Gill, Aurora real architects of Bangladesh victory
As a member of the Army Headquarters’ Military Operations Directorate tasked directly for the conduct of Eastern Command’s Bangladesh war, some clarifications on Khushwant Singh’s column
(July 19) are in order.
The writer says, “the Indian Army was deep inside East Pakistan before President Yahya Khan was forced to declare war against India”. This is incorrect. The Indian Army or IA (as opposed to the Mukti Bahini) entered East Bengal only after the Pakistani aerial bombing on the Western Front at Amritsar, not any time before that. The IA was poised operationally ringing East Bengal from all sides including bridging to cross water obstacles and a certain airlift capability before it was ordered to move in. And yes, we hardly got any help from and were none too happy with the performance of the Mukti Bahini in most sectors they were operating in. Once the war had been joined, the Mukti Bahini had hardly any role to play. The statement that the “logistics were against Pakistan” is only true in respect of any assistance from the Pakistani mainland. Actually, in this short war, the IA had to cut its logistic tail to make up for more boots on the ground and all the natural obstacles that confronted us. General Yahya grossly misjudged Gen Niazi’s generalship. Quite frankly, we ourselves expected greater resistance to some of our outflanking moves that finally clinched the race for Dacca (which incidentally was not in our initial plans and came as a gift which we readily accepted). Again, it was deliberate planning on our part to avoid cities or their capture that obviated mopping up casualties and provided added impetus for the link up. The writer is right that we repatriated the POWs to India as we feared reprisals and since logistically it was a problem holding so many of them in the enemy territory. Finally, though Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw got all the credit, some of us who were right there do know that the nation should have better recognised Lt-Gen I.S. Gill, the DGMO, who so often clashed with Sam in the Operations Room and stood up to Indira Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram in not prematurely launching the operations, and General Aurora, who engineered one of the greatest military victories in modern times. Lt-Gen Gill, an MC from WW2, incidentally like Khushwant Singh who loved his Scotch, was as tough as they get, could suffer no fools and lost out to the politicians to become an Army Chief because of his outspokenness. It is his contribution and not that of any other General or Chief of Staff who claim ownership of the victory today that needs a mention and one, after due research, hopes Khushwant Singh will write about. Had we gone in to East Bengal earlier during the rains as our politicians wanted, we would have suffered a terrible blow as we did in 1962 and the Indian Army would have been blamed for it. Maj-Gen HIMMAT SINGH GILL
(retd),
Chandigarh
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