Friday, February
16, 2001, Chandigarh, India |
Budget bit by bit V-Day vandalism |
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Repeated extension of ceasefire
A maverick politician forever
Pakistan’s foreign policy as Musharraf understands it
India’s only ape under threat
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Repeated extension of ceasefire The recent killing of Sikhs, the murder of 15 civilians in Salohi village, the attack on a police control room and numerous other actions of Fidayeen since the cessation of the operations against terrorists in J and K have cast doubts on the wisdom in the repeated extension of the ceasefire. From the very beginning there has been confusion on the issue of the ceasefire. Initially, it was interpreted as cessation of operations against terrorists. Then it was confused with the ceasefire on the Line of Control (LoC). Finally, it embraced both activities. In fact, there are three aspects to it. One is the ceasefire on the LoC, (the futility of exchange of fire on the LoC has been repeatedly highlighted in these columns), the other is checking infiltration (which though continues) and the third is the suspension of operations against the terrorists operating in J and K. The declaration of unilateral ceasefire was decidedly a bold political step and an honest attempt to give peace a chance in that strife-torn state. Though the cessation of counter-insurgency operations was initially welcomed by the population in the valley as these, in the past, did cause inconvenience and at times harassment to the affected public, but the substantial increase in the killing of innocent civilians has since resulted in a change of perceptions. We seem to carry our experience of dealing with the insurgency in the North-East to Kashmir, both in terms of ceasefire and dialogue with insurgent groups or their political wings. But there is no similarity between the two situations. Nor is there any parallel in the situation in Punjab during the 1980s-90s with the one in J and K. While the insurgency in the North-East has had some degree of indirect support, during certain periods, from outside, but in the main it has essentially been indigenous in nature and content. Whereas in J and K it is essentially Pakistan supported and sustained. Gradually but surely, the composition and structure of the insurgency in J and K has been changing whereby, according to some assessments, upto 70 per cent of the terrorists operating in the state are of foreign origin. However, operations of all the groups, including those with larger local elements in their ranks, are controlled from across the border. In fact, insurgency has taken the form of full-scale cross-border terrorism with decreasing local support and sympathy. This is not to say that the alienation of the valley’s population with India is any the less. Therefore, political initiative to tackle the insurgency in the state, by itself, can be of little avail. The All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) at one time was considered the political face of the insurgency in J and K. But with the composition and control of insurgents increasingly passing into the hands of Pakistan and foreign elements, the APHC’s relevance has diminished considerably. Its political clout and influence have been mainly confined to the valley, but here too it has been on the wane. It had given a call to boycott the recent panchayat elections in the state, but the turnout, notwithstanding inclement weather and threats from terrorist organisations, has been unexpectedly high. Additionally, and evidently, it has no influence over the more virulent terrorist outfits such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, not even through Pakistan by proxy. Therefore, the complexion, contours and control of insurgency has undergone a paradigm change, which we do not seem to preceive well enough. This brings into question the wisdom of entering into confabulations with the APHC. Allowing the APHC to enter into a dialogue on the Kashmir issue with Pakistan and extremist groups operating from the other side will willy-nilly amount to bringing a third party into the dispute. While we may seriously consider shedding our extreme aversion to third party intervention (mediation), the APHC is hardly an appropriate third party! This approach of drawing the APHC into a dialogue and then despatching its representatives to interact with Pakistan and the terrorist groups controlled by it, would give a discredited and irrelevant organisation legitimacy and sustenance. Be that as it may, here we should be more focused on the issue of the extension of the ceasefire and its possible ramifications on the future security scene in J and K. Those supporting the ceasefire have been busy putting across the canard that the people of the state are very happy at this move of the Government of India. If this happiness springs from increased civilian casualties (in the six weeks preceding and following the ceasefire these increased from 117 to 150, grenade attacks from 33 to 57, etc) then it is a case of perverted logic and motivated assessment of the ground reality. It also exposes the lie of the killing of innocent civilians by the security forces, as human rights activists have often alleged, because such killings have substantially increased while the security forces are more or less “confined to the barracks”. Admittedly, inconveniences such as frisking, searching of vehicles and cordon and search of localities and villages may have ceased, but the increase in the figure of civilian casualties cannot bring relief to the populace. Undoubtedly, aggressive or excessive firing in the course of cordon and search operations or during encounters with terrorists, can lead to civilians being caught in the crossfire and, as such, they are resentful of these types of operations. The ceasefire gives one or the other side a breather, time to recoup, regroup and reorganise, and in genuine cases time to prepare for negotiations and settlement. Obviously, under the circumstances, it is solely the terrorist groups which stand to benefit. Given the efficacy of Indian intelligence in J and K, we will not be any the wiser as to where all the new bases, caches for “arms-ammunition-explosives”, regrouping, sources of information and contacts, etc, are being created by the insurgent groups. It will further reinforce the dangerously high content of defensive mentality prevalent in the Army. A slight aside may be relevant here. During an interaction with the top brass of the Army prior to my presentation to the Arun Singh Task Force on the Indian Army’s 20 years future perspective, a very senior gunner officer, connected with the Kargil operations, when queried, told me that his artillery had no means to correct fire during counter-bombardment task, where the expenditure of ammunition is believed to be 60,000-70,000 rounds. When I asked as to why small parties of two to three personnel were not sneaked across the LoC, through the wide gaps in the enemy positions, to some hiding places from where they could direct the fire of our guns, his reply left me aghast. They were not supposed to sneak across the LoC, he said! The alleged withdrawal of some troops from the LoC by Pakistan must be seen in the light of the totally defensive mentality of India. Pakistan’s experience of 52 years of Indian defensive attitude on the LoC involved no risk in withdrawing some troops from this line. From the very beginning, the terrorist groups did not accept the ceasefire (cessation of anti-insurgency operations). Consequently, it has been unilateral. A unilateral ceasefire has a definite life-span, depending on the response from the opposite side. Where the other side does not respect the ceasefire and, in fact, increases the tempo of terrorist activities, it is difficult to understand logic behind the idea of continuing with the unilateral part, month after month. Admittedly, our approach has been well received in Western capitals as also by an odd political party in Pakistan, but these marginal gains are no substitute for a well thought-out long-term approach to the problem in J and K. The peripheral advantage apart, the final outcome may not be in the best interests of the people of the state, more so the security forces, who will sooner than later face heightened activity from the terrorists, their jihadis and Fidayeen elements, who stand to gain from the ceasefire. Even during a war, at some stage, negotiations can be opened between the opposing sides while there may be no let-up in the tempo of operations. There is no logic in a sustained perseverance with the stand that cross-border terrorism must cease as a prelude to talks with Pakistan. It is not our contention that positive results will immediately materialise or cross-border terrorism will fold up once we take a seat at the table, but we would have taken the first essential step and drawn Pakistan into a dialogue and tell it, face to face, to stop cross-border terrorism. Kashmir is a complex problem and there are no easy or quick solutions to it, but approaching the problem with patience and moving forward, say one step at a time, does hold out promise, no matter how remote and hopeless it may appear at the moment. We must persist with the ceasefire on the LoC and perhaps take some additional steps on the same lines in regard to Siachen. Continue to check infiltration with greater vigour. But there should be no let-up in the tempo and scale of operations against the terrorists operating within J and K. And if and when we start dialogue with Pakistan step up these all the more. However, greater care needs to be taken that in these operations, minimum harassment and injury is caused to the local population. The writer is a retired
Lieut-General. |
Pakistan’s foreign policy as Musharraf understands it Gen Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan is no foreign policy expert. But on security, he is. That is what he claims. He boasts, he can talk on Pak security for a whole day! The foreign policy of a country is based on global and domestic circumstances. That is true for Pakistan, too. Musharraf says that the cold war is over and that bipolarity has given way to unipolarity. The West has thus won the ideological war, but a new conflict has begun — that of civilisations. Musharraf really believes in it. He is impressed by the reality on the ground. He says: “We (Muslims) are on the spot, and suspected in many ways and we are targeted.” If he can say this, he really believes in this theory. It must be clouding his entire global outlook. He sees Muslims surrounded by a hostile world. Similarly, he believes that the fall of the Soviet Union began in Afghanistan. And he is not impressed by the Russia which has emerged out of the debris of the Soviet Union. Russia’s future is “ambiguous”, he says. Has it to do with his new thoughts on Central Asia? Afghanistan is still in “turmoil”, he says. But the Taliban is the “new reality” in Kabul. It is in control of 90 per cent of the territory. The rest 10 per cent is held by the Northern Alliance — that is by “Ahmed Shah Masood — one personality and a Tajik,” he says. Musharraf has high praise for the Taliban. It has “brought peace” to the territory under its control and has disarmed everyone “which we are finding it difficult to carry out in Pakistan,” he says. An unguarded confession? Musharraf believes that the Taliban will change its ways. A society undergoes changes with changes in its cultural environment, he claims. And he cites the case of Iran, which came out of its isolation and became more moderate of late. With the fall of the Soviet Union, he believes, Central Asia has emerged as a “Muslim bloc”. It has affinities with Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. This “Muslim bloc” has abundant natural resources. But it is landlocked, which, he affirms, gives Pakistan a geographic and strategic advantage. Pakistan is the natural outlet for this bloc, he claims. This explains why he was keen to take up the pipeline project between Iran and India. Perhaps he is more sincere on this than Bhutto or Nawaz Sharif. “Pakistan stands at the crossroads between the Middle East and the Gulf, the Central Asian countries and South Asia. That enhances its strategic importance.” This is his key belief. Its importance cannot be minimised. Musharraf is convinced that China is emerging as the strongest contender for the second pole, and is standing in the way of India’s aspirations for a regional and global status. But India’s aspirations may find common cause with that of America, he says. He admits that the nuclear equation between India and Pakistan has become a major factor of international concern. But it has brought Kashmir, he says, into world focus. Going into what determines Pakistan’s foreign policy, he mentions five factors: security interest, which is the most important; economic interest; international concerns (for example CTBT, human rights etc); Pakistan’s ideological interests, namely its desire to preserve Islamic identity and, lastly, upholding the country’s principle, which he associates with the issue of Kashmir. Gen Musharraf believes that the strength of any country’s foreign policy is directly proportional to the domestic viability. And he sees this viability as the sum of military and economic strength. The security of Pakistan is the prime concern of every Pakistani, he proclaims. It shapes the foreign policy of Pakistan. But is there a real threat to Pakistan? There is, he says. But there are people in Pakistan, he admits, who favour reduction of armed forces and peace with India. But the Indian threat is not confined to Kashmir, but goes beyond, he says, for India’s real intention, he believes, is to dominate over Pakistan — both its economy and foreign policy. This impinges on Pakistan’s sovereignty, he says, and is, therefore, a real threat. Musharraf admits that there are two schools of thought on Kashmir: one is in favour of putting it on the backburner in order to foster stable relations with India and the other is opposed to a compromise because it is tantamount to accepting India’s dominance over Pakistan’s policies. It is this threat from India, he concludes, which shapes Pakistan foreign policy responses. The Government of Pakistanis acts on the belief that the Pakistan are aware of this threat from India and refuse to sideline Kashmir — because “Kashmir is in the blood of every Pakistani.” So, what is to be done? Musharraf rules out a war with India, “because no sane person can think of war in modern days.” He says; “We must avoid war through a total deterrence (hence the nuclear bomb?) and diplomacy.” He does not spell out how. Instead, he says, Pakistan must “engage” India on Kashmir (in the proxy war?) and on the peace front (in propaganda?). And Pakistan must mobilise international organisations like the UN, OIC, SAARC and others. Pakistan must avoid a two-front threat, he asserts. That was the situation, when the Soviets invaded Kabul. So Pakistan must maintain good relations with Kabul and Tehran, he says. And he claims that Pakistan has “very good” relations with Iran, specially after his talks with President Khatami. As for Kabul, it is absolutely necessary for Pakistan, he says, to have “the Pashtuns on Pakistan’s side.” For two reasons: because of the demographic factor of Afghanistan (70 per cent of Afghans are Pashtuns) and the geography of Afghanistan (because this 70 per cent live around the border of Pakistan). It does not matter whether they are led by Gulbudin Hekmatyar or the Taliban, he says. This is realpolitik. There are three issues facing Pakistan in Afghanistan: (1) peace; (2) terrorism, sanctuaries and training camps; and (3) Osama bin Laden. Musharraf wants to find a solution for all these. On Pakistan’s relation with China, which is crucial for Pakistan’s security, Musharraf says that there is a convergence of the strategic security concerns of the two in this region. On Pakistan’s economic future, Musharraf appears to have put his full faith in the country’s geographic location. He says, gas has emerged as the fuel of the 21st century just as oil was of the 20th. Now Qatar wants to sell its gas to India. So does Iran. In both cases, it has to go through Pakistan, he says. So Pakistan’s economic interests are tied to the Gulf region. The same can be said of Central Asia, which is landlocked. “God has given us this strategic location”, he says, “the importance of which is emerging fully now.” Musharraf sees Pakistan as the “hub” of this oil and gas flow to South Asia, South East Asia and the Far East. He seems to be unaware of alternative schemes. As for India’s fears on going for an oil/gas pipeline through Pakistan, he says; “We are a responsible country and when we reach an economic agreement we will abide by it.” Perhaps he will. Musharraf admits that terrorism “is striking at our roots.” But in Kashmir, it is freedom struggle. However, he agrees that there are splinter groups which have taken to terrorism. Pakistan is opposed to them. On CTBT, Pakistan is not standing in its way. On narcotics, Pakistan has stopped its production, but admits that Pakistan is being used as a conduit. It is a matter of concern. Speaking about Pakistan’s experience in diplomacy, Musharraf says that he is for a pro-active policy, and is not ready to accept world’s judgement on men and matters. He does not see Taliban as an “evil force” nor does he see the Mujahideen as terrorists. There is no “terrorism” in Kashmir. “That is our point of view,” he declares. This article is mainly based on Musharraf’s address to the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs — author. |
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