II

Practical and useful suggestions have been given in the article. Political shelter to these insurgents must be stopped if any progress is to be made to control the Naxals. Sincere efforts must be made regarding economic upliftment and general development of the affected areas.

Police forces like BSF, CRPF, ITBP and SSB are not properly organised even after many years of existence. BSF should remain on the border to check any inflow of arms, ammunition, explosives and anti-national elements. Gaps are likely to be created when BSF is withdrawn from the border and sent to Naxal affected areas. This situation helps Maoists to re-group and re-arm.

In police units certain percentage of vacancies are fixed for Army personnel and these should be utilised to impart specialised training to the police to enable them perform their duties more efficiently in insurgency prone areas. Battle inoculation is essential for IPS and police officers to remain effective. Proper training, high quality equipment, solid logistical support and high motivation coupled with strong will power will help counter the menace of Maoists. 

S C VAID, Greater Noida

III

Maj-Gen Mehta (retd) has gone to the root cause of insurgency. The Maoist menace is gaining ground because of soft handling by our indecisive politicians whose minds are deluded by greed for votes and fear of criticism. When the situation goes beyond their control, they try to rationalise by taking shelter behind the principle of use of minimum force against our own people.

The right solution to redress the genuine grievances of the people is use of adequate force, including Army and Air Force, judiciously to bring the situation under control. Military presence in the Naxal affected areas will surely help in training of CRPF and act as a morale booster.

Lt-Col H S GUR (retd), Hisar

IV

I fully agree with the writer that long term strategy and tactics are required to face the single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country. In fact, the country is losing the battle against the Maoists.

The insurgency started as a peasant rebellion in the eastern Indian village of Naxalbari in 1967 and has now spread to a large part of central and eastern parts of the country.

In fact, Naxalites claim to be supported by the poorest rural populations especially Dalits and Adivasis. They are highly motivated and trained. They have frequently targeted, police and government workers in what they say is a fight for improved land rights and more jobs for neglected agricultural labourers and the poor and follow a strategy of rural rebellion similar to that of protracted people’s war against the government. 

An internally weakened India will be incapable of effectively dealing with the increasing external terrorist threats. As such, even though the Naxalite movement is an internal security concern, it can have serious consequences for the defence of the country and needs to be dealt with urgently.