Lessons to be learnt
By K.S. Bajwa

WORLD over the Indian soldier carries a reputation for his fighting spirit and steadfast tenacity in battle. Time and again, he has fought on against adverse circumstances and made the supreme sacrifice rather than flinch from his duty. After independence, a greater determination was lent to his tenacious fighting spirit. In 1947, 1 Sikh hurriedly flown into the Kashmir valley fought with dogged courage to stop invading hordes from reaching Srinagar. On Nov. 2, Maj Som Nath Sharma, PVC, 4 Kumaon and many of his men laid down their lives to stop a much bigger force of raiders, trying to reach the airfield through Badgam. From May to November 1948, 1 Patiala (later 15 Punjab) defended Zoji La, the Northern gateway into the Kashmir valley, under very adverse conditions. Lance Naik Amar Singh, with his light machine gun and a helper, manned a listening post 150 yards ahead of his platoon defences. Despite bleeding continuously from a serious head wound and his helper incapacitated by a shattered arm, he kept a sizeable force of attackers at bay for 15 hours. During the demanding six months of continuous fighting similar acts of gallantry were performed nearly every day. Such were the men who rose out of the debilitating chaos of the division of the Indian Army to defend Kashmir. Compare the outstanding performance of 1 Patiala, with the excuses put out by the Kargil Brigade Commander that a lack of this or that led to his dismal failure to defend Kargil.

To attribute the debacle of 1962, against the Chinese, to a poor performance by the Indian soldier would be only a superficial observation. Though betrayed by the political leadership and poorly directed and led in the field, the soldier fought with his traditional grit and courage. Consider the case of 2 Rajput, who were forced to fight at Namka Chu in a very tactically unsound defensive deployment thrust upon them by the whims of Lt Gen B M Kaul, the Corps Commander. The Rajputs fought magnificently under inspired leadership within the battalion. The heavy casualties suffered by the battalion speak eloquently for thier fighting spirit.

About the same time, on the hills overlooking the plain of Chushul in Ladakh, another saga of the indomitable spirit of our soldiers was being written. Orders given to Maj Shaitan Singh, PVC, C Company of 13 Kumaon, were to hold the defences of the strategic Rezang La at all costs. The Chinese attacked at 2 a m on Nov 18,’62, with a reinforced battalion supported heavily by fire. True to the orders given to them 91 per cent of C Company died while holding their defences for five hours against a much superior Chinese force. Even though the Chinese had not cut off their routes of withdrawal, not one man left his post. On the other hand, in Jemadar Surja’s 7 Platoon, Naik Gulab Singh and Lance Naik Singh Ram had crept forward to within 70 yards of a machine gun causing casualties, when they came upon a strong Chinese platoon hidden in a depression. Realising the serious danger to their platoon, both men charged the Chinese, firing their light machine gun. Both died but their sacrifice gave adequate warning to their platoon to be ready to meet this threat. When their bodies were recovered three months later from the spots where they had fallen, the Chinese had covered them with blankets as a mark of respect for their gallantry. The company had been awarded one PVC, 8 VrC and 4 Sena Medals for gallantry, a record unparalleled so far.

In the 1965 Indo-Pak war, in addition to cases of outstanding tenacity in battle, were a number of instances of units giving way under the shock of battle. 161 Field Regiment in the Chhamb sector, instead of engaging the approaching Pak tanks, fled abandoning their guns. In the advance of 54 Infantry Brigade on the GT Road axis the gallant 3 Jat captured Dograi on September 6, pulled back under orders and recaptured it against heavy opposition on September 22, 15 Dogra and 13 Punjab not only failed to close upto the Ichhogil canal, but on September 10, fled in panic caused by a false rumour that enemy tanks had outflanked their defences. 3 Jat stood firm throughout this crisis. On the Ranian axis, 1 Jat, 38 Infantry Brigade, withdrew from the Bhaini-Malikpur bridge on the Ichhogil canal captured earlier when they were subjected to heavy shelling. 1/3 Gorkha Rifles had retreated from their defences without orders. 1 Jat and 6 Kumaon had dispersed. Garhwalis, though shaky, were holding out. Then the whole brigade withdrew to Loppoke opening a serious threat to Amritsar.

In 4 Mountain Division graver failures had taken place. By the morning of September 7, of the six battalions that advanced into Pakistan, only 4 Grenadiers and 1/9 Gorkha Rifles had remained intact. 13 Dogra withdrew from Rohiwala village which they had captured when some Patten tanks suddenly appeared in their vicinity from beneath an aquaduct of the Ichhogil canal. 1/9 GR holding the firm base covering Ganda Singhwala too fell back. 13 Dogra was rounded up by the evening and made to dig in near the border but during the ensuing night again lifted from this position leaving behind the commanding officer, the subedar major and a few odd men. Early on September 7, Commanding Officer of 9 JAK Rifles holding the Rohi bridge, fearing that they would be surrounded by Pak tanks, withdrew, with one company abandoning the rest of the battalion. 7 Grenadiers, after their second abortive attack to capture Ballanwala, lost their cohesion. In 18 Raj Rif many men had deserted their positions. Both 7 Greanadiers and 13 Dogra had practically ceased to exist as fighting outfits. Their remnants were merged with other battalions in their respective brigades. After the initial failures, 4 Grenadiers, 9 JAK Rifles, 1/9 GR and 18 Raj Rif stood firm in the sector around Asal Uttar and helped destroy the Pakistani armour.

This wide spread failure of some of the infantry battalions and formation commanders was a matter of grave concern. Basically it showed that the army had not yet quite recovered from years of neglect and the politically-enforced passivity. In the aftermath of 1962, efforts were largely focused on preparing for operations in the Eastern mountain terrain. A Pakistan armed to the teeth by the generosity of the USA did not receive sufficient attention. The political and military leadership did not prepare for the confrontation with Pakistan which had been staring us in the face for quite some time. Both 1 and 11 Corps were very hastily committed into battle. Formation headquarters and units did not get time to recall their personnel away on leave or due to other causes. Troops were neither properly briefed nor mentally and emotionally prepared for the shock of the coming battle. Many of the battalion commanders and their troops developed serious battle nerves after the first minor skirmishes. Unfortunately some of the formation and battalion commanders themselves surrendered to their fears and failed to steady their commands. A major cause was that training was not realistically battle-oriented. Battle preparation, designed to train troops to withstand the initial shock of enemy fire in battle, was invariably a complete farce. On top of these infirmities in training and mental conditioning of troops, the Army was allowed to develop a considerable awe of Pattons, Sabres and guns supplied by the USA. It was observed that whenever Pak tanks made their appearance, troops exhibited a lack of steadiness. Here, too, the absence of proper conditioning and a lack of joint training of infantry and armoury divisions was obvious.

We had much to learn from these unhappy developments. Some of the lessons learnt were implemented before we went to war again in 1971. It goes to the credit of Field Marshal Manekshaw that he withstood strong political pressure in April ‘71 and gained sufficient time to properly prepare the Army before we went into battle. There were hardly any failures of the type experienced in 1965. The Indian soldier fought with its traditional elan, tenacity and valour. And he wrote his finest hour in the victory of 1971.

Some major lessons that still need to be fully implemented are that the political executive and its bureaucrats must under no circumstances trifle with the command structure of the Army and that the professional views on maintaining a high state of combat readiness must be respected. Equally vital is a forward-looking strategic vision so that the forces get adequate opportunity to be prepared for the tasks that may be assigned to them.

This feature was published on October 10, 1999