e have all heard the statement that "war is diplomacy by other means" attributed to
Clausewitz. The actual statement was more nuanced but this will serve for our present purpose. We are also familiar with the corollary that "diplomacy is war by other means". Each contains enough truth to justify the cliché. That truth is that war and diplomacy, military force and international relations, are Siamese twins, joined together at birth for life. Militaries have always provided states with an instrument for effective diplomacy, mainly through the threat of the use of force or, in the case of a militarily weaker state, the ability to withstand military attack or engage in attrition. The actual use of force in most, if not all, cases demonstrates the failure of diplomacy.
The issue is, therefore, not whether militaries and force are important in international relations but how important they are, and their role.
The role of force
Force is an inescapable factor in international relations, whether through its actual use or in the threat of its use. It is much more so in international society than within the nation states in which we have organised our societies. This is because alternative forms of legitimacy are much less developed in international society than in our domestic societies with their complex systems of laws and domestic political legitimacy. International society is only now beginning to arrive at commonly accepted definitions of laws for some activities. Where such laws exist, such as the laws of war or the law of the sea, they are underdeveloped, or not universally accepted, or not always respected in practice.
In other words, while domestic societies have evolved or are evolving towards rule of law, international society is still much closer to primeval anarchy, where to a very great extent "the strong do as they will and the weak do as they must."
The last sixty years have seen a dramatic increase in the frequency of conflict and its intensity, between and within societies. This is a result of new technologies of force and their widespread dissemination. In fact we seem to be entering a phase of increasing militarisation of international relations. Look at recent developments in the Middle East, where conventional air power, covert and Special Forces, and internet social media have been used in new tactical combinations with old fashioned propaganda and international institutions to change regimes and create political outcomes.
Secondly, as technology has developed, newer forms of power also have increasing effect. For instance today cyber actions in virtual space have kinetic effects that were once only possible through the use of traditional military force.
The state no longer has a monopoly of violence, and technology has empowered small groups and individuals to the point where they can pose credible threats to society, if not the state itself. We have only to think of the recent lethality of terrorist groups and their attacks.
Limits on use of force
Paradoxically, though military force is the ultimate and preponderant sanction in international society, and its use is more widespread than ever, it is less and less the preferred option. This is due to the paradox of conflict. The higher the effect of force, the less likely it is to be used. If the emergence of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction changed international relations fundamentally, they also highlighted the use of force for deterrence rather than as an actual sanction, as a means of influencing an adversary's behaviour through the threat of force rather than its application.
Today there are limits to the utility of force in international relations. As Sun Tzu said two millennia ago: "To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting". (Sun
Tzu: Art of War III.2.).
Order, justice and resolution are the normally desired outcomes of any conflict. Force has a pivotal role in restoring order. But it can do very little on its own in ensuring justice and a final resolution of the causes of conflict.
Other limits come from recent factors such as technologies and their widespread dissemination.
Taken as a whole, the experience of using military force against terrorism and extremism since September 11, 2001 reveals these limits under today's conditions. In many cases the strategic outcomes created by the post 9/11 use of force have been the opposite of those originally intended.
And in today's situation, in a world of weapons of mass destruction, it becomes essential that the basically anarchic practice of international relations with the powerful calling the shots be regulated or moderated. This could be achieved by evolving new norms of international behaviour and by democratising international governance and its mechanisms. In fact such a process is now a compelling necessity. As experiences of 9/11, Iraq and Afghanistan show, a different approach to international relations is long overdue. As power is more and more diffused internationally, this different approach to international relations will become all the more necessary.
The Role of Military
These developments make it necessary to re-examine the role and utility of the conventional military as traditionally configured and
organised. What is the conventional military's relevance when the spectrum of conflict is wider than ever before and when force is widely held and used in international society outside the military?
It can be argued that as traditionally configured, the militaries of most powers are irrelevant to large portions of today's broader spectrum of conflict. The traditional military is no longer the sole or major instrument to deal with the wider spectrum of conflict, a spectrum that is wider than ever before in history, in new domains like cyberspace and outer space and extending to the economy, society and social and political psychology.
Cyberspace as a domain is an example where rigid hierarchies and structures go against the nature of the domain and the technology itself, which is best handled by small groups or individuals, often acting on their own. We have shown the capacity to adapt to such challenges before. For instance, every democracy that has a developed Special Forces capability has kept it outside the traditional military command structure and uses it to activate the sub-conventional spectrum of conflict.
The expanded spectrum requires that we seek
jointedness, that much used but less practiced word, not just between services but with the other instruments of state power. Today's spectrum requires a holistic integration of all the instruments of state power, the armed forces, the intelligence agencies, our scientific and technological resources, soft power instruments and others.
In other words we need much closer coordination between civil and military power. In my experience. even minor actions by the military have foreign policy consequences. The military is therefore both an important adjunct and component of diplomacy.
There is also a need to restructure militaries to learn the lessons of a decade or more of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. While different doctrines and theories have been applied in the last decade, their results in practice can at best be described as mixed. In fact some of the best results are those that we have developed from our own experience in India in dealing with insurgency and cross-border infiltration and terrorism.
Militaries today are faced with a choice: they can stick to what they know and do best, at the risk of reduced relevance. Or else they can reorder themselves to deal with the new challenges that face us, rethinking doctrines and practices from the tactical to the operational to the strategic and even the grand strategic level.
At this stage, I can imagine some of you thinking that this is all very well in theory but what about the use of the military in diplomacy. Should India not be doing much more military diplomacy, particularly when armed forces play such an important role in the internal politics of countries in our
neighbourhood? Of course we must, and we do so where we can. The Indian armed forces' increasing contacts with the world have been a very useful adjunct to our diplomacy and have brought our armed forces, and by extension the country, respect for professionalism and competence.
But we must also remember that when the military is in power in a country, as it has been for an extended period in some of our
neighbours, they behave as politicians do, with their primary purpose changing to staying in power. Secondly, if they respond to your diplomatic approaches it is because of what you represent, the strength and capacity of your country, not individual brilliance or attractiveness or professional fellow feeling. When you speak for a strong, prosperous and united India you will be listened to and are effective, in or out of uniform.
The Indian Experience
Is there an Indian doctrine for the use of force in statecraft? This is not a question that one normally expects to ask about a power that is a declared nuclear weapon state with the world's second largest standing army. But India achieved independence in a unique manner; through a freedom movement dedicated to truth and non-violence, and has displayed both ambiguity and opposition to classical power politics. In the circumstances posing the question is understandable and legitimate.
While India may have achieved independence after a non-violent struggle, it was a struggle that Gandhiji described as non-violence of the strong. As far back as 1928 Gandhiji wrote, "If there was a national government, whilst I should not take any direct part in any war, I can conceive of occasions when it would be my duty to vote for the military training of those who wish to take it.... It is not possible to make a person or society non-violent by compulsion."
Faced with the tribal raiders sent by Pakistan into Kashmir in October 1947, Gandhiji said that it was right for the Union Government to save the fair city by rushing troops to
Srinagar. He added that he would rather that the defenders be wiped out to the last man in clearing Kashmir's soil of the raiders rather
than submit.
In saying so, Gandhiji was entirely in keeping with a long Indian tradition which has regarded the use of force as legitimate in certain circumstances, namely, if there is no alternative way of securing justice. This is in essence a doctrine for the defensive use of force, when all other avenues are exhausted.
The lesson that comes through very clearly in both the major Indian epics, which deal with wars of necessity, is also apparent in
Kautilya, the original realist, and in Ashoka, the convert to idealism. Ashoka and Kautilya were both products of a highly evolved and intricate tradition of statecraft which must have preceded them for centuries. A simple reading of the Arthashastra suffices to prove how in Indian strategic culture, as early as the third century before Christ, the use of force was limited both by practical and moral considerations.
In the Indian tradition the use of force is legitimate not just if it is in a good cause and its results will be good. Instead, this was a doctrine that saw force as necessary in certain circumstances, to obtain justice, when all other means are exhausted, and which also recognised that force was not always the most effective or efficient means to this end.
The other lesson that Indian thinkers have consistently drawn from history is of the perils of weakness. The colonial narrative of India's history, stressing "outside" invasions and rulers had as its corollary the conviction that India must avoid weakness at all costs lest that history be repeated.
India as a Nuclear State
This strategic culture is also reflected in the Indian nuclear doctrine, with its emphasis on minimal deterrence, no first use, and its direct linkage to nuclear disarmament. We have made it clear that while we need nuclear weapons for our own security, it is our goal to work for a world free of nuclear weapons. We are ready to undertake the necessary obligations to achieve that goal in a time-bound programme agreed to and implemented by all nuclear weapon and other states.
In sum, there is an Indian way, an Indian view and an Indian practice in the use and role of force.
How do we apply this approach in today's complicated situation of multiple threats, rapid shifts in the balance of power and growing Indian interests abroad? We are now in a world where the geopolitical centre of gravity is shifting to Asia and its surrounding oceans. In Asia itself, several strategic rivalries contribute to uncertainty. We are in the midst of a global shift in the balance of power and in a time of great change, far from the certainties of the Cold War or other eras. And the global power shift has immediate consequences in our immediate vicinity.
In grand strategic terms the primary purpose of Indian military power remains the defence of India's territorial integrity (on land, sea, air and in space), and to prepare for the threats of war that exist. This task on the Asian landmass does not change.
We should now also be leveraging our geopolitical potential to develop our maritime capabilities, fulfilling our responsibilities and contributing to maritime security in the Indian Ocean littoral, critical as this is to our ability to transform India and ensure her security.
Conclusion
The role of militaries in international relations will continue to be influenced by the changing character of the threats that we face, but the essential role of the military to protect and further a country's interests is likely to endure, even as the means adopted to apply or threaten force continue to evolve.
India as a society and nation has by and large made wise choices in the past on matters relating to the use of force, showing strategic restraint and realism. We have contributed force to internationally legitimate uses such as UN peacekeeping, while limiting its domestic deployment. Today we are in a position to make a greater contribution to global public goods in areas such as maritime security.
At the same time we are moving towards an Indian doctrine for the use of force, though this is a work in progress.
Excerpts from the Cariappa Memorial Lecture delivered in New Delhi by the National Security Adviser