P E R S P E C T I V E

Security
Why we fail to prevent terror attacks
The Mahabodhi temple blasts occurred in spite of a specific warning by the Intelligence Bureau. With most state police forces facing a shortage of personnel for basic policing, they are ill-equipped and not trained to carry out surveillance, or even act on an input.
By Ajay Banerjee 
EACH serial bomb blast triggers a hyper-reaction from political parties, the media and the public in India. In the ensuing blame game, what gets glossed over and forgotten, is the need to address the problems in the crumbling institutional framework meant to nab terrorists and act on specific inputs.

Poll reforms
Leadership in the shadow of bars
The Supreme Court’s recent judgments, attempting to clean up politics by debarring jailed politicians from contesting polls, are a welcome step. But there are grey areas. What if a leader has been implicated, or is acquitted by a higher court subsequently?
By KV Prasad
TWO pronouncements by the Supreme Court last week — one disqualifying elected parliamentary and legislative representatives in the country on being convicted, and second, debarring those behind bars or in police custody from contesting elections — has been largely welcomed by political parties in principle, but have since raised larger questions.

Security
Why we fail to prevent terror attacks
The Mahabodhi temple blasts occurred in spite of a specific warning by the Intelligence Bureau. With most state police forces facing a shortage of personnel for basic policing, they are ill-equipped and not trained to carry out surveillance, or even act on an input.
By Ajay Banerjee 

EACH serial bomb blast triggers a hyper-reaction from political parties, the media and the public in India. In the ensuing blame game, what gets glossed over and forgotten, is the need to address the problems in the crumbling institutional framework meant to nab terrorists and act on specific inputs.

hindsight Security personnel inspect the site after the explosion in the Mahabodhi temple complex at Bodh Gaya on July 7. REUTERS

The July 7 blasts at the Mahabodhi temple in Bihar led to the usual exchange of sharp words between the BJP and the Congress. Lost in this frenzy was the grim reality that a very specific tip-off from the Intelligence Bureau (IB) had been wasted and no one, so far, has been held accountable. The central agencies could only vent their frustration in private as the stark reality of states being inadequately equipped to deal with terror surfaced yet again.

Last year in September, addressing the annual conference of DGPs of all states, Union Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde had advised: “Take prompt notice of every piece of intelligence as it is received and develop capacities for addressing the threats posed by terrorism.” Almost 10 months later, the message is lost as the state police is bogged down with routine crime, court appearances, nabbing criminals and crowd control at dharnas, cricket matches, political rallies and religious congregations.

A constitutional provision prevents central agencies and forces from any direct intervention in the policing issues of states. It is entirely up to the state police to act, or not act, on tip-offs given by these agencies.

“The blasts at the Mahabodhi temple occurred despite a specific warning and that is a worrying sign and needs correction,” says an IPS officer. Since August 2012, the temple had been put on high risk and the Bihar Police was apprised of it. In the first fortnight of June this year, the IB, backed by information that two suspicious foreign-based youths had travelled to Bihar, issued a very specific terror threat for Mahabodhi and Vishnupad temples.

Reasons for failure

States inadequately equipped to deal with terror State police bogged down with routine policing Central agencies and forces can’t intervene in policing issues of states Police woefully short on staff, lacks motivation and adequate training

Not much changed on ground. On June 26, the SP (City) of Gaya, Chandan Kumar Khushwaha, was quoted in the Patna edition of an English daily as saying: “The security of Mahabodhi and Vishnupad temples has been sensitised. A large number of commandoes and policemen along with a battalion of woman constables have been deployed. A mock drill has been carried out with the bomb and dog squads in and around the temple premises.”

An IB officer posted in Bihar took up the matter with the range DIG of the state police, who then visited the Mahabodhi temple for a security review on July 3. Eight constables were posted and it was admitted that they had received a warning from the IB.

When the serial blasts took place around 5 am on July 7, there was no police presence. The culprits had kept a dozen cylinders with explosives and all went undetected as the local policemen were clueless and clearly untrained for such an internationally planned attack. “Had the police nabbed even one culprit, it would have prevented the blasts, and even lead to the masterminds,” said an IB officer.

On how the input was wasted, Dr Niranjan Sahoo, Senior Fellow at the New Delhi-based think tank, the Observer Research Foundation, remarks: “This is sheer incompetence and lethargy.” The recent case depicts a lackadaisical approach of the beleaguered state police forces which are woefully short on staff, lack motivation and adequate training and do not even have the equipment to handle such alerts.

Statistics of the Bureau of Police Research and Development released in 2012 reveal a countrywide shortage of about 5.39 lakh policemen, out of the total sanctioned strength of 21.24 lakh policemen. None of the states meet the sanctioned ratio of the number of policemen for every 100 sq km. This ratio varies as per the population density. So a city like Mumbai would have a different ratio compared with a small town like Shahabad on the Ambala-Delhi highway.

Delinking terror

The Centre’s efforts in the past two years to delink terror from policing duties have failed. States have opposed the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), a centrally controlled body. The NCTC was to handle only terror-related cases. The already operational MAC was to be subsumed in it and the body would have had an operations wing.

Though BJP-ruled states had opposed the NCTC, BJP president Rajnath Singh, following a visit to the blast site, admitted: “No state can act against terror by itself. The Centre must help.” Dr Sahoo says: “Our dilemma is how to break through the federal issues which crop up when such matters are raised.” In case of the Mahabodhi temple blast, a functional NCTC would have had the powers to requisition the police or post central police forces at the threat site. At present, central forces can be sent in only after a request from a state.

 

Generating input Central agencies like the IB, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), National Technical Research Organisation and Military Intelligence — as per their respective mandates — keep a watch on activities in India and outside. Using a mix of electronic surveillance, intelligence gathered from human resources, information from informants and bits of information from arrested associates of terrorists, a report is collated. Long-serving analysts well versed with the terror module “churn it” and crosscheck it for its veracity before an input is sent out on a countrywide computer network linked to all states and agencies. The group does this work under the Multi Agency Centre (MAC), which was set up following the Kargil Review Committee report. After the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, the MAC works round the clock, gathering information from all over the country and abroad and sending out inputs for action. Units in each state are called Subsidiary-MAC. The IB officer in charge of the state heads the S-MAC and coordinates with the state-appointed nodal officer working under the ADGP (Intelligence). If there is something urgent, the IB Director (under whom the MAC operates) sitting in his North Block office in New Delhi picks up the phone and speaks to the state DGP concerned. A serving officer points to a flaw in this system: “There is no provision in the MAC which makes it mandatory for the states to give feedback and report back on the action taken, if any. Once a specific input is sent, it boils down to the initiative and capability of the local police.” A former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, admits: “This is not a foolproof or perfect system. We are still learning.” The question is do the states have the manpower to analyse an MAC input? Do they have the necessary manpower to deploy a group of 70-80 trained men just for surveillance? Success stories  October 2010: Intelligence agencies learnt that ‘Brigade 313’ (an Al-Qaeda affiliate) threatened to attack the Commonwealth Games. The IAF was roped in by the Delhi Police to train its men in identifying flying objects. Trained policemen were drawn from 14 states to provide security. Leon Panetta, CIA chief, met Home Minister P Chidambaram and warned of a Mumbai-style attack on New Delhi. The military intelligence picked up RDX boxes in the Kashmir valley and the Punjab Police apprehended a consignment of RDX from Pakistan. The games passed off peacefully. March 2011: A European country warned India of a strike by the Al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Toiba during the cricket World Cup. Home Ministry’s advisory stated: “These operatives could be well-acquainted with maritime travel to reach their targets in quick time, and could be Urdu-speakers from the Punjab province of Pakistan.” The Navy and the Coast Guard were pressed in. Fishermen along the Gujarat and Kerala coast were asked to watch out for new faces. When the Indian PM saw the semi-final at Mohali with his Pakistani counterpart, fighter jets stood on runway readiness at Ambala and Adampur.   Some Chief Ministers continue to oppose the National Counter Terrorism Centre. I believe we (the Centre) should remain within our limits and not press too much. If they (CMs) do not want, let it be. We should not go ahead without their consent. —Sushilkumar Shinde, Union Home Minister

Poll reforms
Leadership in the shadow of bars
The Supreme Court’s recent judgments, attempting to clean up politics by debarring jailed politicians from contesting polls, are a welcome step. But there are grey areas. What if a leader has been implicated, or is acquitted by a higher court subsequently?
By KV Prasad

TWO pronouncements by the Supreme Court last week — one disqualifying elected parliamentary and legislative representatives in the country on being convicted, and second, debarring those behind bars or in police custody from contesting elections — has been largely welcomed by political parties in principle, but have since raised larger questions.

Sandeep Joshi

In disposing of two petitions, the Bench of Justices AK Patnaik and SJ Mukhopadhaya gave the judgments that have been received well as they seek to attack a deep-rooted malaise in Indian politics — criminalisation.

Several years have gone by as political parties continue to stress on the need to bar criminals and law-breakers from entering the hallowed portals of state legislatures or Parliament and don the role of lawmakers. Yet, a majority of political parties, national or regional, have been guilty of nominating candidates with criminal antecedents, who then interpret an electoral victory as being absolved of all charges in the court of the people.

According to statistics compiled by the Association of Democratic Reforms gleaned from affidavits filed by contestants as mandated by the Election Commission, 30 per cent of politicians in Parliament have criminal cases pending against them and 14 per cent are fighting serious charges like murder, rape, forgery, fraud, cheating and inciting hatred among communities.

Crime and power

While statistics and public perception provides a grim picture of the quality of political leaders, among the early shock to society was when the Samajwadi Party gave a ticket to Bandit Queen Phoolan Devi, who was elected to Parliament in 1996. Of course, in her case, it was a high-profile criminal who served a term and then entered political stream. There were others with lesser known crimes who made it as legislators or parliamentarians without much spotlight on them.

Political parties reacted with caution, welcoming the apex court judgment. As details came out, so did the reactions, raising larger questions. There is apprehension of false cases by political rivals and innocents languishing in jails. The other strand of argument is against the disqualification of elected representatives on conviction leading to complication in case of an acquittal by higher courts. The moral and ethical approach is recognised but the practical difficulties in implementing these are now being debated.

Congress MP and lawyer Abhishek Singhvi, reacting in his individual capacity, welcomed the judgment on disqualification in principle but said there are angularities that need to be ironed out in a comprehensive manner. These include: the two-judge Bench allegedly violates an earlier decision by a Constitution Bench; no caveat against false or trivial cases that entail such disqualification; and a clear gap in regard to the restoration of right in case of reversal.

BJP Deputy Leader in the Rajya Sabha Ravi Shankar Prasad felt political parties would have to take responsibility in nominating people to contest while CPM general secretary Prakash Karat said the intention of the Supreme Court to immediately remove persons convicted of serious criminal and corruption cases was good but the verdict that Section 8 (4) of the Representation of The People Act was ultra vires “poses certain problems”.

“Given the present state of the judicial system, conviction by a trial court is often set aside by a higher court on appeal. If a member is disqualified in some case and gets an acquittal later by a higher court, there will be no scope for redress. Therefore, the judgment needs to be clarified by a review,” Karat said in an obvious reference to the unseating leading to a vacancy that can be filled in a byelection by another person. The earlier law was that once convicted, the elected representative has three months to file an appeal in a higher court.

The devil is in the details and in the case of debarring those behind bars, there is near unanimity across political thought. Singhvi felt while it was novel, moral and ethical, he sought to know: “If a person behind bars, substantially defanged, is still powerful to win an election, who are we to deny him and deny the electorate their right?”

Judicial activism?

What remains unsaid is that it may no longer be possible for the likes of fiery trade union leader George Fernandes, who won the 1977 Lok Sabha elections from Muzaffarpur in Bihar while being incarcerated during the Emergency, to enter the electoral fray.

Expressing serious reservation, Prasad said political rivals in power could resort to vendetta and book opponents on trumped-up charges. Bharatruhari Mahatab, Biju Janata Dal MP, echoed similar sentiments, stating that petty police officers could fix people and put them behind bars.

Karat, too, felt that besides depriving a number of political activists on whom false cases were foisted, there were “lakhs of undertrial prisoners languishing in jail unjustly deprived of their basic liberties given the inefficiency and bias of the legal-judicial system. This judgment can lead to large-scale misuse. Ruling parties and governments can get people behind bars in order to prevent them from contesting elections. The judgment is a case of judicial overreach and requires to be overturned”.

Subsumed in the latest debate is the larger issue of a crying need for comprehensive electoral reforms rather than piecemeal solutions to remove systemic deficiencies that have crept into electoral politics over the years. Some measures have been taken but are clearly not enough.