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india-china
border craft
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pakistan
Defence view: Don’t let guard down
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How to deal with the new China Army observation posts can achieve little, unless the country backs it up with credible political, diplomatic, and military instruments, all under a prudent leadership. By Zorawar Daulet Singh
The
resolution of the Ladakh impasse came with a whimper rather than a bang. What is missing from several commentaries is a focus on the border dynamic itself, and a perspective on what India’s interests are on the frontier and how should they be secured. Despite an opaque system, there is enough information to make a preliminary assessment.
The intensity of forward probing by both sides in the 10 km-wide disputed zone where Indian and Chinese LACs overlap — the so-called “no-man’s land” — was reaching a crescendo where a local face-off escalating into a skirmish was becoming a possibility. An aspect that has come to light is India was being a little careless by setting up “permanent structures” in the disputed zone. It has been reported that the Army was in the process of building seven bunkers before the Chinese intrusion. Ironically, this violates the 2005 Border Protocol that Delhi has signed. While such “structures” pose no threat to China, they do convey the impression of creating new “facts” on the ground. In this context, it is possible that Beijing made a calculated provocation to enter deep into the disputed zone to signal a political message. Interestingly, were the “non-permanent” Chinese tents in the disputed zone of the Debsang valley intended as a deliberate contrast to India’s “permanent bunkers” in the disputed area of Chumar? Anyhow, that Beijing’s signalling was non-threatening was clear throughout. The Chinese platoon was lightly armed and completely exposed with its supply lines stretched. Ultimately, despite the media frenzy, this signalling was “read” by Delhi, with both sides agreeing to restore “status quo ante”. From India’s perspective, this incident has highlighted the need for enhanced political oversight on forward activities in the disputed zone. Whether the backdrop to this is the result of a fragmented system of border management or whether the civilian and military bureaucracies in Delhi were unable to effectively monitor frontier activities is unclear. The India-China border is too sensitive for any arm of the state, sans the accountability and oversight, to be determining tactics. Foreign Minister Salman Khurshid’s comment after his China visit appears to reflect this: “I did say to the Chinese side and shared with the Premier that we felt it is important to analyse our respective systems and to work out why such things happened”.
Manageable dilemma Security defined as a stable status quo, rather than being assertive for its own sake, should be the main factor guiding border policy. One wonders if Delhi’s approach to border management in recent years has not got detached by letting tactics lose that larger security goal. Take, for example, the discourse over forward posts. The removal of the Chumar post is seen as a “strategic disadvantage” by some in the security establishment. There seems to be confusion on the rationale for these “live-in bunkers”. They are meant to assert a claim in the disputed zone and not to provide holding capabilities, any serious tactical advantage, or even reconnaissance across the border. UAVs, AWACs and satellites can provide real-time coverage of any point on the frontier and of Chinese activities in the rear, and, more reliably than an observation post. By pursuing new confidence-building measures (CBMs), India would not be mortgaging its security since a “tin shed” cannot provide defence. Nor would Delhi be abandoning its claim or its ability to patrol up to a disputed pocket. The future prospect of Chinese perfidy through a fait accompli on the frontier will not be deterred by observation posts but by the credible possession of the full array of political, diplomatic, and, conventional and nuclear military instruments at the state’s command, complemented with a prudent leadership and strategy. But to prevent the disputed zone in eastern Ladakh, currently estimated at 10-km, from gradually widening because of China’s logistic ability to adopt an activist peacetime patrolling posture can only be offset by a robust logistic network within the constraints of the disagreeable terrain leading up to the disputed zone. In the western sector, nothing has stopped India from pursuing innovative ways to improve its internal lines of communication, monitoring capabilities, and heavy-lift capabilities to reduce reaction times. By getting ahead of this effort and leaping straight into building posts in the disputed zone, India is trapping itself in a narrative where securing its forward posts have become an end in itself. It also appears sections of the security establishment have not internalised the basic geostrategic reality of what it means to pursue security from the lower ground, and frame policy, strategy and tactics accordingly. China holds the higher ground, and, for better or worse, has a threat perception in the Aksai Chin region — where its western highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet traverses, and, on surrounding areas. This is nothing new and has been an integral part of Beijing’s calculus since the 1950s. India’s core interests in the western sector are permanent access to the Karakoram pass and ensuring the defence of vital areas such as Siachen and Leh. It is ironic that some in the strategic community were advocating a withdrawal from Siachen not long ago when this area is both deeply symbolic and strategically significant in the context of maintaining an eye on Sino-Pakistani shenanigans in the trans-Karakoram region. India must bear the burden to defend these red lines at all costs. Delhi’s military strategy must be predicated on its interests rather than “emotions” or simply to show the flag. True, the latter is also logical in the absence of a de jure boundary but should be recognised as pre-bargaining posturing and not be fused with the core security interests just alluded to. In the eastern sector, geography has enabled India to have better holding capabilities on the LAC itself. Here, India’s core interests are even clearer. It is to defend the areas around north Sikkim and Tawang to ensure the larger defence of the foothills and access to the entire northeast. In this sector, the disputed zone is less contested, India’s political-military resolve is understood by Beijing, and, geography strengthens India’s hand. The 1986 Sumdorong Chu incident demonstrated Indian resolve and reversed the image of the debacle in the eastern front in 1962. In the east, China’s core interest is securing its sovereignty over Tibet and preventing any potential interference from the sub-Himalayan space from undermining Beijing’s hold over the plateau. It is not at all evident that the core interests of India and China in each sector are irreconcilable. Unless either side pursues a maximalist security strategy to unilaterally improve its LAC, the security dilemma is manageable. Nonetheless, as the Himalayan military balance evolves, both sides should engage in a sustained conversation to explicitly communicate perceptions of their core interests in each sector.
To hide or seek? The Chinese probe was not to test Indian military resolve or tactical preparedness in eastern Ladakh. The rationale was to signal that the disputed zone is becoming a potential tinderbox, to probe civilian control on India’s border management system, and, perhaps to gauge whether India is politically ready to contemplate a settlement via an east-west swap. On patrolling, the 2005 Border Protocol can be strengthened to accommodate Indian and Chinese apprehensions. China has proposed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, and, reportedly after the Foreign Minister’s China visit, Indian officials have begun discussions to arrive at an acceptable draft. If both sides can negotiate new norms to supplement existing CBMs to keep the LAC disputed zone stable, that will increase India’s security. On the LAC delineation process that stalled several years ago, there are two possibilities ahead. One is to delineate the LAC without prejudicing either side’s claims and subsequently negotiating a final settlement. Another possibility is to place the disputed pockets of the LAC into the larger negotiation process where the special representatives would resolve all border issues simultaneously in one grand bargain. So far, India has preferred a sequential process. It is unclear if China prefers the second but that is for Delhi to probe when the special representatives resume their talks in a few months. On the prospects of a settlement, the Chinese have hinted they might be open to a serious conversation with India. How would India respond? A realist might interpret the media polemic and Delhi’s coyness during this incident as indicative that the nation is not ready. Individually, India’s highest lawmakers have come a long way in how they view this dispute, and, might be prepared to accept the logic of a settlement that will change the map of India, though with only marginal changes in the de facto ground reality. Collectively, however, politics becomes irrational and reluctant to engage with the facts of history. The onus is on political parties, the strategic community, and, civil society to change the Indian discourse on the border dispute. For, if and when an opportunity presents itself India can confront the “leftover from history”. The writer is the co-author of a book on Indo-China border dispute and a PhD candidate at King’s College, London
The Beijing puzzle As Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (pic) begins his India visit today, a multitude of issues will be on the table. Here’s a quick look at the key points of
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border craft
China’s
“urgency” to “redouble” efforts to push for the boundary settlement is quite perplexing. It explains the motive behind the recent 19 km intrusion in Depsang. Why did China play such a trick? Nothing is clear whether Premier Li Keqiang, during his visit, will push for a boundary settlement only in the Ladakh sector or will he seek to resolve the entire boundary dispute?
India may believe this would be limited to exchanging maps, clarifying the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and verifying troop positions. But this is not what the Chinese may have in their minds. They may push for a formal settlement along the LAC in Ladakh, where they have nothing to lose. And, to India’s disappointment, it may not involve swapping India’s claims over Aksai Chin for China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh, which many in India consider a pragmatic thing to accept. The Chinese may be making a smart move to let India, in the first step, forego its claim over 38,000 sq km (Aksai-Chin), thereby de-link Ladakh or J&K sector from the overall boundary dispute. But, should that happen, India, by implication, will have to give up not only Aksai Chin, but also cede its notional claim over the 5,047 sq km (Skyasgam valley) and the Menser Enclave (five villages) near the Mansarowar lake. Chinese checkers The “urgency” also explains China’s motivations linked to its domestic security agenda. Some of the Chinese border negotiation tactics displayed against three Central Asian states should be instructive. Fearing its sensitive Xinjiang region becoming an object of external power play, Beijing since 1991 has applied all instruments of its power to quell the Uyghur unrest and simultaneously resolved borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Chinese scheme blended ‘incentives with coercion’ — a varied mix of diplomacy, political support, economic allurement and military aid. The strategy was implemented within the crafty policy framework of domestic economic growth and peaceful periphery. The strategy finally worked in China’s favour — acquiring heft and influence. China gave concession to counterparts without actually losing an inch of territory. Beijing settled for a third of territories it claimed from Kazakhstan. Yet the Kazakhs had to admit they had gained. In addition to what it had lost, the Kazakh President had to denounce Uyghur separatism and curb anti-China activities. In a similar pattern, Kyrgyzstan had to cede 1,20,000 hectares in a dubious exchange for Chinese assistance. Tajikistan being the last was made to surrender 1,100 square miles in 2010. Here, China claimed some 28,000 sq km, but settled for 3.5 percent of it. The Tajiks had to cede land and yet made to feel the victor. In essence, China ultimately gained a bit of land, nixed the Uyghur issue, and pushed its economic agenda by making Xinjiang a pivotal link to the Eurasian markets. The success gave birth to a self-serving SCO, lauded as an exemplary multilateral cooperation mechanism, essentially meant to blunt any US-led Asian alliance in Eurasia. But, its growing trade ties with Asian neighbors haven’t stopped China’s increasing appetite for territorial expansion. Land and demographic encouragement continues in Russia’s Far East. Weaker states are induced to let out agriculture and forest land to Chinese farmers. The borders and rivers are still being altered to meet China’s new interests. A view popular now is that the early surrender to China was a mistake, which is bouncing back with huge implications. China’s tactics are fuelling mounting tensions and resentments across Asia. Internal agenda What lessons do they hold for India? How is the boundary issue with India linked to China’s internal agenda? The above Chinese strategy should provide enough clues about what China wants from India. Firstly, China’s new move can’t be unrelated to China’s internal agenda, possibly with a future trajectory in Tibet. In essence, Beijing’s idea is to ward off threat at the periphery to achieve internal stability. Beijing, though, doubts India would ever play the Tibet card. But, it does suspect the US-Japan-India coalescing to encircle and subvert China internally. Therefore, a stronger assertion may be a euphemism for deterring India plus others harming China’s core interests. Of course, China retains the option to offset the three by fronting Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. We don’t know whether any big-ticket deals are slated for Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit, but he is likely to convey three essential points: (a) intends to settle the boundary dispute on its terms, (b) intends to solve the Tibet problem internally; wants no Indian interference in the post-Dalai developments, and (c) to point out that a US-led Asia pivot process should not be encouraged. Secondly, on the boundary issue, China still maintains Arunachal is ‘South Tibet’ and Tibet is incomplete without Arunachal. Remember, the Chinese are masters of the art of denial and deception. Once India falls for Chinese magnanimous position over Aksai Chin, Beijing will then shift the focus to Arunachal. where it hopes to gain from India. They would emphatically convey that India is occupying 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory, but Tawang is non-negotiable in a final settlement of the border issue. Such a ‘minimal demand’ had been aired by Beijing at an unofficial level through Chinese academics. This ‘minimum demand’ tactic was also applied with Central Asian states. China’s recent overt and overbearing postures are not only not reassuring but also disturbing. India should tread carefully on China policy. In any case, ceding Aksai Chin would fundamentally alter the status of J&K. By implication, India would have to forget about PoK as well. Is there a clear Indian strategy? The writer is a former Ambassador and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.
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pakistan History has been created in Pakistan with the first-ever transition of power from one government to another after five years of uninterrupted civilian rule. Even though it faced serious charges of corruption, nepotism and inefficiency, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led government was allowed to complete its tumultuous term by other stakeholders in the murky politics of Pakistan as any move to bring it down could have brought the military out of the barracks to once again exploit the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Despite threats from the Taliban, the turnout in the May 11 polls was so impressive that voting had to be extended by an hour. The people of Pakistan affirmed their faith in the electoral process, demonstrating an eagerness to ensure that democracy takes strong roots.
Leading his party to an impressive victory, Pakistan Muslim League (N) supremo Nawaz Sharif is set to be sworn in as the Wazir-e-Azam for a third time. But it’s not going to be a crown of roses that he will wear as he steps into the Prime Minister’s Office. With Pakistan engulfed in sectarian violence and its economy in a shambles, Sharif has his task cut out. His equation with the all-powerful army will be of great significance as he gets down to the task of navigating the policies on security, economics and foreign policy.
The army kept a low profile in the last five years, but that was possibly because it realised direct intervention in the state’s affairs would make its own position untenable. It was aware it would be a Herculean task to tackle the mess that the PPP government had created. However, the army is not likely to surrender to the civilian leadership the veto power it has strategically kept in its hands all these years over the nature of relationship with India. Will Sharif walk the extra mile to address New Delhi’s concerns or will the army dictate to him its own anti-India agenda? Sharif, who has made all the right noises on ties with India, will have to do some tightrope walk if he is sincere about opening a new chapter in India-Pakistan relations. Even before he emerged as the new leader, Indian policy makers were confident his party would emerge as the single-largest group, but his resounding win has come as a surprise even to New Delhi. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was gracious enough to immediately pick up the phone and speak to Sharif. As they exchanged pleasantries, they invited each other to visit their respective country. Good, and bad But India needs to exercise caution and not show any anxiety to embrace Sharif. New Delhi has had mixed experiences with him during his two terms as the Prime Minister (from 1990-1993 and 1997-1999). At the same time, however, we must also keep in mind that 63-year-old Sharif, a protege of former dictator Zia-ul-Haq, was the co-architect of the composite dialogue with the then Indian Prime Minister IK Gujral after his victory in the elections in Pakistan in 1997. The composite dialogue still provides the basis for India-Pakistan negotiations. The relations between the two neighbours had touched a new low in 1998 when the elections in India brought the BJP-led NDA government headed by Atal Behari Vajpayee to power. The first major step it took on the security front was to conduct nuclear tests. Pakistan, with Sharif at the helm of affairs, followed suit and conducted tit-for-tat nuclear tests, raising the spectre of a fresh conflict between the two neighbours. The tests invited world-wide condemnation and economic sanctions on both countries. As the world rang in the last year of the 20th century, the leaderships of India and Pakistan realised that there was no alternative to peacefully resolving all bilateral issues. “We can choose our friends but not neighbours,” Vajpayee would say time and again before finally undertaking a historic journey to Pakistan in February 1999, travelling by the inaugural service of the Delhi-Lahore bus. As Sharif played a perfect host to Vajpayee, the two leaders produced a landmark Lahore Declaration. In its content, the two countries asserted their commitment to the vision of peace, stability and mutual progress and their full commitment to the Shimla Declaration and the UN Charter. Both governments recognised that the development of nuclear weapons had brought added responsibility to them towards avoiding conflict and promoting confidence-building measures (CBMs). The declaration along with an MoU signed by the two sides also reaffirmed the commitment to intensify efforts to resolve the Kashmir conflict and other disputes, through bilateral dialogue and to implement nuclear safeguards and measures to prevent conflict. Both governments condemned terrorism and committed themselves to non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. But just when the Lahore Declaration was being signed, the Pakistan army, headed by Gen Pervez Musharraf, was quietly giving a final shape to its Kargil adventure. With coffins of young Indian soldiers killed in the Kargil conflict being shown on TV news channels, Pakistan’s facade of friendly relations with India was completely shattered. India did eventually evict the Pakistani troops from the rugged heights of Kargil but paid a heavy price in terms of casualties among its soldiers. To date, Sharif claims that the Kargil conspiracy was hatched by Musharraf behind his back and that he was not to blame for the adventurism of the Pakistan army. In recent interviews, he has even promised to conduct a probe into the Kargil conflict and share its outcome with India to demonstrate his sincerity to pursue friendly ties with New Delhi. It would not be wrong to conclude that the Kargil war did sow the seeds of suspicion between Sharif and Musharraf, resulting in the October 1999 military coup in which the duly elected government was dismissed. Musharraf took the reins of power in his hands and sent Sharif into exile to Saudi Arabia. It must go to Sharif’s credit that he not only survived in this holy exile for eight years, but also managed to hold on to his political base in Pakistan. He appears to have become a mature and much wiser politician. Keeping the word Coming to India’s expectations from Pakistan under Sharif’s leadership, New Delhi would obviously like him to fulfil in letter and spirit Pakistan’s commitment to not allow the misuse of its territory for terrorist activities directed against India. The 26/11 terror attack and Pakistan’s inaction in bringing to justice its perpetrators continue to be a stumbling block in the improvement of bilateral relations. India is hopeful that Sharif will take the trial of the accused in the Mumbai attack case to its logical conclusion and also investigate the ISI’s role in the conspiracy. Sharif has in recent months gone on record to say that he will restrain LeT founder Hafiz Saeed, who continues to spew venom against India. New Delhi would like Sharif to stand by his commitment. Pakistan would also do well to investigate the recent beheading of an Indian soldier by Pakistani troops which outraged the people of India. On the economic front, the expectation in New Delhi is that Pakistan will accord the most-favoured nation (MFN) status to India sooner rather than later in line with its obligation under the WTO. India had given the MFN status to Pakistan in 1996 but Pakistan is yet to reciprocate the gesture. There is a tremendous scope for boosting bilateral trade between the two nations. Ironically, the two countries presently conduct more trade with each other through Dubai and Singapore. Sharif, who hails from a business family, is expected to encourage enhancement of trade and economic links. It would be a wise idea if Indian business honchos make investments in Pakistan and vice-versa. That would be a bigger CBM than all other initiatives taken so far. The dialogue process is currently at a standstill. There is no likelihood of it being resumed in right earnest before the Lok Sabha elections in India next year. Till that time, however, the leaderships of the two countries could remain in regular touch and their diplomats could continue meeting informally to discuss outstanding issues. Pakistan would also have to lessen its rhetoric on Kashmir if it is serious about resolving the issue. The two countries must stop suspecting each other’s game-plan in Afghanistan after the drawdown of foreign troops in 2014. Trilateral cooperation between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan will go a long way in ensuring peace and stability in the region. Pakistan could also consider providing India transit access to Afghanistan. The two countries have been discussing a number of conventional and nuclear CBMs between them. It’s time to implement these CBMs. Hopefully, India and Pakistan have drawn lessons from the attacks and subsequent deaths of Sarabjit Singh and Sanaullah Ranaut in each other’s jails and ensure that prisoners are allowed to lead a life of dignity. Meanwhile, it would still not be a bad idea for the Indian Prime Minister, who has invested hugely in normalisation of relations with Pakistan, to travel to the neighbouring country in search of peace.
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Defence view: Don’t let guard down In January 2013, Indian Army Chief General Bikram Singh had issued directions to his commanders stationed along the Line of Control (LoC) — “Retaliate to firing (from across). Uphold ceasefire as long as the adversary upholds it. When fired at, respond immediately”. The instructions came after the Indian Army accused Pakistan of beheading two of its soldiers.
The General’s words echoed the terse military-relationship between the two countries, created by the British-drawn Radcliffe line in 1947. Since then, four wars have been fought, besides a few full-blown military stand-offs. Five months after some hard talk by India, Nawaz Sharif has sent out a peace signal and New Delhi has, somewhat, responded to it. Amid all the peace talk, it is unlikely that the immediate future holds a change in India’s military stance, readiness and doctrines. Ashok K Behuria, Research Fellow at the MoD-backed think tank, the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), says: “Nawaz has made it clear that he would initiate a peace process. He is sincere, but Pakistan’s India policy is run from the Pakistan army headquarters at Rawalpindi.” India’s elucidated stance on Siachen, the stated doctrine of the armed forces, the tense permanent stand-off along the LoC, or the defence preparedness along the western borders, are, as of now, not headed for an overhaul. The overbearing presence of China inside Pakistan and its competing economic-strategic interests with India in Afghanistan have complicated matters. “Even as peace is being talked about, keep the gun powder dry,” advises Brig (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, who has been part of the track-II diplomacy initiative. Two-front war In case of Siachen, Pakistan army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani suggested demilitarisation of the glacier after an avalanche in April 2012 killed 140 Pakistani soldiers. India has set three pre-requisites for this — authentication, delineation and demarcation of troop positions on ground before pullback plans from the 2,600 sq-km glacier can be discussed. It wants the 109-km Actual Ground Position Line (de facto border on the glacier) to be authenticated on the maps and the ground, as has been done for the 742-km LoC. But Pakistan refuses to do as this would regularise India’s claims. If Pakistan violates a de-militarisation treaty, it would enjoy easier access to Siachen, leaving India at a serious disadvantage. New Delhi wants iron-cast international guarantees against any violation. India’s military doctrine has factored in a two-front simultaneous war with Pakistan and China. Till a decade ago, the focus was on Pakistan, but things are now changing slowly to check-mate a coordinated adverse move by Beijing and Islamabad. Indian Army’s strike corps — headquartered at Ambala, Mathura and Bhopal — have a west-ward orientation. On April 15, the Indian Air Force announced it had validated a “two-front” doctrine that would have a “swing fleet” of fighters capable of quickly moving from west-to-east. It indicated its prime focus and assets would remain closer to Pakistan at bases on the western front (Ambala, Pathankot, Halwara, Adampur, Sirsa, Bikaner, Bathinda, Suratgarh, Bhuj, Jaisalmer and Bareilly). The Navy’s only sea-borne aircraft carrier is part of its western-fleet and its fighter squadron is based at Goa till the carrier Admiral Gorshkov arrives. The fears of a two-front war were described during a debate in Parliament on May 9, 2012. The Leader of the Opposition in the Rajya Sabha, Arun Jaitely, said: “India has to be prepared for a 90-day full spectrum war. How do we defeat Pakistan and how do we hold China? All this has to be factored in.” With terror organisations having training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), it would be far-fetched to imagine Indian Army removing its assets or men from existing positions along the LoC. Rather new sensors and surveillance equipment have been installed along the Indo-Pak border in Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat. “Pakistan has to ensure that there is no infiltration from its side. It has to destroy the infrastructure of terror organisations and strictly abide by the sanctity of the LoC, only then can some trust be built,” says a serving officer. Military CBMs In 2003, the two nuclear armed neighbours agreed to have a ceasefire along the LoC. That was the last of the military confidence-building measures (CBMs). It prohibits cross-border firing, but India accuses Pakistan of having violated the ceasefire 93 times in 2012. Pakistan also blames India for violations. The only other military CBM was 22 years ago, when India and Pakistan inked an agreement on April 6, 1991, to inform each other about military exercises, besides laying down a set of do’s and dont’s for combat planes and helicopters when flying close to the borders. This was an outcome of India’s Operation Brasstacks of 1986-87 (carried out during the height of the Cold War when the USSR had its forces in Afghanistan) that had led Pakistan to allege India was preparing for a war. The more immediate trigger to this had been the stand-off in 1990 when Indian and Pakistani forces faced each other eyeball-to-eyeball. The crisis had a nuclear overhang to it and was defused after both countries were persuaded to back off. Will the latest peace signal lead to another CBM ensuring a more measured response from forces on either side? “It’s possible in the long run, but unlikely immediately,” says a senior officer. “In these years, the dynamics have changed. The US is about to exit Afghanistan and India’s economic and military rise has led to the US declaring it ‘pivot’ of Asia-Pacific,” he says. China factor With Pakistan importing fighter aircraft, tanks, warships and artillery guns from China, India has no option but to look at the threat originating from the western front. A total 55 per cent of Chinese arms export is to Pakistan, as per a 2013 report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). China-Pakistan ties have been a matter of concern for India, especially the transfer of technology for nuclear missiles and space technology. China recently occupied the Gawadar Port located just west of Karachi. In November 2011, it had conducted a major military exercise with Pakistan, close to Indian borders. In September 2012, the two countries bolstered their 50-year defence ties and signed a cooperation agreement. This will ensure working-level delegations in training, logistics and education, besides providing Pakistan with advanced hardware and technology. The issues
Pak-China ties
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