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Gujarat gets Lokayukta From North to South
Korea |
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Loopholes in laws Result in low conviction rate Every rapist, on being found guilty of the crime, has to undergo a minimum imprisonment of seven years under the present laws. Besides, under a special provision, Section 376(2) — for custodial rape, rape by an employer, rape in a remand home, rape by a medical professional in a hospital, rape of a pregnant woman or of a girl under 12 years of age or gang rape — prescribes for 10 years of imprisonment. In some cases of gang rape courts have already given life imprisonment — the Gujarat High Court recently upheld life imprisonment for Sajal Jain along with his four friends in the Bijal Joshi gang rape case of 2003.
How to improve ties
with ASEAN
Let man learn from
beasts
Pak strategy: Deny
India nuclear victory
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From North to South Korea
North Korean
ruler Kim Jong-un surprised the world in two ways on the New Year day. He decided to address the people of North Korea on the first day of the year against the practice of not indulging in any such exercise by his father and the previous ruler, Kim Jong-il, who died in 2011. Kim Jong-un’s grandfather, Kim Il-sung, made the annual address as the head of the North Korean government 19 years ago. But more important than this was the young ruler’s call for an end to the atmosphere of confrontation between the two Koreas. He pointed out, “An important issue in putting an end to the division of the country and achieving its reunification is to remove confrontation between the North and the South.” The two Koreas are technically at war with each other as they have not signed any peace agreement after the 1950-53 military conflict. They have been occasionally issuing threats to each other. The conciliatory statement of the North Korean ruler indicates that, perhaps, the time for hot exchanges between the two is coming to an end. Though experts believe that this is just a call for aid from South Korea, it appears that a churning process is on in North Korea. Even if what Kim Jong-un has said is aimed at telling South Korea that North Korea needs financial assistance to alleviate its economic woes, it cannot be dismissed as being of no consequence. It may result in the lessening of tension between the two. A clear picture of the evolving situation emerges if we look at it against the backdrop of the statements made by the recently elected President of South Korea, Park Geun-hye. During her election campaigns she often mentioned the removal of poverty in North Korea as a major challenge for the people of South Korea. And one way to improve the economic condition of the North Koreans is to begin a process of unification of the two parts of the Korean peninsula. The North Koreans must be liberated from the oppressing system of governance which has not only led to extreme poverty but also denial of all kinds of human rights to them.
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Loopholes in laws
Every
rapist, on being found guilty of the crime, has to undergo a minimum imprisonment of seven years under the present laws. Besides, under a special provision, Section 376(2) — for custodial rape, rape by an employer, rape in a remand home, rape by a medical professional in a hospital, rape of a pregnant woman or of a girl under 12 years of age or gang rape — prescribes for 10 years of imprisonment. In some cases of gang rape courts have already given life imprisonment — the Gujarat High Court recently upheld life imprisonment for Sajal Jain along with his four friends in the Bijal Joshi gang rape case of 2003. Yet, in majority of cases the culprits barely spend a few months or couple of years before they are set free. Because in the majority of cases, a victim from an economically weaker section has no choice to select a lawyer to defend her case. The state-appointed public prosecutor represents her. The rape victim remains merely the prosecution witness that weakens her case and the accused are often out on bail. Then, in many parts of the country where remand homes for minor girls do not exist, minor victims of rape are kept either in police custody or in prison, sometimes for 8 to 12 years without any legal redress. In such cases the rapists lead free, 'respectable' lives influencing law enforcing agencies at all levels while the victims stay confined to institutions, like prisoners. Also Sections 155 (4) and Section 54 of the Indian Evidence Act are contradictory; they rest the ‘burden of proof’ in a most archaic manner on the victim rather than on the accused. Laws fail to help because at each step; from the way matter is reported to the police, the nature of FIR, identification parade, the medical examination report, are neither sympathetic nor sensitive to women. A woman should be interrogated only at her dwelling place. Rape-kits should be made mandatory for all hospitals to help collect evidence against rapists. Only then will reframing of laws help.
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We are embedded in a biological world and related to the organisms around us. — Walter Gilbert
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How to improve ties with ASEAN THE recently concluded Indo-ASEAN Summit in New Delhi marked the most notable success of Indian foreign policy over the past two decades. Sadly, no recognition is being accorded to the visionary role of former Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, who realised the crucial importance of greater economic cooperation and integration of a liberalised Indian economy with the dynamic economies of Japan, South Korea and India's South-East Asian neighbours, who are all now members of the ASEAN regional grouping. ASEAN is set to become an Economic Community by 2015. Narasimha Rao's visionary policies have been carried forward imaginatively by successor governments, headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Dr Manmohan Singh. It has also to be acknowledged that Narasimha Rao's efforts were successful largely because of the recognition of Singapore's elder statesman, Lee Kwan Yew, and his successor, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, that an economically vibrant India would have an important role in the maintenance of peace and security in ASEAN's neighbourhood, extending from the Indian Ocean to the shores of the South China Sea. India's growing economic ties with ASEAN after a 20-year-dialogue partnership and 10 years of annual summits have fashioned a new architecture of dialogue and cooperation across what is now defined as the "Indo-Pacific" region, extending India's strategic profile beyond the Indian Ocean and across the South China Sea. India's dialogue with ASEAN is now not limited to annual summits. There are now annual meetings between the Defence Ministers of ASEAN on the one hand and its partners like China, Japan, South Korea and India, on the other. Moreover, ASEAN is today the driving force behind the East Asian summit, which brings together its 10 members with the US, Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. India has consciously taken a low key posture in ASEAN forums, stressing the need for ASEAN to be the driving force for consensual efforts to build peace, security and progress across the entire Indo-Pacific region, thus linking security in the Indian and Eastern Pacific regions. Interestingly, the Vision Statement issued at the New Delhi Summit alludes to ASEAN appreciation for "India's role in peace and stability". India, in turn, recognises "ASEAN's centrality" in "economic structures and institutions currently emerging in the region". Whether ASEAN can retain its traditional unity in dealing with external challenges, in the face of an assertive and domineering China, however, remains to be seen. While much attention is focused on India's trade relations with China and the US, what is often overlooked is that India's trade with ASEAN, which reached an estimated $ 79 billion last year and is scheduled to reach $ 100 billion by 2015, has increased 10 times over the past decade. Investment flows in the same period amounted to $ 43 billion. Moreover, with a virtual "open skies" policy governing air travel, more and more Indians now visit ASEAN countries, notably Thailand and Singapore. While economic integration with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN has been mutually beneficial, India would do well to tread cautiously on its endorsement of the China-backed proposal for new regional architecture, described as a "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership". This proposal seeks to convert India's entire eastern neighbourhood, including China, into a free trade and investment area. Indian industry is already reeling under the pressure of imports from China. There is a total absence of transparency in China's fiscal and economic policies and obvious subsidies to its exports. Further opening out of the Indian economy to Chinese goods and services must be undertaken only if it includes measures that safeguard the development of Indian industry, particularly in key areas like power, communications, electronics and other employment-oriented sectors. Given its strategic partnership with ASEAN, India can no longer perpetually sit on the fence, on emerging tensions between ASEAN countries like Vietnam and the Philippines on the one hand and China, on the other. China appears ready to use force to enforce its territorial claims, ignoring the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas, on its maritime frontiers with South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Malaysia. China is also becoming more rigid on its border claims on the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh and in Ladakh. Vietnam's Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung noted: "I hope India fully supports ASEAN in the full implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the six-point principles on the South China Sea, in order to settle disputes peacefully, as per International law". External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid virtually rejected this appeal asserting: "Sometimes doing nothing about conflict is about not doing something." This may sound glib, but it wins us no friends and is a recipe for appeasing a China that supplies nuclear weapons wherewithal to Pakistan and seeks to undermine Indian influence across its entire Indian Ocean neighbourhood. Despite the recent progress in our relations with our eastern neighbours, very little has been done to utilise "soft power" through the promotion of the ancient Buddhist links between India and its eastern neighbours. There are between 150-190 million Buddhists in South-East Asia., with an estimated 134 million Theravada Buddhists in Myanmar, Thailand and Cambodia. There are 44 million Buddhists in Vietnam, practising Mahayana Buddhism and an estimated 7 million Buddhists, mainly of Chinese origin, in Indonesia, Singapore and Philippines, who practice a synthesis Mahayana Buddhism, with Confucianism and Daoism. There are an estimated 90 million Buddhist believers in Japan, who also profess adherence to Shinto. In South Korea, there are 11 million Buddhists linked to 26 Buddhist sects. While the Union Government is developing Nalanda University, the Madhya Pradesh Government has undertaken a commendable initiative establishing an International University for Buddhist-Indic Studies in Sanchi. It is imperative that New Delhi develops a comprehensive scheme for developing and linking the sites of Buddhist heritage across Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and UP into a global hub for Buddhist tourism and studies. The scheme, which could be implemented within a decade, should include the development of international airport facilities in Patna and Bhopal, together with six-lane highways linking Buddhist sites and a range of hotels, rest houses and other facilities for international and domestic tourists. Countries like Japan should be involved in investment and the development of these facilities. A comprehensive proposal on these lines can perhaps be put forward at the next ASEAN and East Asian summits by the Prime
Minister.
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Let man learn from beasts MAN has much to learn from the beasts. So let us not belittle the nobility of animals by describing the six depraved homo sapien rapists as “beasts” because beasts do not rape, ever. Yes, beasts do copulate with their opposite gender but always in dignity, governed by the sacred biological urge to perpetrate their species. Again, out of an in-born genetic instinct, beasts are guided by the law of “Natural Selection” in which it is the most “receptive” of females who chooses and opts to mate with physically the fittest among their males. No more and no less. The female then bears, suckles and ultimately detaches from its progeny! Take the case of birds. Most species bond once a year as a universal truth and remain united till the fledging of their young. But in the case of several species such as the sarus crane, the geese and the pigeons, much like the homo sapiens, they too pair for life. But the similarity ends with that action alone; because the sacredness of the act of procreation among the paired-for-life birds (and bees and beasts) is renewed mostly once every year or more often as per their biological clock, and each renewal is celebrated with the joy of an act of faith by both partners. The male puts on the wooing display each time with ardour and total commitment, oblivious of the world around, till he wins the heart of his “fair-lady” all over again! There is never any groping or violence or molestation to speak of. Little wonder that as in the case of the sarus cranes (and many more), when one of the pair dies a natural or an unnatural death, the survivor more often pines and perishes but never takes on a new partner in life. Now, unlike the homo sapien males, the male of some species among the so-called “beastly” mammals may pair with more than one female in the same season but always with consenting females only. Take the case of the Asian elephants, the largest terrestrial “beast” alive today. They live in large herds but mating is performed in strict privacy by detaching from the herd. The following day, the consummated pair rejoins the herd. The gestation stretches to almost two years during which period cows and young bulls of the entire herd shelter the pregnant cows against all harm. Shortly before birth, the herd seeks out a secluded river or any other water body. While the expecting female bathes, a few members mount guard and the rest of the herd prepare a cushion of soft branches and leaves as the maternity mattress. They then encircle the area from a discreet distance, leaving the cow to bear the calf in security and privacy. The birth is then signalled to the world at large, with collective and joyous trumpeting with up-raised trunks, by the entire herd. Those who have witnessed consider it the ultimate experience of a lifetime. It is time that homo sapiens, especially their male gender, reclaimed the coupling urges from their “beastly”
past.
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Pak strategy: Deny India nuclear victory
Pakistan's
relations with two of its neighbours - India and Afghanistan - are strained, and a third border, with Iran, marks the Sunni-Shia divide within Islam. Domestic social services are in decline. Governance is widely conceded to be poor at both the national and provincial level. Many extremist groups have found shelter in Pakistan. Some fight the military, others have colluded with it. Over the past five years, Pakistan ranks second (only to Iraq) in the incidence of mass-casualty deaths due to sectarian and politically-inspired domestic violence. Amidst these indicators of national decline - and in the face of concerted efforts by the US and other nations to prevent Pakistan from crossing key production thresholds -- Pakistan now possesses a considerable and growing nuclear arsenal, which is publicly estimated to include perhaps 90-110 weapons. It is hard to identify another governmental or military enterprise in contemporary Pakistan that has been more successful in identifying goals and implementing them than Pakistan's nuclear weapon-related programmes. Most Pakistanis who bemoan the problems they face in everyday life feel pride in the accomplishments of testing and producing nuclear weapons. They begrudge governmental corruption and incompetence, but not money spent on the Bomb.
Start of N-pursuit Pakistan's serious pursuit of nuclear weapons began with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who famously declared in 1965 -- well before taking charge of the country and the programme -- that his compatriots would "eat grass" and suffer other deprivations in order to possess nuclear weapons. This priority became more focussed after the 1971 war with India that resulted in Pakistan's grave humiliation, vivisection, and Bhutto's ascendancy as President, and subsequently, as Prime Minister. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a powerful political figure who became President of Pakistan from 1988 to 1993, provided continuity of oversight over the nuclear programme after Bhutto's demise and during a period of revolving Prime Ministers. As with other nuclear programmes in other countries, "first generation" scientists in defense establishments also played key roles in nuclear development programmes, most notably Munir Khan and Samar Mubarakmand of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission and A.Q. Khan of the Khan Research Laboratories. The transfer of Pakistan's nuclear weapon-related programmes to military control was realised in stages, beginning with the imprisonment in 1977 and subsequent execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq. Military supremacy in all military-related nuclear matters was reaffirmed after Ghulam Ishaq Khan's forced resignation from the Presidency in 1993, and was consolidated further when, in February, 2000, then-Chief Executive and Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, implemented plans for a directorate to focus on operational issues -- the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) at Joint Staff Headquarters -- that the recently deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had dawdled over.
High-end nuclear strikes While high-end Pakistani nuclear strike packages probably include some military targets, the standard way for new nuclear-weapon states to define minimal, credible deterrence is by means of counter-value targeting, i.e., being able to destroy an adversary's large metropolitan areas. There are ten cities in India with populations over three million: Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad, Chennai, Kolkata, Surat, Pune, and Jaipur. Mumbai is a centre of commerce, culture, and nuclear infrastructure. New Delhi is the seat of government. Chennai and Kolkata are significant regional hubs. Bangalore and Hyderabad represent the new, "rising" India, fueling India's economic growth. Placing these cities, some of which contain very significant Muslim populations, at risk is one way to check perceived Indian designs on Pakistan's territorial integrity. This analysis hypothesises very modest requirements for Pakistani counter-value targeting. Assuming ten cities and three weapons per city, thirty weapons delivered on targets would be required. These numbers are notional; they may vary from city to city and could be revised upward or downward. Those responsible in Pakistan for planning counter-value targeting against Indian cities would also have to assume losses of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and storage sites to Indian pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes. Consequently, if there is a fixed requirement for the laydown of a certain number of weapons against Indian cities, a multiple of this number would presumably be applied to compensate for expected losses. In any event, counter-value strikes against Indian cities could entail a very substantial use of nuclear weapons. All of these planning factors are closely held, so this assessment is highly conjectural. Indian leaders and hawkish analysts have expressed the view that their country could survive a nuclear war, whereas Pakistan would not. As former Defence Minister George Fernandes said in a 2002 interview, "[I]f he should finally take that kind of step, perhaps out of desperation, he should realise that India can survive a nuclear attack, but Pakistan cannot." Army Chief S. Padmanabhan echoed these sentiments when he reportedly said that "India would severely punish any state that is 'mad enough to use nuclear weapons against any of our assets.' Padmanabhan added, 'the perpetrator shall be so severely punished that his very existence will be in doubt. We are ready for a second strike.'" Likewise, hawkish analyst Bharat Karnad wrote, "The problem here is not one of preventing nuclear war, but with believing that Pakistan can annihilate India, which is not possible, even as the reverse is eminently true."
A targeting doctrine These assertions have not gone unnoticed by those who set Pakistan's requirements for nuclear weapons. It would be out of character for Pakistan's military leadership to accept the survival of India and the death of Pakistan in a nuclear war. Thus, in this conjectural analysis, Rawalpindi is likely to pursue a "victory denial" strategy in the event of a complete breakdown in deterrence. The growth of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is commensurate with a targeting objective to exact overwhelming damage sufficient to prevent India from recovering as a functioning society. Denying India "victory" in a nuclear war would constitute the high end of Pakistan's targeting objectives. These might include, in addition to India's largest cities, its leadership, key industrial facilities, ports, nuclear power plants, dams, and other critical infrastructure that are not necessarily situated in large metropolitan areas. A targeting doctrine to deny India victory in a nuclear slugfest would be an unusual and exacting way to define minimal, credible deterrence, but it could well explain Pakistan's production capacity for nuclear weapons and the prospective growth of its stockpile. Peter R. Lavoy has argued that Pakistan's nuclear deterrence strategy is predicated on a commitment to "escalation dominance." During the Cold War, hawkish US strategists held the view that victory was still possible in nuclear exchanges, even at great cost. Failing that, an adversary's victory could still be denied - and deterrence reaffirmed - by means of expansive nuclear inventories and targeting capabilities. Do the managers of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent believe that they can fight and win a nuclear war with India? In their foundational essay, Agha Shahi, Zulfiqar Ali Khan and Abdul Sattar wrote that Pakistan was "not so unrealistic as to entertain" thoughts of the "use of nuclear weapons for war-fighting or seek to develop capability for preemptive attack." These authors argue that, "India is too large and too well armed to be vulnerable to a disabling strike." This line of reasoning is reaffirmed as long as India's strategic assets grow, are properly diversified, become more operationalised for deterrence purposes, and if New Delhi becomes more serious about command and control arrangements. It would not require Herculean efforts for Indian leaders to dissuade Rawalpindi that a Pakistani victory in the event of a nuclear war is not achievable. A strong case can be made, however, that New Delhi has been lax in assuring retaliatory capabilities and proper force management. While the achievement of victory by Pakistan in a nuclear war with India seems far-fetched, the denial of an Indian victory is another matter. The build-up of Pakistan's nuclear forces is entirely consistent with this objective.
Pakistan's deciders Pakistan's nuclear requirements are set by very few military officers and one retired officer, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, with very little civilian oversight or ability to question military requirements. After taking charge of the SPD in 2000, Gen. Kidwai was promoted to Lt. General in October, 2001, and then received an extension in service in 2004 to stay at its helm - a highly unusual personnel action. Gen. Kidwai faced retirement in 2005 because his time on active duty would extend beyond those who were about to out-rank him. His boss, Chief of Army Staff (and President of Pakistan) Pervez Musharraf decided on his retirement, while keeping him in place at the SPD. While many retired military officers have been given plum assignments overseeing civilian institutions in Pakistan, the appointment of a retired military officer to be in charge of a most sensitive joint staff assignment is unprecedented. Gen. Musharraf's decision survived his banishment from Pakistan. Gen. Kidwai's extended tenure at the SPD has meant that his views regarding Pakistan's nuclear requirements will be very hard to overrule. How many other individuals help determine the requirements to implement nuclear doctrine is a matter of conjecture. Presumably, a small core group of very senior military officers are instrumental in making such decisions, beginning with the Chief of Army Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the head of the Strategic Forces Command, and the Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy. A larger group of military officers, scientists, and civil servants provides input to these decisions and implements them.
Decisions on nuclear matters Sitting atop Pakistan's National Command Authority, which was initially promulgated as an administrative regulation at the outset of Gen. Musharraf's rule, and then codified into an ordinance nearing the end of his tenure, is the Head of Government. With Musharraf's exit, the Head of Government became a civilian in the person of President, Asif Ali Zardari. In November, 2009, President Zardari revised this ordnance, placing the Prime Minister, then Yusuf Reza Gilani, at the top of the NCA. This passing of the baton was orchestrated in the context of clarifying the transition from a Presidential- to a Prime Ministerial-led government. Under the Musharraf set-up, the Prime Minister served as Vice Chairman of the NCA. Now it appears that the Vice Chairmanship is vacant. Two subsidiary bodies of the NCA - an Employment Control Committee and a Development Control Committee -- have Deputy Chairmen. The Deputy Chairman of the all-important Employment Control Committee is the Foreign Minister, a position currently held by Hina Rabbani Khar. The Deputy Chairman of the Development Control Committee is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Three civilian Cabinet Ministers also serve on the Employment Control Committee: the Minister for Defence; the Minister for Interior, and the Minister for Finance. According to an interview Gen. Kidwai gave in 2002, when Gen. Musharraf sat atop the NCA, "practically all (99%) of the nuclear decisions pertain[ed] to the Head of Government." One can certainly envision that when the Army Chief of Staff sat atop the NCA, he held the ultimate authority in determining employment and developmental decisions relating to nuclear weapons. It would strain credulity to assert that this remains the case under a civilian Head of Government - Prime Minister Gilani, his successor, Raja Pervaiz Ashraf, and under the Deputy Chairmanship of Foreign Minister Khar. While notional authority now resides in the office of the Prime Minister, and while Cabinet Ministers on the NCA are involved in these decisions, real authority lies with the Chief of Army Staff, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Kidwai, and a few others, some of whom may not be involved in decision-making under extreme duress. Michael Krepon is the co-founder of the Stimson Center and a Diplomat Scholar at the University of Virginia. He is the author of "Better Safe than Sorry: The Ironies of Living with the Bomb"
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