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Jones’s description of the way the Pakistanis saw the emerging
events makes for a very gripping account. In Bangladesh, the
Hamoodur Rehman Commission castigated General Niazi for not
concentrating his forces in Dhaka. By sticking to the ‘fortress
holding’ strategy all along the border, Niazi virtually left
Dhaka uncovered, and made the task of its capture by Indian
forces much easier. It is, of course, a different matter that
Indians were always worried that if they did not take Dhaka at
the earliest, the declaration of the city into an international
free zone under the aegis of the UN, could pose a serious
diplomatic embarrassment for them. The race for Dhaka under the
able command of General Aurora and his Chief of Staff General
Jacob, at present the Governor of Punjab, will remain a very
vivid and glorious chapter in the annals of military history.
Jones writes about General Jacob and his strategy that paid rich
dividends against the Pak army in Bangladesh: "Fortunately
for us the Pakistanis had concentrated their troops in the
towns. Had they chosen to defend approaches to the river
crossing sites we would not have been able to cross the rivers
and reach Dacca".
The Kargil war,
where many of our young officers and jawans died because of an
intelligence failure is covered in some detail, and the author
says of the Pakistani military, "But there is considerable
evidence that the military did hold back a significant amount of
crucial information from the prime minister (Nawaz
Sharif)", in the planning and conduct of the Kargil war and
the occupation of some of the Indian posts left unoccupied
during the previous winter. The sad reality of Kargil was that
whereas in the case of Pakistan the army appeared to have kept
the PM in the dark, in our case the Indian Army, including its
top brass, was in the dark about the size and magnitude of the
Pakistani intrusion till it was very late. An in-depth study
must be made to ferret out the whole truth of what happened at
Kargil, so that we can avoid a repeat in the future. About
Kashmir, Bennett Jones opines: "The tragedy of Kashmir is
that the voices of the Kashmiri people themselves have been
drowned out by the Islamists, nationalists and ideologues in
Islamabad and Delhi".
Was it A.Q. Khan
or the PAEC that produced Pakistan’s nuclear bomb? How many
nukes are India and Pakistan estimated to possess today? Jones
examines the nuclear chain of command in Pakistan in case the
Head is incapacitated, and the relative missile power of the two
neighbours. Pakistan’s role in encouraging the Mujahedeen
fighters in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet army, and later on
the flight of the Afghan army to northern Afghanistan, are some
of the events of recent history that Jones covers in some
detail. It is a candid account of a very turbulent part of South
Asia that could well become the most dangerous part of the world
today.
Jones has done a
good job of presenting an accurate account of General Musharraf
and the present-day Pakistan. Pick up a copy of the book to read
how the military could fare in the years ahead in Pakistan.
Jones rounds off his account with this telling sentence:
"And while he (Musharraf) believes that the Pakistan army
is the solution to the country’s problems, he shows no sign of
accepting that, in fact, it is part of the problem."
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