the leading elements had not
reached the designated area due to poor management of the
movement, when ceasefire was declared. For us, it was a
colossal waste of our major punch (and a very expensive
one at that).
In war, battle-induced
fears, uncertainties and confusion may often lead to
faulty conclusions. In 1971, a major thrust was launched
into the Shakargarh area from Road Kathua-Sambha directed
onto Zafarwal on the night December 4/5. On the night
December 8/9, a division mounted a complementary thrust
towards Shakargarh from the Lasian Enclave, our territory
across the Ravi. For this attack a brigade of the
division was holding a firm base on the home bank of the
river, west of Dinanagar. The bulk of the artillery,
supporting the initial phases of the operation, was
deployed within or close to this firm base. The medium
regiments equipped with 130 MM guns with a range of over
29 km (a very effective weapon against armour) were dug
down in pits and so could engage targets in a limited arc
astride the axis of the thrust. All the planned
objectives were captured at night and the advance made
good progress on December 9. By the evening, Nainakot was
almost enveloped and the road to Shakargarh lay wide
open. No enemy armour was encountered. The artillery air
observation post, which had been flying over the area
throughout the day, also reported no sign of hostile
armour. In the evening, a report was received at the
Divisional Headquarters that enemy armour had crossed the
Ravi in strength south of Nainakot and was advancing
towards the firm base. We had no fixed defences in the
reported line of enemy advance which lay outside the arc
of fire of the medium guns.
This report induced a
state of total alarm and a "flap" ensued in the
Divisional Headquarters (In military parlance, a state of
confusion and directionless cross-purpose activity).
Switching of troops was ordered. Orders and
counter-orders flowed out in bewildering succession.
Fortunately, elements with cooler and more logically
calculating reflection were able to prevail. It was
successfully argued that it was impossible (and also out
of character) for the Pakistanis to conceal such a large
armoured force and its inevitable support and logistic
back-up in the Shakargah Salient, and even more so,
launch it through the Ravi. It was well nigh impossible
for armour to ford the Ravi without extensive engineer
assistance and preparations, which had been amply
confirmed by our own experience when we inducted our
armour into the Lasian Enclave across the river before
launching our operation into the Shakargarh Salient. It
took a determined effort by a saner brigade commander to
establish the reported thrust to be merely a fog of
war before the "flap" could be laid to
rest.
It is absolutely vital
that commanders are trained to make realistic assessments
and update them continuously so that the most productive
use is made of limited resources of men and material. It
is equally vital for commanders to think ahead coolly and
logically so that the imponderables of war can be
effectively managed.
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