Sunday, February 16, 2003		Books

Our heroes and chinks in armour
Kuldip Singh Bajwa

Musharraf’s War
edited by Maj Gen Rajendra Nath, PVSM (retd). Lancer Books, New Delhi. Pages 298. Rs. 580.

THE Pakistani aggression in Kargil in 1999 was a link in the long chain of unabated hostility towards India ever since 1947. Maj Gen Rajendra Nath and his fellow contributors have made a commendable effort to take a holistic view of this conflict. The historical perspective, Pakistani plans, Indian response, the failure of Indian intelligence, successful conduct of operations after the initial confusion, the sustained determination and valour of Indian soldiers and their young leaders and the contending interests of the USA and China in the Indian geo-strategic environment have all been etched out. The lessons to be learnt have been aptly highlighted.

The plan for the aggression into Kargil had been conceived sometime in 1987 during the General Zia-ul-Haq regime but was put in cold storage. Pervez Musharraf fine-tuned the plan when he became the Pakistan Army Chief in October 1998 and subsequently implemented it in 1999. The primary purpose was to revive militancy in Kashmir and induce a global intervention in Kashmir in favour of Pakistan by playing on the international apprehensions of a nuclear flashpoint.

Pakistani Generals had assumed that the Indian leadership and the Army were not capable of an effective response to their ingress. It emerges that Pakistan neither had a well-conceived strategic aim nor a soundly formulated tactical plan. India too did not cast its strategic vision beyond the elimination of the Pakistani intrusion. The Indian political and military leaderships were taken by surprise. However, after the initial confusion, the response was swift and decisive. Troops, armaments and war materials were hastily gathered from all over the country, thereby causing imbalance in the operational capabilities of formations in the plains. Hastily inducted units were not properly prepared, equipped and trained for operations in high altitude. There is a case for raising of area-specific units from out of manpower suited to operate in the high altitude terrain. With thoughtful planning the requirements of turnover and relief can be resolved.

On May 11, 1999, the Army sought the deployment of armed helicopters from the Air Force that actually went into action at 6.30 am on the 25th of May. The Chief of Air Staff had serious reservations about the employment of the Air Force. After he was persuaded with some time-consuming effort, he had approached the government for sanction. The government too took time to decide. This kind of delay in the mustering of all the needed operational resources is not acceptable. The explanation that the Chief of the Air Staff required this time to button up the air defence in India is neither convincing nor valid. Such precautions are an essential element of the operational alert, which had been enforced. This kind of indecisive tardiness is totally out of tune with the very fast moving modern warfare and can cause serious losses and setbacks in battle.

There were also initial hiccups when the Air Force went into action in close support of the ground operations. Air Marshal R.S. Bedi explains that a few years back the Army had struck a deal with the Air Force that in exchange for its support to acquire its own-armed helicopters, it would do without close air support. Consequently, the Air Force had stopped training its pilots in the techniques of providing close air support. This kind of an understanding ran counter to the absolute necessity of intimate integration of the Army and the Air Force in the successful conduct of ground operations. It was undoubtedly an extreme example of single service thinking to extend parochial turf.

The utmost necessity to closely involve the military hierarchy in the decision-making loop by the government has been highlighted. In the absence of the military involvement, the decisions invariably end up politico-bureaucratic oriented, which often does not promote effective application of armed power. A case in point is the restriction on crossing of the LoC laid down by the government without consulting armed forces. While this self-imposed restraint is claimed to have created a favourable global climate for India, it added a great deal to the already considerable difficulties of conducting ground and air operations. It also conveyed to Pakistan that India would restrain itself from launching any military threat elsewhere. While the gains of international goodwill have not deterred Pakistan from cross-border terrorism, the retention of strategic freedom of action to apply its superiority in armed power would have helped India obtain more lasting results.

Had the political policymakers and military planners done their strategic homework with a degree of geo-strategic insight a Kargil would have emerged as a distinct possibility. Pakistani intrusions could then have been anticipated and either pre-empted or managed at a much lower cost. It is, therefore, absolutely vital to critically study the Kargil battle and learn from it.