It’s army, once again

After the days of General Zia it has been a kind of rotational governance — either the general’s protege, Nawaz Sharif, being at the helm of affairs, or the daughter of Zia’s benefactor, Ms Benazir Bhutto, in the seat of power, with smaller players coming in-between. Both have been discredited, though in different ways. Ms Bhutto’s fall from grace has been caused by her jailed husband, Asif Ali Zardari, popularly known as "Mr Ten Per Cent", while Sharif finds himself in the dustbin of history because of his mistaken belief that as Prime Minister he could snatch from the army its traditional role as "the guardian of Pakistan’s izzat", writes Syed Nooruzzaman

EVER since the establishment of Pakistan (1947) the army has been a major player influencing the system. But it could have never occupied the centrestage had the politicians and bureaucrats functioned responsibly. Before discussing the developments that led to the overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif regime by army chief Gen Pervez Musharraf, it would be fruitful to go into history to find out how Pakistanis have depended on the army more than any other institution whenever faced with a chaotic situation. On all the three previous occasions when the army intervened, the system had been showing signs of a near total collapse. A close look at the situation that prevailed in October, 1958; March, 1969; and July, 1977; will bear this out.

Between 1947 and 1958 Pakistan had seen seven Prime Ministers and all but Liaquat Ali Khan were the products of "palace intrigues". Golam W. Choudhury, author of the celebrated book "Pakistan", holds the two Governors-General who came after M.A. Jinnah—Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandar Mirza — responsible for this. The mess created by the then rulers provided the army the right opportunity to show them the door. Or one can say that it was an invitation from the crazy civilian rulers to the army generals to take up the reins of power as the "guardians of the national interests", as the latter came to be described in the years that followed.

This was how Gen Ayub Khan came into the picture. He had the consent of President Iskandar Mirza when he abrogated the 1956 Constitution and imposed martial law. But the general did not trust the civilian head of state and forced him to go soon — on October 27, 1958, just 20 days after capturing power — and himself became the Chief Martial Law Administrator. The public heaved a sigh of relief and celebrated it, as can be noticed now in the streets of Pakistani cities and villages after the dismissal of the Nawaz Sharif government.

Gen Ayub Khan’s regime continued to gain public acceptability as he concentrated on the socio-economic development of the country. A time came when he emerged as the De Gaulle of Asia. But as everything has to end, the Ayub regime too began to totter when he shifted his attention from economics to politics. Introducing a system of indirect elections called basic democracy, he wanted to give a civilian face to the administration he was running. His over-indulgence in politics became his undoing. Economic problems of the people got neglected, leading to an atmosphere of general resentment against the regime. His political experiment not only failed but also eroded the absolute power he had enjoyed till March, 1969 .

Gen Yahya Khan was perhaps well aware of the economic weaknesses which could not allow him to rule the country for long. Hence his efforts to toy with the idea of restoring civilian rule. But he failed. The result was a civil war-like situation for nearly nine months. However, out of this chaos emerged a civilian set-up, though by that time one wing of Pakistan had got separated and proclaimed itself as Bangladesh.

Democracy was reborn in Pakistan under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. But he too became power-drunk and wasted much of his energy on implementing populist policies instead of concentrating on economic reconstruction. Pakistan’s industry moved at a slow pace when in its neighbourhood, specially in India and China, economic growth was the primary interest of the rulers.

Political and economic unrest provided a God-sent opportunity to the then Chief of Army Staff, Gen Zia-ul-Haq, to put the civilian ruler in place. Ironically, General Zia was the choice of Bhutto, but the general preferred to sacrifice his benefactor when the time came to choose between the latter and playing the role of the saviour of Pakistan. General Zia got discredited because he involved himself in fundamentalist activities to emerge as "Ameerul Momineen". In this mission he contemptuously ignored the promises he had been making off and on — to restore civilian rule. A democratically elected set-up came into being but only after accidental intervention in 1988.

After the days of General Zia it has been a kind of rotational governance — either the general’s protege, Nawaz Sharif, being at the helm of affairs or the daughter of Zia’s benefactor, Ms Benazir Bhutto, in the seat of power with smaller players coming in-between. Both have been discredited though in different ways. Ms Bhutto’s fall from grace has been caused by her jailed husband, Asif Ali Zardari, popularly known as "Mr Ten Per Cent", while Sharif finds himself in the dustbin of history because of his mistaken belief that as Prime Minister he could snatch from the army its traditional role as "the guardian of Pakistan’s izzat".

Besides the army, there have been two other significant factors in the life of Pakistan — Allah Mian (religion) and America. The super power has been less interested in influencing the course of events in Pakistan for some time because of its business compulsions to forge a closer relationship with India — the world’s second largest market in terms of population. Besides this, in the aftermath of the Kargil crisis America has become an object of hatred in Pakistan. However, Mr Sharif as Head of Government had his own compulsions to listen to the dictates of Uncle Sam. In the process he angered both Allah Mian and the army. The fundamentalist forces came into the open to demand the removal of the Prime Minister who had dared to go against the wishes of the two. The result as we see today could not be different.

General Musharraf — whose ancestors came from Azamgarh in India’s Uttar Pradesh to settle in Delhi, where he was born, before they migrated to Pakistan — perhaps realised that history would judge him as a timid general who failed to rise to the occasion to safeguard the traditional role of the armed forces in Pakistan. He had certain advantages as compared to his predecessor, Gen Jehangir Karamat, removed by the Sharif government unceremoniously. The advantages were :

(1) He was (as he is even now) in the good books of the fundamentalist forces and those behind terrorist campaigns emanating from Pakistan.

(2) He knew the President, Mohammad Rafiq Tarar, since the days of the latter as a Judge of the Supreme Court and a sympathiser of the Tablighi Jamaat. General Musharraf belongs to the Deoband school of Islamic thought and both can make good company.

(3) There was a general feeling in the army ranks that the "guardians of Pakistan’s izzat" had been humiliated by the Nawaz Sharif regime and it was time to make the government realise that the big brother — the army — would not tolerate it any more. This meant that the government’s efforts to hold the army solely responsible for Pakistan’s Kargil fiasco must be responded to in kind.

Thus General Musharraf acted with certain definite advantages though under trying circumstances. If he gives the compression of not being prepared to continue as the ruler of Pakistan, he has his own reasons. Pakistan’s economy is passing through a sluggish period. The privatisation programme that got a boost during Sharif’s rule has failed to produce the desired results. Prices are sky-rocketing and unemployment is showing no signs of coming under control. The public goodwill that General Musharraf has earned — though not a healthy development for a nascent democracy — will disappear soon if he continues army rule for a long period. Pakistan may lose heavily in terms of financial assistance from abroad.

The Mohajir factor also goes against General Musharraf. But his family has been at Lahore for a long time and now he considers himself more a Punjabi than a migrant from India. More than anything else, the way he has been functioning after staging the military coup provides enough proof that he is disinterested in becoming a General Ayub or a General Zia. He has not dissolved the Pakistan National Assembly or any of the provincial assemblies.

When Nawaz Sharif made General Musharraf the Chief of Army Staff on October 8, 1998, he had with him the recommendation of President Tarar plus a plan to contain the Muttahida Qaumi Movement of Altaf Hussain. The army chief and Hussain hate each other despite both having a Mohajir background. The deposed Prime Minister wanted to use General Musharraf to teach Hussain a lesson for the MQM’s anti-Sharif government campaign. But the General has had the reputation that he can never be taken for granted. Sharif realised this much later after the army was given total control of WAPDA (the Water and Power Development Authority). The army issued strict instructions to WAPDA that no politician or bureaucrat would be allowed to play any role in future negotiations with independent power producers. This was contrary to what the former Prime Minister had calculated. His discomfiture did not end there. The army chief later on issued a list of WAPDA defaulters which included the names of certain business enterprises owned by Sharif’s family and a Shia Cabinet minister, Abida Hussain. She was forced to resign.

This and a few other developments, besides the Kargil issue, distanced Sharif from General Musharraf, so much so that their relationship almost reached the point of no return.

The subversion of the democratic process that followed should have been expected by Sharif. Perhaps, that is why he devised a scheme to handle General Musharraf the way he had dealt with General Karamat. The move boomeranged because the general proved to be smarter than his Prime Minister. The fledgling democracy in Pakistan suffered a serious setback. But, surprisingly, those who should have at least opposed this — like Ms Benazir Bhutto and cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan — appear to have welcomed the development. And they are not alone. No lover of democracy will approve of it.

The Pakistanis who are happy at the turn of events — despite Sharif’s sins — deserve to be reminded of what Allama Iqbal said decades ago:

Ai tair-e-lahooti
Us rizq se maut achchhi
Jis rizq se aati ho
Pervaz main kotahi.

(O’ ye who fly high
It is better to die
Than to live
With your wings clipped.)