, as a protégé of Gen Parvez Musharraf, has a military pedigree many soldiers would envy. As a fellow of the prestigious Royal College of Defence Studies, London, he is in the exalted company of his mentor.Media reports ascribe to him the thinking behind Pakistan’s doctrinal aspects of countering India’s pro-active strategy. While being a great professional citation, this is hardly likely even if he is considered an expert at defensive, and not offensive, warfare because Pakistan’s reaction of moving some of its formations to strategically more viable locations was thought through well before General Sharif rose to the level of a Corps Commander (30 Corps, Gujranwala).
Hamid Hussain’s assessment that General Sharif “is probably not suited to lead an army engaged in a war” needs to be evaluated more comprehensively. Study of history belies the assumption that the body language of senior military leaders and their appearance can lead to definitive deductions about their military intellect, translation into ground execution and leadership skills under duress and stress.
Some see Sharif as a ‘defensive general’. |
Of Pakistan’s senior leadership it can authoritatively be said that it is outstandingly wily and innovative at ‘conflict initiation’ but astonishingly unprofessional at taking the intent and aim to its military conclusion as part of ‘conflict termination’. This has been borne out in the 1965 Indo-Pak conflict, the actions in East Pakistan in 1971, in the operational content of Exercise Zarb-e-Momin in 1990, the Kargil misadventure in 1999 and in the recent exchanges on the LoC in Poonch, Mendhar and Keran.
None of these events led to any positive gains for Pakistan. In fact, the only decision which led to a possibly positive outcome was President Musharraf’s mutual initiative with the India to bring about ceasefire on the LoC on November 26, 2003, a decision which had far-reaching implications for both armies. Will General Sharif show similar cerebral capability and ‘soft’ approach towards the LoC to enable the task at hand on the more difficult western and internal security fronts, which are wrenching Pakistan apart? In fact, the most important question is how General Sharif will view the Jammu & Kashmir dynamics.
Will it be bravado at the LoC to display an offensive personality in charge? The negative spinoff of any such machismo will be an immediate effect on Nawaz Sharif’s declared intent of treading the peace path with India. Secondly, Pakistan’s current penchant with filling the Valley and Jammu region with infiltrated terrorists to retain options in calibrating the proxy war may well tempt General Sharif to project an offensive character. A reversal of policy is least likely especially when there is a change of command.
With Pakistan’s supposed perception that nothing major is likely on the diplomatic front over the next six months the situation points towards Mr Sharif giving his new army chief time and space to settle, even at the cost of a few flare-ups on the LoC. Although Mr Sharif has had negative experience with his chiefs, it is unlikely he will sully the internal military reputation of the new chief by placing unreasonable controls on him. We are therefore unlikely to see any major change in the policy on Jammu and Kashmir; only time and our response at the LoC will dictate which way the situation will head.
The Indian establishment needs to ensure that traditional assumptions of winter being a period of stability on the LoC are put at rest. The Pakistan defence establishment has been known for its innovations in conflict initiation. Whatever the personality of General Sharif, the dynamics of 2014 will force him to be aggressive on Kashmir. He may be forced by the hardliners to aid and abet the current Kashmir policy.
Some would expect that a personal loss in the form of his elder brother in a battle with the Indian Army in 1971 may have created in General Sharif a latent antipathy against India and this would be an opportunity for revenge. His credentials do not appear to suggest that. General Sharif is likely to think through any initiative.
The label of being less offensive possibly appears due to his track record of appointments and being an Infantryman. Flamboyant commanders are presumed to be black uniformed (Armoured Corps or Special Forces) with a record of commanding units and formations aggressively on the LoC, which General Sharif lacks. Possibly, PM Nawaz Sharif was advised on this and he deliberately chose to have a stable conformist. Infantrymen may not carry flamboyance, but it needs to be remembered that aggression comes naturally to them. On the Indian side the majority of iconic military leaders, Cariappa, Manekshaw and Aurora were all Infantrymen.
Predicting anything about Pakistan is fraught with danger, most of all the panning of personality of its military leaders. However, on balance, General Sharif’s tenure needs to lend stability in the approaching difficult and challenging years of the security scenario in the sub-continent. His politico-military compulsions of keeping J&K on the simmer (not boil) have to be assessed. He is unlikely to kowtow with radical elements beyond current levels knowing that tactical gains will not translate into strategic victory. Lastly, the Indian establishment needs to carefully evaluate whether General Sharif is the man to trust. In short, it is a situation where there are shades and shades of grey in which a black and white mind would only spell paralysis.
The writer is a Fellow of the Royal College of Defence Studies, London, and former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps